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‘People make their own history, but they do not make it out of  whole cloth; they do not 
make it out of  conditions chosen by themselves, but out of  such as they find close at hand.’
Marx
‘History is not the realm of  happiness.’
Hegel




Thompson T02687 00 prelims   7 16/12/2014   13:29
Thompson T02687 00 prelims   8 16/12/2014   13:29
Preface and Acknowledgements
The structure of  this volume is thematic, and consequently historical situations 
and events which appear in one chapter, such as sex or religion, are on occasion 
discussed later on from a different angle in another context. Some of  the chapters 
are mostly thematic with examples drawn from a variety of  very different historical 
eras, others have a more chronological slant. My modest intention is to try, in a 
popular fashion, to examine historical development over an extended period and 
global scope and make linkages where appropriate to the structures of  human 
interaction in context and situation.
The opening sentence of  Michael Mann’s four-volume masterpiece, The Sources 
of  Social Power is: ‘This book is bold and ambitious.’ Attempting to discuss similar 
themes within a single volume feels more like megalomania, and I am particularly 
conscious of  Flaubert’s remark (also quoted by Mann) that historical writing is 
‘like drinking an ocean and pissing a cupful’. Much that could be included has of  
necessity to be omitted. Nevertheless I think that the project is a worthwhile one 
and my hope is that it will encourage readers to engage not only with the themes 
which are addressed here but also the historians referred to in the following pages.
For rendering dates I use the modern forms of  Common Era (CE) and Before 
Common Era (BCE) in place of  the older forms still widely used, AD and 
BC. Occasionally, when relevant in dealing with very long stretches in the past, 
Before Present (BP) is employed. When quoting from texts written in American 
English I have for consistency’s sake changed the spelling (apart from titles) into 
British English.
Bibliographical Note – the historiographical area surveyed by this volume is so 
broad that an appropriate bibliography would be as long as the volume itself  – and 
would then still be inadequate. The texts that have been of  most relevance to this 
sketch are referenced in the endnotes. 
Thanks are due to friends and colleagues who have enlightened me greatly in 
discussion of  these themes, particularly Myra Macdonald who has read the text 
and made many acute and helpful suggestions on both content and style (errors of  
fact and interpretation are of  course my own). Appreciation is also due not least to 
my ever helpful and endlessly patient editor at Pluto Press, David Castle. 
Willie Thompson
May 2014
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Historical Timeline 
c. 200,000 years before present (BP), Palaeolithic Era
The estimated approximate date for the emergence of  Homo sapiens in Africa with a 
stone-using (Palaeolithic) technology, hunter-gatherer economy, and little evidence 
of  representational culture. Other human species (hominins) continued to survive.
c. 60–15 thousand years BP, Palaeolithic Era
H. sapiens by the later date had spread through Africa and Eurasia using more 
developed stone technology and with significant evidence of  representational 
culture. Other human species, principally Neanderthals, continued to exist in 
a northern hemisphere dominated by glaciation, and interbreeding has been 
demonstrated. Modern humans penetrated to Australasia. 
c. 15–10 thousand years BP, Mesolithic Era
In this period the ice retreated (with intermissions) in a context of  global warming. 
The Palaeolithic economy shifted its emphasis from hunting to gathering and 
exploitation, when available, of  shoreline marine resources. A more developed 
stone technology is termed Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) H. sapiens reached the 
Americas and other human species disappeared.
c. 10,000 years BP, earlier Neolithic Era and agrarian era; first great technological revolution
The ice age ended and the beginnings of  agriculture and animal stock rearing 
made their appearance. The most developed and versatile stone-using (Neolithic) 
technologies were devised, as were a range of  new technologies, especially pottery 
and weaving. There occurred a big expansion of  representational culture and the 
beginnings of  significant social differentiation in more concentrated settlements.
c. 4000 BCE, later Neolithic Era, urbanisation
Urban development commenced in Mesopotamia with local rulers and focused 
on a local god. The process was accompanied by accelerated social stratification. 
Technology remained predominantly Neolithic. Written scripts were also 
developed.
c. 3000–1100 BCE, Bronze Age, beginning of  written history
The growing importance of  metal tools and weaponry, principally bronze, is 
apparent, spreading throughout Eurasia. Social stratification and division of  labour 
developed increasingly together with the first empires and divine monarchies, 
initially in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Similar but Neolithic monarchies developed 
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in Mesoamerica and the Andean coast. Alphabetic script was devised and spread 
in western Eurasia.
c. 1000–200 BCE, ‘Iron Age’
A shift to iron-using technology occurred throughout Eurasia accompanied by 
social, political, and cultural disruption, invasion and collapse of  empires and 
dynasties throughout the continent, to be replaced by iron-technology based 
successors. 
c. 600 BCE–500 CE, Hellenistic Era
A succession of  agrarian and herding-based empires developed in Eurasia and 
sub-Saharan Africa with iron-using technology; imperial polities remained the 
norm. Far-reaching technological and cultural developments advanced, especially 
in China. ‘Salvation religions’ spread throughout Eurasia, including monotheist 
ones. Coined money was invented.
c. 500 CE–1500 CE, final phase of  dominance of  iron-using territorial empires
The empires and dynasties of  the first centuries of  the millennium largely collapse, 
to be replaced by similar successors. States upholding the rival salvation religions 
of  Christianity and Islam were in almost continuous conflict. Technological and 
scientific advance continued, mostly in China the Arab empire and the Indian 
subcontinent, supplying part of  the foundation for the subsequent technological 
breakthrough.
c. 1500 CE-present, globalisation era, second great technological revolution
Initial ‘globalisation’ commenced with European societies’ acquisition of  
the American continents and destruction of  native civilisations. Production, 
communication and technology were all transformed with the shift from natural 
power sources to ones based on fossil fuels and directed on scientific principles. 
Western global hegemony was established. These changes were accompanied by 
unprecedented population growth, global shift from rural to urban predominance, 
cultural upheavals and greatly enhanced destructiveness of  weaponry. New 
forms of  seaborne empires became the norm. In the twentieth century nuclear 
weaponry threatened universal destruction and environmental dangers were 
belatedly appreciated.
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Introduction: The Fabric of  History
The Purpose of this Volume
The ‘fabric of  history’ referred to here is a metaphor for the changing range of  
activities which constitute the human reality along with the world of  material 
artefacts and social institutions which these activities produce. Within a blink 
of  evolutionary time, the species Homo sapiens has transformed the world of  
inorganic materials, the organic world of  plants, animals and other life forms – 
and especially the world of  its own activities and the being of  its own existence. It 
was a development through time within a framework of  the three universal, tightly 
interlocking realities – work, sex and power – with their radiating implications – 
which constitute the reality of  human experience as a social species and provide 
this volume’s title.
It is a perfectly normal and understandable presumption to take for granted that 
the evolutionary emergence of  modern humans and the historical transformations 
they have brought about were in some sense embedded in the nature of  things. As 
we shall see, that was only very partially the case. H. sapiens spread over most of  the 
earth’s surface as a foraging hunter-gatherer. It will be argued that in the context 
of  planet-wide climate change around ten millennia ago there was indeed a certain 
inevitability about the first of  the great economic revolutions, the shift towards 
agricultural production or pastoralism as a dominant lifestyle and also the general 
form of  the resulting social structures which emerged. The second and recent 
great innovation, to a world of  artificially-powered mechanisms, it will be argued 
however, was a contingency which became a reality only against the odds and was 
not implicit in the nature of  the human species and the world it inhabited. Nor is 
there reason to presume that this current state of  affairs will persist indefinitely; 
natural or social calamity could knock away its material underpinnings and stop 
it dead. 
The human story is certainly not just one damned thing after another (let 
alone one damned narrative after another). The argument of  this book shares 
the presumption that although the future is unpredictable (as is true of  biological 
evolution) history in the most general sense, combining economic, social political 
and cultural activity, has a logic which can be deciphered after the event – but 
the role of  contingency and the potential of  paths not taken have to be kept 
under consideration. History could very often have gone in a quite different 
direction from the one that was actually realised – the species in its early days 
for example could easily have been wiped out by natural forces when it was still 
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small in numbers and according to some accounts that was actually the most likely 
outcome – even bare survival was at that point against the odds.
What is being attempted here therefore is to discuss how and why, within the 
overall framework of  the great transformations, history took the general direction 
it did and other potential ones proved abortive. Humans are the only species which 
have a history in that sense; others are the province of  natural history or biology. 
The difference arises from the unique form of  consciousness that humans possess, 
the ability through representation to reflect on the past and evaluate the future, 
to consciously choose one option or course of  action over another, to create and 
attach importance to symbols. These issues are discussed in subsequent chapters.
The emphasis here is to examine the organic, material, social and cultural forces 
which underlie these developments throughout the course of  human experience, 
with chronological narrative as a secondary concern – although certainly that has 
to be taken into account. In 2010 the British Museum produced a well-deserved 
best seller entitled A History of  the World in 100 Objects. It is a magnificent piece of  
work and I thought of  supplementing it with A History of  the World in 100 Atrocities, 
but decided that would be too horrific to cope with. Walter Benjamin’s aphorism, 
quoted at the beginning of  this volume, comes forcefully to mind. 
What motivated me to write this book was an intense appreciation of  his remark 
combined with an acute consciousness of  the improvements in social relations 
that have been achieved in certain parts of  the world and the fragility of  these 
advances in the face both of  malign social forces and environmental deterioration. 
In this context I continue to regard Marx’s perspective, loosely defined as historical 
materialism, as being the most appropriate for human history and human affairs, 
though also conscious of  its insufficiencies.
Regrettably the conclusion seems inescapable: that the human story up to 
the present, despite all the remarkable material, intellectual and artistic cultural 
accomplishments over the millennia, has been overall a pretty bleak and grisly 
one and that the great majority of  human beings who have lived and died over its 
course have been victims, rather than beneficiaries, of  the historical process. The 
fabric of  this volume, if  not the fabric of  history itself, is somewhat grim and 
dark – though, as will be evident from the record, there is also a contrary weave 
of  resistance, achievement and hope; history need not in the future continue 
predominantly as a catalogue of  calamity, or in Voltaire’s phrase, ‘. . . nothing more 
than a tableau of  crimes and misfortunes’. 
I am concerned to examine and to explain so far as possible both the similarities 
and the differences between social practices widely separated in time and space. 
The author of  A History of  the World in 100 Objects, the Director of  the British 
Museum, Neil MacGregor, writes that: ‘The similarities between the cultures of  the 
old and the new worlds [Eurasia and the Americas] are . . . strong. Both produced 
pyramids and mummification, temples and priestly rituals, social structures and 
buildings that function in similar ways . . .’1 or as Daniel Lord Smail expresses a 
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similar sentiment: ‘We celebrate the diversity of  human civilizations, but it is the 
similarities that are the most startling, the thing that continually reminds us of  our 
common humanity.’2
Aspects of  these processes have been investigated with great depth and 
sophistication in recent decades by archaeologists, anthropologists, historical 
sociologists and historians. Just a few names to mention in this context include 
Perry Anderson, Christopher Boehm, Fernand Braudel, Jared Diamond, Kent 
Flannery, Ernest Gellner, Jacquetta Hawkes, Michael Mann, Joyce Marcus, Joseph 
Needham, Chris Stringer and Ellen Wood. 
The objective of  this volume is to outline and assess in a concise and easily 
presented form the conclusions which emerge from their and others’ work, and 
to do so within the context and interpretation of  historical materialism. This 
perspective emphasises that human societies are part of  an organic world upon 
which they are ultimately dependent and which they work collectively to transform 
to their purposes. The notion that nature exists to suit human convenience is not 
merely fallacious, it is also very dangerous, and yet the human species is the only one 
to have also separated itself  from nature. That separation, and the manner in which 
it has developed, is what constitutes history, and is this volume’s central concern.
Work
The many terms used in English in relation to work with positive or negative 
connotations are a reflection of  its multiple forms – ranging from ‘achievement’ 
at one end of  the scale to ‘penal servitude’ at the other. Work is human activity 
intended to achieve satisfaction in one form or another for oneself  or other persons, 
but not all activities of  that sort count as work. ‘Work’ implies the expenditure 
of  effort, more often than not against intrinsic difficulty. The boundary however 
between work and other sorts of  activity such as play or entertainment is a very 
fuzzy one – and even entertainers work at entertaining. Depending on its quality 
work can be fulfilling and joyful or it can amount to torture. What is indisputable 
is that socially organised and directed work, both manual and mental, upon natural 
substances, has been intrinsic to the transformations of  the material and social 
universe that have occurred throughout history, and the changing character of  
work is the principal element in social development.
As Engels remarked at Marx’s graveside, humans first of  all have to secure a 
food supply, tools and facilities for shelter before they can embark on religious 
speculation, cultural endeavour, law-making or war-making. This is not to say that 
the latter activities are of  lesser importance in the great scheme of  things, or 
that they do not impact upon and give shape to the former ones. Or, as a school 
textbook of  economic history I recall put it in unconscious tribute to the Marxist 
‘base/superstructure’ metaphor; economic activity, of  which work is the principal 
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component, is the foundation of  everything else, but not necessarily of  greater 
importance, for foundations exist to carry better things.
Following roughly 190,000 years of  life working as hunter-gatherers and 
foragers, humans have in the last 10,000 years carried through the two radical 
transformations indicated above. The first of  these was certainly profound, but 
the second, with even greater and constantly accelerating consequences, is just 
over two centuries old and produced the world we are familiar with – which 
could be designated as the technological era. Its framework was the economic 
and social structure known as capitalism, which has dominated the era through 
its protean development, and generated historically momentous endeavours to 
modify or abolish it while retaining the technological advantages with which it is 
associated.
Neither of  these transformations, despite a certain inevitability about the 
first, was consciously intended; they followed from innovations and practices 
intended to fit in with the then pre-existent social order. A key proposition of  this 
volume is that from an indeterminate period following the initial establishment 
of  agricultural production, but probably around 7000 years BP, human history 
has been principally the history of  forced labour in multiple forms, what Michael 
Mann terms ‘compulsory co-operation’ – which implies a social class division, 
based on very different varieties of  work, between enforcers and enforced. Basic 
forms of  this relationship include tribute exaction, slavery, serfdom and wage 
labour, which are discussed in the course of  the volume, as is the resistance they 
have provoked.
Sex
So far as there is any specific purpose in the non-human biosphere that purpose 
is reproduction – at the micro level genes propagating themselves – and for 
any land-dwelling vertebrate sex is a necessary precursor to the production of  
offspring. However it is more than that as, even outside the human context, the 
existence of  non-reproductive sexual activity among numerous species (up to 
1,500 of  them) indicates.
The discussion of  sex in subsequent chapters takes account not merely of  
acts of  copulation among human beings, but also of  the very numerous forms it 
can assume, the consequences which it carries and the associated activities which 
surround it, far exceeding those engaged in by other species.
In the metaphor of  ‘the fabric of  history’ the cultural and social context 
of  sex is the red thread that runs across it. Not only does it result frequently 
in reproduction, creating family groups in diverse forms and implying all that is 
associated with child-rearing in such contexts. It permeates every pore of  human 
culture, generating differentiation in occupational roles, modes of  clothing 
and deportment, the social interaction both between and within the genders in 
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particular societies, and is the dominant theme of  cultural production – literary, 
aural and visual – in every one. Endeavours in some cultures to downplay, hide 
or even deny the importance of  sex, such as taboo words, have only served to 
emphasise it.
Power
According to Michel Foucault power relations constituted by what he would call 
‘discourse’ are crucial to every social interaction (and not only work and sex). We 
need not go quite so far, but even so there is no denying power’s centrality. It has 
in history permeated social relations of  almost every sort – though possibly need 
not do so in the future. Nevertheless, up to the present the voice that has echoed 
down the millennia has been the voice of  command. 
Michael Mann’s four-volume magnum opus of  historical analysis covering 
developments from the Bronze Age to the contemporary world is entitled The 
Sources of  Social Power, and this book is greatly indebted to it, though diverging 
on crucial aspects. Mann, whose standpoint reflects the influence of  Max Weber, 
identifies three determinant sources, namely economic power, political power and 
ideological power. He argues that at different times in history one or other of  
these forms was the dominant one. This necessarily less extensive single volume 
is concerned to examine how power relations, namely the manner in which a 
person or persons are in a position to compel another person or persons to do 
the bidding of  the former and how that relationship was resisted. The aim is 
to examine the complexities of  the interweave between such relationships and 
the other forces which determine the processes of  historical development. The 
concern here is not only with the manner in which these processes work out on 
a social scale but also to attempt some explanation of  the motivations which can 
be seen or deduced to have inspired individuals, both those who exercise power 
and those who resist it.
The text embodies the proposition that the most significant of  power relations 
is the means by which elite groups at various levels of  society and different phases 
throughout history forcefully acquire a greater or lesser part of  the product of  
basic producers, the essential foundation of  nearly all historical societies to date. 
Power of  course has other dimensions, from the relations within the nuclear 
family to organisations of  varying complexity.
Over the centuries of  written history not only has there been a persistent 
division between elites and basic producers, but they take persistently repeated 
forms. While relations between the two show multiple variations, they do so within 
a limited number of  basic social structures. Among elites themselves, the parallels 
in their mode of  operation are even more astonishing, whether we are discussing 
the court of  Sargon the Assyrian, that of  the Ming dynasty, the Roman and 
Byzantine emperors, the Muslim caliph, the medieval kingdoms, the Vatican or the 
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Politbureau. Whether these are polytheist, monotheist or atheist we find the same 
forms of  intrigue, manoeuvre and treachery, flattery and factional alliance. The 
instances can be multiplied indefinitely and are reflected in organised collectives 
further down the social scale. 
Progress, What Progress?
Unprecedentedly, a creature that was evolved around 200,000 years ago on the 
African savannah to cope in its ecological niche with the basic objectives of  all 
living organisms, nutrition and reproduction, also, while not neglecting food 
and sex, ultimately left a representational record of  its thought processes and in 
addition latterly devised technologies covering the globe, so complex in nature 
that their construction and functioning requires to be carried on by a limited cadre 
of  experts. Moreover, and most remarkably, it has devoted itself  to reflection on 
life, the universe and everything. In the words of  the philosopher Raymond Tallis, 
‘we are cognitive giants’. The phenomenon may be summed up in the fact that 
the English word ‘culture’ has two divergent meanings – either the routines of  
everyday life with the tools which make them possible; or else what we think of  as 
intellectual/artistic achievement. 
It was once popular – it is now much less so  – to define that course as ‘progress’. 
The concept of  ‘progress’ is a loaded one, and it normally implies approval, as in 
the phrase, ‘We’re making progress’, but that is not necessarily so; it can be used 
in the opposite sense, as in Hogarth’s title, ‘The Rake’s Progress’. In this volume 
it is used neutrally. Certain realities are unquestionable. Since the emergence 
of  the species which has arrogated to itself  the arrogant title of  Homo sapiens 
sapiens (colloquially, ‘very wise guy’) its population has expanded from a very 
small number, possibly only a few dozen at one stage.3 Peter J Richardson and 
Robert Boyd argue that ‘At the time of  the final modernization of  the human 
brain, humans were most likely a rare and, given the nature of  the Pleistocene, 
endangered species’,4 but now six to seven billion in number and still growing, 
with increasing average longevity. This growth has been accompanied by, and been 
dependent upon, an unceasing, if  irregular, refinement of  technique and ability to 
exercise control over the natural environment, multiplying beyond measure the 
quantity and character of  consumables and material objects available to (some) 
individuals and communities – I am writing this with a computer keyboard and 
screen, not with a reed pen on papyrus. 
If  you like – and with some reason – you can refer to all that as ‘progress’, but 
there are few nowadays who would not recognise at the same time its deficiencies 
and contradictions. As Jacquetta Hawkes once remarked over half  a century ago, 
a man can have equally depraved thoughts whether driving a Cadillac to LA or 
trotting to Ur on a donkey. 
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Likewise, the question being addressed is what lies behind or underneath these 
similarities in social structures and forms of  behaviour taking place in radically 
different circumstances. The ‘fabric of  history’ does not, needless to say, imply 
any notion of  ‘human nature’, which merely poses the same question in different 
terms or evades it altogether. No satisfactory answer is pretended here – finding 
that is a research programme that has been ongoing over many decades past and 
will be to come. This book tries to bring together a number of  considerations 
– in however introductory a manner – that helps to illuminate the underlying 
question. It draws on the work of  many authors who have contributed to the 
discussion, as will become apparent. Most of  them are of  a recent or relatively 
recent character. 
Not by Bread Alone
For all the importance of  basic material considerations in relation to long-term 
historical development, they do not suffice to explain the sphere of  social culture 
both ‘high’ and ‘low’ – the whole range from leisure to lawmaking, drinking to 
drama – nor of  ideologies, ethics or attitudes to the imagined invisible world 
which have at all times, positively or negatively, permeated the waking lives of  
every human being from cradle to cremation (or alternative means of  disposal).
With that in mind, it is scarcely to be disputed that history’s course of  
development is largely determined by the nature of  the interaction between 
productive technique and the hugely varied range of  activities, embodied in every 
collective, from family units to governments, which depend upon it. For example 
Mao Zedong’s aphorism that ‘power grows out of  the barrel of  a gun’ implies 
both a theoretical knowledge and a technology of  firearms and explosives. If  
we can argue that there is a consistency in the socio-economic weave of  human 
societies, nevertheless the patterns of  colour incorporated in that weave  – in literal 
terms the range of  cultural practices – are as enormously varied and complex 
as the multiplicity of  languages, dialects and argots spoken and written by the 
bearers of  culture. One cultural feature that has had a particularly far-reaching 
global impact over the past 3,000 and especially the past 2,000 years, has been the 
emergence, expansion and fragmentation of  monotheist religion, originating in 
a small Levantine community, then spreading and frequently dominating, firstly 
through Eurasia and part of  Australasia, then eventually the remainder of  the 
globe. Its social, cultural and even economic significance has been enormous, 
and appropriate space is devoted to it in this text, as demonstrating both the 
consistency and the variation in human practices.
Finally this volume considers contradictions, in the shape of  the adverse 
consequences that have been produced by the course of  historical development 
or progress and the attempts made to overcome them – from the biological 
consequences of  human settlement, increase and agriculture to institutions 
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such as slavery and wage labour or the increasingly destructive powers of  
improving technology – and eventually to the growing menace of  environmental 
catastrophe which threatens at the present time. To attempt in short compass a 
general perspective on the course of  human development, is no doubt a foolishly 
ambitious project, but may, hopefully, represent a modest input into the discussion 
of  how humans can cope with a very uncertain future.
To briefly outline the pages that follow, Chapter One is concerned with the 
place of  Homo sapiens, humans, in the cosmos, in their planet’s biosphere – and 
that very specific feature of  their biology, the consciousness which makes humans 
what they are. Chapter Two considers the initial millennia of  human development, 
the different species of  humans, their migrations, their technologies and what can 
be known about their lifestyles. Chapter Three deals with the initial agricultural 
transformation of  c.10,000 years BP, its causes and consequences and its continuing 
heritage. Chapter Four addresses what has been the central reality of  human life 
in all times and places – sex, reproduction and kinship. Chapter Five focuses upon 
the emergence of  two other major realities, domination and hierarchy, the contexts 
of  economic and social exploitation. Chapter Six, dealing with exploitation and 
violence, examines the praxis of  domination and hierarchy. Chapters Seven to 
Ten examine dimensions of  social practice which are intrinsic to the nature of  
human existence – ethics, religion and identity. Chapter Eleven is concerned with 
the lead-up to the second great socio-technological transformation, focusing 
on the centuries prior to the intrusion of  European power into the Americas, 
Eurasia, sub-Saharan Africa and Australasia. Chapters Twelve and Thirteen deal 
with that transformation itself, in the shape of  European-enforced globalisation 
and the ‘Industrial Revolution’. Chapter Fourteen considers the general theme 
of  opportunity costs and unintended consequences throughout history. Chapters 
Fifteen and Sixteen discuss attempts which have been undertaken throughout 
history to overturn the structures of  domination and exploitation that have 
characterised historical development; including the most recent and global, 
namely socialism. Finally, Chapter Seventeen summarises considerations on the 
significance of  humans in the global environment, the central characteristics of  
their history and prospects for the future.
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Cosmos, Creatures and Consciousness
Our Place in the Cosmos
In the English language the term ‘history’ has two distinct though connected 
meanings. In one sense it can mean a record of  human doings, embodied in 
a written narrative or analysis, sometimes referred to as historiography, and in 
another the actuality of  what occurred in the past. In the narrower sense of  
the first, the reconstruction of  the events involved depends on written records 
(sometimes supplemented by artwork) – the general form in which the science of  
historiography is understood, and has a timespan of  roughly 5,000 years.
The approximately 2.6 million years of  hominin1 existence on the planet prior 
to that are reconstructed by archaeologists through material remains of  artefacts 
or preserved body parts. The drawing together of  evidence from the millennia 
of  written history and from the longer stretch of  archaeological investigation is 
sometimes referred to as ‘Deep History’. The much lengthier span of  organic life, 
extends to around 3.6 billion years, and is studied through biology and evolutionary 
history. An even greater timespan which saw the formation of  the stars, including 
our own with its planets, and eventually the Big Bang which generated the universe 
and where it all started, is the province of  cosmology. This in its entirety has lately 
been referred to by some as ‘Big History’ and all of  it is relevant to the present 
situation of  human beings.
We read from time to time, in discussions of  the possible universes that might 
have emerged from the Big Bang, approximately 13.7 billion years ago, assertions 
that it was fortunate for us that the one which happened to be actualised2 was also 
one that happens to be ‘favourable to life’. That is a basic error; our universe is for 
the most part totally inimical to life, which could not conceivably exist either in 
the cold of  interstellar space or in the interior of  a star. Its only possible location 
is as a thin skin on a planet receiving energy inputs from its parent star, along with 
other conditions which permit the complex chemistry of  life to function; and 
from what is known of  our own solar system or the exoplanets identified so far in 
other systems, few, if  any of  these, are anywhere like suitable. 
Certain conclusions however strongly suggest themselves. The number of  
exoplanets so far identified is around 5,000 and rising, and these are all comparatively 
near us by cosmic standards. It is therefore a virtual certainty that there exist many 
billions of  planets throughout our own galaxy. Another near certainty is that the 
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process of  evolution that has taken place on our own world was an enormously 
unlikely outcome. Among the billions of  these exoplanets some must be suitably 
constituted and placed to harbour life forms. The likelihood therefore is that life 
is actually quite prevalent in the universe. The probability is also that it is mainly if  
not overwhelmingly unicellular, as it was for most of  earth’s history and that any 
multicellular organisms that happen to arise are likely to be primitive and simple.
So far as our own sun’s family is concerned, on no other of  its planets could 
multicellular organisms survive for more than a few seconds. Extremophile 
bacteria could perhaps just possibly cope with Mars, some of  the Jovian moons or 
Saturn’s moon Titan, but even that is extremely doubtful, and in any case hardly 
counts. In this particular region of  our galaxy, at any rate, we are utterly alone. A 
further consideration applies to the galaxy as a whole. 
It seems that our own galaxy is untypical compared to its neighbours, especially 
the nearest one, the Andromeda galaxy (with which we are on eventual collision 
course). The big black hole at the centre of  our galaxy, though millions of  times 
larger than the sun, is relatively small as such entities go, and unusually quiescent.3 
The one in Andromeda is much larger and much more active, blasting out deadly 
radiation in every direction as it consumes interstellar gas and stars caught in its 
gravitational field and probably making life impossible on any of  the planets that 
galaxy contains. As long ago as 1930, Olaf  Stapledon’s science-fiction novel First 
and Last Men envisaged an end to human life due to the radiation of  a nearby 
supernova – which is by no means an impossible scenario.
What applies to cosmic space also applies to cosmic time. Although the earth 
has existed for around a third of  the universe’s age, that span constitutes the 
merest blink on its scale – recent calculations show a future of  100 trillion years 
before the last stars are extinguished and an inconceivable 10100 years before all 
matter disintegrates and what was the universe consists of  nothing but radiation. 
In what we think of  as the present, ‘the train of  cosmic time has barely left the 
station’. Needless to say, humans will be long gone well before the universe looks 
any different from how it does at the moment, even considerably before the sun 
expands to vaporise the inner planets, as it inevitably will in another five billion 
years or so. 
The Biological Reality – Our Place in the Organic World
The sponge is not, as you suppose,
A funny kind of  weed;
He lives below the deep blue sea,
An animal, like you and me,
Though not so good a breed.
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This rhyme4 prefaced a popular textbook of  biology from which I learned a great 
deal as a teenager. However the last line is open to challenge. Sponges are as 
much evolved as any other life form, including humans, and are adapted to fit 
into their environmental niche as much as ourselves. To be sure, they are much 
less structured or complex than any vertebrate creature, or indeed most other 
invertebrates, but the sponges, if  they had the capacity to reflect on these matters, 
might not necessarily consider that to be a disadvantage, for while structure and 
complexity has its advantages and privileges it also has its downsides – which 
apply to societies as well as to individual organisms; and sentience all too often 
equals suffering.
Humans, members of  the biological domain (or superkingdom) of  eukaryotes,5 
and the animal kingdom,6 share the planet with a multitude of  other species in that 
kingdom, not to speak of  the kingdoms of  plants and fungi, and the two domains 
of  the prokaryotes (less complex unicellular organisms), archaea and bacteria. Any 
adequate appreciation of  the human story has to take account of  these absolutely 
fundamental relationships.7
To get a sense of  perspective of  where modern humans stand in earth’s history, 
famously, if  the whole of  that history were compressed into one year, the first 
clearly fossilised multicellular animals, most famously the trilobites, began to 
flourish in the seas only in late November, the dinosaurs were extinguished around 
Christmas, Homo sapiens appeared about 20 minutes before the end of  the year, 
with the building of  the Egyptian pyramids and everything else that has followed 
in the last two minutes.
At first glance there appears to have been a continuous drift towards greater 
complexity throughout life history – prokaryotes to eukaryotes, eukaryotes to 
multicellular life forms, evolution of  these towards continually more complex 
forms until that process resulted in the human brain, the most complex object 
in the known universe. This appearance however is almost certainly illusory. For 
about two thirds of  life history, originating approximately 3.5 billion years BP 
(before present) the prokaryotes were the only life forms, and for at least 80 per 
cent of  the time life has existed on earth the only organisms were unicellular ones. 
It is an open question whether the initial appearance of  living organisms was 
accidental or possibly predetermined by the chemistry and environment of  the era 
in which they first evolved, but the much later development to eukaryotes and then 
multicellular organisms was more likely accidental.
The late Stephen Jay Gould argued that if  the film of  life could be rerun from 
its beginnings, there is no likelihood that the second showing would produce the 
same or even similar outcomes. His contention is disputed, opponents pointing 
to the convergent evolution of  life forms to suggest that similar evolutionary 
pressures would bring about similar if  not identical results – the eye for example 
has evolved several times in slightly different ways, and growing brain power 
does seem to be an overall feature of  life’s story to date. Nonetheless Gould’s 
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contention appears to be the more convincing. The ancestors of  the vertebrates 
were merely one of  many competing phyla8 in the Cambrian seas, with no more 
likelihood of  survival than several others which failed to make it beyond that era. 
Jumping forward to the Pleistocene, the era in which H. sapiens evolved, if  matters 
had gone slightly differently it would have been the Neanderthals who survived 
and modern humans who suffered extinction. Whether the former, given time, 
could have replicated the achievements of  the latter is an open question.9 
The Evolutionary Record
Early life most likely evolved in the seas and so certainly did the original multicellular 
organisms, of  which the ancestors of  the fish, the earliest of  the vertebrate phylum, 
were one. Between 400 and 350 million years ago one lineage of  lobe-finned fish 
evolved lungs and colonised the land (arthropods – ‘jointed legs’ – in various 
genera including insects and arachnids were there before them). These pioneering 
vertebrates were confined to watery landscapes both on account of  their skins and 
the necessity of  laying their eggs in water, as amphibians do. The development 
of  amniote reproduction by means of  shell-enclosed eggs enabled opportunities 
for wider colonisation and was taken advantage of  by two lineages, one of  which 
led to reptiles and their bird relatives, and the other, the synapsids (one of  the 
latter, though it was not ancestral, being the famous sail-backed dimetrodon), to 
mammals. Early reptiles and synapsids, both descended from amphibians, looked 
externally very similar.10
The emergence of  the earliest dinosaurs and the earliest mammals was roughly 
contemporaneous, but for tens of  millions of  years the former dominated the 
macro zoology of  the planet. The antiquity of  the primate lineage, to which 
humans belong, is uncertain, though it could extend as far back as 85 million years 
when the dinosaurs were still flourishing. The ancestors of  the primates lived in 
the trees of  tropical forests and evolved characteristics suited to that way of  life, 
including advanced colour vision. Most mammals lack significant colour vision 
as their ancestors were nocturnal and depended primarily on smell. Primates 
however possess it, for a tree-dwelling lifestyle necessitates the ability to recognise 
the ripeness or otherwise of  fruit. Arboreal life also resulted in the development 
of  forelimbs which were evolutionarily designed for grasping rather than walking, 
especially the thumb-like character of  the fifth digit. 
Most primates are even now primarily arboreal (gorillas and baboons are 
exceptions) and none apart from the ancestral human lineage, extending back 
between five and nine million years, are bipeds who walk upright, freeing their 
forelimbs, no longer principally devoted to climbing, for all manner of  other 
purposes. Modern humans are the only existing mammalian true biped – indeed 
such ability is the distinguishing anatomical feature of  the Homo lineage.11 Donald 
V Kurtz notes that ‘Bipedalism and erect posture required morphological changes 
in the hominins from head to toe and complementary physiological and metabolic 
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changes that affected females in particular . . . Bipedalism is the key factor that 
defines early humans’.12
Palaeontology indicates that around 15 million years ago a large number of  ape 
species flourished in the tropical and subtropical regions of  Africa and Eurasia 
(none existed in the Americas). Only half  a dozen or so now remain, including 
that hyper-predator with a grossly overdeveloped brain, H. sapiens. Humans as well 
as being social animals are also conscious ones – which is not to say that other 
animals are necessarily without this attribute, but the complexity of  the human 
form is without parallel in the animal kingdom and is fundamental to history. 
The question of  how much longer human life on earth is likely to persist is one 
which has increasingly come to the fore. Even if  we avoid self-extermination or 
self-created environmental catastrophe, our own species’ lifespan is nonetheless 
limited as much as is the span of  an individual life – or that of  any particular 
species, none of  which is forever. 
Nevertheless, life on planet earth is extraordinarily tenacious overall and has 
come through unimaginably catastrophic episodes, including the snowball earth 
which preceded the Cambrian era, the name attached to the emergence of  complex 
life forms around 550 million years ago with a variety of  body plans that are still 
with us today. Later, enough of  life survived the worst era of  extinction at the end 
of  the Permian 250 million years ago to evolve the enormous complexity which 
has characterised the following aeons. 
All the life forms visible to the human eye, from the titchiest near-micro-
scopic mite to the mightiest redwood and everything in between, are structured 
assemblages of  eukaryotic cells and in the ‘wild’, are either looking for another 
one to eat or liable to being eaten. Among animal species this also applies to 
each other, apart from a few exceptions such as herbivores so big and powerful 
(elephants and gorillas for example) as to have no natural predators. These were 
the grim and brutal realities which confronted the earliest humans.
A Social Animal
Human beings are social animals, a characteristic we share with many other 
species, both vertebrate and invertebrate, but we occupy a unique position on 
the planet in two critical respects. Recent research has demonstrated that many 
species of  non-human animals – from birds to primates especially13 – exhibit 
cultural differences, characteristic social patterns of  behaviour varying between 
different groups; but humans, by means of  their unique attribute14 of  language, do 
so on a scale wholly beyond comparison with any other animal. Secondly humans, 
also equipped with hands bearing opposable thumbs, beggar all comparisons in 
their ability to consciously alter and manipulate the surrounding environment to 
their convenience. The limited use of  tools by non-human species are natural 
phenomena; culture as it is understood by humans is something very different – 
and it was not invented by the presently existing species of  human. 
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The distinctive feature of  later hominin behaviour, beside the use of  language, is 
the control of  fire, something that every other animal avoids. It is this ability above 
everything else that can be said to mark the transition from nature to culture. The 
first unambiguous evidence of  control and use of  fire goes back around 400,000 
years but was almost certainly practised from around 1.5 million years BP – it was, 
like the knapping of  stones for greater convenience, first undertaken by earlier 
species of  hominin, from whom Homo sapiens undoubtedly inherited it as the first 
critical step in cultural evolution, marking an existential separation from nature. 
The entire span of  human history can be reasonably interpreted as a sustained 
endeavour to increase the separation from nature, to control and eliminate as far 
as possible the natural constraints that the flesh is heir to and must have afflicted 
severely the earliest members of  the species – attacks by predators, failure of  food 
supply, constant discomfort, constant assault from internal and external parasites15 
and dangerous microbes, early death. Most readers of  this volume live in societies 
and cultures where that project has succeeded spectacularly – too spectacularly 
indeed for the good of  the species. However it required a very long time – around 
150–170 thousand years as far as can be ascertained – before H. sapiens’ culture 
took a dramatic leap forward both in the material sense of  made objects and the 
abstract one of  symbolic expression.
In the course of  organic history this last represented another dramatic novelty. 
While the neurological processes of  the trilobite or the triceratops (at least 150 
million years apart) are not open to investigation, we can take it for granted that 
neither they nor coexisting animals gave any thought to the meaning of  their lives 
or reflected upon the origins of  the world they lived in. Rather, like every other 
creature, they simply got on with their invertebrate or reptilian thing – namely 
feeding and breeding, the dominant concern of  every animal apart from Homo 
sapiens. Humans though are different; they possess a unique form of  consciousness 
and through that consciousness they are situated in history as well as nature.
Consciousness
Human consciousness remains a phenomenally mysterious phenomenon. 
Understanding of  its relationship to that physical object, the brain, has advanced 
substantially in recent years in the sense of  determining which areas of  the brain are 
associated with which forms of  mental activity, but understanding consciousness 
and its central activity, choice, from the inside as it were, has scarcely improved in 
the course of  the past seven decades.16
Based on laboratory experiments (rather than Freudian speculation) it has been 
suggested that the role of  consciousness is a very minor one17 and that most mental 
activity indeed takes place at an unconscious level. Certainly most of  the physical 
brain is devoted to controlling unconscious bodily processes and only a minor part 
of  it is concerned with conscious activity, and much conscious activity, to be sure, 
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is combined with an unconscious reflex. It is necessary to think only of  activities 
like driving a car, riding a bicycle or playing tennis.18 Nevertheless it seems rather 
improbable that our cities are built and our aircraft flown, let alone our quarks or 
our cosmos investigated, by individuals who, it has been suggested, remain only 
10 per cent conscious (though if  applied to warfare or financial speculation the 
idea might be rather more convincing). This volume is written on the presumption 
that consciousness is a reality, and since it is basic to the history of  our species, the 
immediate concern in this chapter is to discuss how it might have evolved. In the 
words of  Colin Renfrew, ‘. . . the notion of  mind encompasses intelligent action in 
the world, not merely cognition within the brain’.19 
In terms of  the human metabolism’s energy budget consciousness is a very 
expensive item indeed and could scarcely have evolved unless it fulfilled some very 
strong evolutionary purpose. Nevertheless it might give us pause to consider that 
while there are some individuals with such powers of  concentration that they can 
play several chess games simultaneously while blindfolded, and Stephen Hawking 
can advance our understanding of  the cosmos from inside a totally helpless body, 
for most of  us it is surprising how little control we have over our conscious 
thought processes if  resting and not focusing on a specific activity. Our minds 
skitter all over time and space with streams of  different associations all competing 
for attention.
Consciousness is a process rather than an entity, swirls of  electrochemical 
activity in the brain. The notion that it could exist apart from its physical basis 
is nonsense, as absurd as imagining that digestion could exist without bowels or 
circulation without veins and arteries. Disembodied spirits are a contradiction in 
terms. Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of  evolution, though 
evolution, being a hit-and-miss affair, may well produce organs or functions which 
lack any immediate survival value. However the advantages of  cognition, even at 
primitive levels and not necessarily involving what humans would recognise as 
consciousness let alone self-consciousness, are not difficult to perceive.
Basically, cognition enables an organism to take advantage of  alternative 
possibilities. Filter feeders like sponges, which are loosely articulated assemblages 
of  cells without much differentiation, or the tentacled, more developed, sea 
anemones and corals, which are anchored in place, have to take whatever comes 
along in the way of  food or danger. There is no need for such organisms to have 
any conscious awareness of  the environment, let alone the self, whereas a mobile 
organism with a nervous system can ‘choose’ between flight or fight; if  a predator 
it can select its potential victim, and if  fleeing estimate the best available place 
of  refuge.
However Derek Denton (The Primordial Emotions: The Dawning of  Consciousness)20 
has a rather different interpretation of  consciousness’ origins. He argues for 
its emergence as an evolutionary consequence of  air-breathing vertebrates – 
initially amphibians then the early reptiles and the related reptile-like ancestors of  
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mammals – moving into parts of  the landscape where amphibian skins would be 
liable to dry out (frogs for example will let themselves die of  dehydration rather 
than actively seek for water). 
Awareness
These creatures therefore had to develop a form of  cognition enabling them to 
monitor the level of  their bodily fluids so as to take appropriate action in terms 
of  regulating them, including air, ‘. . . masterpieces of  evolutionary invention 
emerged with the colonisation of  dry land. They reflect the genesis of  intentional 
behaviour’.21 Denton writes that, ‘The theory I wish to propose is that primary 
consciousness arose from the primal or primordial emotions . . . The creature 
could then begin to exercise options’22 He goes on to quote Christopher Higgins, 
‘The idea of  a goal is an integral part of  the concept of  mind, and so is the idea 
of  intention. An organism which can have intentions, I think, is one which can be 
said to possess a mind’.23 
Evidently consciousness is not applicable as a concept to unicellular organisms, 
though some of  those, particularly those concerned with the immune system, 
give a tolerable imitation. There are multicellular organisms, which nobody would 
dispute fall into the same category – most evidently plants and fungi – but it 
applies also to certain animals – a worm cannot be aware in any sense when it is 
being eaten alive by a bird, or a jellyfish by a turtle – neither has any semblance of  
a brain, nor do sponges, sea anemones, corals and comb jellies, though some of  
these have nervous systems.
Organs of  cognition at the front of  the organism, and an expansion of  nervous 
tissue to coordinate its cognition and its activities, namely a brain, has however 
been throughout evolutionary history a characteristic of  most mobile animals 
whether invertebrate or vertebrate. It is however to be doubted whether any 
invertebrate possesses consciousness at any level (though claims have been made 
for octopuses, connected with their ability in captivity to run mazes, and the bees’ 
honey dance is very impressive): they can probably best be regarded as organic 
robots. On the other hand the larger-brained non-human mammals at least, and 
possibly even birds, probably do have some rudimentary form of  awareness at a 
pre-reflective level – domestic pets like dogs and cats, for example, can and do 
demand food and attention from their owners. 
It is indisputable that the brain is the physical basis for consciousness – 
adequately demonstrated by the fact that brain lesions or chemical influences have 
more or less dramatic effects upon its operation. It is equally clear that human 
consciousness, and whatever forms of  the same are sustained by other species, 
have a similar physical basis. How that translates into the subjective experience 
that we know as consciousness is a so far unanswered conundrum. The fact that 
conscious activities of  particular sorts can be identified as occurring in particular 
regions of  the brain does not get us any nearer to a solution.
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The likelihood however is that most species of  mammals, while possessing an 
immediate consciousness inhabit a continuous present – specific memory would 
be an unnecessary and expensive add-on (some unfortunate humans due to brain 
damage find themselves in a similar situation). It is also probable that most, 
though not all, non-human learning operates at an unconscious and reflex level 
without specific conscious memory. However human consciousness operates at 
an enormously more complex level which involves not merely awareness but the 
awareness of  being aware and consequently some sense of  personal identity. 
It requires a considerable effort of  imagination, but it is not altogether impossible, 
since no doubt it underlies our own more developed one, to envisage what a 
non-conceptual consciousness might feel like, one which was simply a focus for 
sensory stimuli without any terms to name them. It is necessarily speculation, but 
that may well be the sort of  consciousness to be found in nonhuman mammals – 
and very possibly other classes as well, birds, reptiles, amphibians. A consciousness 
at that level would permit its owner to have subjective experience of  suffering and 
satisfaction. Scarcely less intriguing and exasperating is the question of  at what point 
on the evolutionary scale an organism can be said to experience conscious processes. 
It has practical implications as well, since on the answer depends one’s idea of  
which experiences it is permissible for humans to subject a non-human organism 
to – whether experimental animals in laboratories, targets of  hunts, farm animals 
or pets.
The development of  brain power in the primate order exceeds anything 
in previous evolutionary history and is almost certainly related to the fact that 
with a few exceptions primates are predominantly social animals – cooperation, 
signalling, status and rank, competitive display and alliances are all very much in 
evidence and even inter-species cooperation has been observed among monkeys 
hunted by chimpanzees. The reasoning abilities revealed by chimpanzees through 
experiments are startlingly impressive and chimpanzees both in the wild and 
in captivity, recognise themselves as individuals. It has even been suggested 
that humans should be considered the third chimpanzee species along with the 
common chimp and the bonobo.
Advanced Cognition
As primates exceed all other orders of  animals in cognitive ability, so humans 
exceed all other primates. Verbal language may possibly not be the only factor in 
this differentiation (brain size presumably has a lot to do with it) but it is certainly 
one of  the most important. What linguistic abilities were possessed by pre-modern 
humans is impossible to guess, but the likelihood is that, at least among the later 
species, it was not wholly absent – Neanderthals certainly had the necessary 
anatomical structures for speech formation (as chimpanzees do not): ‘. . . human 
language and intelligence evolved not to make us better at foraging but to make us 
better at social networking’.24
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It can be generally agreed that language is not absolutely necessary to 
consciousness. Given memory, it is possible to think in mental images even if  
one does not have a word for the object of  cognition. However consciousness 
combined with language is an extraordinarily powerful piece of  cognitive 
equipment; it makes us indeed ‘cognitive giants’. It enormously increases the scope 
for the cooperation seen among other primates such as the chimpanzees who hunt 
monkeys and the monkeys who aim to avoid capture, and of  equal or even greater 
importance we think ahead and evaluate consequences: ‘our hypotheses die in 
our place’, according to the saying. We can as a consequence formulate and discuss 
plans and projects and foresee the consequences of  alternative lines of  action. The 
importance of  that for survival among forager bands is immeasurable.
Two closely connected further cognitive inheritances from our evolutionary 
past deserve mention in relation to our mental equipment. Firstly, the fact that 
humans are pattern-seeking creatures, liable to find meaningful patterns in all 
manner of  unlikely contexts, and secondly, the attraction of  false positives. The 
first of  these is ambiguous in effect, but has evident advantages. Observation of  
patterned regularities can reveal facts about the natural or the social environment 
that would not otherwise be apparent25 (and in a modern context this disposition 
is intrinsic to scientific observation). The second, also perfectly understandable in 
evolutionary terms, is likewise very useful in a Palaeolithic environment – for the 
liability to mistakenly identify a threat, i.e. a ‘false positive’, even though erroneous, 
is certainly not without its survival advantages. To suspect that a rustle in the 
undergrowth might be a sabre-tooth, or the night-time shadow on the cave wall 
could be a leopard, suggests swift evasive action. If  you are wrong no harm is 
done, but if  you ignore the danger you may well become the carnivore’s dinner. 
Like all other animals adult humans are, and with good reason, inherently 
lazy (energy must be conserved as much as possible); greedy (food should be 
consumed while the opportunity exists); and cautious. Injury reduces prospects 
of  survival; animals of  the same species in the wild do not fight with each other 
unless territory or mates are in question, and when they do such conflicts are 
seldom or never pushed to the extent of  serious injury. The excitement of  the 
hunt is a contrary impulse if  the prey is capable of  inflicting significant damage, 
but few predators apart from humans face that problem. 
In humans these first two tendencies can, and have to be, countered because 
they conflict with social functioning and cohesion, and that is what various forms 
of  socialisation are essentially about. At the same time, like certain other foraging 
animals, humans are also curious and adventurous, and consequently as individuals 
pursue personal projects, usually culturally determined or influenced ones. Our 
concern is with the reality that humans are simultaneously biological organisms 
focused on feeding and breeding, and social entities operating in the matrix of  
cultural forms. The contradiction between innate evolutionary impulses and the 
no less evolutionary demands of  socialisation is a foundational part of  the human 
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reality. That contradiction applies especially to human sexuality, to be discussed in 
due course, and while paralleled by that of  the chimpanzees and their close cousins 
the bonobos, is quite unlike that of  most other animals, even among the primates. 
Consider in this context ‘the seven deadly sins’. A moment’s thought will 
demonstrate that as usually codified these are dispositions to ‘sin’, rather than 
actual sinful deeds. But gluttony, pride, lust, anger etc., in themselves have a clear 
survival value – gluttony, greed and sloth for the reasons cited above, pride and 
envy to inspire dominant behaviour, anger to motivate defence or successful 
aggression, lust for reproductive success. However if  they were to enjoy universal, 
constant and uncontrolled expression social cohesion would be impossible, the 
basic requirements of  living incapable of  functioning. These dispositions are 
inescapable and even necessary but they have to be appropriately channelled, and 
in all known instances they are channelled in one form or another. 
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Cooperation, Stone, Bone and Dispersal
Human Beginnings
The Palaeolithic (literally ‘Old stone age’) or prehistoric origin of  human society 
was no mere preliminary to the historical societies but accounted for by far the 
majority of  the human timespan – no less than 95 per cent of  it. The reader 
has to be advised that this is an intensely contentious area with major divisions 
among experts regarding interpretation and new discoveries making substantial 
alterations to the picture almost on a monthly basis. Chris Stringer in his The Origin 
of  our Species, 2011, remarks that his volume is likely to be out of  date even before 
publication. What follows is therefore an outline dealing with the broad picture 
connecting the least disputed developments. The first migration of  humans from 
Africa was that of  Homo erectus, which spread onwards from what is now the 
Middle East throughout a large swathe of  Asia, including the north of  China and 
Indonesia as well. How these humans reached Java is unclear, since it is unlikely 
they had boats, but they were certainly there. 
Modern humans likewise evolved in Africa, probably from an erectus line 
through Homo ergaster, Homo antecessor and Homo heidelbergensis (which also left 
Africa and whose European component may have been the Neanderthals’ 
ancestor, though there are other possibilities).1 There is strong evidence that all 
of  these human species, including sapiens, or at least some of  their communities, 
practised cannibalism. After all, if  you don’t recognise strangers to be as mentally 
real as yourselves there is no reason in principle why you shouldn’t eat them. As 
Christopher Boehm has remarked, ‘There seems to be a special, pejorative, moral 
“discount” applied to cultural strangers – who are not even considered to be fully 
human and therefore may be killed with little compunction.’2
Migrations – the Palaeolithic and After
The period in which some modern humans first left Africa is highly contentious. 
The tentative majority view (Recent African Origin hypothesis) is that the 
definitive migration occurred around 70,000–65,000 years BP and that an earlier 
exodus, possibly as early as 125,000 years BP, was abortive. Whatever the timing, 
Palaeolithic modern humans spread much more widely than their predecessors, 
though that of  course took time. They reached every corner of  Eurasia and all the 
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surrounding nearby islands, arriving on the Australian continent around 50,000 
years BP, and eventually the then peninsula of  Tasmania. Paradoxically, in view 
of  later developments, the most distant leading edge of  the expansion might have 
been the most technologically sophisticated. Jared Diamond comments,
[A]s of  40,000 years ago, Native Australian societies enjoyed a big head start 
over societies of  Europe and the other continents. Native Australians developed 
some of  the earliest known stone tools with ground edges, the earliest hafted 
stone tools (that is, stone axe heads mounted on handles), and by far the earliest 
watercraft, in the world. Some of  the oldest known painting on rock surfaces 
comes from Australia. Anatomically modern humans may have settled Australia 
before they settled western Europe.3
The continental Australian population of  eventually 300,000 failed, due to isolation 
and their relatively small numbers relative to other continents, to develop further 
their technology of  stone, bone and wood. The even more isolated population of  
Tasmania (c.4,000 in number), cut off  by rising sea levels from the remainder of  
the continent, suffered significant technological regression, becoming by modern 
times, ‘a uniquely simplified material culture’, a circumstance which suggests that 
population size and diversity was indeed important.4
The native Tasmanians, exterminated by colonisers in the nineteenth century 
(though their genes live on due to some interbreeding) actually lost many of  
the cultural advances that their ancestors had brought with them, such as bone 
tools and the capture and consumption of  scaly fish. ‘The stone technology of  
the Tasmanians, when first encountered by European explorers in A.D. 1642, 
was simpler than that prevalent in parts of  Upper Palaeolithic Europe tens of  
thousands of  years earlier.’5 They may even possibly have lost the ability to generate 
fire, having to rely instead on preserving the source or waiting for fire started by 
a lightning strike, though this is uncertain. Evidently, however, genetic heritage 
alone did not suffice to ensure cultural advance, environmental (and possibly 
cultural) pressures were enormously important.
Somewhat later between 15,000 and 12,000 years BP, three migrations across 
the Bering land bridge connecting eastern Asia and what is now Alaska, or 
possibly by coastal travel south along the continental coast brought Palaeolithic 
modern humans to the Americas, filling every part of  the continent from Alaska 
to Patagonia, eventually developing Neolithic cultures based on maize or potatoes 
and even the only known examples of  Neolithic civilisations.
Humans have always been a migratory species, not surprisingly as the earliest 
bands of  H. sapiens had to be constantly on the move in pursuit of  food sources, 
whether animal or vegetable. Nor should simple human curiosity (which can be 
dangerous, but is on the whole a survival advantage) be altogether neglected. 
However the migrations of  this species, filling every habitable niche on the 
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planet, was totally unprecedented, nor has it ever ceased. Striking instances, some 
of  which will be discussed more extensively later on, include the migration of  
Indo-European speakers westwards and southwards from their point of  origin 
in the region of  modern Iran, bringing iron-using technology into Europe and 
destroying the Bronze Age Minoan and Mycenaean civilisations of  the Aegean, 
while establishing the cultural foundations of  the Indian subcontinent. 
Also, probably in the first millennium BCE, the Bantu language group spread 
southwards in sub-Saharan Africa. Greeks subsequently founded nearly a thousand 
overseas colony city states between 750 and 550 BCE – even prior to the high 
point of  classical Greece. Contemporaneously the iron-using speakers of  the 
Celtic language group covered much of  the European peninsula and beyond from 
Ireland to modern Turkey, to be followed by Germanic speakers during the first 
millennium CE, to be followed by Slavonic-speaking peoples during the same era, 
and behind them steppe nomads from further east, who brought their language to 
the Carpathian plain.6 In a rather earlier historical period migrants whom generic 
evidence links with the island of  Taiwan were settling the uninhabited islands of  
the east Pacific archipelagos.7 
In the first millennium CE there occurred the Arab migrations from their 
Arabian homeland across North Africa and up the Nile, as well as south along 
the Red Sea African coastline. In the following millennium Polynesian settlers 
colonised the uninhabited New Zealand islands and even reached a location as 
unlikely as Easter Island. During the past five centuries the extent of  migration far 
from declining, increased phenomenally, consisting of  voluntary or semi-voluntary 
migration from Europe to all the climatically temperate areas of  the planet (and in 
North America across the continent from east to west) as well as wholly coerced 
migration in the form of  the slave trade from Africa to the Americas. World 
migration continues unabated, though now largely in the opposite direction.
If  Palaeolithic humans were anything like their descendants of  historical times 
the most important pull behind their long-range migratory behaviour – outside the 
customary bounds of  their necessarily nomad lifestyle – was more than anything 
else the hope of  improving their life prospects. Since the advancing edge of  the 
expansion into uninhabited territories could have no way of  knowing what it was 
likely to encounter since there were no humans to report back, it is reasonable 
to conclude that these people moved because their existing territories were 
unsatisfactory for one reason or another, endangerment or failure of  food supply 
being the most obvious. 
Life must have been very precarious, under constant menace from drought 
which decimated plant and food animal populations and affected sources of  
drinking water; its opposite, flooding, having the same effect. Other climatic 
disadvantages would have included dust storms; volcanic eruption; intrusion 
of  predatory animals also being forced to migrate and endangering the animal 
food supply if  not humans directly. Another possibility however that cannot be 
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altogether excluded is the exact contrary – growing population putting pressure 
upon resources, or even interpersonal conflict within the hunter-gatherer society.
Primitive Revolution?
Flint was the material of  choice for the manufacture of  Palaeolithic artefacts – at 
least those which survive for the attention of  archaeologists. It is a quartz stone 
found mostly in the form of  nodules originally solidified in chalk strata, but often 
eroded out, as on beaches. It has a somewhat glassy appearance, superficially 
resembling the chemically very different and scarcer obsidian or volcanic glass. Its 
principal virtues are its hardness and the fact that it can be chipped to produce a 
very sharp edge that, when it becomes worn, can be sharpened again by further 
chipping (though not as much as obsidian which can take an edge sharper than 
the sharpest steel). 
Flint can therefore be used to form all manner of  tools, especially hand axes 
made from the core of  the nodule and cutting knives, spear points or arrowheads 
from the flakes chipped off. To produce these effects the nodule had to be flaked 
and trimmed in a precise fashion, which must have required a very high degree of  
skill and practice. At some point around 50,000 years BP it was discovered that 
by heating the flint in an appropriate fashion it could be made more malleable for 
working. When flint was unavailable, inferior sorts of  stone or other materials had 
to serve. Wooden artefacts, of  which there must have been many, seldom survive, 
though those made from bone, such as needles, or antler, including ornaments,8 
often do. Objects made from animal skin or sinew are least durable of  all, but 
occasionally leave behind traces of  their existence. Shells too might be used 
as cutting or scraping instruments or worn as jewellery, as they appear to have 
been by some Neanderthals. Ochre, a pigment derived from grinding a yellow or 
reddish pigmented clay and mixed with a suitable binding agent such as fat, for 
body decoration or marking surfaces such as cave walls, appears to have been used 
by all communities of  modern humans and probably Neanderthals as well. 
At some point between 77,000 and 69,000 years BP what has been described 
as a ‘mega-colossal’ volcanic eruption occurred on the island of  Sumatra, 
leaving behind Lake Toba, the largest volcanic lake anywhere in the world, and 
constituting possibly the most massive eruption of  the last 25 million years. The 
effect on the biosphere must have been calamitous (several metres of  ash were 
deposited as far away as India) and it is not unlikely, though not entirely certain, 
that the human population was significantly reduced, so that an ‘evolutionary 
bottleneck’ was created with no more than a few thousand breeding pairs left 
alive. If  the Recent African Origin hypothesis is justified, the eruption may have 
indeed been connected with the beginning of  the migration throughout Eurasia 
and further afield.9
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If  there is argument about the consequences of  the Toba eruption there is none 
that the event actually occurred. Similarly there is no question about the reality 
of  another development in the region of  50,000–40,000 years BP referred to at 
times as the Upper Palaeolithic Revolution, but intense disagreement regarding its 
significance. One hypothesis is that it resulted from a population surge which may 
have occurred once the presumed bottleneck consequent on the Toba eruption 
had been passed. It signified in long-term perspective a dramatic enhancement of  
human capacities in both technology and abstract culture. 
A far more diverse kit of  stone tools appears in the archaeological record from 
this point on, especially the flint blade, which must have required an especially high 
degree of  skill to produce. Composite bone and flint tools such as harpoons also 
make their appearance. For the first time in the record symbolic representations 
also appear, ‘an artistic tradition of  astonishing competency’,10 represented at its 
most accomplished level by the famous cave paintings, mostly of  game animals.
How is this to be interpreted? One school of  thought holds that genetic 
development, possibly resulting from the previous ‘evolutionary bottleneck’, 
reprogrammed the human cognitive and conceptual apparatus so that intellectual 
accomplishment previously impossible was now on the agenda, and laid the 
foundation for the remainder of  human history to date. The most far-reaching 
interpretation of  these advances is that proposed by Alan Walker, namely that 
language, as distinct from a much more primitive form of  vocal signalling, also 
had its origin at that point.
The alternative interpretation, which is also the majority view, is that while the 
Upper Palaeolithic Revolution was real enough, it was less of  a sudden novelty 
but more of  a breakthrough (not necessarily unconnected with human dispersal, 
population growth and climatic variation) based on a long previous accumulation 
of  technique and experience which eventually assumed much more advanced 
characteristics. The idea that language may have originated from no earlier than 
50,000 years BP does appear very improbable; however the hypothesis that the 
present existing linguistic groups may have originated in that era has rather more 
traction.
Clans and Initiation Rituals
Undoubtedly the earliest human collectives (as again is the case with other apes) 
were limited family groups. Clans, which necessitate the use of  conscious concep-
tualisation, and constitute a wider form of  association where the presumed genetic 
relationship is as often as not a mythical one, are a subsequent development. There 
is of  course no record of  when they made their first appearance, but ‘The Netsilik 
data suggest that foragers without clans sometimes created extensive networks of  
cooperating nonrelatives’.11
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Clans are an association of  supposedly related but separate family groups 
situated in different locations. Their material advantage is that when a particular 
familial group falls upon hard times – suffering deprivation or threatened with 
attack – other members of  the clan in better provided circumstances elsewhere 
are under a social obligation to help them out and entitled to reciprocation when 
the circumstances are reversed. To justify the arrangement a ‘blood relationship’, 
real or imagined, is invoked since kinship is of  central conceptual importance in 
such societies. All the clan members are supposedly descended from the same 
real or imagined ancestor, human or mythic, reinforced usually by supernatural 
underpinning. Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus suggest that,
[Forager] societies with clans enjoy advantages over those without them. They 
have created large groups of  people, claimed as relatives, on whom they can rely 
for defence from enemies, for amassing the foodstuffs needed for major rituals 
. . . . The advantages of  clan-based society may even tell us something about 
the disappearance of  the Neanderthals. Neanderthals displayed low population 
densities and show no archaeological evidence for social units larger than the 
extended family . . . . The Neanderthals may simply have gone the way of  most 
foragers who had no social units larger than the extended family.12 
In spite of  the importance of  birth relationships Flannery and Marcus note that 
while one is born into a family one has to be initiated into a clan, and initiation 
rituals are of  central importance in all forager communities; they continue into 
the early agrarian ones and persist even in places which develop into urban 
concentrations. It has been suggested that Greek drama had its origin in initiation 
rituals associated with the god Dionysius.13 Initiation rituals continue into the 
present, most notoriously in US student fraternities, but also in schools, military 
establishments, workplaces and suchlike institutions. They used to be an almost 
invariable feature at the conclusion of  an apprenticeship in the skilled trades of  
British industry. These latter examples are essentially rather vicious games, but 
in prehistory and among existing clan societies they were and are a very serious 
business. While extending also to women, initiation rites mostly applied to males 
and normally, though not invariably, involved interference with their genitals in 
one way or another (as tends still to be the case).
Initiation usually proceeded according to the following pattern. Groups of  young 
males on the verge of  manhood were taken away from their normal surroundings 
by designated practitioners, and subjected to painful ordeals, circumcision being 
a very common one, with the aim both of  requiring them to endure painful 
experience and to fix the experience in their memory, as well as creating a feeling of  
companionship from having suffered the ordeal together. Following this they were 
then initiated into the secrets of  the clan and the universe as understood by the clan 
elders. They were next returned to their normal surroundings where celebrations 
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were held to mark their emergence into adulthood and then full membership of  
the clan. For elites, royalty and particularly monarchs, special initiation rituals 
were often prescribed. Among one West African tribe, for example, the king was 
‘recircumcised’ – i.e. his entire penis was skinned. Presumably in this case there 
were not too many applicants for the post – which may have been the idea.
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The Neolithic Transformation and its 
Consequences: Settlement, Wealth and 
Social Differentiation
The hand of  history’s course at 8000 B.C. lies heavily on us.
              —Jared Diamond
This chapter aims to identify and examine briefly a cluster of  events which, 
sometime around 10,000 years ago following the retreat of  the last glaciation to 
date, were to set the stage for all future historical developments. The basic social 
and cultural structures that have prevailed down to the present day, examined at 
greater length throughout this volume, were initiated in this period as an inevitable 
consequence of  a fundamental shift in lifestyles. That they were a natural 
consequence is underlined by the fact that similar developments occurred quite 
independently within the space of  a few millennia in widely separated parts of  
the globe. 
According to Colin Renfrew, quoting Robert M Adams, ‘the independent 
emergence of  stratified, politically organised societies based upon a new and 
more complex division of  labour is clearly one of  those great transformations 
which have punctuated the human career only rarely, at long intervals.’1 The 
first five millennia or so of  these developments can be interpreted only through 
archaeological remains, while from around 5,000 years BP written documents 
provide evidence of  an entirely novel sort.
The First Agricultural (Neolithic) Revolution
Some signs of  incipient agricultural practices are noted as long ago as 70,000 
years BP, but these did not lead anywhere, only demonstrating the ingenuity of  
early H. sapiens. It took until the end of  the last glaciation, around 10,000 years 
BP, for the principle to be revived. At that time a Mesolithic2 hunter-gatherer 
community or communities in the region which is now termed the Fertile Crescent 
in the Middle East adopted a new lifestyle,3 and consequently according to Jared 
Diamond, ‘. . . geographic variation in whether, or when, the peoples of  different 
continents became farmers and herders explains to a large extent their subsequent 
contrasting fates.’4 
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The Mesolithic era was characterised by the disappearance of  the tundra 
big game of  the late Palaeolithic and involved instead greater emphasis on the 
gathering side of  the equation and, where possible, the adoption of  a seafood diet. 
The emerging Neolithic5 economy, in contrast to the nomadism which had defined 
earlier eras, depended principally on settled habitation, especially at this period in 
the area of  alluvial rivers. It focused on domesticated food crops, in the case of  
the Fertile Crescent emmer wheat,6 to be followed rapidly by the domestication 
of  beasts which had previously been hunted as prey, usually cattle, sheep, pigs and 
equids (principally asses; horses came later) allowing them to be used as a source 
of  meat and skin and in some cases as draught animals. No doubt rising carbon 
dioxide levels 10,000 BP proved favourable for agriculture. One consequence was 
that these pioneers had to adjust genetically to a diet containing gluten and milk, 
which previously had been rejected by human immune systems.7 They also needed, 
as historian/philosopher Ernest Gellner remarks, ‘a sense of  long-term obligation 
and permanent relations’.8
The agricultural revolution did not stop with food crops; other plant species 
were involved, and the domestication of  plant life was followed and accompanied 
by that of  animals. Dogs, all descended from wolves, are almost certainly the first 
domesticated species, and probably as early as the Palaeolithic, though the earliest 
definite skeletal evidence is no older than 15,000 years BP. Domesticated dogs 
are effective companions and assistants for Palaeolithic hunters – domesticated 
cattle, sheep, llamas, goats or pigs evidently are not. (Horses might be in principle, 
but never were in reality; they were a hunted meat source and among the last 
large animals to be domesticated, camels being the last of  all.) The domestication 
of  animals was followed by that of  birds (pigeons were probably the first) and 
even of  insects – the semi-domesticated honey bee and the wholly domesticated 
silkworm, the latter being dependent upon humans for survival, the adult breeding 
form unable even to fly. The Amerindian Neolithic societies however lacked large 
draught animals. 
Overall the consequences, even the relatively immediate ones, were enormous. 
The shift to agriculture set in motion a cycle of  development which transformed 
the human planet, at first comparatively slowly and eventually with ever-acceler-
ating speed. How it came to be initiated is far from evident and archaeology can 
only reveal its consequences, doing no more than hint at what might have been the 
motivations behind its introduction. Latterly the concept of  an original Neolithic 
Revolution, propounded by V Gordon Childe in the 1930s has been challenged 
on the grounds that the process was replicated elsewhere from the Nile to the 
Yangtze river valley to the Americas, and settlement prior to agricultural activity 
certainly occurred, and in different parts of  the world. Even so, in global terms the 
concepts appears to be valid enough. Pre-Neolithic settlements of  considerable 
size have been unearthed, most famously at Göbekli Tepe on the Turkish-Syrian 
border – though the precise sort of  activity which went on in these settlements 
Thompson T02687 01 text   28 16/12/2014   13:29
the neolIthIc tranSformatIon  29
remains disputed among archaeologists. Michael Mann, the renowned historical 
sociologist, suggests that pre-Neolithic settlements of  flint miners or fishermen 
were likely developments. 
As with revolutions of  any sort, whether political, industrial, social or Neolithic, 
the details always complicate and qualify the main outlines of  the concept. The 
Neolithic was a series of  revolutions widely separated in time and place rather 
than a single event. But the transformation in human lives which they initiated, 
eventually covering most of  the globe, was real enough. 
In societies governed by tradition as hunter-gatherers must be, sudden dramatic 
changes in lifestyle voluntarily arrived at are rare. It has been calculated that 
agricultural methods depending on vegetable products of  the sort practised by 
the Neolithic farmers have a lower nutritional yield than Mesolithic subsistence 
practices would have done, not to mention a much less congenial lifestyle for both 
sexes. As Jared Diamond points out,
There was often not even a conscious choice between food production and 
hunting-gathering. . . . in each area of  the globe the first people who adopted 
food production could obviously not have been making a conscious choice 
or consciously striving toward farming as a goal, because they had never seen 
farming and had no way of  knowing what it would be like.9
Anyone who has performed agricultural work (particularly of  the arable sort) 
without machinery will be aware what tedious, laborious and backbreaking toil is 
involved. Even when the crop has been brought in, tedium and toil continues – 
mostly for women – in grinding the grains in primitive querns; not to mention the 
work of  processing animal or vegetable fibres into cloth. The adoption of  such 
an economy can be surmised to have been compelled, most likely by changing 
climatic conditions, to gain access to a more secure source of  food supply, if  a 
still highly unreliable one. In one rare instance, namely the coast of  the Northeast 
Pacific Ocean, where seafood was unusually plentiful and easily accessed, a 
Mesolithic economy could become a settled rather than a nomadic one and no 
transition to agricultural production took place. Such possibilities do not appear 
to have obtained anywhere else, and certainly not in the Fertile Crescent where 
systematic agricultural production originated.10 Jared Diamond in his account of  
why agriculture evolved differently in different locations writes that 
[O]ne cannot decide at present whether the origins of  Chinese food production 
were contemporaneous with those in the Fertile Crescent, slightly earlier, or 
slightly later. At the least, we can say that China was one of  the world’s first centres 
of  plant and animal domestication. China may actually have encompassed two 
or more independent centres of  origins of  food production.11
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Other Examples
There is some evidence, though no certainty, that Neolithic agricultural practice 
may have spread from the Fertile Crescent to the Indus valley and laid the 
foundation for the civilisation which flourished there around the same period as 
the Egyptian, which was most likely initiated quite independently of  the Fertile 
Crescent. Both the latter and the Indus valley civilisation were dependent on 
wheat crops, as was the more developed irrigated cultivation which first emerged 
in Mesopotamia in the sixth millennium BCE.12 It is unlikely however that the later 
adoption of  rice-based agriculture in the Yangtze valley came about via cultural 
diffusion. It too is most likely to have been an entirely independent development, 
and indeed in this case the archaeological evidence demonstrates fairly clearly 
the transition from a gathering to a cultivating economy. Wherever agriculture 
developed, Mann notes, ‘the overall trend was towards greater social and territorial 
fixity . . . agricultural success was inseparable from constraint’.13
Although full understanding of  the Neolithic revolutions remains to be 
established, what is unquestionable is that the adoption of  agriculture in 
Mesoamerica and the Andean region, the former based on maize and the latter on 
potato tubers, were entirely isolated developments, independent of  each other and 
evidently of  Eurasian ones. Sub-Saharan African agricultural cultures may also have 
developed independently, though this cannot be known with certainty, and several 
independent instances in New Guinea also probably did. There is even evidence 
of  its beginnings among the Australian Aboriginals of  the temperate eastern zone, 
where the economic basis prior to European colonisation nevertheless remained 
a foraging one.
The likelihood is that if  the post-Mesolithic agricultural revolutions had not 
occurred when and where they did, they would have happened at some other 
times and places, or in other words, once Homo sapiens had covered the terrestrial 
globe this form of  living was virtually certain to emerge sooner or later once 
climatic conditions permitted the production of  food crops, even if  initially as 
a supplement to a predominantly gathering economy. The fact that the major 
instances occur within very roughly the same time period, relatively speaking, all 
over the world, suggests with near certainty that the impact of  the global warming 
which accompanied the end of  the glaciations approximately 10,000 years BP, was 
a causative factor planet-wide, both putting pressure on the existing resources 
of  a hunting and foraging economy and presenting the possibility of  alternative 
food sources. 
Jared Diamond’s ground-breaking work, Guns, Germs and Steel, includes a very 
plausible hypothesis, backed up with detailed empirical evidence, of  why Eurasian 
(and Egyptian) developments occurred much earlier and developed much further 
than those in Mesoamerica, northwestern South America, Australia or sub-Saharan 
Africa. Basically he contends that geography and biology were intrinsic to the 
respective outcomes. ‘Food production spread much more rapidly to some areas 
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than to others. A major factor contributing to those differing rates of  spread turns 
out to have been the orientation of  the continents’ axes: predominantly west-east 
for Eurasia, predominantly north-south for the Americas and Africa.’14
Consequently the principal regions of  agricultural settlement in Eurasia were 
located where food crops, particularly those derived from grasses, ripened at 
approximately similar times, encouraging their spread by imitation. Also, and more 
importantly, there were far more potential candidates to become food crops, in 
the shape of  seeds, fruits and tubers, than was the case in other parts of  the globe. 
‘Virtually all of  [the most suitable grasses] are native to Mediterranean zones or other 
seasonally dry environments. Furthermore, they are overwhelmingly concentrated 
in the Fertile Crescent or other parts of  western Eurasia’s Mediterranean zone, 
which offered a huge selection to incipient farmers.’15 They were also easier to 
domesticate – in the Americas for instance the domestication of  maize proved 
both very difficult, and regionally restricted. It took centuries to accomplish. ‘A 
next stage of  crop development [in the Fertile Crescent] included the first fruit 
and nut trees, domesticated around 4000 B.C. They comprised olives, figs, dates, 
pomegranates, and grapes.’16
The difference in availability of  animal candidates for domestication was of  
equal or perhaps even greater importance. Sheep, pigs, goats and cattle were not 
only food sources, but in the case of  the latter of  energy as well, particularly in the 
use of  oxen for transport and ploughing. Likewise with horses, somewhat later, 
and finally camels. Both of  these were sources of  milk (rather specialised ones), 
but much more generally transport and, in the case of  horses, agricultural energy 
as well. 
A massive range of  innovations accompanied these advances, ones which were 
central to all succeeding pre-industrial cultures and remain still at the forefront 
of  our own. Among the most important are woven fabrics from either animal 
or vegetable sources (wool, silk, cotton) and pottery. Although pottery figurines 
are known from the late Palaeolithic, functional use of  this substance, with one 
known exception, appeared only in the Neolithic. The pottery objects in question 
are mostly containers, and may well have originated from the practice of  lining 
with clay the baskets or skins used for transporting liquids. In Japan, pottery even 
preceded agriculture. For cutting tools or weaponry however, stone, or occasionally 
obsidian, remained universal; metal technology still lay millennia in the future. 
Even with stone technology, however, an innovation took place; one which 
has given its name to the era, Palaeolithic (Old Stone Age), replaced by Neolithic 
(New Stone Age). Alteration occurs in the appearance of  the stone instruments. 
Frequently made by grinding rather than chipping they become more polished 
and more sophisticated – their often beautiful appearance can still amaze. In some 
very fertile Mesopotamian areas where any suitable stone was lacking, sickle blades 
were made of  overfired clay, which could be as sharp as glass, but just as fragile.
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Economy and Inequality in Eurasia
This section deals with the material basis of  inequality in its earlier forms; other 
dimensions are considered in Chapter 5. Archaeology prior to the appearance 
of  the written word can only reveal to a limited degree the social structures and 
relationships of  the cultures in question, though even that limited degree can be 
substantial. The remains of  buildings can suggest, if  not with complete certainty, 
what kind of  activity occurred within them, and if  residential, clues to the relative 
status of  the occupant. Indications are even stronger if  burial remains of  the 
deceased are found within. 
The great Egyptian pyramids and Tutankhamen tomb, albeit from a literate 
culture, demonstrate beyond any possibility of  doubt the mechanical sophistication 
and expertise not to mention the riches, of  the Bronze Age society which created 
them. Individuals of  maximum wealth and prestige, especially rulers, liked to take a 
lot stuff  with them into the afterlife, even though not having future archaeologists 
in mind. The Sutton Hoo treasure accompanying the burial of  an East Anglian 
king is an example from a very different and possibly illiterate culture. Very 
few archaeological sites speak so clearly and unmistakably as these spectacular 
examples, and the degree of  social inference which can be drawn from lesser ones 
is less revealing, though it can still be considerable.17 
Certain conclusions, from the tentative to the well-established, can usually 
be arrived at. A settled lifestyle means that stuff  can be stored. With the 
multiplication of  stuff, beyond what an individual can eat, wear or carry around 
(both of  non-perishable agricultural produce and manufactured objects of  use 
or decoration) social differentiation inevitably follows. It is speeded up if  the 
well-endowed families (rather than individuals at this stage) help out their less 
privileged neighbours in times of  shortage, for this then sets up an obligation that 
sooner or later has to be repaid, possibly in labour (or sometimes sexual) services 
of  some kind, and the economic screw is tightened. Moreover, accumulated 
stuff  has to be protected from other covetous fingers and that too has social 
implications. The early Jericho possessed fortifications (the oldest known) around 
8000 BCE, long before the emergence of  the first cities in southern Mesopotamia.
The Americas
Thanks to archaeology, for a variety of  reasons the origins of  agriculture in the 
Americas is better understood. It emerged in two separate and almost entirely 
unconnected centres, namely Mesoamerica and coastal Peru, at considerably later 
dates, 4,000 to 5,000 years behind its Eurasian equivalent. A very informative 
commentary is to be found in Marcus and Flannery’s The Creation of  Inequality.
In Mesoamerica the foundation plant was maize, developed, with considerable 
difficulty from its teosinte wild ancestor. Its use spread slowly northwards into the 
North American southwest, eventually as far north as the Missouri valley. Other 
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food crops included squashes and beans. On what is now the Peruvian coast, this 
time with the foundation food being the potato, a series of  sedentary agricultural 
communities developed in the valleys of  what is now northern Peru.
As was to occur in Eurasia and Africa these communities in due course became 
part of  empires ruled by god-kings and the lineage-based elites around them. 
The Moche of  coastal Peru were to be eventually succeeded by the Inca empire 
based in the Peruvian highlands. The dominant empire in Mesoamerica following 
a series of  others, most famously the Maya in the Yucatan and adjacent areas, was 
to be the Mexica or Aztecs. In both these cases this followed a pattern familiar 
in Eurasia – the ruler of  an outlying region of  the empire or on its borders, as 
in Mesopotamia, would take over the empire using military force recruited from 
kinsmen and dependants.
If  the Eurasian equivalents are to be regarded as civilisations, these were 
certainly civilisations on any account; remarkable that they were based upon 
Neolithic technology – flint and obsidian were the materials of  choice for tools 
and weaponry, although precious metals were used for decorative purposes and 
bronze tools were starting to be manufactured in the Inca empire shortly before 
the Spanish conquest.18 It is interesting to speculate what might have been the 
outcome if  that civilisation had continued to develop undisturbed.
Social Differentiation
The archaeology of  Neolithic agricultural communities makes it evident that 
they could not have been self-sufficient, but had to engage in trade relations with 
other communities when necessities such as salt, or indeed luxuries, could not 
be locally obtained – there were undoubtedly some exchange relations even in 
the Palaeolithic era.19 In exogamous clan society trade relations may even have 
involved trade in sexual partners (and in the case of  men or women, depending 
on culture, accompanied with a dowry of  whatever stuff  the local community was 
well supplied with).
Another consequence of  agricultural settlement deserves to be mentioned. 
Since hunter-gatherer times humans20 have formed close relationships with 
consciousness-altering substances.21 Naturally, prior to agriculture these had to 
be derived from suitable wild plants of  the magic mushroom sort. Agriculture 
opened up a set of  wonderful new possibilities – the deliberate manufacture of  
intoxicating substances out of  cultivated products, including honey and fruit – 
and practically any carbohydrate would do once the technique of  fermentation 
had been developed. The use of  barley to make beer was probably the first 
development; wine followed later. 
The domestication of  animals did not remain confined to settled agricultural 
communities. In addition it permitted the emergence of  a different kind of  society 
– that of  pastoral nomads. One suggestion is that this lifestyle made its appearance 
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around 6000 BCE. Evidently not all domesticated animals were equally fit for 
a population of  nomads, no nomadic society, for example, is known to have 
concentrated on pigs. Cattle too, in many places, fit awkwardly with this form 
of  social order in view of  their rather specialised feeding patterns and nomadic 
societies dependent on cattle are largely confined to Africa. The preferred 
animal types for most pastoralist herders are the (geographically very specialised) 
reindeer and the less specialised sheep, goats, camels and horses. The legendary 
ancestors of  the Hebrew peoples were sheep herders, and, although ‘the only 
pure nomad is a poor nomad’ according to one saying, a nomadic lifestyle on 
occasion could provide opportunities for aggression or the extraction of  wealth 
from settled communities.
The latter point highlights a frequent relationship between pastoralist nomads 
and settled agricultural populations – one of  hostility and frequent hostilities. 
In some instances the pastoralists, whenever they aspired to take over a settled 
domain, proceeded to conquer rather than merely levy tribute upon it (especially 
when, as in the case of  the Huns and Mongols, they were dominated by warrior 
elites and in possession of  superior mobility). They then tended to become 
absorbed into and adopt the ways of  the more advanced cultures they had taken 
over – setting up cycle which would be repeated again in due course. The great 
medieval Arabic scholar Ibn Khaldun made this kind of  cycle the centrepiece of  
his historical theory. 
Settlement and food production from the soil, accompanied with social 
differentiation, were central themes of  the human species’ first great transformation. 
A further central theme however was that in certain geographically suitable 
parts, steppe land and savannah for the most part, stock raising and herding 
were adopted as the social norm. As a result in Eurasia and Africa an interaction 
between agriculturalists and pastoralists was set up which was to dominate 
significant stretches of  pre-modern history. Key aspects of  this will be dealt with 
in subsequent chapters. 
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Gender Differentiation, Sex and Kindred
It is a remarkable feat of  nature to weave powerful sexual feelings and desire in the fabric of  
the brain without revealing the reproductive purpose of  those feelings to the eager participants. 
—Jaak Panskepp
The basic evolutionary function of  the human species, as of  all life, is to reproduce 
itself, with all other activities being directed to that central purpose. As in that 
of  their closest biological relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, as well as the 
slightly more distant other great apes and gibbons (though not monkeys) human 
reproduction is untypical of  most animals both vertebrate and invertebrate. 
It is not seasonal,1 but can occur at any time of  the year. Humans, while less 
unique than used to be thought within the animal kingdom2 in terms of  their 
sexual practice, are certainly more inventive and versatile; their anatomy enables 
them to assume a multiplicity of  copulatory positions far beyond the scope of  
any other animal, and certainly no other creature has access to the enjoyments of  
pornography. Sadistic and masochistic behaviours in the sexual sense also appear 
to be confined to humans. Humans are also the only animals which take pains to 
conceal their genitals in public, though there are many variant forms within this all 
but universal practice. 
As noted in the previous chapter humans – or rather hominins, for the 
point relates not only to H. sapiens and Neanderthals, but to H. erectus and its 
evolutionary predecessors as well – are the sole mammalian true bipeds. This 
anatomical peculiarity has enormous consequences not only in the obvious senses 
of  locomotion and the freeing up of  the forelimbs for all manner of  activities 
including toolmaking, but socio-sexual implications of  the most profound sort, 
especially when conjoined with the evolutionary hypertrophy of  brain and skull. 
It all represented a very marked difference in hominin social behaviour compared 
with that of  other apes. ‘With their hands free, females were able to carry their 
infants, hold and tend them more intimately, and provide for their needs better, 
perhaps, than nonhuman primates to whom infants must cling as their mothers 
move about quadrupedally.’3
The pelvises of  non-human apes, basically arboreal creatures, are relatively 
long and narrow and adapted for quadrupedal locomotion on the ground. The 
hominin pelvis is shaped very differently, and in females is particularly broad and 
shallow in accordance with the necessities of  bipedal pregnancy, and in addition 
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the uterus and vagina are placed more forward in the abdomen. Compared with 
apes the bipedal hominin female genitalia are more concealed between the legs 
– whatever significance that may have had for gender and sexual relations in 
hominin society prior to the adoption of  coverings. These changes also make 
face-to-face copulation possible and usually the preferred position, something 
very unfeasible for quadrupedal mammals, and this may well have had implications 
for pair bonding, though of  course it is impossible to know. 
The Importance of Grandmothers
Of  cardinal importance for hominin social relations, however, is the relevance 
of  the hominin (as far as we are concerned, human) female sexual apparatus for 
childbirth to produce an infant with a relatively huge skull. Evolution has assisted 
by making the infant’s skull plates capable of  movement to narrow the head during 
passage through the birth canal, but that is only a partial solution. Evolution must 
have favoured the females best adapted to survive the ‘obstetrical dilemma’ of  
giving birth to infants with skull formations of  exceptional difficulty compared 
with those of  other primates. To cope with that problem, as the species evolved 
infants were born increasingly immature and therefore requiring longer stretches 
of  nursing and dependency.4 
Moreover the human vagina is ill-placed to permit unassisted birth, which 
other ape mothers can do quite easily. It is possible with humans, but extremely 
difficult and very dangerous – assisted birth is overwhelmingly the norm. And 
who better to provide the assistance than the mother’s own mother, aunts or other 
experienced older relatives? Hence the importance of  grandmothers to human 
evolution and social evolution, and this consideration is not the only one. 
Human infants, toddlers and children, even in forager societies, partly because of  
their physical constitution, partly on account of  the amount of  social learning they 
have to undertake, have an exceptionally long period of  dependency compared to 
any other animal, and yet population sustainability requires mothers to undertake 
subsequent pregnancies and childbirths while their earlier children remain in a 
dependent state. Here again grandmothers and great-aunts provide the biological-
social solution. Female apes die soon after their menopause; human females do 
not. Kurtz argues that ‘The grandmother hypothesis suggests that postmenopausal 
women played an unheralded role in the evolution from an ape-like life-history to 
one more like that characteristic of  the genus Homo and their associated social 
organizations, especially the family’.5
Sex, Fertility and their Policing 
An idea prevalent in the nineteenth century that early humans lived together in a 
‘primitive horde’ practising totally unregulated sexual relations is almost certainly 
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mythical.6 All social primates sustain a rank order system in their groups (even 
bonobos, where it is least emphatic) and such ranking almost invariably implies 
differential access to sexual partners. The almost complete promiscuity of  the 
bonobos (mother–son unions however seem to be avoided) is very much the 
exception. Differences in rank as a means of  restricting and regulating sexual 
activity is one thing; the need to control population growth in an environment 
of  scarce resources is another; encouraging it when the problem is scarcity rather 
than surplus of  population is something else again. In every known human society 
in time or space where evidence exists, sexual activity has been hedged around 
with rules and qualifications and often enough with cultural motivations reaching 
far beyond those of  simple population control. 
Noting first of  all social restrictions whose rationale is relatively transparent; 
populations of  hunter-gatherer societies and those dependent on unsophisticated 
forms of  agriculture always have very complex systems of  family relationship and 
incest prohibitions which extend far beyond the circle of  immediate relatives.7 
The number of  permissible potential sexual partners is therefore restricted and 
those eventually selected (usually by relatives) more often than not confined to 
persons outside the local community. Thus the intake of  new members into the 
community and the immediate family can be controlled, and possibly advantageous 
bargaining over territorial rights or dowry (depending on resources available) can 
be undertaken. 
In such societies, especially where there is strong and permanent environmental 
pressure and a need to restrict population growth, obstacles to enjoyable intercourse 
may be enjoined by the elders; or even drastic forms of  male genital mutilation, 
usually carried out as part of  an initiation ritual, such as crushing one testicle, 
may be performed to reduce fertility without destroying it altogether; a practice in 
some Australian Aboriginal societies. On the other hand, when increased fertility 
is at a premium, one response is to forbid any sort of  sexual behaviour which 
avoids or lowers the likelihood of  conception. The injunctions in the Mosaic law 
against either coitus interruptus, or sex with a menstruating woman (liable to the 
death penalty in Hebrew society) are examples of  such social control.
Generally speaking, it is the increase rather than the restriction of  fertility which 
is most commonly favoured, for in prescientific societies death rates from natal 
mortality, injury, disease or aggression are always in danger of  outstripping live 
birth rates, though agricultural societies had the advantage over nomadic as their 
mothers could attend simultaneously to larger numbers of  infants. Moreover, 
a population with large numbers of  healthy males is more likely to prevail in 
warfare over one with fewer. From the point of  view of  parents in agrarian 
societies numerous offspring to work in the fields are an advantage, and they also 
provide an insurance for old age – provided the parents are not living in a society 
which practises compulsory euthanasia upon its members incapacitated by age 
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or infirmity, mainly nomadic ones such as Arctic hunters, but sometimes also 
agricultural ones, as formerly with Japanese peasants. 
Sexuality dominates, overtly or covertly, the overwhelmingly greater part of  
cultural practice in any society. Garments, as well as giving practical protection 
against the elements, are designed with few exceptions to either emphasise or 
hide sexual features, depending on gender or culture; cosmetics to emphasise 
them.8 Throughout all recorded history genders have been distinguished by 
dress codes, often emphatically so – contemporary examples include regimes 
like the Gulf  states and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the contemporary style 
of  androgynous clothing, originating in the twentieth century, symbolised by 
blue jeans and now very widely favoured in Western and East Asian societies, is 
historically unprecedented and is still disapproved of  in formal contexts even in 
those countries where its wearing is everyday routine.
Few narratives, from folk tales to television dramas fail to be concerned with 
gender relations or more explicitly sexual ones, either immediately or at one or two 
removes. In modern popular songs these dominate overwhelmingly. Gender and 
sexual relations, frequently linked to property considerations, occupy a large part 
of  legal prescription and practice. In modern times scientific research has many 
other concerns but remains affected by unequal gender relations that demean the 
roles played by women. 
Sex and Power
The degree of  gender inequality varies between cultures, but to a greater or 
lesser extent it appears to be historically a human universal, or very nearly so, 
accepted as the natural order of  things and challenged only in very recent times. 
Its origins, it may be safely assumed, lie far beyond recorded history. Mythological 
justifications were advanced – in Hebrew legend the deity had created man first, 
the first woman had been formed from his rib and moreover had been the first to 
taste the calamitous fruit and then tempt her man to do likewise. In Greek legend 
a woman had been responsible for releasing all the inflictions that humanity had 
to suffer. In Chinese legend by contrast a goddess creates humanity – not that it 
much improved the position of  Chinese women.
Writing in the late nineteenth century, Friedrich Engels, in The Origins of  
the Family, Private Property and the State, drawing his evidence from the work of  
anthropologist Lewis Morgan, attributed masculine dominance, succeeding in his 
view an earlier era of  gender equality or possibly matriarchy, to the development 
of  intensive agriculture and stock rearing Dealing with large animals, in this 
interpretation, required men to take the leading role on account of  their larger 
muscles. Domination and patriarchy followed naturally, ‘the great historical defeat 
of  the female sex’, according to Simone de Beauvoir in the historical section of  
The Second Sex. She criticises Engels for a degree of  superficiality in not accounting 
for the subjective motivations behind the developments, ‘ . . . the most important 
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problems are slurred over . . . it is impossible to deduce [original italics] the 
oppression of  women from the institution of  private property’.9 Nevertheless she 
is in accord with his anthropological outlook, which though innovative in its own 
day must now be regarded as dated.
However there can be little doubt that gender differentiation and subsequently 
sexual inequality and oppression is rooted in the sexual division of  labour, partly 
based on biological difference, more significantly on custom and usage driven by 
self-interest accruing to the emergent dominant sex. Once social habits become 
seriously embedded, especially with the force of  self-interest behind them 
they are extraordinarily difficult to uproot, and when the self-interest relates to 
something as fundamental and consciousness-dominating as sexual activity, then 
immeasurably more so. 
The driving force of  sexuality in the course of  history combined with gender 
differentiation was to have grim consequences. As noted above, precedence in the 
social hierarchy tends to give males access to larger numbers of  sexual partners, and 
with the accumulation of  wealth made possible by the agricultural revolution of  
ten or eleven thousand years ago, then with the institution of  slavery and directed 
aggression, one of  the accumulation possibilities open to dominant males, was 
that of  harems10 of  captive women, evident in the earliest written records and not 
yet wholly extinct in the twenty-first century. 
The rulers of  Bronze Age and subsequent empires – Egyptian, Assyrian, 
Babylonian, Indian, Chinese, Aztec and Inca – naturally possessed the most 
extensive harems, generally though not invariably staffed by eunuchs; but 
subordinate officials and favoured subjects also practised the custom. It was one 
dramatic aspect of  the general and comprehensive subordination and subjection 
of  women which accompanied the advance into agriculture, cities, literacy and 
metal working. There is no record of  the occasional female ruler, even the grim 
and successful nineteenth-century Ranavalona of  Madagascar, having a retinue of  
male sex slaves; at least I have never heard of  one, although Roman and Byzantine 
matrons were said to entertain themselves sexually with eunuchs and the Empress 
Catherine of  Russia maintained a cohort of  lovers. However, prior to the twentieth 
century, women who could openly please themselves with whom they selected or 
discarded as sexual partners were rare indeed.
So far as eunuchs were concerned, they first appear in the historical record of  
the Sumerian cities and later imperial powers multiplied their numbers. Imperial 
Chinese dynasties from the earliest onwards manufactured them on an industrial 
scale and other cultures were not much behindhand. Their condition was intended 
to ensure that they could never challenge the power-holders either politically or 
sexually. The civil service in Byzantium was staffed largely by eunuchs some of  
whom rose to high positions in the church and military  – generals, admirals, and 
in one case the highest church office, the Metropolitan of  Constantinople. During 
the seventh-century Arab siege of  Constantinople the opposing admirals on both 
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sides were eunuchs. The medieval Roman church, by contrast, though it used in 
its choirs eunuch songsters termed castrati, forbade any eunuch to become a cleric 
(as was the case in Judaism) and newly-appointed Popes were allegedly checked to 
ensure that they remained complete. 
Some Examples
Sex and Christianity
The official, as distinct from the actual, morality of  Roman culture was fairly 
sexually restrictive in the first place and the Christian church enhanced this 
enormously. It disapproved of  sex and disapproved of  it intensely, regarding it as 
the badge of  mankind’s fall from divine grace, initially due to womankind. In such 
Christian communities for a married person to decide upon total abstinence from 
sexual relations was highly approved of, and perpetual virginity was even better. 
Jerome, one of  the church fathers remarked that the only excuse for sex was that 
it produced potential virgins. 
Both Jesus’s reported statements and Paul’s writings favoured celibacy 
(non-marriage) and chastity (non-sex),11 probably because both expected the 
apocalypse to occur very soon, and therefore did not need to consider the future 
of  the community. As Jesus is reported to have advised, ‘Take no thought for 
tomorrow, for tomorrow will take thought for itself ’.12 In addition there was 
the influence carried into Christianity of  sexual restrictions embodied in Jewish 
tradition and foreign to Roman culture. Considerable numbers of  early Christians 
both male and female adopted these styles. Their choice was believed to confer 
not only holiness but also freedom, ‘the paradise of  virginity’, and in certain 
respects undoubtedly it did. It released those who opted for it, both men and 
women – often against the bitter opposition of  their pagan extended families – 
from compulsory sex and onerous family obligations, and in the case of  women 
multiple and dangerous childbearing. All that, though, was without any particular 
reference to the creation story. 
In the early fourth century the sin of  disobedience in the Genesis legend 
became identified with sexual sin in western Christian tradition (less so in what 
became the eastern Orthodox and Coptic churches). All those who took the text 
literally were in accord that Adam and Eve’s disobedience had brought disaster on 
their descendants, but the text itself  scarcely hints that their sin itself  was sexual, 
only that eating the forbidden fruit caused them to realise that they were naked. 
Moreover, baptism and faith in Christ were assumed to relieve believers from 
their ancestral sin and return them to the freedom Adam and Eve had forfeited by 
their misdemeanour.
The ideological shift which stood this understanding on its head was due above 
all to the gruesome twosome of  the late fourth century (when the empire was still 
intact) and the early fifth (when it was collapsing in the west); namely Jerome, the 
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Bible translator, and Augustine the bishop of  Hippo in Roman North Africa. Both 
were men of  ferocious polemic in speech and writing and, according to their own 
statements, of  a ravenous sexuality which they hated in themselves. Sex in their 
opinion was both the marker of  God’s displeasure and the punishment for it, ‘the 
proof  and penalty’.13 According to Augustine human nature was irreversibly and 
incorrigibly corrupt. Redemption was possible through divine grace alone, and that 
would be extended only to a minority. The more widespread the abstention from 
sex the better both in the empire – and beyond, as far as Christian missionaries 
could reach and thereby expand that minority.
Clerics
The church however was presented with a dilemma in this regard (it was presented 
with many others as well, as are discussed in Chapter 9). Sex and reproduction 
there must be, however undesirable, if  Christian men and women were to be 
around until the apocalypse (expected shortly) and be present to experience its 
accompanying horrors. (Those who took the principle to its logical conclusion 
and argued that the creator of  the universe was an evil god were soon sidelined.) 
The answer arrived at was to separate off  the truly holy ones who refrained wholly 
from sexual contact; first of  all as hermits in desert areas, or sitting up on pillars 
all their days, and then in convents which might be either for men or for women 
(preferably virgins). Economic forces were not absent either, and fathers could 
save the expense of  dowries by compelling their daughters to become nuns.14 
These religiously separated individuals therefore remained detached from 
the remainder of  reprobate mankind, to practise their holiness undisturbed as a 
fulltime occupation. Of  course they depended on wealthy members of  reprobate 
mankind to support their sanctity, but these, along with their inferiors, could 
still enjoy a lesser form of  salvation by doing and believing (above all believing) 
what the clergy told them. The Buddhist monks and Hindu Sadhus (somewhat 
intermediate between hermits and monks) were and are very similar in conception 
to their Christian counterparts – withdrawal from worldly concerns in order to 
concentrate on holy matters and rituals, though the variety of  practices between 
and within each religion (Japanese and Taiwanese Buddhist monks and nuns 
can even marry) make generalisation difficult, except to note that some orders 
of  Christian monks engaged in manual (usually agricultural) labour as part of  
their discipline. 
What in the Christian church were known as the ‘secular clergy’, comprising 
everything from archbishops to parish deacons, who did the spadework of  keeping 
the reprobate up to the mark, occupied an intermediate position between the 
sanctity of  the monks and nuns on the one hand and the sinful laity, from kings 
to serfs, on the other. In the early Christian church these clergy were normally 
married, but following the eleventh century separation between the Roman church 
and the Eastern Orthodox or Byzantine portion the papacy became increasingly 
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insistent on celibacy for all of  its clergy. The motivation behind this was to prevent 
possession of  any benefice from parish to archbishopric becoming hereditary, as 
would otherwise tend to happen. It did not of  course stop clergymen (even monks 
and abbots) from fathering children, but these were stigmatised as bastards and 
ineligible to inherit. In the Byzantine empire, where the hereditary principle was 
less embedded, the parish clergy continued to be married, as they still are in the 
Orthodox church, higher ranks being recruited from the celibate monastic clergy.
The Western church was also from the same period busy tightening up marriage 
regulations and inheritance principles; Stephanie Coontz refers to, ‘the variety – 
and ambiguity – of  marriages in the Middle Ages’.15 The eighth-to-ninth-century 
emperor Charlemagne, though regarded as an ornament of  Christianity, had several 
wives and numerous concubines. He prohibited his daughters from marrying 
but did not object to their lovers. The illegitimacy of  the (appropriately named) 
William the Bastard did not stop him from becoming duke of  Normandy and 
subsequently king of  England – in subsequent centuries that kind of  thing would 
have been impossible, and indeed the new rules stopped William’s illegitimate 
grandsons from being considered monarchical candidates. 
During these centuries, a bastard if  suitably placed could rise very high (the 
founder of  my university was a priest’s son and a bishop) but could not anywhere 
in Europe legitimately aspire to a crown. Those who tried to do so had to pretend 
they were actually legitimate. The church was also significantly widening the scope 
of  prohibited degrees – the closeness or consanguinity of  relationship within 
which it was forbidden to marry or, as a rule, to conduct sexual relations. The aim 
was, by restricting the availability of  marriage partners, to inhibit concentration of  
wealth in aristocratic families and encourage its donation to the church instead, for 
the church was desperate for legacies and in addition all secular households were 
legally obliged to hand over a tithe amounting a tenth of  their income.
Gender Inflictions
The inauguration of  agriculture, civilisation, and property beyond modest personal 
artefacts, was especially bad news for women. With property came inheritance 
and with inheritance considerations of  paternity. Women became virtually a trade 
commodity, compulsorily assigned to husbands/masters according to family 
advantage and subject to far-reaching behavioural restrictions and even genital 
mutilation to ensure their compliance. The degree of  restriction varied according 
to local culture and the rank of  their male relatives. If  peasant women were treated 
relatively less severely than aristocratic ones in this respect, it was only because 
they were less valuable commodities and required enough scope in which to do 
heavy manual labour – the Chinese custom of  foot-binding for example disabled 
any woman from fieldwork.
In the nineteenth century Engels noted that the initial division of  labour was the 
gender one (although he didn’t use that term). This was undoubtedly the case even 
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during the Palaeolithic era. The differences in reproductive responsibilities – the 
sexual division of  labour – no doubt provided the basis for the gender division, 
as pregnancy, childbirth and lactation (and to a lesser extent menstruation) put 
women at a physical disadvantage when it came to gender relations – not to speak 
of  sexual dimorphism, the fact that men generally are bigger and stronger. In 
short, males were favourably placed to load the ‘shit-work’ onto women, in some 
instances quite literally. In the rural community in which I partially grew up, with 
no running water or sanitation, emptying the buckets from the dry lavatories into 
the sea was the province of  women. Women among the elites of  course delegated 
such tasks onto female domestic servants.
Anastasia Banschikova, using surviving advisory literature aimed at the literate 
classes with reference to ancient Egypt, writes of, 
[A] complex picture of  a gradual evolution of  Egyptian stereotypes of  the 
woman from the Old Kingdom concept of  wife as ‘the second power’ in 
the married couple the relations with whom are to be mutually balanced and 
aimed at obtaining psychological harmony between husband and wife as two 
autonomous friendly persons – through the New Kingdom concept of  wife as 
the ‘family co-manager’ of  her husband, while their relations are aimed mainly 
at providing ‘usefulness for domestic wealth’ (at the same moment the motif  of  
adultery emerges in the Teachings for the first time) to the Late Period concept 
of  essentially, at heart bad and corrupted woman who is not regarded as a real 
personality anymore.16
The evidence cited in this article suggests a steady deterioration in the social 
position of  Egyptian women over the two thousand years from the middle of  the 
third millennium BCE to the first millennium. 
[T]he only aim of  marriage is to acquire posterity; the woman’s personality is 
fully ignored and/or dishonoured as well as any possibility to get psychological 
contact with her. The only example of  family relations which provokes the 
author’s special attention is adultery of  a wife which is presented as a constant 
threat to every husband caused by the common nature of  women ‘as they are’, 
not by any specific negative situation within this or that family . . . to teach a 
woman is the same as to try to fill a torn bag with sand.17
In classical Athens (custom varied between Greek city states and Spartan women 
were unusually liberated by the standards of  the times) women were especially 
badly treated, secluded within households, and compelled to marry an available 
cousin should she be the only heir on her father’s death – even if  this involved 
divorcing the husband she was already married to. The heiress had to be kept 
‘in the family’. ‘[I]n the heyday of  ancient democracy the subjugation of  women 
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was [regarded as] not only just, but preferable to the liberty they had formerly 
enjoyed.’18 Two millennia later Martin Luther was to assert that he had as much or 
more reason for concern about who sired his daughters’ children as he would have 
for which stallions impregnated his mares. 
Over the entire range of  written history women have been subjugated, placed 
under the patriarchal control of  male relatives backed up by male legislators and 
opinion-formers, treated as commodities or as ornaments. In a few places, such as 
antique Serbia, it was possible for women who had forsworn sexual activity to be 
accepted as honorary men, but that was anomalous and still designated men as the 
superior sex. Walter Benjamin’s remark quoted at the beginning of  this volume can 
be extended to note that the history of  civilisation is also the history of  misogyny 
– a state of  affairs which is far from having been satisfactorily changed, even if  
some initial steps in some parts of  the world have been taken during the past 
century or so.
Sex – Procreative and Recreative
Sexual activity among humans can be undertaken either for enjoyment or 
procreation, or both together. Undoubtedly the former is the primary motivation 
in the overwhelming majority of  sexual encounters (or likewise with solitary sex), 
much though that reality has been fiercely denounced throughout history by assorted 
moralists. (It is not accidental that the word ‘morality’ in the English language is 
taken to refer to sexual morality unless specifically stated to be otherwise.)
It is in the area of  sexual interaction surely that gender inequality has been most 
pronounced. Throughout recorded history and no doubt for millennia before 
that, men have by force imposed themselves sexually upon women (sometimes of  
course also on other men, and juveniles of  both sexes). It was accepted as simply 
being the way things were, and until late in the twentieth century men in Britain 
were legally entitled whenever inclined to rape the woman they were married to. 
Even where marital rape has been made illegal, the distress occasioned to the 
victim by having to take a partner to court is a great deterrent to exposure.
Of  all the forms of  subordination to which women have been subjected, sexual 
subordination and other forms of  violence in the home must through endless ages 
have been the most intimately and keenly felt – and this is not even taking into 
account molestation or abuse of  children by adults, or – what used to be extremely 
prevalent in former centuries – of  servants, especially girls, by employers or their 
relatives when domestic servants were a prevalent part of  the social landscape. 
The development of  what would in our own time be widely (though far from 
universally) regarded as the ideal of  sexual activity – that it should be voluntarily 
entered into between fully consenting adult partners on an equal footing without 
any constraint or coercion on either side – has a long and painful history. How far 
it still differs from the present actual reality is a measure, notwithstanding power 
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imbalances in homosexual and gender relations, of  the personal suffering endured 
in this dimension by over half  the world’s population.
Marriage and Divorce
Although its forms have been infinitely variable in all known societies and cultures 
an institution equivalent to what we call ‘marriage’ has been a central social fact, 
with formally monogamous unions generally being the norm. Only elites as a 
rule could afford the costs of  recognised polygamy in the cultures where it was 
accepted, though of  course monogamy, regardless of  prohibitions and injunctions, 
has always been, as someone once expressed it, ‘ragged at the edges’. The primary 
purpose of  marriage has likewise always been the procreation, nourishment and 
social education of  the next generation, though accommodating additional other 
purposes, among them, in all non-forager societies, the question of  property 
regulation, especially inheritance.
Throughout recorded history, and most likely prior to that as well, marriage has 
been a family arrangement, rather than an agreement between two individuals. In 
circumstances where children, especially daughters, are regarded as a species of  
property and no premarital association with potential marriage partners permitted, 
arranged marriages, i.e. ones arranged by parents and relatives often with property 
and/or dynastic considerations in mind, follow naturally, and might well apply 
to widows (less so widowers) as well as to unmarried young women. In cultures 
where arranged marriages are the norm, marriage brokers play a role equivalent to 
estate agents dealing with properties in home-owning societies. 
The dowry system, which has also prevailed throughout diverse cultures ever 
since settled agriculture and stock-rearing became the central forms of  sustenance 
and social living, has been the occasion of  immeasurable heartbreak. Essentially it 
was an exchange of  stuff  between families on the occasion of  familial acceptance 
of  an unmarried individual from another family as a marriage partner. In some 
instances it was the man or his family who had to provide the dowry, as with 
African cattle herders, but far more frequently the dowry came with the woman. 
Inability to provide a dowry rendered a woman unmarriageable at all levels of  
society except the most destitute, and to avoid this disgrace borrowing would be 
resorted to, more often with very evil consequences (see Chapter Six). 
The evils of  dowry payments are by no means extinct in the present day. In 
India, although formally illegal, they are still demanded and the demand accepted. 
This has led to the scandal of  bride burning, episodes in which the groom’s 
family, dissatisfied with the level of  the dowry payment, have demanded more and 
frequently escalated the demands after initially receiving the additions. If  still not 
satisfied the result has been that the bride is murdered, usually by being burned 
alive with kerosene, since that can be passed off  as a domestic accident and the 
reality is difficult to prove. 
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Sex and Love
Historically therefore the individuals involved have had minimal or no choice in the 
selection of  their marriage partners, with women, as usual, being the more severely 
affected gender. Historically, the Catholic church did insist that marriage should 
be a relationship entered into voluntarily, but this was a rule more honoured in the 
breach than the observance, for family pressure, again especially on women, would 
normally produce the appearance of  a fictitious consent. In medieval Europe 
(and not only in these past times, according to Terry Eagleton in his memoir The 
Gatekeeper) surplus daughters would be obliged in the same manner to become 
‘brides of  Christ’ and enter convents. The current state of  affairs throughout 
most of  Western culture, in which most forms of  consenting adult sex are socially 
acceptable (though not in all of  its localities and notwithstanding a reservoir of  
popular prejudice) is historically unprecedented, and the speed at which it has been 
accomplished, within less than a century, is dramatic and startling.
Though by no means universal, throughout large areas of  the globe in present 
times the accepted norm is that individuals are mutually free to choose which 
partners of  the opposite sex they prefer, while arranged marriages, though not 
outlawed, are often frowned upon and forced marriage of  the traditional kind, 
now conducted underhand, is regarded with horror and contempt; and in some 
countries is a criminal offence. Marriage, as distinct from casual sex, is supposed 
to be based on mutual attraction with a sexual foundation but embracing a much 
wider degree of  sentiment, designated in English by that ambiguous term ‘love’. 
The notion that this should be the normal form of  marriage was abroad in the 
seventeenth century, particularly strongly in England during the middle decades 
of  that century where revolution enabled it to be expressed freely, and in the same 
country the newly-invented literary form of  novels were full of  narratives of  ‘true 
love’ struggling against parental repression.
It has been seriously argued that romantic love is a modern, possibly even a 
twentieth-century, concept, but certainly no older than European late medieval 
times. The evidence is quite otherwise. Hebrew legend includes the story of  Jacob 
and Rachel, which in its current form dates from around the middle of  the first 
millennium BCE, but is certainly based on an earlier folk legend. The central 
legend of  classical Greece is based upon an adulterous love match. Hero and 
Leander are also part of  Greek mythology. The Lancelot-Guinevere story and 
its Tristan-Iseult counterpart, are medieval in their present form, but are based 
on much older legends, the latter possibly originating in Persia. More prosaically, 
Heloise and Abelard were actual people, and though medieval, twelfth century 
not late medieval. Humans are complex animals and it is entirely to be expected 
that strong sexual attraction between two individuals should have resonances in 
consciousness far beyond the immediately physical. 
Throughout recorded history marriage has invariably been a most unequal 
institution – a man at the bottom of  the pecking order in every other respect, even 
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a household slave, could if  married, act as a domestic tyrant, and the occasional 
man tyrannised over by his wife was regarded as doubly contemptible. Such 
inequality extended as well, not surprisingly, to the termination of  marriage. The 
absolute prohibition of  divorce by the Christian church19 (though it could be got 
around by annulment) was unusual. Most societies made provision for it by civil 
law (or its equivalent if  literacy was lacking).
Needless to say divorce was often a male-only prerogative, 20 in one case only 
requiring the husband to say ‘I divorce thee’ three times. The frequency of  divorce, 
even in such situations, however was inhibited by consequences relating to children 
(it was easier if  there were none; indeed ‘barrenness’ was frequently a justifiable 
ground for divorce) and often required the repayment of  any dowry the wife 
had brought to the marriage. There were historical instances in which women 
were legally allowed to initiate divorce proceedings on a variety of  grounds, in 
the Roman state for example, but that was a practical possibility only with family 
support. If  that were lacking the wife had no protection against intimidation – or 
destitution when no longer supported by her husband. 
One acerbic epigram has it that in marriage women sell themselves (or are sold) 
wholesale, in prostitution by retail. Prostitution, euphemistically termed ‘the oldest 
profession’ also appears as a social phenomenon in the earliest written records. In 
antiquity a very large proportion of  the prostitutes both male and female staffing 
the numerous brothels to be found throughout towns and cities were slaves being 
hired out by their owners, or if  not technically slaves were reduced by destitution 
into selling their bodies in such a manner. Freelance courtesans and ‘street girls’ 
(the term is used in the Egyptian writings cited above) did exist throughout the 
centuries, but the latter were, and continued to be in all cultures, despised as the 
lowest of  the low, exploited by pimps, or if  selling themselves independently, in 
constant danger of  being robbed, injured or murdered by clients or rivals.
Where prostitution has been regulated by law, which has been the case in most 
societies at least since the Sumerian civilisation, the law was biased in favour of  the 
men paying for sex and against the women/boys selling themselves or being sold – 
not least because the clients were often enough powerful men or soldiers; situations 
therefore where work, sex and power were particularly closely interlinked.
Pregnancy and Contraception
Though it is only seldom the immediate purpose of  heterosexual intercourse, 
pregnancy is always a possible outcome, and if  not in a socially authorised and 
condoned relationship, a most unwelcome one. Even in ‘respectable’ but unequal 
relationships where sex is effectively coerced and contraception absent repeated 
pregnancies could result, so that one pregnancy was barely ended before another 
began, with consequent pressures on family resources and the mother’s health.
Many and varied methods of  variable effectiveness both of  preventing and 
terminating pregnancy have been in use since ancient times. Some were purely 
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ritualistic and purely ineffective, such as that reported of  1950s Britain, that 
crossing one’s fingers during sex, or assuming that particular positions would 
inhibit conception. An anonymous webpage notes that some ‘were, admittedly, 
more terrifying than most of  the methods in use today’.21 A particularly lethal one, 
supposedly advised in China, was drinking hot mercury. Coitus interruptus (a very 
chancy method), anal sex and varied forms of  non-penetrative sex, were widely 
employed, even when, as often, resolutely prohibited by authority – so far as these 
matters can be documented. Condoms date back at least several centuries and with 
their rubber manufacture from the late nineteenth century onwards, became easily 
the most popular method of  contraception (and very profitable to manufacturers) 
before the invention of  the contraceptive pill in the 1960s. 
There is an interesting and telling light thrown on gender relationships by this 
last comparison. The use of  condoms required men to take the contraceptive 
responsibility; with the spreading popularity of  the pill it was women, even though 
the use of  condoms presented no medical risks and there was no certainty that 
the continued use of  the pill did not – certainly it had fairly extensive hormonal 
effects. Whether or not the pill liberated women sexually – enormously (as 
generally believed), partially or not at all, certainly it accompanied the undoubted 
sexual revolution of  the late twentieth century in industrialised Western societies. 
This was marked by general social acceptance of  premarital, and to some extent 
extramarital, sex and to some degree of  accepting homosexuality, as well as to 
a great broadening of  sexual discourse. Condoms continue to be used; in some 
circumstances their use is emphasised as protective barriers against infection, 
particularly since the 1980s from the initially untreatable HIV and a small indicator 
of  how far sexual attitudes have moved in those cultures is the ready availability of  
condom-dispensing machines on all manner of  premises.
At any rate, until very recently in all cultures and still surviving in some, 
conceiving a child outside of  the prescribed restrictions (which of  course varied 
according to time and place) was, as the evidence of  illicit sexual activity, a source 
of  humiliation, contempt and brutal sanctions. At best it meant censure and loss 
of  honour, at worst murder or execution even if  the conception had resulted from 
rape (which unless committed by an invading army, and even then still meriting 
dishonour, was supposedly always the woman’s fault). 
Same-sex Sex
In past ages, at least in Western cultures, any form of  sexual activity apart from 
orthodox vaginal copulation in the ‘missionary position’ (the term is indicative) has 
been denounced by authority as ‘unnatural’.22 As noted previously, nothing could 
be further from the truth, the use of  the term in this context is purely ideological in 
the worst sense and aimed at the assertion of  power and control. Among humans, 
children viewing or playing with their own and their peers’ genitals of  both their 
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own and the other sex is natural enough, and not necessarily to be categorised as 
sexual, but very possibly as an exploratory satisfying of  curiosity. 
Both observation of  non-human animals and the history of  humans demonstrate 
that same-sex eroticism is perfectly ‘normal’, though in human societies where 
it was tolerated or even approved was usually practised within a framework of  
conventional rules, and within such cultures no contradiction was imagined 
between homosexual and heterosexual eroticism. Julius Caesar was famously 
designated according to Suetonius, as ‘every man’s woman and each woman’s man’. 
In imperial China sexual relations between a teacher and his male student were 
regarded as normal. In classical Athens the general and author Xenophon was 
regarded as ‘queer’ because he was attracted solely to women in a culture where 
bisexuality was the norm. Conversely, Tom Driberg, a British MP of  the 1950s, 
whose preferred form of  sex was to practise fellatio on any available male, was 
horrified and appalled at the idea of  sexual contact with a woman – including 
the one he had married for the appearance of  respectability. At least since Alfred 
Kinsey produced his research on sexuality in the 1940s and 50s, it seems likely that 
most humans are born, or else develop in childhood, as innately bisexual along a 
spectrum of  homosexuality/heterosexuality, but that some occupy one or other 
of  the extreme ends. The sociologist David T Evans, in his 1993 volume Sexual 
Citizenship, particularly Chapter 6, argues a very strong case along these lines.23
In the Hebrew and Judaic law and culture, however, homosexual acts, along 
with other forms of  non-procreative sex, were denounced relentlessly, and this 
anathema was passed on to Christianity and majority Islam. The outcome was a 
cascade of  discrimination, cruelty and death throughout the centuries. Much if  
not most of  it was undoubtedly due to plain malice and fear of  the Other. The 
persecutors satisfied their consciences, though, with the conviction that if  they 
did not expunge such offensive breakers of  divine sexual law these outcasts would 
contaminate the population and provoke divine wrath (the legend of  Sodom was 
always to hand). The Byzantine emperor Justinian asserted that laws against sodomy 
were essential, as such activity was the cause of  earthquakes, and contemporary 
incidents both in the US and the UK demonstrate that similar convictions are not 
yet dead, right-wing politicians in both countries having attributed natural disasters 
to toleration of  homosexuality.
Though homosexuality was decriminalised in the Turkish empire in the 
nineteenth century, in most contemporary Islamic states prohibition is fiercely 
asserted and in some punished with execution. Not until the 1960s did most 
Christian-majority countries begin to dismantle legal prohibitions and penalties, 
a development still fiercely resisted with bigoted passion by right-wing Christians 
in the United States, who continue to invoke the threat of  divine punishment 
(for example the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center) on account of  legal 
tolerance. And everywhere the road from tolerance to acceptance has been a 
long one.24 
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Kinship
Importance
Throughout the entire course of  human history the bonds of  kinship have been 
of  cardinal importance, the very foundation stone of  social relationships. They 
remain so, and although partially weakening in some contemporary societies, 
nevertheless even in the most ‘developed’ countries of  the present century still 
retain a great deal of  importance. You were/are supposed to be able to trust your 
kin in a fashion greater than with outsiders. In Scotland, for example, at least 
until the earlier twentieth century, the word ‘friends’ also meant kinsfolk. Kinship 
provides a metaphor for all manner of  non-biological relationships – fatherland, 
motherland, ‘father of  the people’, ‘kith and kin’, and the use of  ‘Father’ as a title 
in the Roman Catholic priesthood.
Evidently the English word ‘kin’, which is the root of  the words ‘kind’ and 
’kindness’, named a primary reality of  human culture down the ages. Nor was this 
kind of  connection the case only at the level of  intimate personal acquaintance, 
such as between parents and offspring or siblings brought up together in nuclear 
families; it extended and extends far more widely, even to persons one has never 
heard of  if  a genetic relationship is unexpectedly revealed, such as a child given up 
for adoption encountering its biological parent as an adult. 
The political and administrative structures both of  the Greek cities and of  
Rome were based on presumed (though not actual) clan structures. In hereditary 
monarchies when the monarch died without an obvious heir the nearest living 
‘blood’ (i.e. genetic) relative was sought for in order to fill the vacancy. It was 
a situation of  this sort which led to the Anglo-Scottish independence wars of  
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Today property disputes are 
notorious between relatives of  the deceased, even those who have scarcely known 
the late departed, or each other. 
The Muslim community of  believers divided into Sunni and Shia over events 
in the seventh century hinging on the issue of  blood relationship to Muhammad. 
The Christian community which emerged at the end of  the first century CE was 
presumably fortunate that its founder, Saul of  Tarsus, had no descendants, or 
similar splits would have been likely (other kinds of  split are dealt with in Chapter 
9). Among the original Christian community in Jerusalem kinship with Jesus of  
Nazareth was indeed a qualification for leadership, but that community was wiped 
out by the Romans in consequence of  the Jewish revolt in 70 CE (the later claim 
that it emigrated and survived is mythical).
Kin Structures
Although we have of  course no direct evidence from that era, we can be more 
than reasonably confident that the kin group formed the nucleus of  early human 
communities and that nomadic bands consisting of  a few dozen individuals 
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represented the earliest expansion of  such communities. All forager and subsistence 
agriculture societies that appear in the record are organised on kin principles and 
down the centuries as communities expanded, as cities were established and states 
created, matters scarcely changed. Work was organised along kinship lines both in 
urban and in rural settings. 
Agricultural plots of  land everywhere were occupied and worked on a 
family basis with family labour central, though outsiders lacking their own 
property might be recruited into the household if  the family were prosperous 
peasants, and among pastoralists the animals upon which they depended were 
family-owned. Largely hereditary aristocracies dominated the settled agricultural 
population. Landownership or occupancy or rural trade proceeded from father 
to son (or occasionally daughter or other relative) and in urban settings sons 
followed their fathers into artisan occupations. In the Indian subcontinent such 
relationships became rigidified into the caste system, a strictly hereditary culture; 
another example of  how work, sex and power became tightly imbricated, and 
re-emphasising that kinship structures in agrarian-based societies are based upon 
and reinforce inequality (including gender inequality) in terms of  power.
At the top of  the Hindu caste system however were what we might term 
cultural workers  – the priesthood or Brahmins. This was also a closed hereditary 
occupation, as it was in parallel cases in other parts of  Eurasia, but not in the 
cultures descended from imperial Rome, whether east or west, for there the 
topmost clergy, and in the West all clergy, were required to give up hereditary 
succession, though they could still practice nepotism – handing on their office and 
privileges to male relatives if  not offspring. At the summit of  the secular order 
however, the hereditary principle prevailed from the most powerful empires to 
the most insignificant outlying monarchies such as the Welsh princes (though in 
Byzantium it was rather looser). The Medici family in republican Florence from 
the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries built up their quasi-monarchical power 
both through their immense wealth and also by means of  constructing a network 
of  kin alliances. Their increasing power having brought them into conflict with 
the popes, they extended the strategy by getting their relatives into the college of  
cardinals and eventually securing the papacy itself.
In areas not well controlled by central authority – primarily isolated agricultural 
ones – family or clan feuds, often with serious fatalities, were recurrent phenomena. 
Avenging a fellow clansperson was a duty and cardinal obligation. Areas of  special 
notoriety in Europe were the Balkans in general and Albania in particular, also 
Sardinia and Corsica, with the Mafia replicating the phenomenon in the less 
isolated and more urbanised Sicily. The Scottish highlands were notorious in their 
time, as were the ‘backwoods’ of  the eastern United States, which were the scene 
of  bitter feuding between biologically related clans of  farmers and illicit distillers. 
Other parts of  the world were anything but exempt – Jared Diamond cites an 
instructive example from the New Guinea highlands: ‘My first husband was killed 
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by Elopi raiders. My second husband was killed by a man who wanted me, and 
who became my third husband. That husband was killed by the brother of  my 
second husband, seeking to avenge his murder.’25
Regular succession to the top position in the earlier medieval period as often 
as not did not pass to an eldest son, but always to a close relative of  the deceased 
ruler (in Scotland the relative who killed him); the principle of  primogeniture, 
the succession of  the eldest son followed by nearest male relatives in order of  
proximity and age, and applied to all title holders, was not established until well 
into the second millennium CE and never in every place.
Prior to the modern era the family, which could include servants and slaves as 
well as relatives, was thus in all cultures and societies usually the site of  production, 
of  occupational training, of  education (depending on social status) and of  its close 
sibling, ideological indoctrination, though the role of  religious functionaries in 
the latter was also conspicuous. The importance of  the family was all-pervasive 
 – in imperial China both Daoist and Confucian culture for example, stressed 
family obligations (including to ancestors as well as living members); it permeates 
the Jewish scriptures – though the Christian ones of  the New Testament can be 
seen on some readings as anti-family. This reflected the tensions which could 
be generated if  some family members accepted the new religion and others 
did not and the bonds of  kinship came in conflict with those of  faith – though 
when the soon-expected apocalypse failed to occur Christianity soon became as 
family-centred as any other faith. 
The impact of  industrialisation from the eighteenth century onwards significantly 
changed the nature of  the family, though neither dramatically nor rapidly. It 
tended to become more nuclear and less extended, though that was a slow process. 
Indeed it may have been essential to the industrialisation process, and not only 
because families were a necessary precondition for there to be another generation 
of  operatives. For the industrial enterprises, both manufacturing and financial 
which were set up were generally family firms, where sons or close relatives were 
expected to take over from the founder, and many a dispute and antagonism was 
generated by these relationships, which time and again were reflected in fiction. 
Dickens’s Dombey and Son is a representative case from the nineteenth century. 
In French nineteenth-century politics the capitalist elite were referred to by 
their enemies as the ‘200 families’. Pétain’s Vichy regime of  1940–44 attempted 
to replace the revolutionary slogans of  ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’ with ‘Work, 
Family, Fatherland’, (Travaille, Famille, Patrie) satirically translated by the Resistance 
as ‘Forced labour, 200 families, Betrayed fatherland’ (Travaille forcé, 200 familles, 
Patrie trahie). Throughout the twentieth century reactionary movements around 
the globe have made a point of  emphasising their dedication to ‘the family’, 
while radical movements and trade union organisations frequently refer to their 
members as ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’.
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In Protestant cultures, there was an emphasis on family worship; fathers, with 
family prayers and bible readings, being supposed to supplement the endeavours 
of  the clergy. Robert Burns’s poem The Cottar’s Saturday Night, which relates to 
the late eighteenth century, is a representative example. The cottar was a lowly 
type of  agricultural labourer, and the importance of  the family to the economic 
transformation applied as much to the labouring classes as to the moneyed strata. 
The family unit was naturally essential to the production and reproduction of  the 
labour force, with parents and extended family members having responsibility for 
the care and upbringing of  the emerging intake of  labour units. This continued 
until late into the nineteenth century without any state intervention, until a literate 
labour force became necessary with the advance of  technology and industrial 
organisation.
Families of  the period were frequently very large and functioned as a collective 
of  all its members, with older children, unless and until they entered the paid 
labour force, recruited to look after younger ones, with gender roles and gender 
hierarchies strongly emphasised. In the early years of  British industrialisation, 
with textiles moving into factory production during the initial decades of  the 
nineteenth century, the child labourers employed in the spinning mills (though 
sometimes recruited from orphanages or workhouses) most often worked under 
the supervision of  their parents, especially mothers, employed in the same mill, 
with the overlookers supervising the parents.
Families can be very brutal environments, and the historical written record may 
only reveal the tip of  the iceberg. The tyrannical mother-in-law was a standard 
trope of  Chinese literature; wicked stepmothers feature prominently in Western 
storytelling and the tyrannising of  children, including adult children and especially 
female ones, by parents is recorded all over the globe. With children viewed as 
a form of  property and serving as economic and social assets at all levels of  
society, this was to be expected, and violence and fear were means ready to hand 
to enforce the parents’ preference. The fifteenth-century Paston letters, a unique 
documentation of  relations in an upwardly mobile, proto-bourgeois English 
family, record the repeated beating of  a daughter to force her into the marriage 
her parents wanted to arrange for her (they failed). 
Indeed, prior to the twentieth century, violence and terror were the 
recommended strategies for child rearing and education in practically all cultures. 
In ancient Rome the paterfamilias was even entitled to execute his adult children 
if  they offended him too severely – surely the ultimate expression of  patriarchy. 
Though females were and are the principal sufferers from patriarchy, and indeed 
in contemporary discourse it has come to apply almost exclusively to gender 
relations, historically males were by no means exempt. A notorious instance is 
the panic over masturbation of  both male and female sorts, which prevailed in 
Western culture during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indulgence 
in masturbation, male or female was supposed to lead to all manner of  ailments, 
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most prominently insanity, and a range of  ingenious devices were advertised in the 
public prints to enable parents to stop adolescent boys and girls playing with their 
genitals. Genital mutilation was even resorted to. 
Kin connections have been a central element throughout all history, and 
necessarily so, as without them a social species could never have survived, let 
alone have gone on to form wider communities. Religious structures have 
been built around them, most famously in eastern Asia. Apart from the intense 
emotional relationships involved, they have served as crucial support mechanisms, 
both in normal times and more especially during episodes of  crisis. Even in the 
contemporary world, where, outside the nuclear family, their practical significance 
is much weaker than in previous eras, they remain of  enormous importance. It is 
no accident that such relationships continue to be central to imaginative narratives.
However there is also a downside, and often enough kin relations can also 
be tyrannical ones in many dimensions – especially when they are imbricated 
with property relations and the preservation and extension of  accumulated 
family property comes to be considered more important than the welfare of  
individual kinspersons or indeed of  public property. For example, the notorious 
corruption problems which have plagued newly-independent countries from the 
mid-twentieth century, are not all down to individual greed and egotism but also 
to kinship demands upon politicians and government servants who are expected 
to share their larger incomes through a widely extended kin network and take 
unethical advantage of  their positions. As the discussion above underlines kinship 
pressures too, have throughout history functioned as a very powerful mechanism 
for enforcing unequal and inequitable gender relations. Kinship is a universal aspect 
of  human reality but its impact in different cultures has been very differential – 
both for good and for ill.
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5
Status Differentiation, Hierarchy 
and Hegemony
I like the insight that for more than 90 percent of  their existence on earth, human groups 
sought to prevent the emergence of  states. 
—Michael Mann (The Sources of  Social Power, Vol. 1)
The mastery gained by one person or group is at the expense of  the loss of  power of  another 
person or group. 
—Ian Kershaw (Hitler, 1889–1936)
This chapter discusses the transition and development from conditions of  minimal 
social hierarchy to one of  maximum differentiation in power and privilege, their 
economic foundation having been outlined in Chapter 3. The aim is to discuss 
how achievement-based societies became oppressive and class-divided ones, the 
forms of  hierarchy, oppression and inequality which have largely constituted 
the fabric of  history since their initial establishment. It deals with hierarchy in 
the more general sense; subsequent chapters with its particular manifestations. 
The development which commences with emergence of  agrarian societies 
around 10,000 years BP intensified with the beginnings of  urbanisation around 
5,000–6,000 years BP, which saw the establishment of  god-kings, unaccountable 
elites and absolute rulers. 
Previous chapters have sketched the framework of  human development, so 
far as can be ascertained, with significant attention to what used to be known 
as ‘prehistory’, namely the epochs which preceded the invention of  literacy and 
the appearance of  written records. The latter innovation, commencing in Eurasia 
around 5,000 years ago and coinciding roughly with the beginnings of  what we 
are pleased to term civilisation, opened up an enormous and much clearer new 
window into the past as well as introducing unprecedented forms of  social order 
for the communities subject to rulers with literacy at their disposal. At a later stage 
parallel developments, though on a very different technological basis, occurred in 
the Americas.
Some Theoretical Considerations
Human reality can be expressed in the paradoxical phrase, ‘we are not what we are 
and we are what we are not’. In other words, individuals are constantly projecting 
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themselves towards the future to the achievement of  goals which vary according 
to the individual and the culture in which they are situated. Once achieved these 
goals lead on to further ones, either in the same direction or others – it is virtually 
impossible for very long to simply enjoy passively what one has attained. 
The fundamental project may be something as simple and basic as perpetuating 
oneself  in one’s offspring or either escaping from an intolerable situation or 
schooling oneself  to endure it; or it may be as ambitious and complex as unravelling 
the secrets of  the universe. It is important to understand how basic a part of  the 
human reality this is. It applies as much to the most banal of  projects as to the 
most ambitious, to the most worthy as well as the most discreditable. Our sights 
are always set on the next target even if  that should be no greater than bringing 
in next year’s harvest, marrying off  one’s daughter to a satisfactory suitor and 
dodging the baron’s latest imposition. 
In the days of  Christendom the ultimate target for most believers was to get 
to heaven. In a different time, situation and culture, when we have unlocked the 
secrets of  the atom we have to move on to tackle those of  the quark and the Higgs 
boson. This chapter aims to discuss the manner and social context in which these 
attributes of  the human condition (in phenomenological terms being and being-
for-others) are transformed into the drive to dominate, command and control, to 
stand highly not only in achievement and esteem but likewise in wealth and power, 
so that the stage is reached when, according to a saying from feudal Hungary, 
‘Beneath the rank of  baron no-one exists’.
In our contemporary society it is no accidental shortcoming that when a 
squillionaire has accumulated more wealth than anyone could possibly use in 
a hundred lifetimes they should still want to accumulate more; or, a little more 
modestly, when a salary runs into the hundreds of  thousands of  pounds, euros 
or dollars it should still be insufficient – shock horror, ‘his bonus is bigger 
than mine!’ 
Politicians who reach very high office regard themselves as failures and are so 
regarded by history if  they fail to become prime minister or president. If  they do 
achieve that pinnacle of  ambition the attainment is still not enough, they want 
to be accounted a great one, and even if, like Winston Churchill, they succeed 
in the latter ambition they still want to cling to office. Less significantly, it is 
never enough to be number two on the tennis circuit, it is essential to be at the 
very top.1 
Thus, among the most attractive of  objectives to strive for is thymos, the desire 
to stand well in the estimate of  others. All societies exhibit this phenomenon, but 
only in complex ones with substantial material production does it turn into the 
ambition to exceed others, and better still to dominate them. The point is relevant 
to both genders, though because in the past and still to an extent in the present 
males are more in the public eye, it appears to apply more prominently to them.
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Preserving Equality
Hunter-gatherer societies that survived into the recent past, or occasionally still 
do, were always, anthropologists report, relatively egalitarian, at least among the 
males, and such hierarchy as existed was based on little more than esteem. Indeed, 
a variety of  social devices were employed to keep matters that way, extending from 
mockery and satire directed against individuals tending to ‘get above themselves’2 
to the assassination of  incorrigibly insufferable ones by ‘counterdominant 
coalitions’. ‘My hypothesis has been that the immediate agency that created a 
shameful conscience was punitive social selection . . . .’3 Christopher Boehm goes 
so far as to suggest that ‘[possibly] antihierarchical feelings are an important and 
evolved component of  human nature. It is notable how hard the !Kung worked 
to prevent a meritocracy of  good hunters from arising’,4 he remarks, although the 
very fact that these precautions were necessary suggest that hierarchical ambitions 
were also present, if  to a lesser extent than egalitarian principles. 
Nevertheless in the few hunter-gatherer societies which still exist and doubtless 
in those of  the past and the deep past, some differences of  status are to be found, 
if  only ones of  esteem and not very marked – between childhood and adulthood, 
initiated and uninitiated, between differences of  physical strength and energy for 
example, or number of  surviving children, the most capable hunter or gatherer as 
compared to those less competent – and most importantly the person or persons 
who communicated with the spirits of  the natural world and/or with those of  
the dead. Boehm advances the interesting hypothesis that in the Palaeolithic and 
the Mesolithic which succeeded it, the alpha persons of  these societies were not 
humans but ancestral spirits or the supernatural beings invented as explanations 
of  natural phenomena. 
Leaders then, such as they were, could be no more than what Boehm calls 
‘betas’. A degree of  leadership though, would probably have been necessary in 
hunting large game animals. If  that was a practical consideration, however, so 
was the necessary sharing, though not necessarily an equal one, of  the carcass 
following a successful hunt. But, and most importantly, there was necessitated 
the willing cooperation of  a hunting band in dangerous circumstances, for which 
only voluntary cooperation and willing acceptance of  leadership could work. 
Any attempt to apply coercion would undermine solidarity, reduce efficiency and 
challenge the need for the group members to be able to rely absolutely on each 
other. This willingness could only be made possible by preserving a large measure 
of  egalitarianism among the hunters. 
Equality Undermined
It was this kind of  situation that Marx and Engels characterised as one of  
‘primitive communism’ – rather naively, for reality was much more complicated 
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than that, especially when the status of  women is taken into account. Nevertheless 
they had a point, for what in the Palaeolithic and Mesolithic had been societies 
unable to sustain much social differentiation and whose division of  labour, if  
any, had been the gender one, was succeeded by collectives with dramatic social 
divisions, hierarchies and domination. Signs could be seen as early as the clan 
system outlined in Chapter Two.
With the beginnings of  agriculture, clans, being composed of  separate units, 
began to fracture into sections, with some claiming superiority over others. The 
expectation that a favour by one individual or group to another will be reciprocated 
at some point appears to be nearly a universal attribute of  humans in all places and 
times, which in agricultural societies develop more complex forms. It has great 
advantages, but also very marked downsides, for it is a powerful lever of  social 
differentiation,5 as Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus suggest:
Clans have an ‘us versus them’ mentality that changes the logic of  human 
[interaction]. Societies with clans are much more likely to engage in group 
violence than clanless societies . . . . Societies with clans also tend to have greater 
levels of  social inequality. . . . The germ of  such inequality may have been 
present already in the late Ice Age.6
However the transition to dominance hierarchies was far from immediate, and was 
for a long time restricted both socially and geographically:
[V]illage societies with achievement-based leadership were among the most 
common in the world. They were remarkably stable societies, made up of  descent 
groups that exchanged brides and gifts, honoured their ancestors, considered 
everyone equal at birth, yet threw their support behind gifted kinsmen who 
sought to achieve renown. . . Achievement based societies became common as 
soon as [various regions] had adopted agriculture and village life.7
Certainly such societies persisted at local level even under the overall rule of  
mighty empires, a point made at an earlier period by Marx in his account of  Indian 
society, and repeated with emphasis by Mann, writing of  village structures, even 
when overlaid by hierarchical empires; he notes that ‘No general social evolution occurred 
beyond the rank societies of  early, settled, neolithic societies’8 The lords of  humankind, in 
order to assume their new roles removed themselves from village life. 
Citification: Hierarchy and Subordination Intensified
Agrarian societies in all parts of  the world, once they had extended geographically, 
developed highly stratified forms of  hierarchy. In any explanation of  this, certain 
logistical realities have to be kept in mind. As explained above, hierarchy of  a sort 
exists in hunter-gatherer societies, but owing to their economic situation, it has to 
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be based largely, almost entirely, on status – the shaman, the leader thanks to his 
(always ‘his’) physical prowess, skill in the hunt, descent from a renowned ancestor. 
Serious distinction in goods in addition to prestige, requires a settled society 
producing a large surplus of  stuff. It requires more than that however – servants 
and guards and a network of  wider support that enables a high-status individual to 
emerge as a ruler over a defined territory.9 The ruler moreover must have sufficient 
resources from which followers can be rewarded. Ideologically, as the earliest 
written evidence shows, generosity is a highly acclaimed virtue in any ruler – at 
its most extreme this could give rise to the potlatch of  Native Americans of  the 
Northeast Pacific; ceremonies which were centred on competitive gift-giving or 
even deliberate destruction of  valuable objects.
The outcome of  the evolution of  Neolithic settlement, both in Eurasia and the 
Americas was urbanisation, and with that hierarchy reached new levels of  intensity 
and differentiation. On the long view this occurred around approximately the same 
timescale – 3000–1000 BCE, which in Eurasia and Mesoamerica coincides roughly 
with the emergence of  written script, a highly effective tool of  government on 
this scale, Sumerian cuneiform being the earliest clear example. The coagulation 
of  village communities into urban settlements must certainly have been a complex 
process, and one requiring to have in place a system in which the urbanised area 
drew its resources from the surrounding agricultural area and sustained trading 
relations with more distant ones.
Cities also emerge into history as centres of  religious cult – in the ideological 
narratives which are recorded, the cities were creation of  a god or gods. With the 
appearance of  cities we enter the domain of  civilisation, which, after all, simply 
means ‘citified’. In Mann’s words:
Civilisation is the most problematic term, because so value-laden . . . civilisation 
combines three social institutions, the ceremonial centre, writing, and the city. 
Where combined they inaugurate a jump in human collective power over nature 
and over humans . . . that is the onset of  something new. . . . I use the metaphor 
of  a social cage.10 
Regularly, at least in riverine civilisations dependent on alluvial agriculture, 
this produced the hierarchy to end all hierarchies – the institution of  god-kings 
combining divine attributes with earthly authority. Such dynasties appeared 
in Sumer, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, China, Mesoamerica and the Andes – the 
situation in the Indus valley civilisation is unknown, due to its script being as 
yet undecipherable, but archaeology suggests that its society was less stratified 
than those mentioned. ‘The Egyptian monarchy is the first we know of  in which 
the ruler was, in effect, one of  the supernatural alphas.’11 However this kind of  
institution was by no means confined to such geographies but later on could arise 
anywhere, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific islands.
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There were variations in the degree of  divinity attributed to these rulers. At the 
most extreme level the king actually was the embodiment of  the god in human 
form, like the Egyptian Pharaoh, who was worshipped as the personification of  
Horus, who was supposed to inhabit whichever Pharaoh was the reigning one. 
Alternatively he (always ‘he’ with very rare exceptions) might not actually be the 
god itself  but physically descended from him or her, like the Japanese emperors, or 
more modestly, be human but especially selected by the god, such as the Hebrew 
monarchs – a tradition which continues down to the present and remains inscribed 
on the British coinage.12 Most modestly of  all, the Roman emperors before 
Constantine (apart from Caligula who is reported to have claimed to be a god) 
remained human during their lifetime, but could, if  well-regarded, be promoted 
to divinity following their death.13 Vespasian on his deathbed is supposed to have 
complained, ‘I think I am becoming a god!’
If  we consider in general why hierarchies developed and extended along with 
advances in urbanisation and technique the answer must be, to use modern 
terminology, a combination of  pragmatic, psychological and ideological 
considerations. Self  evidently, an increasingly complex web of  social organisation 
requires expansion of  the corps of  organisers, but there seems no reason in 
principle why this could not have happened on much more egalitarian lines than 
what everywhere actually became the reality.
However if  the alpha male who had emerged from the alpha clan to become the 
central executive officer and rise into rulership was regarded as the representative 
of  and mediator with the gods, or indeed an actual god himself, and being onside 
with the gods was viewed as essential to public welfare, then a mechanism, powered 
by thymos, was in place for that individual to demand increasing power of  command, 
deference, acknowledgement of  divinity or near divinity, and immoderate material 
artefacts devoted to his majesty, such as the Egyptian pyramid tombs.
The immediate servants of  the god-king, especially those who directly ministered 
to his divinity, the priesthood, naturally occupied an especially privileged position. 
Their position was normally strengthened by monopoly possession, if  not of  
basic literacy itself, of  control of  public narrative, and of  other monopolies as 
well, such as that of  sacrifice to the god – the Jewish Bible recounts the strenuous 
efforts of  the Jerusalem priesthood to enforce this monopoly. The god-king’s 
secular servants as well, such as generals and lay administrators, benefited from 
their proximity to the fount of  authority, and the servants of  the top servants 
possessed in their lesser estate lesser privileges, but still privileges.
The most important of  these privileges was that of  possession, and the cardinal 
possession was that of  the ultimate resource of  an agricultural society, namely land, 
which had been initially communally owned and worked. Ownership, property 
beyond that of  personal effects, now comes into the picture, although not yet 
necessarily resulting in private property. The landed possession of  a royal servant 
might be revocable at will by the monarch, though in the case of  the priesthood 
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that would be unlikely, for their properties were supposed to be that of  the god 
(the existence of  rival gods might complicate matters). Though the monarch 
might be supposed to actually embody the god, that was only for his lifetime, and 
so the priesthood enjoyed provided pretty secure corporate possession of  their 
lands. ‘Clearly, then’, as David Graeber expresses it, ‘property is not a relation 
between a person and a thing. It’s an understanding or arrangement between 
people concerning things’.14
Of  course ownership of  land is little use to anybody unless it is utilised for food 
production or other economic activity, and royal servants certainly would not be 
doing that with their own hands. A labour force was consequently required, which 
implied the necessity of  coercion, physical or ideological (usually the former), for 
who would voluntarily toil on behalf  of  someone else for no reward but purely out 
of  altruism? The consequences are discussed in Chapter 6.
Hierarchy and New Technologies
The process of  early urbanisation in Eurasia and Egypt was associated with and 
accompanied by a cluster of  technological and other social developments – the 
two principal ones being written script and metallurgy. These acted to further 
divide the division of  labour and economic differentiation and therefore a further 
mechanism for intensifying hierarchical division. The impact of  these, like 
urbanisation itself, was historically monumental. 
Writing
The earliest written scripts, particularly the cuneiform of  Sumer, which spread 
throughout the Mesopotamian region, is thought to have originated in the use of  
symbols to keep accounts of  trading and tax relations. They were impressed on 
clay with a reed stylus, clay being the most convenient medium available in the 
region. Later they were carved on rock, leaving, other things being equal, records 
that would last not merely for centuries but for millennia. 
These latter texts of  course were royal proclamations or records of  royal triumphs, 
frequently boasting of  successful battles, massacres, tortures and enslavement. The 
contemporary Egyptian dynasties also left plenty of  monumental carved records, 
using the Egyptian pictogram or hieroglyphic script, but the Egyptians also made 
use of  another medium, papyrus, made from reeds and which could be regarded 
as a form of  paper – certainly the word is derived from it. It was marked with ink, 
again using a reed stylus, unlike the Chinese ideogram script, which was done with 
a brush. Papyrus, made from organic material, is very perishable of  course, but 
in the particular Egyptian conditions of  soil and climate, could, if  protected, last 
for centuries. The first alphabetic script, the Phoenician, from which all others are 
descended was again devised for the purposes of  trade – the Phoenicians were a 
great trading community.
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The possession of  literacy – which need not necessarily mean that a particular 
individual was literate, but might instead be that they were in a position to 
employ scribes who had mastered the technique – provided immense hierarchical 
advantages. It divided a population between the lettered and unlettered, the 
command or lack of  a symbolic resource which went beyond mere speech and 
those who commanded it were the possessors of  wealth and other privileges. 
They therefore had the leisure to learn to read if  so inclined, or if  not to hire 
literate scribes.
Such advantages permitted rulers to communicate more effectively and at long 
distance, transmitting orders and receiving reports to and from their governing 
subordinates. It enabled them to keep records of  taxes and services owed and 
which were paid or remaining unpaid. It preserved records of  their achievements 
and ancestry, both important considerations. It gave concrete form to the law 
codes. It took on great ideological significance, consolidating the religious beliefs 
which underpinned social function and validated the rulers’ position.
Literacy in those eras (one might see an analogy with software programming 
in our own) was a craft profession, intended at that time to serve the purposes 
of  elites. Scribes, the masters of  the craft, wrote and read for their masters, not 
for themselves. The possession of  this tool, strengthening the grip of  rulers 
and priests, enabled them ‘to facilitate the enslavement of  other human beings’, 
according to Claude Levi Strauss.15 
This context repeated itself  (one is almost tempted to say ‘to the letter’) in 
the Mesoamerican Neolithic civilisation. The Andean Inca society did not have 
a written script but used a code of  knotted cords to convey information. The 
outcome was a similar one. Social differentiation was particularly emphasised 
when the script was cuneiform, ideographic or pictographic – to master any of  
these required long training and practice. The appearance of  alphabetic script 
may well have enabled literacy to spread more widely – it nevertheless remained 
a possession of  elites and gave them enormous social and cultural advantage. It 
is not surprising that the illiterate should have regarded written documents with 
awe and imagined that if  something, particularly laws, was written down it must 
certainly possess authority. 
Metallurgy
Metals, apart from gold and native copper (difficult to find but relatively easy to 
work) are difficult to produce and process. You need training in the techniques. 
They mostly require great heat and an intimate knowledge of  how to handle 
both the raw material and the finished product to give the right result – how to 
turn the ore into crude metal and that into a useable object. This usually required 
knowledge of  how to combine it with exactly the right quantity and character of  
alloy. Get it slightly wrong and the finished object – tool, container or weapon – 
could be useless. The Japanese swordsmiths of  the European medieval era were 
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probably the ultimate non-mechanised technicians, but the steel they employed lay 
millennia in the future. 
The first metal to be smelted and formed into a functional or decorative object 
was copper, naturally enough since it is the easiest. The renowned iceman – the 
frozen corpse of  a Neolithic traveller discovered in the Alps relatively recently, 
preserved for over five millennia by the frozen environment – had among the 
possessions found beside him an axe with a copper blade.16 The disadvantage of  
pure copper is that as well as not being particularly plentiful it is also relatively soft 
and therefore, while easy to work, of  limited advantage as a tool or weapon. Mixed 
with tin or zinc17 however, it gives much harder materials – bronze or brass – and 
these, particularly the former came to be widely used in various functions, one of  
them giving its name to a historical era – the Bronze Age. 
The early urban civilisations of  the Middle East and China, both dating roughly 
to the third millennium BCE, were cognate with the use of  bronze as the metal of  
choice, but since its raw materials were relatively scarce ones (tin is plentiful but 
of  little use on its own) its products were correspondingly valuable ones and so 
stone remained in wide usage for less esteemed purposes, such as ploughshares 
or hammers. In the Chinese context bronze was used almost exclusively for 
ritual objects. 
Iron Age
Iron overcomes these disadvantages – the ore is plentiful and when alloyed produces 
an object far harder and much cheaper than a bronze one. Its disadvantage is that 
it is much harder to work and requires a much higher temperature (steel, which 
is an alloy of  iron and carbon, even more so). Nevertheless these disadvantages 
were overcome and iron came to displace bronze for useful instruments – in parts 
of  East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, to oversimplify somewhat, the Neolithic 
passed directly into the Iron Age at an uncertain date but probably during the 
first millennium BCE. With each of  the earlier technological/cultural revolutions, 
which, it is necessary to bear in mind, were gradual rather than overnight 
developments, social structures were very significantly affected. The general line 
of  development in the movement from stone to bronze, the urbanisation process 
and the establishment of  written scripts, was to widen and reinforce the gap 
between elites and the mass of  the population over whom they exercised their elite 
powers. Ownership of  bronze weaponry and armour was a mark of  high status. 
The advent of  ironworking technology, which probably began in Anatolia 
but because of  its inherent difficulty took time to develop, redressed the balance 
somewhat for a time, as iron was both a superior metal and much more widely 
available once the technology was established. A peasant armed with an iron axe 
could take on and possess an advantage over a Homeric warrior with his bronze 
sword. Moreover iron tools, now widely available, meant the possibility of  much 
higher productivity in agriculture and handicrafts. Mann suggests that the Iron Age 
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revolution may have generated a self-conscious subordinate agricultural class. The 
Greek poet Hesiod (seventh or eighth century BCE) would be an iconic example.18
The immediate results of  the metallic transition however were chaotic,19 and 
involved the overrunning and destruction of  Bronze Age empires throughout the 
Middle East on either side of  1000 BCE. The cheapness and availability of  iron 
shifted the power balance towards rain-watered agriculturalists and nomads on the 
fringes of  the Bronze Age civilisations. Mann suggests that iron put an end to the 
superiority of  the chariot as an instrument of  war. Undoubtedly there occurred 
large-scale violent migrations within the eastern Mediterranean around this time, 
though their exact character is obscure. 
Among those which went down were the Mycenaean kingdoms of  mainland 
Greece, empires and kingdoms in the fertile crescent and the Hittite empire 
in Anatolia (ironically, it having been a pioneer of  iron use) and eventually the 
Egyptian empire. Having fought off  the early attacks from the rather mysterious 
‘sea peoples’ it was successively overrun by its Assyrian, Persian and Macedonian 
rivals. Possibly it may have been the same socio-political environment of  the 
earlier centuries of  the first millennium BCE which enabled the establishment 
of  the Hebrew kingdoms around that period. According to Michael Mann ‘The 
collapse of  the Hittites and the Mycenaeans, and the retreat of  Egypt to the Nile, 
left a power vacuum along the eastern shores of  the Mediterranean. The whole 
area became decentralised and petty states abounded’.20 What is striking is that 
within a few short centuries, when this ‘dark age’ ended, the divine monarchies had 
reasserted themselves, expansionist and tyrannical as ever, even more misogynist 
than their predecessors and with a growing taste for eunuchs. 
Empires
The Middle East empires of  the first millennium BCE, once the chaotic conditions 
of  the transition had passed, were what we would term as the earliest Iron Age 
civilisations, were it not that their written records cause them to be regarded 
as historical (the archaeological concept of  ‘Iron Age’ is applied to preliterate 
communities). They copied in a fairly exact or even more strongly emphasised 
form, the hierarchies and habits of  their Bronze Age predecessors. 
A succession of  these empires dominated the entire region, beginning with 
the Assyrian, through the Babylonian, succeeded by the Persian, followed by the 
Hellenistic and eventually the Roman. The associated peasantries, including the 
Egyptian (along with their rulers)21 were the victims of  them all, though even 
by the standards of  Bronze Age or later monarchies, the Assyrian empire,22 with 
its capital at Nineveh in northern Mesopotamia, had a particularly unsavoury 
reputation. This was not only because of  their kings’ ruthless aggression, which 
employed massacre, mass torture, including of  children, and deportation as routine 
methods of  government (and boasted about them). Even when a community 
submitted unresistingly, constantly enhanced demands for tribute would reduce 
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them to penury and drive them to distraction or hopeless revolt. The Phoenicians 
apparently developed their seagoing culture as a means of  escaping the intemperate 
pressures to which the Assyrian rulers subjected them. Assyria owed its period of  
dominance to the fact that its original capital, the city of  Assur,23 was strategically 
placed on trade routes. Later its kings gained control of  rain-watered cornlands 
and iron ore deposits. In the empire the role of  peasant farmers/soldiers was 
similar to that of  the much later Romans; free agriculturalists in their youth owing 
military service to the monarch. 
It has been suggested that the Assyrian empire, rather than being uniquely brutal, 
deliberately exaggerated and emphasised its atrocities as a means of  terrorising its 
subjects and rivals, and that the depiction of  horrors in which they delighted need 
not be taken too seriously, the very fact however that such propaganda methods 
were favoured speaks for itself. ‘A militarily inventive group was capable of  . . . 
holding down terrorised population by the threat and occasional use of  ruthless 
militarism’, according to Mann.24 
Imperial Impacts
The brutal impact of  these empires was not confined to their contemporaries. 
Each handed on to its successors styles of  government, cultural practices and 
ideologies that dominated western Eurasia down to the modern epoch. ‘Severe 
social conflict was endemic to the Roman Empire, as it was to all ancient empires 
. . . in a sense, banditry was perverted class warfare.’25 Indeed if  we consider that 
the history, religion and mythologies of  Judaism were formed in the crucible of  
these empires, particularly the Babylonian and the Persian, later, for Christians, the 
Roman, their resonance is still very much with us in the twenty-first century CE. 
However, the fact that very similar styles of  rulership evolved quite independently 
in eastern Asia and the Americas does suggest that agrarian civilisations, whether 
employing stone or metal as the instrument of  their production and destruction, 
have a natural affinity for government by god-emperors or their slightly less 
pretentious equivalents. They create hierarchies with a divine ruler at the apex, a 
ruling elite, and made up of  landowning gentry and often, though not invariably, 
religious functionaries as a separate elevated caste.
The Bronze Age god king had three basic functions, the first being to ensure 
fertility (possibly this may in the beginning have involved his own ritual sacrifice, 
especially if  he failed to deliver, though that is speculative). The second was to 
administer the law, the third to command his warriors for aggression or defence. 
In the ideologies of  these cultures it was believed that law was not made (at 
least not by humans); it pre-existed, and was established by divine fiat. In actuality 
of  course it embodied the custom of  the community: the king’s remit was to 
interpret it, resolve ambiguities, declare penalties and, possibly, codify it, as was 
famously done by the Babylonian monarch Hammurabi in the eighteenth century 
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BCE (although Mann suggests that Hammurabi’s code may well have been more 
ambition than actuality).26 
Hammurabi begins by announcing that the gods have commissioned him to 
codify and publicise the laws they have instituted. Penalties for violation vary from 
fines of  precious metals, through torture, mutilation or enslavement to horrific 
forms of  execution. The Judaic law code, famously, was supposed to have been 
directly dictated by the deity from Mount Sinai – in actuality it was codified during 
the Babylonian exile in the sixth century BCE, and lays an unusual emphasis on 
religious duties. Deprived of  a king, the exiled Jews refusing to assimilate to the 
Babylonian culture were obliged to depend upon their religious representatives 
for ideological leadership, which meant religious observance and the law, with a 
marked overlap between them.
What law codes did was regulate behaviour and specify sanctions for breaches of  
the same regulations. They had a lot to say about sexual relations in cultures where 
women were regarded as a form of  property, belonging either to their menfolk, 
their husband or their owner if  they were slaves. The laws also regulated equity, 
what would be known later as civil law, whereby disputes usually over property 
rights, would be settled according to the law code. However losing such a lawsuit 
could have severe consequences for life and limb as well as one’s property.
Caste
Separating off  of  a ruler and immediate acolytes from the remainder of  society 
is only one of  the forms in which hierarchical relationships can be embodied. 
The separation of  the entire community into different orders with differential 
obligations and privileges based exclusively on descent with regulation (almost 
invariably prohibition) of  intermarriage between them, was an important historical 
phenomenon.
Best known in its Hindu version, caste differentiation was widely practised 
throughout Eurasia and Africa into historic and even modern times. It combined 
three elements – occupational exclusiveness, hereditary descent and domination/
subordination. Those at the bottom of  the heap suffered not merely physical 
maltreatment but also ceaseless humiliation in order to remind them of  the 
inferiority of  their place. 
At the time of  the settlement of  the Indian subcontinent (c.1500 BCE) by 
northern invaders, whose military advantage was provided by the use of  chariots, 
the invaders were apparently divided into three castes – priests, warriors and 
cultivators. Later as the centuries passed the system developed into an extremely 
complex and differentiated one with endless subdivisions (more fully discussed in 
Chapter 8). 
No other caste structure ever rivalled it in scope or complexity. More commonly 
elsewhere caste structure consisted of  respectable members of  the community, 
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rich or poor, contrasted to a class of  outcastes, despised, shunned, regarded 
as dirty and prone to disgusting practices, discriminated against and frequently 
persecuted – outcasts indeed. Examples include the Burakumin of  Japan, Jews and 
Roma throughout Europe, the Cagots in parts of  western France and the Basque 
country (whose origin is unknown). Outcaste or low-caste status could be linked 
to ethnic differences, such as the Ainu of  Japan, Native Americans or African 
Americans in the USA, non-whites in apartheid South Africa – but not necessarily 
so, as in the cases of  the Burakumin or Cagots, or non-Roma travellers in the UK 
and Ireland. There appears to have been a tendency for outcaste groups to be 
particularly associated with occupations involving the handling of  dead bodies 
whether human or animal – gravediggers, tanners, butchers – which may have 
implications of  ritual pollution. 
Evidently this did not apply to Jews, where in earlier centuries religious prejudice 
was explanation enough, but here too, occupational categorisation was important, 
Jews being associated in the Christian popular mind with moneylending and trade 
in valuable objects – they were forbidden to own land and excluded from the 
craft guilds. The Roma too not only had a distinct language and culture, but were 
specially associated with itinerant peddling and disreputable practices involving 
magic. Their itinerant lifestyle was in itself  an offence to the settled populations 
they moved among, populations themselves living on the edge and all too ready to 
find objects of  blameworthy prejudice particularly when encouraged by religious 
and secular authority. 
Honour
Along with the concept of  law, sometimes in association, at others in opposition, is 
that of  honour, with its closely associated though not identical concept of  thymos, 
recognition or respect. It is suggested that honour originated in nomadic clan 
societies where codes of  honour substituted for the absence of  written law codes. 
It was dishonourable to disrespect a fellow clansperson or infringe his possessions. 
Such possessions included sexual partners and offspring, personal equipment or 
herd animals, depending on the society.
With the evolution and establishment of  agrarian hierarchical societies, notions 
of  honour were carried over into them, but altered and modified to fit changing 
circumstances. The point about honour was that it required the individuals often to 
exert a disagreeable effort and act against what might well be their own sentiment, 
in other words to accede to the collective demands of  their society rather than 
to follow their personal inclination. Normally it was closely tied to hereditary 
status but unlike such status honour could be easily lost by deeds of  commission 
or omission.
Clan structures, nominally based on descent but frequently on adoption, 
continued into agricultural and citified societies – they existed in classical Greece; 
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the Roman gentes and the Scottish highland clans are further examples. Indeed 
clan structures are virtually a cultural universal, dying out in lowland Europe 
only in the medieval era and, at that time, nowhere else. The especial situation 
of  slaves in general and eunuchs in particular was that they were torn away from 
their clan societies and therefore made totally dependent on the goodwill of  their 
masters.
Honour required a clan to take care of  its members, specifically to take their part 
against injury or threat coming from outside. The worst of  all crimes was to injure 
or kill a fellow clan member. The honour of  the clan (later, with the decline of  
clan society, of  the family) was a cardinal consideration, which in unusually lawless 
societies such as Sardinia or Albania often resulted in the blood feud: if  a clan 
member was killed revenge had to be exacted against a member of  the offending 
clan (not necessarily the offender in person). In order to diminish blood-feuding, 
Anglo-Saxon kings instituted the wergild system, whereby a specified money 
payment could be offered in place of  blood vengeance. Clan members forfeited 
their own honour and were liable to severe punishment if  they failed to uphold 
that of  the clan.
Honour was also individual and honour was differential – the higher your social 
standing the more of  it you had, but at the same time the more you could lose and 
the more you were obliged to insist upon receiving due deference. Among males 
a slight to your honour, whether from an inferior or an equal, required reprisal, 
otherwise your own honour was compromised – when women were involved 
the issue was more complicated. Loss of  honour on the part of  a Japanese 
samurai could only be expunged by ritual suicide. If  the issue was between equals 
this frequently resulted in a duel, often lethal, though in European society not 
necessarily so if  honour was satisfied with minor injury on either side. An inferior 
was not fit to duel with; he had to be humiliated at best or more likely physically 
punished – thrashed, mutilated or even murdered.
Individual honour however was not confined to the elites. Except for those 
at the very bottom of  the social scale, subjects of  the monarch or those on 
legitimate business within his territories enjoyed a graded measure of  honour. 
When ambassadors or inferior lords were in the presence of  a god-king they were 
required to prostrate themselves, but if  the monarch then failed to accord them 
the lesser honour that they were entitled to expect he was regarded as behaving 
dishonourably. Likewise a nobleman was supposed to respect his personal servants 
or even, if  he were a feudal baron, his freeholder tenants.
As the frequency of  aggressive relationships between communities grew, 
developing into full-scale warfare in agrarian societies, one particular type of  
honour received increasing emphasis, particularly when elites consisted of  military 
castes. This was the requirement to show courage in battle – a particularly difficult 
demand in cases when every natural impulse is to avoid fighting, especially if  the 
odds are unfavourable. For a warrior or soldier, therefore, cowardly behaviour, 
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or even to show fear, was the most disgraceful and shameful of  all possible acts, 
particularly if  they were leaders or officers. At a famous naval battle of  the late 
tenth century in a Norwegian fiord, one of  the Viking leaders panicked and fled 
and was consequently disgraced for evermore.
For women in honour/shame societies the equivalent was modesty. This 
included strictly subordinating themselves to their male relatives, keeping closely 
to the sexual regulations imposed by misogynistic custom or the law, making 
themselves as inconspicuous as possible in mixed company, staying indoors or 
even totally covering their bodies and veiling themselves if  venturing abroad. In 
the law code drawn up by the Babylonian monarch Hammurabi, while respectable 
women were required to veil themselves, prostitutes,27 who were accorded no 
honour or modesty, were strictly forbidden to do so and savagely punished if  they 
disobeyed. In the Confucian culture of  imperial China respectable women were 
subjected to the ‘three obediences’ – obedience to her father before marriage, 
to her husband during marriage, and to her son during widowhood. In reality, a 
frequent trope in Chinese narratives both fictional and otherwise was the manner 
in which women, tyrannised before and during their marriage, in their widowhood 
tyrannised in turn over their daughter-in-law. 
Once law codes were instituted they naturally tried to incorporate considerations 
of  honour, above all for the upper orders – the wergild system is an example 
– but not infrequently came into conflict with its demands. A priority for the 
monarch was to institute peace in his realm, which helped to ensure that the taxes 
and tributes kept flowing satisfactorily, but for an aristocrat honour required 
violent private satisfaction for any injury or insult. Nor was that the full extent 
of  the problem, for family honour, as mentioned above, could easily result in the 
initiation of  a blood feud with consequent disruption of  the peace and departure 
from the legal process.
The method of  settlement for the upper classes in the form of  the formal duel 
between the offender and the man he had offended was termed ‘giving satisfaction’. 
At least it avoided the spreading of  the conflict, and though usually illegal was 
treated rather as cannabis smoking is at the present time – custom refused to 
consider it as a crime. In the early nineteenth century two British cabinet ministers 
engaged in a duel, although it was something of  a farce. The great Russian poet 
Pushkin however died in one around the same time, as did a leading American 
politician, killed by no less a person than the Vice-President. On occasion however 
governments seriously tried to outlaw the practice, and in seventeenth-century 
France Cardinal Richelieu, the effective ruler, made it a capital offence. Two young 
aristocrats defied his decree by fighting a duel in the middle of  Paris – and were 
executed beneath his window for their presumption, but that did little to suppress 
duelling in France.
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Games of Thrones: The Rules of Ruling
Though I could with barefaced power sweep him from my sight and bid my will avouch it, yet 
I must not.
—William Shakespeare (Macbeth)
The seventeenth-century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in his 
famous Leviathan, argued for a social contract origin to government in which 
men (women didn’t count of  course, let alone juveniles) by an original agreement 
surrendered their natural freedom in lives that were ‘nasty, brutish and short’ in 
order to live instead under a sovereign. This would usually be an individual but 
sometimes a corporate body. This sovereign would see to the protection of  their 
lives, properties and families and in return was thereafter owed virtually absolute 
obedience. In historic terms of  course this contract was mythic, though less 
nonsensical than his contemporary Sir Robert Filmer’s notion that monarchs were 
justified in their sovereign actions on account of  the fact that they were successors 
of  Adam. In conceptual terms however Hobbes had a point – even the most 
absolute of  sovereignties embody an element of  consent. 
Monarchy has been the default mode of  agrarian civilisations and of  the 
nomadic pastoral cultures which from time to time in the course of  Eurasian 
history preyed upon them, but it could only emerge in specific conditions and in 
these two types of  society was a very different business. In the latter case it was 
a much looser and less institutionalised, arrangement. Mobile groups of  herders 
provided an insufficient basis for absolutist forms of  monarchy, particularly if  
the leading men among the flocks objected strongly to it. Leaders of  nomadic 
horsemen such as Attila or Genghis Khan were indeed able to establish monarchies 
of  formidable power but it is clear from the histories of  these conquerors that 
ability to organise and firmly rule tribal coalitions was only made possible by the 
prospect of  plundering or seizing control of  the settled areas. 
Tightly organised and entrenched monarchy with quasi-divine rulers necessitates 
a sufficient growth in numbers and settlement in particular locations. It was no 
accident that such monarchies emerged alongside citification; that was the essential 
starting point. Farming, depending on geography, soil and climate, could take 
place in nucleated villages with peasant plots and communal village lands, whether 
riverine or rain-watered, or in scattered homesteads, the former being typical in 
most of  Eurasia and the Americas, the latter largely confined to heavily forested 
northern Europe. Village lifestyle, as noted, brought with it social differentiation 
growing out of  kin networks and frequently imbricated with claimed contact to the 
spirit world. It has been suggested by anthropologists, for example Kent Flannery 
and Joyce Marcus that the ‘men’s house’ frequently occurring in such contexts, 
a taboo-protected building with hierarchical seating arrangements from which 
uninitiated clan members were excluded, was the embryo of  the citified temple 
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dedicated to a particular god, becoming a sacred space due to the cult objects 
conserved within it. Within such a context, they argue, the dominant lineage of  a 
dominant clan was likely to allow the emergence of  a dominant individual. 
Such an individual would demand and receive deference and gifts and tribute 
on a more or less consistent basis – but was also expected to redistribute much of  
that: the tradition of  royal generosity was a universal one which continued down 
into European early modern times. Stingy monarchs were unpopular ones, and 
though miserliness might sometimes be efficacious in strengthening their rule, it 
was more likely to endanger it. The same applied lower down the line as well; the 
wealthy magnates of  cities in the Roman republic and empire who held municipal 
authority were expected to be lavish with their gifts for civic improvement, and 
one at least was lynched for failing in this respect. 
Monarchical rule appears to have been imposed with relative ease in Egypt, 
Mesopotamia and China (conflict was principally about who should do the ruling) 
but was not unresisted in some parts of  classical urban civilisation, particularly 
in the Mediterranean area. The legends of  the Jewish scriptures hint at popular 
reluctance to institute a monarchy, while Athens and Rome expelled their early 
kings and Sparta and Carthage reduced theirs to nominal status. Oligarchic rule 
was the default option in the commercial cities of  the classical Mediterranean, 
though some were monarchies and the Athenians experimented lengthily with a 
democracy of  male citizens (excluding women, slaves and resident outsiders) until 
this was overthrown firstly by the Macedonian monarchy and later even more 
definitively by republican Rome. Such alternative forms of  rule tended to exist 
either among newly-settled nomadic groups, in areas of  logistically difficult terrain 
or else commercially-orientated settlements, particularly coastal ones. 
In pre-Iron Age and Iron Age northern Europe, where settled agriculture was 
practised and social differentiation had occurred, it is possible that sacralised 
figures were appointed as representatives of  the community or clan before the 
gods and possibly exercised some wider authority, though it could not have been 
very much. The disinterred bog bodies from that era are a possible sign of  such 
an outcome. Their remarkable anatomical preservation thanks to the chemical 
qualities of  the bogs suggests that most of  them were individuals of  some social 
standing rather than executed criminals, and while they may simply be human 
sacrifices (some undoubtedly were), it appears rather more likely, from knowledge 
of  climatic conditions in which they lived, that at least some were sacred monarchs 
who had fallen down on their primary responsibility of  keeping the weather gods 
onside and were sacrificed to appease them.28 The proliferation of  petty kings in 
Ireland in historic times may hint at a similar conclusion.
Further north, principally in Scandinavia, communities of  isolated farmsteads, 
while possibly owing allegiance of  a sort to a local ‘big man’, were even more 
resistant to the imposition of  kingship. Lawmaking and settlement of  disputes 
were conducted at open-air gatherings known as Things, in which at least all heads 
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of  families and an even broader range of  adult males participated. The kings 
who appeared from late in the first millennium CE had enormous difficulty in 
enforcing their sovereignty over the area of  their claimed rule and some of  them 
got killed trying.29 
The establishment of  kingship among the Germanic-speaking peoples of  
Northern Europe during that millennium, with all its momentous consequences 
for subsequent world history, was provoked by a particular circumstance, namely 
warfare. In conflict with nomadic horsemen from the east and the Roman 
principate to the south, tribal coalitions elected war leaders, who went on to style 
themselves kings. Success in war greatly expanded their power and their pretension, 
not to speak of  their material wealth, though they were still obliged to pay heed 
to the armed warriors in the tribal assembly. From the beginning of  the fifth 
century, sometimes in alliance with the emperors and their regional administrators, 
sometimes fighting them, they established domains inside the crumbling structure 
of  the Roman empire in the west. Once consolidated, these regimes speedily took 
off  in an authoritarian direction. Perry Anderson summarises it in a couple of  
instances: ‘The royal “Book of  Constitutions” promulgated by the new Burgundian 
realm . . . was consecrated by a small group of  31 leading nobles, whose authority 
had now manifestly eliminated any popular say in the laws of  the tribal community. 
The Vandal State in Africa became the most ruthless autocracy of  all . . . .’30
The initial core of  an embryonic monarchy in agrarian communities may have 
been established by some form of  agreement between leading families, in response 
either to an internal crisis threatening the community or an external threat requiring 
a war leader selected as an individual possessing appropriate mana,31 who then 
became a sacerdotal figure hedged around with exceptional privileges and taboos. 
However subsequent expansion into a more extensive state was everywhere – from 
Polynesia, through Eurasia, North Africa and tropical Africa and the Americas – 
accomplished or accompanied by armed violence, supplemented on occasion by 
marriage alliance. Raiding and acquisition of  stuff  and territory strengthened the 
position and prestige of  the successful aggressor and also acted as an insurance 
against rivals.32 The details of  warfare for government and society are examined 
below. Here we are concerned with the ‘civil’ aspect of  ruling within the area 
of  the prince’s acknowledged control. Once he (and very occasionally she) had 
established their position, how did they proceed within their domain and what 
dilemmas did they confront?
As indicated, apart from waging war (which involved more than fighting, but 
also recruitment, logistics and supply), the monarch’s primary responsibilities were 
religious, usually involving public ritual performances, and issuing, or causing to 
be issued, judgements interpreting law and custom among his/her subjects, or at 
least the more important ones. Certain intrinsic issues confronted any monarchy, 
regardless of  time or place, intrinsic indeed to the leading individual in any form 
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of  government. What is necessary to understand is that while ruling may be a 
privileged occupation it is not an easy or secure one. 
Monarchical Servants
The monarch required of  course a retinue of  personal servants reaching from the 
equivalent of  butlers and chamberlains to the domestic who emptied his chamber 
pot (and frequently in specific cases the eunuchs who administered his harem). 
Monarchs also needed a council of  advisors and an administrative staff  to execute 
their commands, and it was this which could present particular difficulties. 
The Chinese empire ran a very complex examination system from which 
the mandarin bureaucracy was recruited, elsewhere the equivalent function was 
generally fulfilled by systems of  patronage. Administrative and domestic functions 
might of  course overlap – Richard III is said to have taken advice from his 
‘groom of  the stool’, the lackey who attended to his excremental functions.33 The 
domestics, the advisors and the administrators together made up the monarch’s 
court. The English terms ‘chancellor’, ‘steward’, ‘constable’ and ‘marshal’, derive 
from these functionaries in the medieval era.
This setup necessarily generated substantial problems. Even lowly domestics, 
not to mention concubines, could be suspected of  having undue access to the 
monarchical ear, and on account of  their inappropriate influence arouse jealousy 
among those who felt themselves more entitled to be in his or her counsel. A 
notable instance was Mary Queen of  Scots’ private secretary, David Rizzio, 
who in 1566 was suspected of  inappropriate behaviour in the queen’s bed and 
murdered for his pains. When it came to the administrative staff  matters were even 
worse, for these, of  necessity, on account of  their responsibilities had to act as 
day-to-day advisers. In the Chinese imperial courts, the Byzantine and its Ottoman 
successors, eunuchs from time to time achieved enormous influence and acted as 
virtual prime ministers.
The magnates of  the kingdom or empire were likely to find this distasteful and 
feel they were being excluded from the position of  influence which was theirs 
by right, and resent it bitterly. Of  course as they had other affairs to attend to – 
their country estates or whatever – they could not be constantly in the monarch’s 
presence and only on occasion be summoned to meet together as a grand council. 
It was simply impracticable, particularly in an era of  pre-modern transport, that 
these magnates could act as the monarch’s close advisers. Generally speaking, if  
the monarchs governed to the satisfaction of  their elite constituency, members 
of  the latter were prepared to put up with the situation. On the other hand, if  
no satisfaction was forthcoming, if  the ruler was ineffective or overwhelmed by 
defeat abroad or natural disaster or social breakdown, they were in big trouble, 
particularly if  the dissatisfied magnates had military power to hand.
Even if  problems like that were avoided, the sovereign was by no means 
out of  the woods, for they still had to take into account plotting, factionalism 
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and disloyalty in the court itself. Nor was that the end of  the difficulties. The 
monarchical bureaucrats in such polities were not isolated inside the court. In 
most cases, unless brought in as slaves from beyond the frontiers, they would have 
friends and kin outside it. This led to factionalising and lobbying on their behalf, 
generating jealousy and dissatisfaction and corrupting the business of  government 
– not to mention skimming off  the monarchical revenues, which they would be 
accused of  doing even if  they weren’t.34
All that was relatively routine stuff, but a much more serious peril was always 
waiting in the wings of  palace politics. A powerful court official, especially one 
who was well-connected outside, might reduce the monarch to a figurehead and 
seize the effective power for himself  and his descendants. It was a situation which 
recurred repeatedly in hereditary monarchical polities. 
It happened to the Merovingian kings of  Gaul in late antiquity, in the European 
Middle Ages some centuries later, to the Japanese emperors and the Abbasid 
caliphs of  Baghdad, and in the modern era to the kings of  Nepal. There were 
both advantages and disadvantages if  the monarchy was only semi-hereditary or 
non-hereditary. In that case it was more difficult for a powerful official to establish 
dominance beyond a single reign, but on the other hand dynastic legitimacy was 
then weakened, public discontent less restrained and the obstacle conferred by 
sacerdotal inheritance against an ambitious usurper was missing; one reason why 
palace coups were so prevalent in the Byzantine empire. 
It was not surprising therefore that from the earliest days of  monarchy, 
dynasties of  effective rulers did not normally last very long. To the often violent 
dialectic of  interaction between the centre and periphery (roughly speaking the 
rulers and their magnates) was added the poisonous stew of  palace politics, often 
exacerbated by succession crises when an evident heir was lacking (see Chapter 
Four).35 Machiavelli’s most renowned text, The Prince, is intended as a handbook 
for rulers to assist them to avoid the sort of  traps involved in ruling. It was never 
intended to be a public document. However it might be suggested that the cardinal 
piece of  advice to any individual about to enter a non-figurehead monarchical role 
ought to be, ‘Watch your back!’
It is quite remarkable how not merely in monarchies but almost invariably in 
any collective, exercising some sort of  governance at however modest a level, the 
same essential social structures emerge with variations according to circumstance. 
It applies as much (if  not more) to the Vatican as to any secular rulership (the 
Medici example is noted in Chapter 4) and to absolutist regimes in the modern 
era (Mussolini once said that he was the most disobeyed man in Italy, and the 
Third Reich was a quagmire of  rival factions competing for the Führer’s favour).36 
The Soviet regime, particularly its central Politbureau, whether in its pre-Stalinist, 
Stalinist or post-Stalinist phases, though less incoherent, nevertheless displayed 
similar characteristics in a modified form. 
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The same applies at all levels and is found in the subordinate arms of  central 
government, in democratic cabinets, in local authorities at every level, in capitalist 
businesses,37 in university senates and courts of  governors, in newspaper offices, 
in voluntary associations and organisations of  every sort. I cannot resist referring 
to what I observed when I was induced in the late 1970s to take on the editorship 
of  the monthly newspaper of  the Scottish Old Age Pensions Association, Scottish 
Pensioner, and consequently had to sit in on the SOAPA executive committee. I 
used to joke that I was getting my old age over with early, but one of  the things 
which astonished me was the degree of  personality conflicts, spite, manoeuvre, 
infighting and factionalism within this elderly collective. All the historical evidence 
suggests that this sort of  behaviour is a universal in even the most minimally 
hierarchical of  structured organisations.
Personality Cults
The early modern king of  France, unlike his English/British counterpart, but 
comparable to most of  his European contemporaries, was an absolute monarch, 
the fount of  law as well as the fount of  honour (though in practice an absolute 
monarch was far from being in a position to do whatever he or she38 liked). 
These absolute monarchs, enveloped in the sacerdotal atmosphere claimed also 
by the non-absolute British one, could be justifiably regarded as the conceptual 
descendants of  the god kings of  the early civilisations. The sacred character of  
the latter was eventually assumed also by the later Roman emperors, who passed 
it on in turn to their European successor monarchs, who found their mystic (and 
mythic) justification in the practice of  anointing described in the Jewish Bible.39 
The Chinese emperors likewise claimed a ‘mandate from Heaven’, the Muslim 
monarchs drew their religious justification from their office of  ‘Commander of  
the Faithful’.
It raises a very interesting question of  how these notions and practices were 
ever allowed to take hold.40 No doubt tradition and imitation played a significant 
part, but again, as with agriculture the institution was invented separately in several 
different locations, ending up with very similar results. No doubt also, individuals 
who had the power to do so were inclined to enjoy a life isolated as far as possible 
from the rigours of  the natural world, taking advantage of  the benefits which 
agrarian-based technology made possible without having to endure the endless toil 
and uncertainties that afflicted the majority of  their subjects. Command over force 
and violence put into their hands the means to enjoy without restraint the labour 
of  slaves, the expertise of  artisans, the comforts of  numerous concubines – and 
only sacerdotal mana leading to intensities of  devotion could provide sufficient 
excuse for being awarded such privileges.
What is startling is to see this syndrome still alive and well into the present era, 
and in some particularly unexpected places. The practices of  the gurus of  esoteric 
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religious outfits such as the Maharaji or Scientology cults are notorious in that the 
cult leaders live in magnificence while their deluded followers devote their lives to 
raising the funding necessary to sustain such self-indulgent lifestyles. But the very 
last place where any similar devotional cult phenomenon would be expected and 
no sacerdotal mana is at issue, namely the twentieth-century communist movement, 
is exactly where, until Khrushchev denounced it in 1956, it flourished remarkably.
Khrushchev’s target was the cult of  Joseph Stalin as Soviet and international 
communist leader. Stalin’s power by the late 1930s was about as absolute as 
absolute power was possible to be, and while affecting simplicity and necessarily 
eschewing magnificence, he lived in considerable style, and his affected modesty 
was surrounded by a personality cult of  gargantuan proportions.41 However it 
was not only a question of  Stalin – most of  the leaders of  communist parties, 
regardless of  whether or not these were ruling parties, cultivated similar styles of  
adulation around their personalities. 
At the same time they were constrained by what Kevin Morgan has referred 
to as Stalin’s super-cult, required to pay him deference, and if  they stepped out 
of  line and opposed his policies, even implicitly, could be subject to sanctions 
in the name of  Stalin.42 Morgan refers to ‘the integrating effect of  practices of  
veneration, providing a point of  cohesion and authority for deeply fragmented 
or unsettled societies’.43 The cult around Mao Zedong in his latter days between 
1966 and 1974 paralleled or even exceeded that of  Stalin. Formally, in an attempt 
to evade the comparison, reference was made to Mao’s ‘thought’ rather than his 
personality – not that this deceived anyone. Even these cults however were modest 
in comparison to that which the family dynasty of  North Korean leaders created 
around themselves from the 1950s into the present century. 
Nothing like that has, by contrast, occurred with the Cuban communist leaders. 
No evident reason for this exception is easily available, but the pre-revolutionary 
culture of  the island may have had some significance and also that the Cuban 
communist leaders did not emerge directly out of  the Marxist-Leninist tradition 
but had separate origins and took over the communist party from outside, so 
to speak. It can be concluded, tentatively, that humans, when they have the 
opportunity, do indeed have an intrinsic liability to behave in a dictatorial manner 
but that each case, whether in the usual sequence or among the exceptions, must 
be explained in its own terms of  external and internal pressures combined with 
inherited culture, to explain which outcome is the one that is eventually realised.
Culmination
By the commencement of  the Iron Age around 800 BCE, although huge tracts 
of  the inhabited world in all the continents, amounting to the greater part of  the 
earth’s surface, still belonged to foragers, humans in a limited number of  areas had 
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come a very long way from their ancestral lifestyles, and the future belonged to 
them (or rather to some of  them). 
Neolithic and Bronze Age artefacts can certainly be very impressive, as anyone 
visiting a museum display of  the ancient or pre-Columbian civilisations can 
testify. Iron-using technology, however, multiplied enormously the productivity 
of  agrarian techniques. For example reaping with an iron sickle (bronze was too 
valuable to be wasted on such lowly instruments) is greatly more proficient than 
doing so with a flint blade let alone one of  overfired pottery. The same applies to 
the difference between stone and iron ploughshares.
The Iron Age which succeeded its bronze-based predecessor was the culmination 
of  a lengthy process. Within Eurasia Bronze Age agrarian rank societies had 
given rise to civilisation (in the technical sense of  city life) though the lead-in had 
stretched over several millennia. With city life came an efflorescence of  hierarchy 
and social differentiation, reinforced by religion, property rules, written script and 
metallurgy. Iron-based technology greatly multiplied the force of  production and 
weaponry and with them the opportunities for domination and control by elites. 
In the last analysis what this social differentiation, intensifying over the centuries, 
meant was that elites were ever more favourably placed to pump resources out of  
the labour of  basic producers. This process will be developed in Chapter 6.
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Exploitation and Violence
The gigantic protection racket of  political history began: ‘Accept my power, for I will protect 
you from worse violence – of  which I can give you a sample if  you don’t believe me.’ 
—Michael Mann (The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1) 
Exploitation and the Extraction of Surplus
The intention of  this chapter is to consider the methods and manner through which 
elites, formed in the hierarchies discussed previously, extract material resources 
from the populations subject to them, the conflicts generated by this relationship, 
and the mechanisms through which these elites transfer their extracted wealth 
between each other in the context of  power relations. Certain other forms of  
violent interaction are referred to in other chapters, principally 5 and 7.
Violence and economic exploitation are closely intertwined (as is resistance to 
the latter). ‘The history of  all hitherto existing society’, according to The Communist 
Manifesto, ‘is the history of  class struggles . . . oppressor and oppressed stood in 
constant opposition to one another’. (Later Engels corrected this to exclude what 
he termed ‘primitive communism’ and would now be described as hunter-gatherer 
communities.)
Social class does indeed remain the most effective and most realistic concept 
for analysing material exploitation, and this is where Marxist analysis is at its 
strongest. However, though not entirely useless, class is a very poor predictor of  
social consciousness, for economic or social classes do not as a rule simply line 
up against each other like opposing armies, and this is where Marxist analysis has 
proved to be at its weakest and most fallible.
The four structural forms of  coercive exploitation are tribute, serfdom (a more 
intense form of  tribute) chattel slavery, and wage labour, with many variations 
of  detail within each form. Tribute was historically the prevalent form whereby 
dependent cultivators or craft workers were coercively made to render either part 
of  their product, or their labour services or both, either to a local superior or to 
central government, whether by a contract they couldn’t refuse or by naked terror. 
Serf  society went a step further by binding the toilers and their descendants to 
a particular lord while leaving them in possession of  a minimum of  customary 
rights. Chattel slavery removed even that element – slaves were the rightless 
property of  their masters and totally at their disposal (though exceptionally cruel 
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treatment might earn social disapproval). Even formally free labour is not without 
a coercive element if  the labourer has to take whichever employment is on offer 
however atrocious the rewards or conditions, or else starve. This is the situation 
which many workers, particularly female ones, find themselves in during the 
twenty-first century in countries such as India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, in 
the manufacture of  consumer commodities like clothing, computer equipment or 
sports gear.
Such relationships have throughout history been covered with all manner of  
ideological1 justifications, very frequently religious ones in the form of  divine 
ordination, but also, and increasingly in the modern era by secular ones focused 
on the market instead. These justifications are extremely important – they create 
the ideological hegemony which makes the social order they relate to take on the 
masks of  obviousness and necessity – at least among the elites. 
For the latter reason, class alone cannot explain the prevailing social 
consciousness in any given society.2 Subordinated classes from time to time resist 
and revolt, and it is claimed that there were episodes in Chinese history where the 
recorded rates of  peasant revolt amounted to 1.8 per hour.3 In such contexts class 
struggle at some level, from passive resistance, through strikes and litigation to 
insurrection, is always going on – but for most of  historical time the members of  
the subjected class have accepted their lot, however reluctantly, and sought private 
accommodations.
Beyond such social acceptance however there invariably stands violent coercion 
either as a threat or as a reality. Such violence has always been the ultimate business 
of  the state throughout recorded history and doubtless earlier, and manifested 
little less in societies in which state formation was embryonic or non-existent. 
In ‘normal’ times those at the sharp end give little thought to the matter. If  they 
do, and express their resentment, the threat of  repression usually silences them, 
but when social tension rises beyond a certain point state violence is invariably 
deployed to resolve matters and conserve the social structure. If  it fails we call 
that a revolution.
As we have already seen in earlier chapters, class differentiation can only 
become marked with communities’ stabilisation of  location (nomadic herding 
communities having been on the whole more egalitarian) and the ability of  an 
individual producer to produce substantially more than they biologically require 
for immediate consumption. Consequently the surplus can be drained off, by 
whichever means, for the use and benefit of  an elite stratum directing the society, 
together with the functionaries whose business it is either to serve them in exerting 
control, or else to produce the artefacts coveted by the rulers. Invariably the 
exercise of  secular power by lords and monarchs comes along with functionaries 
whose remit is to justify it ideologically and usually with reference to the spirit 
world – though they may be tasked with other functions as well, such as, in ancient 
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Mesopotamia, setting the calendar, observing the stars and purporting to predict 
the future.
Such a development is one of  inherent instability. An interaction is set in motion 
which very often resulted in the unification of  settlements into cities and cities 
with their dependent rural hinterlands into agriculturally-based empires ruled by 
divine monarchies. This tended to be especially the case in Eurasia and Egypt 
where the settlements were based around major river valleys. The development, 
without the riverine aspect, was repeated in Mesoamerica and the Andes, and in 
all cases involved much conflict with accompanying bloodshed as rival local rulers 
gambled with their lives and those of  their subjects as they struggled to acquire the 
supreme position. As Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus note:
Colonialism was created neither by anthropologists nor Queen Victoria. It is at 
least 4,300 years old, the product of  kings who sought to add land and tribute 
to their realms. The Sumerians, Akkadians, Assyrians, Hittites, Greeks, Romans, 
Moors, Aztec and Inca [and Chinese] did not learn their craft from anthropolo-
gists and most of  their leaders make Queen Victoria sound like Mother Theresa.4 
These processes, however much they were bad news for those individuals who 
toiled in the fields and spilled their blood on the battlefield or the subsequent 
massacre, propelled an enormous expansion in culture both material and 
intellectual. Perhaps Walter Benjamin’s celebrated remark could possibly be turned 
round to suggest that many documents of  barbarism are also documents of  
culture. The history of  progress is very largely the history of  forced labour. That 
takes many forms, of  which the most unvarnished is chattel slavery. 
Coercive Labour
Tribute
Michael Mann’s view is that ‘Significant improvements in surplus acquisition 
have often come in historical societies from increasing the intensity of  labour – 
usually requiring increased physical force’.5 That defined the essential relationship, 
while it could at the same time take multiple forms. Slavery might be the most 
unvarnished, but was not the simplest, which was tribute, equally relying on pure 
coercion, though the precise nature of  that and its knock-on implications, are 
subjects for considerable analysis. With tribute the producers, without any further 
obligation or manner of  legitimisation, are simply compelled to hand over part of  
their product to the ruler (who may vary from a robber baron to a god-emperor; 
in the latter case tribute becomes known as taxation). 
Tribute may take the form of  labour as well as produce, in which case it is known 
as corvée – for example the Inca used massive coercive labour gangs to build roads 
and undertake irrigation projects. Their rule was ‘an ideological obsession with 
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centralisation and hierarchy, pushed to the limits of  the practicable’.6 Tribute’s 
operation can also be complicated by a situation where the tribute-payer is 
a subordinate ruler who in turn extracts it from the producers – and this may 
proceed through several cycles. Further complexities arise from the necessity to 
police the exaction process. This requires the tribute-taker to dispose of  armed 
force and to appropriately reward the strong-arm enforcers, as otherwise their 
arms are likely to be turned against him, as many a Roman emperor discovered.
Slavery
Slavery is both a simpler and a more complex relationship. It is simpler in that the 
slave is the chattel property of  the slave-owner, a ‘speaking tool’ in the Roman 
terminology, although, inconveniently slaves brought with them the necessity of  
having to be fed and, normally, clothed, which represented a further expense after 
purchase. Medical expenses might also be necessary to protect the investment. On 
the other hand the results of  the slaves’ labour are wholly at the owners’ disposal, 
whether these be material objects, or services (including gladiatorial and sexual 
services) or even intellectual products as in the case of  slave educators or scribes. 
This last consideration relates to one of  the complexities in slave relationships – 
the different grades of  slaves, which in some unusual instances could even extend 
to military slaves, or in classical Athens to ones engaged in police duties. 
The relationship of  sellers and buyers also come into the equation, and of  
course disputes between owners (and in the Roman instance it was not unheard of  
for slaves to own slaves). Finally there was also the question of  how the owners 
were to be protected against slave revolt (gladiators, being armed, were especially 
dangerous). There is no estimate of  the number of  slaves within the area ruled by 
Rome at different times or of  their proportion of  the population. Even Ste Croix 
comments that ‘. . . it would be very wrong to draw any conclusions about the 
total number of  slaves in the respective periods’,7 although he notes that 100,000 
slaves are said to have been killed in Spartacus’s revolt. We do know that early 
in the imperial period a proposal was made in the Senate to make slaves wear 
an identifying mark, but this was rejected because it would reveal to the slaves 
how many of  them there were. The Roman legions were above everything else an 
insurance against slave revolt, the strap which held its slave society together, and 
the emperors were the buckle in that strap. Therefore the elites put up with these 
monarchs though they were often enough psychopathic criminals and the terror 
of  the senators.
In the Greco-Roman civilisation along with the privately-owned slaves there 
were also public slaves, and among these were the least fortunate of  them all. 
They were compelled to toil and largely worked to death in the very worst of  
environments at the most humanly destructive of  labour, especially the mining 
of  precious metals or in the marble quarries which beautified buildings and 
monuments. The prosperity of  Athens at its height was based upon not only slave 
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labour in general but slave labour in the silver mines at Laurion, in conditions 
which Ste Croix speculates may have given rise to the Christian image of  hell. No 
account exists of  what the Laurion mines were like, but there is one of  Egyptian 
mines in Hellenistic times.
To these mines the Egyptian king sends condemned criminals, captives in war 
and those who have fallen victim to false accusations or been imprisoned for 
incurring the royal displeasure, sometimes with all their kinsfolk – both for the 
punishment of  the guilty and the profits which accrue from their labour. There 
they throng, all in chains, all kept at work continuously day and night. . . . Where 
the daylight is shut out by the twists and turns of  the quarry, they wear lamps 
tied to their foreheads, and there, contorting their bodies to fit the contours of  
the rock . . . [toil] on and on without intermission under the pitiless overseers’ 
lash. Young children descend the shafts into the bowels of  the earth . . . No-one 
could look on the squalor of  these wretches, with not even a rag to cover their 
loins, without feeling compassion for their plight. They may be sick, or maimed, 
or aged, or weakly women, but there is no indulgence, no respite. All alike are 
kept at their labour by the lash, until, overcome by hardships, they die in their 
torments . . . and death is welcomed as a thing more desirable than life.8
There is no way of  knowing definitively when the institution of  slavery was 
actually first established, though it is suggested that it may have been as early as 
8000 BCE, in the earlier stages of  the Neolithic revolution. Two main sources of  
slave labour (apart from unfortunates born to it) existed once it became institu-
tionalised. Neolithic communities, like their direct successors in historic times, 
indulged in frequent aggression, and war captives, male or female, were a regular 
source of  such personnel. The other major source of  supply was debt bondage, 
whereby enslavement was the penalty for inability to meet a debt and represented 
a major cause of  tension and resentment in pre-classical and classical times. The 
legendary founder of  the Athenian state was said to have neutralised revolt and 
disorder by outlawing debt bondage; slaves had in future to be supplied from war 
captives or foreign trading connections. Certainly in Athenian society enslaving a 
fellow-citizen was prohibited.
Slavery had already become an institution by the time the earliest written 
documents were produced. It features in the Babylonian law-code of  Hammurabi 
of  the eighteenth century BCE. In the ancient world, however, and subsequently 
except in the Greco-Roman world9 (admittedly an important exception) chattel 
slavery was probably not the dominant form of  forced labour, which, as indicated 
above, was the exaction of  tribute/taxes from a free peasantry. Ironically, what 
used to be taken as the illustrative example of  slave labour, the Egyptian pyramids, 
are now thought to have been constructed by free part-time labour, though slavery 
certainly existed in ancient Egypt.
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Finally, slavery came into its own again as an economic category during the 
early modern era, and indeed the modern world was built on its foundation. 
Chattel slavery came to be practised in the Americas on an industrial scale from 
the sixteenth century onwards, firstly for the extraction of  precious minerals in 
the Spanish empire, and next, with imported African slaves, as plantation slavery 
throughout the Americas for the production of  cocoa, coffee, rice, sugar, tobacco 
and ultimately the cotton on which the British industrial revolution was founded, 
causing Marx to remark that the most advanced form of  production was linked 
intimately to the most primitive. It was not only in the Americas – Scottish miners 
and saltworkers endured a form of  compulsory attachment to and labour for an 
employer nearly indistinguishable from slavery, until the 1780s and most Russian 
peasants were the property of  their landlords until 1861. Another form of  forced 
labour, prevailing in the twentieth century, was the labour camp for prisoners, 
widely employed in the European empires (Sartre commented that ‘the colonies 
are our gulags’), the USA, the Soviet Union, China and most spectacularly the 
Nazi empire.
Slavery ancient and modern has found its ideological justifiers, though it is 
unlikely that many slaves, if  they were aware of  them, found these very convincing; 
but it is manifestly and unmistakably a relationship based on violence, in the first 
place with the capture of  the slaves and thereafter to retain them in that situation 
along with any offspring they might produce. 
Serfdom
Taking into account the varied problems of  slave ownership, another method 
of  exacting surplus from basic producers was a more sophisticated version of  
the tribute relationship, this time dependent upon property in land. In medieval 
Europe it was known as serfdom, where it had evolved from Roman agricultural 
slavery. It can be said to have been the prevalent form of  economy and surplus 
extraction between the passing of  clan society and the emergence of  capitalism.
It had a great many variations and gradations, but in essence the system worked 
as follows – when for whatever reason a landowner found it uneconomic or 
inconvenient to cultivate their estates with slave labour or cultivators hired in a 
wage relationship, the land was leased, either to a family of  cultivators or to a 
managing farmer (the word ‘farmer’ actually means ‘leaser’, as in ‘tax-farmer’, not 
necessarily an agricultural entrepreneur) who took responsibility for finding the 
labour force and had the resources to do so and paid rent – in whatever form – to 
the landowner. A landowner might indeed keep some land for cultivation by his or 
her own dependants and lease further acreages to enhance their income. 
The rent often took the form of  labour services, whereby a certain proportion 
of  their time had to be devoted to working the parts of  the estate that the lords 
reserved directly for themselves, in Western Europe known as the demesne. 
They might in addition have to pay rents in the form of  produce – so many pigs, 
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chickens, sheep and so forth, and when the money economy expanded, money 
rents as well. 
The distinguishing feature of  serfdom proper, however, was that the cultivators 
were unfree. They were tied to the lord’s estate, as were their descendants, and 
could not legally depart, moreover their private affairs, such as marriage, were 
also at the lord’s command and for his or her permission required an additional 
payment. In medieval Europe (including eastern central Europe and Russia, where 
serfdom persisted much longer than it did in the West), the landowner need not 
necessarily be an individual – it might be a corporate body in the shape of  the 
church or an urban corporation. Serfdom differed from slavery proper in that it 
was to some extent regulated by custom and not altogether at the lord’s whim. 
For example a lord could not sell a serf  individually to a different owner – that 
could only be done along with the serf ’s family and his holding. As a mode of  
surplus extraction it therefore could have from the landlord’s standpoint a certain 
disadvantage. Its great advantage was that it provided a tied labour force, and 
in some circumstances, for example in eastern Europe when grain export was 
at a premium, that advantage outweighed everything else, though it was not the 
only or the original one, and slavery continued to exist alongside it, though with 
diminishing prevalence, at least until the twelfth century CE.
The detailed reasons why, in late antiquity, serfdom came to predominate 
over slavery within Christendom, is something of  a controversial issue among 
medievalists, with Chris Wickham to the forefront.10 What appears to have 
happened is that in the former Roman empire, as central control loosened and 
coercion became localised in monarchies and fiefdoms with less effective coercive 
apparatus, former agricultural slaves were elevated to the status of  serfs, and 
former free peasants were reduced to that condition. From the elites’ point of  
view agricultural serfdom’s advantages outweighed the forfeiture of  absolute 
arbitrary authority – it was marginally more acceptable to the victims than slavery, 
more easy to defend theologically and less expensive to police. 
The landlord could of  course also be extracting surplus from free tenants, 
the difference being that the tenants in question could legally take themselves 
elsewhere – they were not tied. A feudal system in terms of  aristocratic privilege 
dominating civil, military and political affairs could coexist with an economy of  
free tenants, as was the case in eighteenth-century France. The advantage of  that 
from the landowner’s viewpoint was that they had no responsibility for their 
tenants’ welfare as they would have incurred with serf  tenants. The disadvantage 
of  free tenancy from the cultivators’ standpoint was that, unless they had a written 
lease, and in the early modern period many did not, the payments exacted from 
them could be raised at will, and they could at any point be expelled from their 
holding if  the landlord discovered a more profitable use for it. In Britain and 
Ireland this was to happen very extensively.
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Monarchs in the agrarian empires around the globe, North Africa, Eurasia, 
the Americas, saw to the transfer of  resources from their subjects to themselves, 
their functionaries and their followers through the customary forms of  extraction 
which they had inherited from their ancestors. Their military capacity guaranteed 
the flow of  surplus, and of  course used up a fair proportion of  it. Their combined 
coercive and ideological hold was undoubtedly impressive – not many peasant 
revolts succeeded, though it is possible that one may have extinguished the Mayan 
autocracy. There are hints of  similar unrest in the Jewish Bible, and the successful 
revolt led by Judas Maccabeus in the second century BCE was certainly a peasant 
as much as a religious insurrection.
Another version of  the same relationship was debt bondage (see below). 
This was short of  outright chattel slavery, but compelled the debtor family to 
labour indefinitely on behalf  of  the creditor, handing over part of  their (usually 
agricultural) product, a form of  serfdom or peonage. It was used extensively in 
China, in traditional South East Asia, by European colonial administrations and in 
the form of  indebtedness for taxes, in Latin America. It was imposed on miners 
during the British industrial revolution and on Shetland peasants from the early 
eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. 
Wage Labour
The final manner of  extracting a surplus through ownership relations was wage 
labour (dealt with more extensively in Chapter 13) which was to become universal 
in the modern era though all the older forms described above, from slavery 
onwards, have survived in certain cases down to the present day. In the wage 
contract the employer makes a payment, which, being less than the value of  the 
work undertaken, leaves the employer with a profit which then flows through the 
financial systems that accompany all economies where wage labour is the prevalent 
mode of  exploitation. If  the employee has no independent source of  income, 
they are obliged willy-nilly to enter into a relationship of  this kind. Though now 
largely fallen out of  use, in the past the term ‘wage slavery’ was popular in workers’ 
movements. Overall, the relationships of  hierarchy and subordination, though 
they do not altogether coincide with the techniques of  surplus extraction, bear a 
close correspondence with them.
Debt
As a facilitator of  social differentiation and exploitation debt was of  immense 
importance. David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5,000 Years, is a most informative 
in-depth analysis. Lying at the root of  the debt relationship is the universal human 
propensity to presume that a favour will be reciprocated: ‘Anthropology . . . reveals 
some remarkable commonalities – fundamental moral principles that appear to 
exist everywhere and that will always tend to be invoked whenever people transfer 
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objects back and forth or argue about what other people owe them.’11 He defines 
the principle of  debt, as distinct from reciprocity, as an arrangement whereby 
formal equals agree to be unequal during the time that the debt lasts.12
Thus the crucial addition which makes debt such a significant social driver is the 
presumption that the favour should be measured and be reciprocated with interest 
– and if  the interest is not forthcoming violence will be employed to enforce it. 
‘Mutual aid can easily slip into coercive inequality.’13
If  history shows anything, it is that there is no better way to justify relations 
founded on violence than by reframing them in the language of  debt . . . Mafiosi 
understand this. So do the commanders of  conquering armies. For thousands 
of  years, violent men have been able to tell their victims that those victims owe 
them something.14 
A good example of  the interrelationship between economy and ideology, this 
is a very pertinent observation. Operators of  protection rackets do not, as a 
rule, merely demand money, they also purport to offer ‘protection’ against rival 
racketeers – and may well do so in order to preserve their investment. Loan sharks 
do not simply send out the boys with baseball bats to knock randomly on people’s 
front doors – they first establish a financial relationship with their victim. 
Graeber is an anthropologist and he points out – something which comes as 
a surprise to the layperson – that the economy of  barter which the pioneers of  
economics like Adam Smith, and most economists since, have assumed to have 
preceded monetary economy, is purely mythical. There is no example anywhere, 
or evidence from any period, of  an economy which operated primarily through 
barter. Among forager or non-commercialised agricultural communities, barter 
does indeed occur, but it is a highly ritualised and occasional event.
How then were pre-monetised exchange relations carried on within or 
between societies in previous eras, as they must have been? The answer is debt. 
Transactions were evaluated and recorded against an agreed standard, which could 
have been anything from a weight of  grain to a measure of  silver, as was the case 
in Hammurabi’s Babylon. Mesopotamian tablets containing records of  debits and 
credits survive in plenty. Egypt and Sumer economies operated on systems of  
credit settled in goods. Even in Sumer, where values were calculated in silver, the 
actual metal remained on the whole in temple or royal treasuries. It was recorded 
debts which made exchange possible, and it did not occur only in the material 
world of  ancient times. Warnings of  reincarnative vengeance against defaulters 
of  debts to the gods as well as humans are to be found in Hindu law codes. 
Graeber notes, apropos of  the supernatural element, that in many Indo-European 
languages the word for ‘debt’ is cognate with that for ‘sin’ or ‘fault’ – and the same 
is true for the Inca language. 
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Coinage followed the use of  standardised objects, such as ingots or little 
imitation bronze knives, to calculate exchange and store value.15 It appeared later, 
around the middle of  the first millennium BCE. Graeber notes that money is not 
a material object; rather that the material objects, coins or whatever, including 
banknotes, are more like the beads on an abacus – a means of  calculating debt, 
acting like IOUs.16 ‘What we call “money” isn’t a thing at all; it’s a way of  comparing 
things mathematically, as proportions: of  saying that, ‘one of  X is equivalent to six 
of  Y’.17 The electronic money we use today is a symbol of  a symbol of  a symbol 
of  a social relationship. Graeber argues that the main original purpose of  coined 
money (usually silver during the Greek and Hellenistic eras) since it was an easily 
transported store of  fixed value guaranteed by a powerful state, such as Lydia or 
Athens, was to pay armies, especially mercenary ones.
Nowadays failure to keep up debt repayments can result in a variety of  adverse 
consequences from repossession up to bodily injury or even death, depending on 
the creditor. Classical society had other sanctions. Enslavement for debt which 
the debtor was unable to repay in goods or money was standard in Greco-Roman 
society and the source of  much social conflict. It was not necessarily the debtor 
himself  who was enslaved (though that happened often enough) but, through his 
patriarchal power, frequently a member of  his family. ‘This [selling of  children 
by parents] . . . appears in the great agrarian civilisations from Sumer to Rome to 
China, right around the time when we also start to see evidence of  money, markets 
and interest-bearing loans . . . .’18
Indeed, in the classical era, debt became closely aligned with slavery. It was very 
difficult for ordinary citizens in the Greco-Roman universe to escape falling into 
debt when bad harvests or other factors beyond their control compelled them 
to borrow in order to survive. Paying off  or partially paying off  a debt could 
often only be accomplished by selling or pawning a family member into slavery, 
either directly to the creditor or else a slave-dealer. If  even that expedient was 
blocked the debtor himself  (or occasionally herself) was enslaved. It was however 
not only emergency conditions which could trap a householder in the web of  debt. 
Borrowing, to arrange a marriage or for a daughter’s dowry or else ritual purposes, 
could have similar consequences. Graeber suggests that the notion of  absolute 
property rights, stressed in Roman law and handed down through European 
history, is derived from the relations of  slave and master.19
Certainly one of  the main if  not the main social demand of  the lower classes, 
both rural and urban, in Greco-Roman society was the cancellation of  debt. It 
was the one, next to redistribution of  landed property, which was most insistently 
resisted by elites. Very occasionally the demand was successful, as in the Athenian 
state (ironically a slave society) where at the initiation of  the democracy in the sixth 
century BCE debt slavery was outlawed and it was made illegal to enslave a citizen. 
That however was a most unusual outcome and did not last very long. One of  
Graeber’s hypotheses is that Greek city-state expansion along the Mediterranean, 
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founding colonies all over it and on the coast of  the Black Sea (nearly a thousand 
between 750 and 550 BCE), was in order primarily to get quit of  people who 
would otherwise have become debtors and generated social crisis.20
It is clear that structures of  debt have been intrinsic to agrarian societies and 
their successors, and, based upon the principle of  reciprocity, probably existed to 
some degree even in foraging ones. Certainly in all its forms it is a very powerful 
engine of  social differentiation. Even in the broadest terms, in the practice of  
making gifts too generous for the recipient ever to repay, it puts the receiver in the 
debt of  the giver both literally and metaphorically, and establishes relationships 
of  superiority and inferiority. Relations of  patronage emanating from an original 
favour remained intrinsic to the fabric of  society everywhere down to modern 
times and persist both in contemporary democracies and the former communist 
bloc and its successors.
Debt and Religious Rules
Famously, religious institutions have laid down rules regarding monetary debt 
and have taken a strong interest in interest. Early Jewish law, even preceding the 
arrival of  coinage, prescribed a debt holiday every seven years, the origin of  the 
term jubilee. The very basis of  Christian theology is a blood sacrifice ‘redeeming’ 
Christians – the word is significant – from their debt burden of  ‘original sin’ in 
disobeying the deity. Sharia law bans the unvarnished imposition of  interest on 
loans, but since monetary economic activity is practically impossible without it, a 
variety of  clever devices, so that interest doesn’t superficially appear to be interest, 
have been utilised to get around the prohibition. Generally speaking this takes the 
form of  a fee for use of  the money. 
The medieval Roman Catholic church likewise forbade Christians to take 
interest, denounced as usury, on loans to other Christians (or at least other Latin 
ones), but again the impracticality of  the rule soon became all too apparent. It was 
avoided easily enough by the trading cities of  the Mediterranean, especially Venice 
and Genoa, whose trading partners were mostly not Latin Christians. Elsewhere 
it was more of  a problem, particularly for medieval monarchs, who at least by the 
beginning of  the second millennium CE were finding their traditional sources of  
income insufficient, even for routine governmental requirements but especially for 
warfare, and had little alternative but to borrow. 
Fortunately – or unfortunately, depending on the viewpoint – a solution was 
to hand. Jewish merchants, not being Christians of  course, were theologically 
permitted to trade in money and make interest-bearing loans, soon developing 
expertise in the practice. They were banned from landowning or most other 
professions. The English king Richard I financed his crusade by means of  such 
loans. Of  course debtors tend not to like creditors, especially when the latter 
are pressing for repayment, and so being a medieval Jewish moneylender was a 
very high risk occupation, for if  the lords to whom you had lent had sufficient 
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social authority and insufficient commitment to repay, it was not too difficult to 
incite an anti-Jewish pogrom as a means of  cancelling their debt. Nevertheless 
some restraint was advisable or they might otherwise find themselves without any 
necessary creditors.
As the cultural authority of  the Papacy weakened in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries except where kings, as in Spain, found convenience in upholding it, the 
usury prohibition eroded and Italian moneylenders increasingly came to replace 
Jewish ones. Both the main Spanish conquistadors, Cortez in Mexico and Pizarro 
in Peru, were heavily in debt to Venetian and Genoese bankers. For them plunder 
of  Aztec or Inca riches was not merely an expression of  surpassing greed but a 
matter of  urgent and pressing necessity.
By the late medieval and early modern centuries in Europe monarchs throughout 
the continent had found it virtually impossible to wage war without falling into 
substantial indebtedness. Even the immense bullion revenues spilling into the 
Spanish treasury from New World plunder, while they helped, did not suffice. 
The monarchs of  the absolutist or would-be absolutist states tried all manner 
of  expedients and devices to cover their deficits, one of  the favourites being 
the sale of  offices and honours, or, if  nothing else would do, simple repudiation 
and default.
Popular Protest
The ground-down and exploited peasantries of  the Eurasian landmass, despised 
and treated as dispensable units of  production, surviving as best they might with 
agricultural techniques which permitted in the most favourable circumstances only 
a small surplus to be produced above bare subsistence. Even that minimal surplus 
was liable to be seized, along with their womenfolk, by landlords, the state or 
invaders. Such peasantries, who were subjected to arbitrary ill-treatment, regularly 
devastated by flood, famine and disease; nevertheless did not submit quietly to 
their fate. 
There is little evidence during the first centuries of  civilisation of  popular 
resistance to the Bronze Age elites of  the early states and empires (though there 
are hints of  bread and tax riots and a strike among Egyptian tomb and temple 
workers is recorded) and on the basis of  what is known about peasant revolts across 
Eurasia from subsequent millennia, the likelihood is that such protest against rent 
(in labour and in product), tribute and taxation (the same) was not unknown in the 
earlier period. Most of  the time no doubt, peasants, slaves,21 servants, labourers 
and craft workers endured rather than resisted, for resistance would have been 
dangerous and without great prospect of  success, but on occasions they must have 
responded collectively to the feeling that ‘we have had enough!’. From time to time 
they could also invoke religious justifications for their action on the basis that the 
masters were defying the will of  the gods by engaging in unfair treatment of  their 
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peasant workforce or their artisan producers, or that they were invading outsiders 
who had destroyed a previously more just social order.
From the time of  the later second millennium BCE the evidence grows from a 
trickle to a torrent. It is initially evidenced by the Amarna Correspondence, a series 
of  fourteenth-century cuneiform tablet letters to the Pharaoh from the rulers of  
vassal city states of  Canaan, covering a number of  topics, one of  which can be 
interpreted, as it is by the author and journalist John Pickard, as an appeal for 
assistance against rural revolt.
Abdi-Asista . . . sent a message to the men of  Ammiya. ‘Kill your lord and 
join the Apiru.’22 Accordingly the mayors say, ‘He will do the same thing to 
all of  us, and all the lands will be joined to the Apiru . . . just now the men of  
Ammiya have killed their lord. I am afraid’ . . . This is clearly a chronicle of  
enormous revolutionary upheaval [original italics]; not a minor skirmish in one town 
or another, but a mighty movement reaching from modern-day Lebanon in the 
north to the Egyptian border in the south, involving perhaps tens of  thousands 
of  participants, and stretching over many decades . . . one of  the earliest recorded 
examples of  a revolutionary movement . . . . 23
It is his suggestion, though this is disputed, that an element of  the Apiru, 
which the Egyptian records define as the Shasu, constituted a more coherent rural 
revolutionary movement and were the originators of  the Hebrew state under 
the banner of  their god Yahweh. Later the successful Maccabean revolt of  Jews 
against the Hellenistic Seluccid empire and its local collaborators was certainly a 
social as well as a religious uprising. The supposed origin of  Jesus of  Nazareth in 
Galilee is not without its significance, for that region was notorious at the time for 
dissidence and low-level forms of  resistance to the local rulers and their Roman 
overlords. The great Jewish revolt of  66–70 CE commenced as an anti-taxation 
insurrection.
Rural revolt erupted in China towards the end of  the first millennium, and 
the founder of  the Han dynasty himself  emerged from the peasantry. It is also 
possible, though uncertain, that the establishment of  the Gupta empire on the 
Indian subcontinent was a result of  lower-caste revolt against elite oppression. 
Most of  the city states of  classical Greece and their rural hinterlands were the 
scenes of  fierce conflict between a landowning aristocracy and their free peasantry 
and urban craftsmen. The citizen democracy which, after bitter struggles, 
characterised Athens between the sixth and second centuries BCE was unique and 
founded upon slavery, misogyny and, at its height, imperialism.
At about the same period the Roman republic, having grown to imperial 
proportions, was racked by slave revolts, of  which that of  Spartacus is only the 
most renowned, and also dissidence among the lower-class free citizens of  Rome 
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itself  – the original ‘proletariat’. The military empire which was instituted by 
Augustus in 27 BCE was primarily an insurance against slave revolt. 
Institutionalised, Organised Violence
The role of  force in providing the framework for human relations is simply more explicit in 
what we call ‘traditional societies . . . ’
—David Graeber
Organised violence can constitute anything from the penal sanctions to be 
discussed in the following chapter to armed invasion with full-scale military 
apparatus. It could also include the unofficial extermination of  aboriginal people 
by private groups of  settlers, supplemented, when required, by the official military. 
All forms of  surplus extraction and many instances of  transfer of  resources 
depend in the last analysis on violence. With the wage relationship that aspect is at 
its most concealed, but any serious threat to it, whether localised or on wider scale, 
provokes a violent response by the extractors and the armed formations which 
guard them either privately or on behalf  of  the state.24
Throughout recorded history organised violence has been overwhelmingly the 
privilege of  elites exercising it either against refractory producers or against each 
other in contests for the forcible transfer of  resources (which may well include 
each other’s producers). 
Early Contexts
Central to the issue is the question whether humans, and more specifically 
human males, have a spontaneous disposition to collective violence against each 
other, a disposition which has served as the underlay to the forms of  organised 
violence discussed in this chapter. Certainly our closest non-human relatives, 
the chimpanzees and the closely related bonobos, return an ambiguous answer. 
The former are very violent, and as well as cooperatively hunting other primates 
to eat them, will attack any stranger intruding on their territory. The latter, by 
contrast, though they also hunt monkeys, are otherwise remarkably peaceable, as 
on the whole, are the other great apes. Similar ambiguity attends early human 
behaviour. Michael Mann notes that, ‘In a quantitative study only four out of  fifty 
primitive peoples did not routinely engage in warfare’ – but it was not normally 
very destructive.25 
Both Neanderthals and Palaeolithic H. sapiens sapiens were probably (though 
not with complete certainty) cannibalistic, at least on occasion. However there 
is no way of  knowing whether those eaten were hunted to death or had died 
through natural causes or by accident, and whether the cannibalism was ritual or 
‘economic’ in character. There is also the possibility, though the likelihood appears 
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otherwise, that the modern humans committed a genocidal extermination of  the 
Neanderthals in what is now Europe. 
Although it is highly unlikely that there was ever in this case a conscious 
programme of  collective violence let alone an exterminatory project, ethnographic 
and archaeological evidence shows that it is fairly certain there would have been 
on occasion lethal territorial conflicts between forager bands, particularly in a 
context of  expanding population and climate-induced dwindling of  resources. 
Ethnographic evidence likewise makes it clear that violence would have been 
threatened or used, for example, against clan members endangering the clan’s 
collective interests by idiosyncratic behaviour.
It is also reasonable to conclude that cooperative violence against other humans 
would be, if  circumstances suggested it, a natural extension of  similar violence 
against large game animals or dangerously predatory ones. In other words, 
collective hunting and fighting, predominantly undertaken by young males, are 
closely linked endeavours. 
Military and Public Violence
With the Neolithic revolution, and particularly with the emergence of  agrarian 
civilisation, collective organised violence appears to assume a more sustained 
and directed character. Technological advance, especially the introduction of  
bronze, made weaponry more effective and also much more expensive, leading 
to aggressive weaponry in the shape of  chariots manned by warriors carrying 
bronze weapons and defensive weaponry in the shape of  bronze armour. Such 
armour was something available only to elites – the rank and file had to be content 
with leather protection. Wooden and hide shields could also be strengthened with 
bronze bosses and studs, but all-bronze shields were made only for ceremonial 
purposes, such as the Celtic shields recovered from the river Thames. Their weight 
made them impractical for use in combat. Mycenaean lords wore helmets made of  
boars’ teeth. The Egyptian armies used very little defensive armour, the Assyrian 
empire became particularly formidable not least because of  their innovations in 
defensive armour as well as military engineering and organisation.
The principal perils for Bronze Age and earlier monarchs came less from their 
own subjects than from their equivalent rivals. One way to increase your resource 
base was to invade a neighbouring territory with your army and either loot it or 
enforce the payment of  tribute, or possibly both. Success in such enterprise also 
had the convenient outcome of  enhancing the monarch’s prestige and power 
among his own people and fear of  it among other monarchs farther afield.
There were of  course major risks, the most immediate one being defeat, which 
would not merely diminish one’s standing but might in addition motivate a palace 
coup – there were always jealous relatives in the background. Even success could 
have its dangers, for if  the monarch did not take the field in person but sent 
out his generals, the victorious general might well get to thinking that he would 
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make a better monarch and have the military force at his command to execute his 
ambition. Better to execute the general instead, but that too could have its dangers, 
if  the latter was well-connected. 
Equally, if  the monarch did lead his armies himself  and endanger his sacred 
person, he would not be able to keep a sharp eye on what was happening back 
in his capital.26 One solution was to restrict major responsibilities, military and 
otherwise, to close family members (the kin relationship again) but that could 
be the most dangerous of  responses and close family members the most deadly 
of  rivals – a scenario repeated so often throughout the millennia that it became 
virtually routine. A number of  these monarchs, well aware of  that reality, were 
notorious son-killers, Herod the Great of  Judea being the most renowned example.
According to Michael Mann, Sargon the Great of  Akkad (not to be confused 
with his later Assyrian namesakes), who reigned in the later part of  the third 
millennium BCE, was the first really historical individual (although the names of  
earlier kings in Egypt and Mesopotamia appear in surviving records) – and he 
illustrates a number of  important realities, beginning with those discussed above. 
Sargon was a member of  the royal court in the Sumerian city of  Kish, and he 
made himself  its ruler by killing his predecessor. He went on to unite the Sumerian 
cities into an empire ruled by himself  and extended his power northwards to the 
sources of  the Tigris and Euphrates, becoming the founder of  the Akkadian 
dynasty. This was accomplished by aggressive conquest, but that was no simple 
matter, as the logistics of  Bronze Age military expeditions were complex indeed. 
It was no easy matter to fashion out of  the militarily proficient young men of  the 
various cities he had brought under his rule, an organised force that could act in a 
coherent fashion under the pressure of  combat. This minimally required planning 
and some degree of  training. 
Once a military force had been created it had to be handled carefully if  it was 
to be used effectively. Discipline, usually enforced by serious punishments, was of  
course essential, but so was provisioning. At times an army could ‘live off  the land’, 
taking whatever was needed from the inhabitants of  the area it passed through, 
but precautions were still required if  that proved to be impracticable. The armies 
of  the Bronze Age were essentially infantry formations, though supplemented 
by charioteers and archers. The distance they were capable of  marching in a day, 
taking into account the nature of  the terrain, had to be considered when planning 
any campaign. Provision had to be made too for supporting the wounded; they 
could not simply be left to take their chances if  the leader was to maintain the 
reputation of  an able commander. 
The feature of  pre-modern warfare most dangerous to its participants was 
doubtless less the encounter with the enemy than, in conditions even more 
minimally hygienic than those prevailing in civil life, encounter with unicellular 
organisms, especially should the army be operating in an unfamiliar climate. Even 
in modern times tropical and subtropical conditions were particularly deadly to 
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eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British soldiers. The medieval popes were 
better protected by the malarial swamps around Rome than they were by any 
military force they could summon, and tropical Africa was similarly protected 
from deep European invasion until the Europeans discovered the prophylactic 
use of  quinine in the nineteenth century.
Iron-using technology brought with it a revolution in warfare, but it did 
not upset the dominance of  autocratically governed empires, merely changed 
the autocratic personnel. Indeed it reinforced them in the Middle East, south 
Asia, China and Japan, and permitted their emergence in Africa. An important 
innovation in the first millennium BCE was the invention of  the horse saddle 
suitable for the use of  cavalry, but the full potential of  this development could 
not be realised until near the middle of  the first millennium CE, for the original 
mounted warrior without stirrups could be readily unhorsed by a determined 
infantryman, and cavalry were mainly employed for reconnaissance and command 
and used sparingly in actual combat. Stirrups were a Chinese invention adopted by 
the steppe warriors who attacked the Roman empire in the fifth century CE and 
the impact this made on the practice of  warfare was monumental. These nomads 
had the additional advantage that little more was needed for the sustenance of  
their mounts than adequate grassland and sufficient water, and if  necessary or 
even by preference they themselves could live on the mares’ milk (or turn it into 
an alcoholic beverage, kumis).
The evolution of  weaponry largely stabilised at this point for the greater part of  
a millennium, slow steady improvements being made on the technologies already 
in existence without any further military revolution. The effectiveness of  body 
armour advanced to its ultimate in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, where 
the noble horseman, totally covered in steel, could only fight on a specially bred 
strong horse – itself  extensively armoured – onto which he had sometimes to be 
mechanically lifted. Advances were also made to the effectiveness of  projectile 
weapons – bows which dated from prehistoric times, and crossbows, used from the 
first millennium BCE and later becoming the standard Chinese infantry weapon.
The first recorded use of  gunpowder as a weapon dates from as early as the 
twelfth century, when it was employed as a siege weapon by a Chinese general. 
During the following century references to the artillery use of  gunpowder are 
relatively sparse, especially in the West, but by the fourteenth century it was used 
on occasion in Britain and in the fifteenth century it was the weapon of  choice for 
conducting sieges, as by the Turks to batter down the walls of  Constantinople in 
1453 (though they used Italian cannon). Seven years later the Scottish king James II 
was killed by the accidental explosion of  one of  his new toys. Hand-held firearms 
were also devised in the same century. The term ‘handgun’ sounds modern, but it 
was also used in that century, as when Henry VII attempted to ban ‘hand-gonnes’ 
in case they distracted his subjects from archery practice.
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In fact the early firearm was much inferior to the bow or crossbow, being 
both less accurate and having a much slower rate of  fire. Its great advantage was 
that it could be used by any soldier after minimal instruction, whereas it took 
a decade and more to train a skilled archer. The problem of  inaccuracy in the 
early muskets was in the eighteenth century overcome to some extent by rifling 
the barrel. Repeater firearms were possible in principle as early as the sixteenth 
century (Henry VIII owned a revolver) but were useless because the deposit 
from the gunpowder then in use jammed the firing mechanism. An eighteenth-
century inventor tried unsuccessfully to devise a machine-gun to fire round bullets 
at Christians and square ones at Turks. It was not until the nineteenth century 
that improved explosives and the invention of  cartridges made repeating rifles, 
revolvers and automatic pistols practical weapons. These were soon followed by 
effective machine-guns, most notoriously the Gatling27 and the Maxim.
These revolutionary killing devices were accompanied by major technological 
improvements in heavy weaponry, which principally involved replacing the solid 
cannon-ball with an explosive shell, enormously more destructive in both land and 
sea warfare. With the dawn of  the twentieth century these were joined and used in 
conjunction with the aircraft and the rocket in the air, and the submarine beneath 
the water, a vessel with no purpose other than destruction. The development of  
atomic weaponry in the 1940s, and its enormously more destructive successor, 
the thermonuclear bomb, in the following decade, with their promise to annihilate 
human life on the planet, might well have brought about the impossibility of  
warfare in any rational perspective – but far from it. Although they have never 
been militarily used again after the initial experiment in 1945, the permanent 
possibility remains that a terminally destructive conflict could at any time break 
out, as up to six states have continued to produce and stockpile them. 
Meantime, human ingenuity has contrived to continue killing on a mass scale, 
with ‘conventional’ weaponry being continually ‘improved’ to make it still more 
deadly and inflict superior all-round destruction – but at the same time the massacre 
and mutilation of  huge numbers with the most primitive of  instruments, such as 
steel blades, are not extinct. Organised violence, recent claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding, remains as all-pervasive in the twenty-first century CE as it was 
in the twenty-first century BCE. 
This summarises the history of  military violence. This was of  course never 
simply a matter of  contending military forces, but was equally, if  not more 
significantly, exercised against informal armed formations resisting state control, 
such as the ‘social bandits’ analysed by Eric Hobsbawm28 or against unorganised 
masses objecting to state behaviour. Modern states in these circumstances tend to 
hold back the military as a last resort, preferring formations loosely referred to as 
‘police’ (armed in most countries) whose specific remit is to exercise violence in 
civil circumstances. It is when these are threatened with being overwhelmed that 
the military with their heavier firepower are called into action. It is unusual, but 
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not unknown, for formations which were initially designated for a policing role 
to become formal military units. The Waffen SS of  the Third Reich are the most 
outstanding example, but a somewhat similar development took place within the 
Soviet NKVD/KGB29 which created heavily armed units indistinguishable from 
military ones. 
The centrality of  military violence to the state structure both ancient and 
modern is evident in monarchies, given the special relationship maintained between 
the monarch and the fighting forces and their commanders. In times when the 
monarch actually led his forces into battle this was wholly understandable, but it 
persists still in contemporary states where the monarch is primarily a figurehead 
– most distinctly in the UK, where the navy and the air force are both prefixed 
with the epithet ‘royal’. Even in Western European states which retain a monarch 
of  much less account, attending military parades remains their central ceremonial 
function and their armed forces have a crown incorporated in their insignia.
Violence was, and often still is, in some countries also the approved method 
of  maintaining discipline within the armed forces themselves – and these 
methods when judged to be necessary, could include execution. Indeed, from the 
seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries English writers recommended that 
common soldiers and sailors should be treated as foully as possible so that they 
wouldn’t mind getting killed. 
Markets and Territory
Apart from the direct extraction of  labour or the product of  labour from slaves, 
serfs or wage labourers, military violence was also used from the earliest times 
to direct the course of  voluntary market transactions, or indeed to restrict their 
voluntary character. This involved the monopoly control of  such things as markets 
and trade routes, either reserving their use to the possessor of  violent means or 
charging others for permission to use the facilities. At the local level, for example, 
medieval lordships, whether individuals or corporations, secular or clerical, 
compelled rural cultivators in the areas under their control, in addition to the 
dues they exacted, to trade any surplus in the markets controlled by the lordship 
and to pay for the privilege.30 The same applied to itinerant peddlers. On a wider 
scale, this could mean control of  trade routes, a frequent bone of  contention 
from the beginning of  long-distance trade, and was the source of  the Punic Wars 
which prefigured the rise of  the Roman state to its eventual domination of  the 
Mediterranean and its hinterland. 
Conflict of  this kind was often enough combined, as it had been from the time 
of  Sargon the Great, with straightforward territorial aggression to seize control of  
resources from a rival polity. In the medieval centuries it was a constant feature of  
political interaction, with excuses ranging from religion to dynastic rivalry. Constant 
warfare was conducted on the frontiers of  Western Christendom either against the 
usually more poorly armed and organised Slavonic peoples31 or the more equally 
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armed polities of  the Muslims in Spain and the Middle East, or the ‘schismatic’ 
rival Christians of  the Byzantine empire. From the end of  the fifteenth century 
the practice of  religiously justified conquest was carried across the Atlantic, and in 
subsequent centuries against the by then less militarily proficient empires of  the 
east. The rulers of  Western Christendom however were just as ready to fight and 
rob each other, as testified by the renowned seizure of  the English throne by the 
Norman duke in 1066 and many more examples.
The relationship between economy and organised violence has a further 
dimension. Huge military expenditure was a very significant drain on the resources 
of  the Roman empire, with all manner of  social consequences following from 
the taxation burden which was involved. Military expenditure in the medieval 
and early modern states greatly affected the social and political trajectories of  
the states involved, and towards the end of  that period an important part of  
the banking system which emerged in the eighteenth century was to underpin 
military expenditure by enabling governments (primarily the British) to raise the 
finance needed. In the contemporary world the ‘permanent arms economy’ is 
central to both the US and the UK – its sudden cessation would provoke mass 
unemployment and bankruptcies. 
Organised Violence and Questions of Perpetuation
The question remains – why did organised violence in all its dimensions become 
such a central feature of  the historical process?32 We can speculate on the likelihood 
of  whether forager bands in the Palaeolithic engaged in lethal conflicts with each 
other – probably they did. 
Prior to the emergence of  centralised states, settled social life was ruled by 
custom, and violence was intrinsic to it. Customary rules prescribed severe 
penalties, including mutilation and death for – even accidental – violation of  social 
custom or taboo, and these specifications were carried over into the earliest law 
codes. Centuries before the codes’ appearance, social differentiation had evolved 
into well-defined class structures and naturally the rules governing relations 
between social superiors and inferiors featured prominently. Violence was second 
nature to the god-kings in their domestic society, and therefore to organise, 
expand and extend it beyond their territory must have come very naturally. These 
monarchs at the same time as they were violently enforcing social subordination 
were also engaging each other in armed conflict. It is no accident that the gods 
of  the Indo-European peoples and their Semitic neighbours were mostly violent 
deities with conflict as their primary vocation, and when combined into one figure, 
such as the Jewish YHWH, were hyper-violent, using plague, famine and flood as 
routine instruments of  government and administration. 
The principal though by no means the only purpose of  what we may term ‘social 
violence’, the sort of  violence whose monopoly Weber argued was the defining 
Thompson T02687 01 text   97 16/12/2014   13:29
98 Work, Sex and PoWer
character of  the state, was and is to ensure the transfer of  resources between 
socio-economic classes. When that process goes ahead peaceably without violence 
having to be employed, the social order is said to be stable and the relationship 
accepted as a law of  nature rather than the fiat of  rulers. At a still deeper level 
violence or the threat of  it was a necessary tool not only to extract surplus from 
the basic producers but to protect and preserve the socio-political structure which 
underpinned the process.
Violence, more so organised violence, especially the violence of  interstate 
armed conflict, has a logic of  its own – it is not purely an instrument of  utility. 
For one thing, it is very expensive, and particularly if  the technology used in 
conducting it is very advanced, a gluttonous consumer of  resources. Occasionally 
it can be made to pay for itself  if  victory produces large gains, but often enough 
victory is ruinously expensive, and as Dr Johnson pointed out in The Vanity of  
Human Wishes, 
And mortgaged states their grandsires’ wreaths regret,
From age to age in everlasting debt;
Wreaths which at last the dear-bought right convey
To rust on medals, or on stones decay. 
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Ethics, Ambitions, Crime 
and Punishment
This chapter is intended to examine certain general considerations about human 
social relations closely related to the themes of  coercion and exploitation discussed 
in the previous subsequent chapter. Alongside questions of  ontology (what reality 
actually is or is not) and epistemology (how do we get to know what we know) 
the nature of  morality or ethics (why ought we do certain things and abstain from 
others) has been a central concern of  philosophers in all literate cultures (and 
doubtless of  questioning individuals in preliterate ones). Mostly this has exercised 
them in what may be loosely termed a religious framework  – involving Brahmin, 
Daoist, Confucian, Buddhist, Islamic, Christian thinkers and scholars; but also by 
ones who reject any supernatural dimension to right conduct.
According to David Graeber, ‘Anthropology . . . reveals some remarkable 
commonalities – fundamental moral principles that appear to exist everywhere 
and that will always tend to be invoked whenever people transfer objects back and 
forth or argue about what other people owe them’.1
In a very important ancient example of  this discussion deities do not intrude 
into the argument, (though the participants take their existence for granted). 
Plato’s Republic is a disquisition on how the ideal society should be organised. It 
takes the form of  a dialogue between Socrates and several of  his acolytes and 
begins with an argument on the nature of  justice and the justification for social 
rules. Inventing the origins of  morals and the principles of  justice is a universal 
practice among humans; societies cannot simply take these for granted, they feel 
compelled to justify them. 
One of  the disputants, Thrasymachus, argues cynically that what is called justice 
is nothing other than the interest of  dominant and stronger individuals dressed 
up as moral rules. Socrates/Plato dodges this interpretation by clever wordplay, 
basically by assuming what he has to prove, namely that an objective standard of  
justice or morality does actually exist, and the bulk of  the dialogue is devoted to 
working out its supposed implications, which are hierarchical and authoritarian, in 
line with Plato’s political standpoint as a reactionary aristocrat.
Critias, a relative of  Plato (possibly his uncle), was also an author, and the 
surviving fragment of  one of  his plays includes a suggestion which, if  not identical 
to that of  Thrasymachus certainly matches it in cynicism:
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[A]lthough the laws restrained
Mankind from deeds of  open violence
They still did wrong in secret, until some
Shrewd and far-sighted thinker had the wit
To invent gods, that all who did or said
Or even imagined evil might be afraid.
Critias, who was also one of  Socrates’s acolytes, later became one of  the oligarchs 
known as the Thirty Tyrants who briefly ruled Athens with murderous ferocity.
Justifications
Few ethical systems indeed fail to justify themselves without reference to 
supernatural claims which are considered to be the wellsprings of  the moral 
precepts that bind society together. These points of  reference need not necessarily 
be gods, as indeed is the case in Eastern cultures,2 where they are related to more 
abstract concepts such as karma and reincarnation. In the classical Greco-Roman 
or the Norse cultures the gods were, to say the least, not much concerned with 
moral issues but rather more preoccupied with power-hungry thuggishness and 
mutual jealousy, with humans filling the role of  disposable playthings. 
Nevertheless in these cultures the gods were supposed to reward or punish 
the due fulfilment or neglect of  sacrificial duties and social roles. In addition 
Greek culture postulated the supernatural figures of  the Erinyes or Furies who 
punished family-connected crime, particularly ones committed against parents. In 
brief, everywhere throughout the globe, virtually a social universal, violation of  
social mores was expected to incur supernatural punishment even if  a human 
one was evaded3 – and this debt could be passed down the generations. In Greek 
mythology, for example, the house of  Atreus was cursed; the ancestors had form, 
including eating their relatives.
It is in the monotheist (or Abrahamic) religions that the connection between 
deity and morality is particularly strong. According to this narrative, the basic 
moral code (and often many details in addition) has been laid down by the deity, 
via prophets to whom he has revealed it, and is binding upon all believers. That 
kind of  assertion however generates a significant conundrum which interpreters 
have difficulty in avoiding.
It relates to the question – is an action moral because the deity commands it, or 
does he/she decree it because it is moral? If  it is the first, then the very opposite 
could equally be right and ethical. If  instead of  ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery’ 
(or cannibalism) the divine law code had stated ‘Thou shalt commit adultery’ (or 
cannibalism), as in the famous misprint in a seventeenth-century edition of  the 
bible, accordingly termed ‘the wicked bible’;4 then it would have been incumbent 
on a believer to do these things, God being all-powerful and able to decree 
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whatever he wishes at his will and pleasure. Any such suggestion however evokes 
horror and disgust among believers – the divinity/divinities of  any particular 
society would never command actions, it is presumed, contrary to that society’s 
dominant ethical principles.
If  on the other hand the deity only affirms rules that are inherently moral then 
that implies that ethical rules are separate from and even prior to him or her, which 
detracts from God’s omnipotence – and what then is the origin and justification 
of  moral prescriptions? In fact they are a condensed and abstract expression of  
the rules governing human relations in particular societies. The Aztec deities, 
notoriously, commanded human sacrifice on a monstrous scale, and doubtless 
their priests believed that they were acting impeccably. 
For millennia efforts have been made to resolve this conundrum. A start is 
made with the injunction known as the Golden Rule which runs through a number 
of  religions, ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ – but that 
would scarcely be suitable for a masochist. Immanuel Kant’s injunction to treat 
other persons as ends in themselves and not as objects is better, but raises all 
sorts of  begged questions as to what such treatment implies. In fact the dilemma 
is irresolvable, and all systems of  ethics are the condensed social practices of  
the communities which sustain them. Moreover, though tending to absolutism in 
principle, e.g. never lie, never steal, in practice ethical precepts are always situational – 
if  pressing circumstances demand that any particular injunction should be broken 
or bent, a convincing reason can always be found for the necessity of  doing so.5
Ethical Origins
Humans’ two closest biological relatives, the chimpanzees and the bonobos, while 
genetically all but identical, exhibit very different forms of  behaviours. The former, 
confined to the north of  the Congo river, are very hierarchical; a chimpanzee troop 
being controlled by a dominant alpha male who gains his position by forming 
alliances with others in the troop, themselves positioned in a definite hierarchy 
beneath the superior individual, who is then sometimes challenged by alliances 
among his subordinates. The Bonobos by contrast, living to the south of  the 
river, are minimally hierarchical and do not form male coalitions, but, famously 
promiscuous, employ sex as a means of  settling disputes and use mothers as allies. 
Nevertheless apes, however intelligent, appear to lack any specifically moral sense 
– behaviour is controlled only by fear or approval.
These relationships are examined in detail by Christopher Boehm in his Moral 
Origins: The Evolution of  Virtue, Altruism and Shame, whose concept of  that origin 
has a lot of  plausibility, although the author is rather too inclined to attribute some 
dispositions to genetic origins when cultural ones would account for them just 
as effectively. ‘We arrived at our moral nature in the great evolutionary nature of  
chance’,6 he writes. ‘Humans are moral because we are genetically set up to be that 
Thompson T02687 01 text   101 16/12/2014   13:29
102 Work, Sex and PoWer
way . . . more was needed than a preexisting capacity for cultural transmission.’7 
Boehm notes that guilt is not a human universal, but that shame tends to be, and 
that the latter’s behavioural manifestation, blushing, certainly is.8 No doubt genetics 
are involved to some extent; a social animal with the cognitive and communicative 
apparatus of  H. sapiens must necessarily have a predisposition to conceive social 
rules as much as it does to speech or else social life would be impossible; but, as 
with speech, the sort of  rules that evolve are potentially flexible to an indefinite 
degree and every society without exception invents a different narrative for the 
origin of  its moral codes. 
All the same, as Boehm points out, there is a downside, for the moral ‘discount’ 
applied to cultural outsiders.9 ‘Thou shalt not kill’ means ‘thou shalt not kill a 
fellow-clansman’.
Cultural Conservatism and Right Order
Historically, cultures or social orders have had an inbuilt tendency towards cultural 
and moral conservatism, manifest, of  course, in a variety of  ways. It is only in 
the last few hundred years that the project of  deliberately and fundamentally 
transforming a culture has been entertained by a significant number of  its 
members. The cultural web, after all, is the necessary source of  food supply and 
other material necessities, also of  social order and ideological underpinnings 
which provide a sense of  the meaning of  individual lives and their place within 
the cultural complex. Major alterations, whether willed or accidental, could prove 
catastrophic as it has been for hunter-gatherer societies forced into contemporary 
modernisation. It is not therefore surprising that social conservatism is deeply 
embedded in social consciousness. Two examples of  agriculture societies of  
differing cultures and periods will illustrate the point.
Right Order 
In ancient Egypt the concept of  ma’at – right order or right conduct, including 
everything from government to funerary rites – set the social structure. It kept 
the peasantry at their toil of  tilling the irrigated fields to feed the community; 
the artisans creating the magnificent objects which fill our museums; the priests 
calculating and identifying the signs when the Nile was due to flood; the Pharaoh 
supplying due reverence to the gods and so ensuring the procession of  days, nights 
and years, or mobilising labour for monumental building projects, conducting 
diplomacy and when necessary leading his troops to battle. His Aztec equivalent 
some thousands of  years later was doing much the same thing, but in addition was 
required to organise military expeditions to maintain a supply of  captives for the 
human sacrifice on a prodigious scale that was needed to keep the sun moving in 
the sky and the maize sprouting in the fields. 
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Fast forward to mainland Britain of  the early eighteenth century where the 
social consensus (not universally accepted but the common sense of  polite 
male-dominated society) was that the country had attained a state as near to 
perfection as the deity was likely to permit. The country was Protestant, having 
definitely escaped from absolutism and Papal slavery. Protestant dissenters from 
the official versions of  the creed were discriminated against but tolerated, and 
even Catholics were not too severely persecuted. It was also a free country, in 
that the monarch’s subjects enjoyed the ‘rights of  freeborn Englishmen’ (most 
Scotsmen too after 1707). Publication, apart from in the theatre was not subject to 
pre-censorship, though the reactionary clergy had fought hard at the beginning of  
the century to retain the official licencing of  publications. 
Internal trade and production ran largely according to the laws of  the market 
apart from the unavoidable nuisances of  customs impositions on foreign imports 
and excise on a few products. In this near-idyllic construction of  that polity those 
enduring ‘homely toil and destiny obscure’ were expected to be content with the 
station into which it had pleased God to call them, to work industriously for the 
benefit of  their masters and the public good, and to conscientiously attend for 
indoctrination at the church, preferably the Established one; women to obey their 
husbands and observe the social conventions. 
Legislators were expected to suppress Jacobite conspirators, uphold the 
Protestant settlement, the Hanoverian succession and the privileges of  the 
Established church and its clergy (especially its clergy). They were also expected 
to protect property as a priority, to keep the wheels of  commerce turning with 
suitable legislation – and everyone was enjoined ideologically as well as in practice 
to fetishise the Law and the laws, including the code of  ferocious penalties which 
were regularly extended to further offences as the century proceeded.10 These 
societies had only one important thing in common – their agricultural economic 
base. In all other respects they inhabited different social universes and their 
dramatically different ethical standards reflected the material and social realities 
of  their circumstances. Equivalent variations would have applied to other agrarian 
societies differently located in time and space.
Law, State, Crime and Punishment 
Law Codes
In preliterate societies and some minimally literate ones, ethical codes tend to be 
embodied in custom, and in literate societies in the form of  written law codes, 
though always there were kinds of  socially disapproved behaviour which were not 
serious enough to be covered by legislation. In traditional Chinese legal theory an 
ideological clash between proponents of  rules based primarily on custom (though 
written down) and other scholars advocating precisely codified laws promulgated by 
authority, resulted in rival schools of  thought termed Confucianism and Legalism. 
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It would be naturally assumed that written law codes, however derived, have to 
be public documents, but this was by no means always the case. Quite separately 
in both archaic Athens and Rome, severe social struggles were occasioned over the 
right of  citizens in general to have knowledge of  the laws, information hitherto 
confined to the elites, which naturally offered great advantage to the latter. Nor 
are secret laws a thing of  the remote past – they have been used extensively by 
dictatorial regimes in the twentieth century, most infamously in the Third Reich, 
though its worst atrocities were committed without any legal authority whatsoever 
beyond ambiguous verbal statements by the Führer. Secret legislation continues 
into the twenty-first century, for example the US laws associated with the Patriot 
Act allow repressive agencies to do what they like without possibility of  legal 
challenge while at the same time avoiding the adverse publicity that publishing 
these laws would generate.
In dynastic empires embracing historically distinct communities, especially very 
geographically diverse ones, such as the early Arab empire, or on a much more 
minor scale, Athelstan’s unified England of  the tenth century, it was frequently 
the case that the separate communities continued to function under their own 
laws for everyday purposes, while the emperors or kings promulgated a general 
further layer of  legislation to serve their own interests. It was also possible, in 
Western Christendom for example, for two quite separate legal systems namely 
secular law and canon law to operate alongside each other, sometimes conflicting 
if  a monarch objected to clerical pretensions. A not too dissimilar system existed 
in the Ottoman empire, Sharia law being the equivalent of  canon law, though 
with a considerably broader scope.11 Canon law, as well as being concerned with 
the behaviour of  the clergy and the organisation of  the church also included the 
personal behaviour of  the lay public, especially regarding matters of  marriage, 
legitimacy and sexual behaviour.
Civil and Criminal Law
Law falls into two major categories – property issues referred to as civil law, 
where illegal wrongdoing does not principally feature and a settlement had to be 
reached, and crimes against persons or property. These are modern distinctions 
of  course, and in history the boundary could be very nebulous – for example in 
the Germanic wergild system of  the early Middle Ages, under which murder could 
be redeemed by paying compensation (graded according to rank) to the victim’s 
family or community. Punishment followed if  payment could not be made.
Developed legal systems, whether civil or criminal had to be interpreted. Acting 
as the supreme interpreter was the monarch’s principal responsibility since it was 
a continuous one and military functions were more intermittent. However such 
interpretation and argument over interpretation required a corps of  experts, 
whether mostly amateurs of  rank, as was the case in imperial China, rhetoricians 
in classical Athens, or professionals; in which case they are referred to as lawyers. 
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These first came to prominence in the Roman republic and empire (Cicero the 
most notable) and were inherited – at a distance in time – by the kingdoms which 
superseded that empire, though in northern Europe for several centuries legal 
disputes and accusations were conducted in gatherings of  free citizens, usually 
guided in their deliberations by a man of  some prestige (in England, for example, 
professional secular lawyers appeared only in the twelfth century). 
A prevalent myth claims that law in general stands above the messy social realities 
of  crime, conflict and dispute and serves as the impartial arbiter which represses 
crime and settles disputes, an assertion symbolised in the icon of  a blindfolded 
female figure representing the Roman goddess of  justice, holding a sword in one 
hand and a pair of  evenly balanced scales in the other. In reality, as has been 
well remarked, law is the expression of  political relations in any given society and 
expresses the will and values of  whoever is politically in charge, while political 
relationships in turn express the interests of  ruling elites. Property law is a good 
example, expressing the interests of  the well-propertied against the unpropertied 
or minimally-propertied. Such laws were used in eighteenth-century England to 
strip agricultural copyholders of  their rights. Legal restrictions on workers’ right 
to organise and strike is another example.
The State
There are and have been stateless societies, and for many millennia all humanity 
got on very adequately without any states. States emerged fully in the form of  the 
city states of  southern Mesopotamia, after a lengthy period of  evolution towards 
such a formation by the stateless agricultural communities in that region. The 
state, initially in the form of  monarchy – and for millennia monarchy was the 
default option though not an invariable one – became the institution responsible 
for administering the laws over a given territory and setting the terms on which 
those subject to it could conduct their lives. Its basic functions throughout the 
centuries have been primarily repressive ones – combating external enemies and 
repressing disturbers of  the peace within the realm, whether political, in which 
case it is termed sedition, or merely anti-social in the form of  violations against 
person, property or social custom.
The realm however has never consisted of  an undifferentiated mass of  citizens 
but of  individuals, groupings, networks, rival elites and so forth, all with their 
own projects, ambitions and lust for power and property. Accordingly the state 
as an institution, if  it was to best serve the interests of  the topmost elite (usually 
embodied in a monarch) had to umpire and arbitrate between these divergent 
social forces, using concession or repression as appropriate. Instituting public 
works, such as canals, aqueducts or the Colosseum, might be part of  that strategy. 
Its cardinal remit however was always to preserve and protect the power relations 
which it was instituted to serve. Often state establishment took the form of  
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aggressive conquest as principalities grew violently into kingdoms, kingdoms into 
empires; on other occasions they emerged by some sort of  consensus between 
social elites in pre-state societies.
Punishment and Cruelty
The practices considered here could equally well have featured in the previous 
chapter. They were permeated with immoderate violence. Punishment is the 
exaction of  retribution upon offenders against social norms or persons defying the 
commands of  authority. It consists in the infliction of  unwelcome consequences 
upon the offender, with the purpose either of  straightforward retribution (aka 
vengeance), deterring or preventing the wrongdoer from repeating similar offences 
or serving as a deterrent example to other potential miscreants.
In contemporary societies everywhere, middle range offenders are punished 
by imprisonment of  varying length and severity, and imprisonment is the penalty 
for all serious crimes in the states which have abolished executions. Lesser 
misdemeanours are usually punished by financial penalties. For the most seriously 
regarded crimes such as murder (and in some states many others, including 
intellectual offences) execution by varying techniques continues to be employed 
in just under half  the states represented at the United Nations.12 In a few states 
physical mutilation continues to be practised, which is regarded with abhorrence in 
most jurisdictions. Generally speaking imprisonment remains the default option.
Sustained imprisonment as a regular form of  punishment covering a large 
number of  offences and individuals, however, is only possible in adequately 
resourced and highly organised societies such as exist today, regardless of  the 
nature of  their regimes. It requires a considerable, extensive and expensive 
structure, of  which suitably designed escape-proof  buildings are probably the 
least part of  the problem – after all, no modern prison is more complex than 
the architecture of  the Colosseum in Rome. But the organisation and cost in a 
significantly large country (or even a small one) of  a corps of  full-time warders, 
and of  supplying even the minimal essentials of  life on a regular basis to large 
numbers of  long-term prisoners, was far beyond the capacity of  any pre-industrial 
society, even the Chinese one.
As recorded by Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris with reference to the Sung 
Dynasty of  the early second millennium CE,
The majority of  jails, whether located in the capital Kaifeng or in local districts 
and associated with the sheriff ’s office, tended to be small in scale, which led 
to difficulties in providing facilities for the segregation of  offenders. Sung jails 
were characterized by their inability . . . to provide adequate food or sanitation. 
Despite state mandates for the provision of  food for poor prisoners or those 
whose families were unable to provide for them, food was a constant concern 
for all prisoners, with starvation occurring frequently in jails.
 
Health care was 
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another concern, despite edicts that ordered the establishment of  jail hospitals 
. . . Prisoners found themselves in jails that were unsanitary and cramped, and 
they were lucky if  they didn’t contract an illness or even die before their release. 
Imprisonment functioned to hold suspects awaiting trial or sentencing as well 
as ensuring that witnesses for crimes were available to testify. It also functioned 
unofficially as a method to deal with specific cases, where they sought an 
alternative punishment to those proscribed by law.13
In Europe the Tower of  London was a renowned prison for very high-status 
individuals, and the Bastille in Paris accommodated prisoners of  that sort as well 
as less important ones, but the standard prisons were nearly all gaols or jails, 
essentially short-term holding confinements for accused awaiting trial or criminals 
due for punishment. Long-term imprisonment in pre-industrial societies was used 
only in the case of  high status prisoners whom for one reason or another it was 
inexpedient to kill, such as Duke Robert of  Normandy in the twelfth century or 
the famous Man in the Iron Mask (in reality a velvet one) in the seventeenth.
Consequently, pre-modern punishments all around the globe, whenever a 
financial penalty was not available or else appropriate, were overwhelmingly ones 
inflicted on the body, with execution very much to the fore; but even when not 
lethal generally ferocious and designed specifically to cause pain in varying degrees. 
Flogging was simple, easily administered and apportioned according to the gravity 
of  the offence; capable of  being used in quantities and intensities ranging from 
a relatively mild sanction to execution by torture. Mutilation was commonly 
practised; branding, eye gouging, amputation of  various limbs and body parts, 
and, a favourite of  medieval European rulers from Byzantine emperors to the 
princes of  northern Europe, blinding accompanied by castration, for the purpose 
of  degradation as well as intense pain and loss of  function. A milder form of  
combining pain with degradation was employed in medieval and early modern 
Western Europe, namely the pillory where the prisoner had their head and hands 
confined in holes in a board placed on top of  a pillar so that they could be mocked 
and pelted by missiles from passers-by. As a supplement their ears might be cut off  
or nailed to the pillory. Occasionally if  the missiles were both hard and substantial 
the pilloried person might be killed. 
Execution and Torture
The lavishly used punishment of  execution could be supplemented with all manner 
of  ingenious improvements to make it as prolonged and agonising as possible. 
Torture might be used as a means of  extracting information, securing a confession 
or as punishment on its own account, but overwhelmingly it was employed as an 
accompaniment to the infliction of  death. 
Legalised torture, either as an adjunct or a preliminary to execution, sprang 
from a similar disposition which regarded the sufferers as disposable items (usually 
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though not invariably members of  the lower orders) who deserved what they were 
getting. The Persian empire had forms of  execution that made crucifixion, the 
Roman version of  death by torture, appear almost humane by comparison. 
The founding fathers of  the new Unites States of  America in their Constitution 
specifically prohibited ‘cruel and unusual’ methods of  punishment. They had in 
mind the physically mutilating penalties used in England to accompany executions 
for treason by non-aristocrats; nobles were merely beheaded. These, devised in 
the time of  Edward I, continued into the mid-eighteenth century, being used for 
example against the rank-and-file Jacobite rebels; and remained on the statute 
book into the nineteenth century; their practical discontinuance from the 1790s 
was probably because of  their public relations liability by comparison with 
the guillotine. 
The ferocious penal systems of  the medieval era were explicitly justified by 
their defenders as necessary to keep the lower orders in order by means of  terror, 
otherwise their depraved instincts would be liable to bring functioning society to 
its knees. In Britain by the late seventeenth century these enhancements of  death, 
except in relation to treason, had largely been discontinued, but on the other side 
of  the scale, capital offences between 1688 and the early nineteenth century, were 
expanded prodigiously, mostly with reference to offences against property. The 
legislators seemed to imagine that the entire population, or at least its lower strata, 
was itching to rob their neighbours and restrained only by the threat of  ending up 
on the gallows as a consequence.
In fact the number of  executions did not increase proportionately with that of  
capital crimes, and a large majority of  those condemned to hang were reprieved. 
It was the threat, the possibility if  not the probability, of  execution, accompanied 
by all the panoply and theatre of  courtroom and scaffold – in other words terror 
– that was supposed to deter, though its efficacy may be doubted. The French 
revolutionaries, who had explicitly abolished cruel and unusual punishments 
and instead substituted the guillotine for all capital crimes, nevertheless found 
it expedient, when under severe threat, to declare terror (the word was explicitly 
stressed) to be the ‘order of  the day’. The first people to be called terrorists were 
not people who opposed the state by murderous means but the Jacobin revolu-
tionaries during their time in power. 
It was not only revolutionaries however; the Piedmontese arch-reactionary 
Joseph de Maistre, writing in the early nineteenth century, was not the only 
theorist to argue that the hangman was the central pillar of  social order: the same 
sentiments were expressed in the 1820s, with if  anything even greater virulence by 
the English jurist Anthony Hammond, a supposed legal reformer.
Torture naturally could have other purposes than inflicting a painful death. 
As mentioned, it has been employed very widely for extracting information, or 
also for confessions in regimes where confession was regarded as essential to a 
conviction, such as continental heresy trials. In Roman law a slave’s evidence was 
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valid only if  it followed from torture. Torture for such purposes has been used 
routinely down the centuries and many museums contain ingenious instruments 
designed to cause excruciating pain without actually killing the victim. Though 
victims might survive the experience, the vast majority, when they had confessed 
or informed, were subsequently executed – very few lived on to die natural 
deaths. 
Torture was used extensively by modern colonial regimes, the French in 
Algeria and the British in Kenya being only the most notorious. In Europe itself  
it underwent a major revival in the twentieth century, employed extensively in 
Stalinist regimes and especially by the Nazis, who were past masters in the art. It 
continues in vigorous health into the present century, more prevalent now than for 
some decades even despite the profile of  organisations like Amnesty International, 
increasing public indignation around the world more readily expressed by the use 
of  social media, and official emphasis on ‘human rights’ and condemnation of  
their violation. Additionally, for all his inaccuracies and perverse judgements, 
Foucault probably had a point when he suggested that in modern societies where 
torture had genuinely been abandoned, it was replaced by more precise, nuanced 
disciplinary regimes.
Mentalities
To the destructive bodily tortures of  past centuries has been added a variety of  
psychological tortures which are especially useful when a victim has to make a 
court appearance and physical injuries would be too embarrassing in front of  
the world’s media. The Stalinist regime may be said to have pioneered these 
techniques. The manner of  their application in Koestler’s novel Darkness at Noon 
was not too far from the actuality, as described for example by real-life survivors 
such as Artur London. The accused would be made to convince themselves 
that they were betrayers and scoundrels and could redeem themselves only by 
confessing to crimes they knew they were innocent of. If  that failed to work, the 
cruder method of  threatening reprisals against their relatives was used, and that 
usually sufficed.
In other regimes fake execution was a method used to frighten and demoralise 
the prisoner. More sophisticated techniques include waterboarding, where the 
victim experiences what feels like drowning, and sensory deprivation, whereby 
sight and sound are shut out, sense of  time and reality is lost. Though principally 
psychological, these may be accompanied by forms of  physical duress, as well as 
loud, aggressive and intimidatory language.
The mentalities underpinning these refinements of  cruelty are difficult in the 
extreme to comprehend. A famous example is the execution in 1757 of  Robert 
Damiens for making an ineffective knife attack on Louis XV. An account of  it 
opens Foucault’s Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, translated as Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of  the Prison.14 Although inaccurate in many details when compared 
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with contemporary accounts, Foucault is probably right in pointing out that the 
conception behind the execution was that any violation of  the royal body, even 
the most minor, had to be compensated for by the infliction of  maximum pain 
on the body of  the offender. However even if  the Damiens case was exceptional, 
execution with extreme cruelty was practised for many lesser offences everywhere 
throughout the world. These kinds of  thing were going on in the very same 
communities in which great works of  knowledge and art were being created.
Human and Inhuman
A frequently-used phrase is ‘inhuman cruelty’, now more usually applied to 
conflict situations rather than judicial practices. ‘Dehumanisation’ in this context 
is discussed in the journal New Scientist: ‘Rivals in such conflicts describe each other 
in ways that deny their shared humanity: they may liken each other to vermin or 
pests to be exterminated’;15 and ‘Hitler did it when he referred to German Jews 
as viruses, parasites and rats . . . Hutu extremists did it to the Tutsis, calling them 
cockroaches . . . .’16 
‘Dehumanisation’ however is a mistaken explanatory approach. The undoubted 
use of  such descriptive rhetoric (used in everyday speech as well as in genocidal 
or similar contexts) belies the reality of  the relationship between perpetrator 
and victim. As the same editorial points out, ‘The cruelties meted out can be so 
ingenious as to betray the work of  a sophisticated social brain’. Nobody killing 
rats or cockroaches feels inclined to torture them first, indeed in the case of  
mammalian pests it would be considered a crime. Cruelty towards animals is a 
persistent trait in human societies, not generally much disapproved of  before 
recent centuries; the English were notorious for their animal cruelty in the early 
modern era before they became notorious as animal lovers (except towards foxes). 
However the infliction of  cruelty on animals did not involve an attitude of  hatred 
toward the non-human victims, rather it was functional, as with working animals, 
or regarded as amusing entertainment in such activities as baiting bulls or bears. 
Targets of  cruelty are never compared to robots; there would be no satisfaction of  
any sort gained by torturing a robot.
Indeed it is precisely because the perpetrator recognises the victim as another 
human consciousness that they inflict pain and distress because they expect their 
techniques to produce the outcomes they seek. Laura Spinney in the New Scientist 
article quotes Jeroen Vaes at the University of  Padua: ‘It’s as if  we have a little 
humanness gauge in our heads that twitches whenever we see another person’.17 
That is well put, but it has to be added that it applies as much to ill-will as to 
goodwill. Perpetrators know that their victim is as real as themselves so far as 
humanness is concerned – but not that they are of  equivalent value. Their brutality 
(animal metaphor again) is attempting by pain and humiliation to force other 
absolute subjects to recognise themselves as objects and identify with reduction 
to that status.
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Conclusion
It is a universal characteristic of  humans, regardless of  their society (and not 
only of  humans, it applies also among non-human primates) that violation of  
social rules, however established and whatever they may be, provokes offence and 
some form of  sanction, extending from reproof  and/or exclusion to the range of  
penalties outlined above. 
However, no society could function adequately if  all its members or even a large 
majority of  them stuck to the rules only because they feared the punishments 
likely to follow if  they acted otherwise. In reality most members of  a community 
internalise the rules and norms into which they are socialised and are not normally 
motivated to break them, and this applies with different degrees of  strength not 
only to the wider society but to subcultures within each one. However, the situation 
becomes complicated in circumstances where a society is divided by serious class 
and cultural differences, and all the more so where these are conjoined with 
coherent oppositional movements claiming ethical principles in defiance of  the 
ruling authority.
Despite the enormous differences which continue to exist between and within 
different cultures, twentieth-century globalisation, particularly the globalisation of  
communication, has brought about a greater degree of  uniformity in this sphere 
than has existed in any previous era. Most striking perhaps is the fact that physical 
torture is not now accepted anywhere as an appropriate judicial penalty. It still 
of  course continues in vigorous depraved health, but no longer as a prescribed 
sentence or in public except insofar as some forms of  public execution still 
practised, such as stoning, incorporate an element of  additional cruelty.
In most regimes nowadays the theory and practice of  penology is supposed to be 
guided by motives of  rehabilitation and reformation of  offenders (or protection of  
society if  they are dangerous psychopaths). In reality, if  the expression of  opinion 
in political statements, newspaper reports and correspondence or the social media 
are any guide – not to speak of  what goes on in penal institutions – the prevailing 
public sentiments everywhere are ones of  reprisal and vengeance. Nearly all of  
us, no matter how rational and ethical we may be, want to see particularly hateful 
figures get their just deserts, and if  that kind of  instinctive reaction is ever to 
be overcome across society through reason and education it will prove a very 
long-term and challenging enterprise.
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The Origins of  Belief  in the Supernatural 
and the First Salvation Religions
T’is the eye of  childhood that fears a painted devil. 
—Lady Macbeth
Magic is a way of  making people believe they are going to get what they want, whereas religion 
is a system for persuading them that they ought to want what they get. 
—V G Childe
Religious belief  has remained a central characteristic of  social life around the 
globe throughout all recorded history and almost certainly for long beforehand as 
well – an explanation for the universe and the human place within it, a framework 
for social order – and during the last ten millennia a justification for hierarchy 
and inequality and a consolatory practice for those who suffer under them. In all 
cases religion has been integrated with work practices, greatly exercised about sex, 
and usually mobilised to justify powerful elites, though on occasion to challenge 
them.1 Defining exactly what is meant by ‘religion’ however is no easy matter. Jared 
Diamond in his book The World Until Yesterday lists sixteen ‘different definitions 
proposed by scholars of  religion . . . it will be obvious that we are not even close 
to agreement on a definition’.2 There is dispute about whether Daoism, Shinto, 
Confucianism and even Buddhism should be described as religions rather than 
philosophies of  life. Various Christian sects, especially Jehovah’s Witnesses, when 
canvassing for converts insist, however disingenuously, that they are not religions, 
and Ernest Gellner writes that, ‘In Hinduism and Buddhism, this world includes 
a multitude of  spirits; the mundane and animistic worlds are jointly distinct from 
the truly Other’.3
Nevertheless, whatever the precise terminology, what all of  these have in 
common with the undoubted religions, especially the monotheist ones, as well as 
with all manner of  folk beliefs, occultism, astrology and so forth, is acceptance 
of  the existence of  supernatural beings and forces. Thus the title of  this chapter 
could as easily have been ‘Supernaturalism’.
Supernaturalism, though this definition is not immune from difficulties, is more 
susceptible than religion to being pinned down. It means belief  in conscious 
agencies (which may or may not take the form of  a deity and its supernatural 
servants) which are not susceptible to evidential rules; that is, they violate Ernest 
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Gellner’s principle that there are no privileged revelations: that any explanation of  
anything must be capable of  being investigated with the possibility of  refutation. 
The existence of  supernatural entities however is beyond public demonstration4 
and is based purely on assertion which may or may not seem convincing. 
In a prescientific age they might well appear very convincing indeed. Super-
naturalism in such an environment is a perfectly natural and rational intellectual 
response for a pattern-seeking animal where contingent associations between 
events are mistakenly interpreted in terms of  cause and effect (known to logicians 
as the post hoc fallacy). Although there is no way of  knowing, it is a fair guess 
that supernatural belief  emerged more or less simultaneously with language, or at 
least more developed language, for although there are hints that Neanderthals, as 
evidenced by their burial practices, may have held some ideas of  this sort, there is 
no evidence that H. erectus did so – though of  course absence of  evidence is not 
evidence of  absence.
Likely Origins
As soon as extended social communication becomes possible, supernatural belief  
would seem to follow almost inevitably. Firstly there is in Palaeolithic circumstances 
the precariousness and fragility of  existence and the near inevitability of  early 
death. As a pattern-seeking species, humans look for explanations, and these 
circumstances form a pattern which touches them most intimately. An explanation 
is sought for, and if  possible some way of  avoiding unwelcome contingencies. 
It is also important to keep in mind, that though death was ever-present in the 
Palaeolithic era, it is extremely difficult if  not impossible to imaginatively envisage 
one’s own death (‘the black sun at which no-one can look’, according to Simone 
de Beauvoir). Curiosity about what had become of  the personalities of  those who 
had already died must also have been a driving factor. 
One possible answer is that they come to inhabit other bodies. Belief  in 
reincarnation is mostly associated today with Hinduism and Buddhism, but in 
fact it is quite prevalent in remaining hunter-gatherer communities. The Inuit faith 
for instance holds to the belief  that the spirits of  the animals they kill for food 
proceed to inhabit other animals of  the same species, and that if  the hunters (or 
rather the women who cut up the carcass) show respect for them, for example by 
offering the carcass a drink, the animal’s reincarnation will be grateful and more 
willing to be killed subsequently.5
Humans too in this belief  system undergo reincarnation, being reborn in a new 
infant once a person dies. This belief  also justifies infanticide when times are hard 
or the newborn is too weakly or is afflicted with disabilities which will render it 
incapable of  contributing to the community in the challenging circumstances of  an 
Arctic environment. This is not seen as killing a person; merely indicating that the 
person is not yet ready to be reborn but will be so later on with a subsequent birth.6
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Secondly there are the natural forces over which humans have no control, 
extending from seasonal variations in climate and temperature, which has 
implications for food sources, to unforeseeable disasters like forest fires, 
earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions. It would be natural, indeed most 
compelling, to attribute conscious agency to natural phenomena – after all, at 
least a hundred millennia down the line, we still get angry with our mechanical or 
electronic equipment when it frustrates us, and individuals involved in dangerous 
occupations such as deep sea fisherman, or addicted to very perilous sports, like 
racing drivers, are notoriously superstitious.
Thirdly, and of  no less importance, there are dreams, still in our own times a 
mysterious phenomenon, though the current scientific consensus appears to be 
that they are simply mental garbage with no meaningful significance. Nevertheless 
they certainly appear subjectively to have some, and unquestionably our ancestors 
at the dawn of  social communication must have discussed their dreams and 
concluded that they were signals from a world different from the day-to-day one 
that they inhabited. They must have contributed powerfully to the notion of  a 
human spirit separate from its physical body. By extension, if  natural forces were 
regarded as having conscious agency, the idea that they were in turn inhabited by 
an immaterial spirit was a perfectly logical conclusion.7
Taking religion in its broadest sense to include all manner of  supernatural belief, 
its utility is evident. It represents a veritable intellectual Swiss army knife, adaptable 
to fulfil an enormous number of  purposes – explaining the nature of  the natural 
world and of  the human place within it, promoting ethical rules and objectives; 
reinforcing community cohesion; offering consolation in hard or disastrous 
times; and not least, by the time rank societies evolved into rulerships, justifying 
domination, subordination and extreme social inequality – not to mention 
providing a career path for a corps of  experts in religious practice. According to 
Michael Mann, ‘Ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate 
meaning in life . . . ’8 and ‘Powerful ideologies provide a bridge between reason, 
morality and emotion’.9 
Getting Started
The area is very unclear and controversial, but a tentative consensus among experts 
would suggest that the earliest form of  supernatural practice, first described for 
arctic Siberia but subsequently identified all around the globe, was what is known 
as shamanism. In this belief  system, specially initiated individuals possessing 
exceptional powers (the earliest confidently recognised archaeological example is 
a woman),10 when in a trance state induced in various ways including naturally 
occurring psychedelic substances, made journeys into the world of  the dead and 
the spirit world more generally and brought back essential knowledge from these 
realms regarding what was to happen and what to do about it. 
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So far as religious practice was concerned, shamanism was linked closely to 
totemism, the mystic association between a community and a particular species 
of  animal (or more rarely plant) which was regarded as being a blood relation 
of  the clan and not to be harmed – biological relationship being regarded as 
all-important. Totemism seems to be a universal constant for both forager and 
early agricultural communities. It must be kept in mind that in these societies – and 
for many centuries thereafter – no categorical distinction was made between the 
spirit world and the material one; they were assumed to interpenetrate.
It was a natural and perhaps inevitable step in agrarian societies, as totemism 
declined, to invent powerful supernatural beings who oversaw the natural order 
and kept it moving, determining human destinies and acting either as protectors 
of  the society or shape-shifters who might behave either benevolently or with 
mischievously evil intent. Deities were viewed as operating differently depending 
on cultural differences. Among the Mexica (Aztecs) the gods required prodigies of  
human sacrifice to maintain the natural world in working order. For the classical 
Greeks, despite being immortal and all-powerful they shared all the human 
attributes of  lust, jealousy, anger and sadism. Among the Germanic pagans 
(probably with ultimately the same origins as their Greek/Roman counterparts) 
they themselves, despite their powers, were mortal and subject to fate, and would 
all be killed at the end of  time. 
In fact the notions of  the fates among the Greeks on the one hand and 
Scandinavians on the other, were virtually identical, in both cases envisaged as 
three old women of  whom the first spun the thread of  an individual’s life destiny, 
the second wove it and the third snipped it. The Scandinavians knew them as the 
Norns, the Greeks as the Moirai, and in the Greek pantheon they were explicitly in 
existence before the Olympian gods and the gods were subject to them. As noted 
above the Greeks added the conception of  the Erinyes or Furies, mythological 
beings who pursued and punished transgressors of  clan custom, especially those 
who attempted to violate their destiny as prescribed by the Moirai. However 
not all cultures developed the notion of  such superhuman deities whether spirit 
or material. The great exception was the Chinese, which although it certainly 
postulated spirit beings, did not have a pantheon of  deities in the manner of  the 
Aztec, Egyptian, Indo-European or even the Japanese. 
All pre-modern cultures, facing the perils of  nature, of  social life and of  
hostile humans, gave a great deal of  attention, most understandably, to trying to 
determine the will of  the gods or supernatural forces. Astrology, developing in 
several different cultures, was a predictable expression of  this ambition. If  astral 
phenomena, which are often predictable, are manifestly associated with natural 
events, it is natural to assume, however erroneously, that they are also associated 
with human destinies. Different methods were also employed, such as the roll of  
dice or inspecting the condition of  the entrails of  sacrificed chickens. Oracles 
pronounced by specially sanctified figures, often referred to in the Jewish and 
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Christian bibles, represented another source of  divination, and the importance of  
divinatory procedures in Greek society is suggested by the fact that the location 
of  the Delphi oracle was referred to as the navel of  the world.11 Historically 
many decisions of  extreme importance, such as whether or not to fight battles, 
notably those in the Greco–Persian wars, have been made on the basis of  
diviners’ predictions.
Sacrifice
Sacrifice does not always necessarily involve violence to humans, and mostly it 
did not – animals were the principal victims in most cultures. Historically, in all 
social practices that could be regarded as religions (though not necessarily in every 
version of  supernaturalism) sacrifice, both routine and exceptional has always 
formed an intrinsic, and in some a central, element. It could cover actions as 
diverse as spilling beer or wine on the ground to killing a favourite child.
The logic behind sacrifice was simple enough. If  something welcome was 
expected from the deity such as seasonal rainfall, flourishing crops, absence of  
pestilence, success in warfare, personal good fortune and so on, then something 
must be given in return – the principle of  reciprocity acting in this case on a 
supernatural plane rather than the merely human one. Public sacrifices were 
performed at seasonal festivals, with which they were closely integrated – a 
generalisation which applies to all varieties of  what is usually termed paganism, 
to Daoism, Shinto, Brahmanism and all the monotheist religions. Sacrifices could 
either be a thank-offering for some favour already shown or intended to procure 
a later favour or avert the gods’ anger.
So far as the monotheist religions are concerned, animal sacrifice continues in 
Islam as it did in the Yahwist religion prior to the destruction of  the Temple cult 
centre by Roman power in 70 CE. Animal sacrifice, central to the cult, was, after 
the return of  the Yahwist community from Babylon at the end of  the exile in the 
sixth century BCE, concentrated in the new temple in Jerusalem and forbidden 
anywhere else to pious Jews. (It functioned also in the rival Samaritan temple to 
the north.) Jewish peasants wishing to slaughter animals for food were obliged to 
take them to the Temple for the purpose (and of  course pay a fee to the priests) if  
they lived within travelling distance. It was therefore discontinued once the temple 
no longer existed.
Animal sacrifice was never practised by the Christians, an attitude possibly 
reinforced by its prevalence among their pagan neighbours. Other forms of  
sacrifice were prescribed instead; of  material wealth, of  energy and of  time 
– and so it has continued to the present day. Animal sacrifice was practised 
ostentatiously in the Vedic religion, the ancestor of  modern Brahmanism and 
Buddhism, of  many pagan (and possibly even ultimately of  all the monotheist 
religions), but since abandoned by most, though not all, schools of  Brahmanism. 
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However real adepts in the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and to a lesser extent 
Muslim faith sacrifice themselves to lives of  ritual, prayer and contemplation, 
often accompanied by severe ascetic practices, abandoning all prospect of  secular 
satisfaction such as sex, family and material prosperity. Monastic orders exist in 
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, and the latter two also include freelance 
holy men (extinct in Christianity) while Islamic Sufi orders exist, although that 
religion disavows monasticism.
Violation of  law or custom was felt likely to provoke the wrath of  the gods and 
endanger the community. Propitiating these violent deities was therefore a prime 
responsibility of  the ruler and his priesthood. That could include the violence 
of  formal human sacrifice (distinct from executions) though by the time of  the 
early civilisations in both the Middle East and China it had become uncommon, 
and in the former replaced by animal sacrifice. However it was still occasionally 
practised in an emergency (probably including child sacrifice in the case of  the 
Carthaginians) even by the Romans, who generally disfavoured it, and there are 
plenty of  legendary accounts in both Greek and Jewish narratives. However only 
among the Mexica does it seem to have been an everyday occasion extensively used 
at every seasonal festival. Elsewhere it appears to have been reserved for a limited 
number of  victims on special occasions, such as the start of  a major enterprise 
or founding a city, or the funeral of  an important ruler, when his attendants 
would accompany him into the afterlife, as was practised in the other Amerindian 
cultures, in early Chinese dynasties, in African chiefdoms, in the Pacific islands and 
possibly in early or pre-dynastic Egypt. Aztec (Mexica) practices, undertaken to 
propitiate the gods and thereby keep the rain falling, the maize growing and the 
sun moving in the sky, reportedly shocked the conquistadors, though to be sure 
they themselves had little enough to boast about in respect of  mass slaughter. 
If  consciousness is attributed to natural forces, it is evident that these may on 
differing occasions be either benign or malevolent, creative or destructive and 
similar attitudes will be adopted when spirit beings are regarded as the movers 
behind the forces. The normal and self-evident thing is therefore to conciliate 
these beings, pay them due deference and sacrifice, avoid provoking their anger 
and pray for them to show their smiley face rather than their ferocious one. 
Moreover severe punishment awaited anyone (and their relatives) who by violating 
the prescribed rituals was likely to annoy the divine beings, whose wrath would 
then be visited upon the entire community.12 
Ethical frameworks based on the custom of  the community ultimately 
derived from the necessities of  cooperation and interrelation in clan society 
with its conceptions of  status and honour, economic practices, decision-making, 
childrearing, and so forth and in some instances developed in a manner which did 
not give priority to deities whether threatening or benevolent. Both the Confucian 
and the Buddhist cultures follow this pattern, with gods, if  they exist, relegated 
to minor roles. Gautama, the Buddha, himself  insisted that he had little if  any 
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comment to make about the gods. Right behaviour however is encouraged by the 
principle of  karma, common to both the Brahmin and the Buddhist traditions, 
by which rewards and punishments in subsequent incarnations of  a person are 
regulated, but karma is an abstract principle, not a specific deity. To be sure, 
the Egyptian gods were concerned with moral behaviour and judged souls in 
the afterlife, but their mechanism for ensuring moral practice was originally the 
abstract concept of  ma’at, though it was later in addition personified as a goddess. 
As for the cultures in which the gods figured significantly, these might be 
regarded as creators of  the known universe, as in the Greek/Roman pantheon, or 
not, as in the Germanic one; they might be protectors and guardians against the 
hostility of  monsters of  desert and sea, like Indra in the Sanskrit pantheon or Ba’al 
in the Canaanite one. The gods of  the Bronze Age were generally satisfied with 
reverence and sacrifices of  greater or lesser moment, generally left law-making 
to the secular power and got on with their godly interests, pausing only to assign 
benefit or inflict suffering in their arbitrary godly fashion. Hammurabi’s code, for 
example, begins and ends with addresses to the gods who conferred the kingdom 
upon him, but there is no pretence that the laws he formalises issued directly from 
the deities (perhaps in a polytheistic society that would have been impossible). 
In religions which evolved pantheons of  gods these deities were effectively 
expressions of  human sentiments and practices projected onto a supernatural 
scale. Different ones, as reported by their adherents, had different styles of  
activity in the world (in the Greek pantheon frequently taking time off  from their 
divine business in order to rape a mortal woman), but tended to be similar in their 
relations among themselves, which were generally ones of  violence, adultery and 
deceit. Most of  them being immortals they could not kill each other, though in 
Norse mythology they could, but they could certainly hurt, embarrass and make 
fools of  each other, sometimes drawing mortal humans into their games. Both the 
Norse and the Greek pantheons possessed gods of  deceit, Loki in the former and 
Hermes in the latter. In Homer the Trojan war is represented as being the outcome 
of  a quarrel between three goddesses. In Norse mythology Loki brings about the 
death of  the rival god Baldur (whose spirit nevertheless lives on in an afterlife).
Life and Afterlife
As noted above, acceptance of  the reality that death is the end of  all things for 
the individual is one that is very difficult, originally even impossible, to absorb. 
Virtually all known cultures postulated an afterlife of  some sort, either one in 
which the spirits of  the dead continued to share hearths, homes and fields with 
the living, went through processes of  reincarnation, or else removed to a separate 
realm of  the dead. In both the Greco-Roman and Semitic traditions this was a 
grim and gloomy place, where a miserable existence was passed among the shades, 
and all the delights of  life on earth were absent. 
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In the Iliad, when Hektor is slain by Achilles, as his soul departs his body it 
laments the joys of  the world he is leaving, and in the Odyssey when Odysseus pays 
a visit to the underworld and meets Achilles there, the latter complains that he 
would prefer the lowliest social position among the living to his existence in the 
world of  the dead. In the Book of  Job there is no hint that Job, suffering unjustly, 
can be expected to be compensated in the afterlife for his infliction. The Egyptian 
afterlife however was different, for following death an individual soul (to simplify 
several aspects of  spiritual existence) passed through terrifying ordeals, but if  it 
had lived a ma’atly existence on earth and was judged worthy by the gods, would 
thereafter enjoy a glorious (the degree of  glory depending upon rank) afterlife in 
an idealised version of  Egypt.
How far these notions may have influenced neighbouring cultures is uncertain, 
but certainly by the later centuries BCE, and the earlier ones of  the Common 
Era important shifts were occurring. During the Hellenistic era when the region 
was dominated by Alexander’s successors and social tensions resulting from class 
oppression were on the increase, the Homeric conception of  Hades as a horrible 
place was increasingly called into question. Access to Elysium, previously reserved 
for the gods and not even all of  these, was broadened for the souls of  the virtuous 
in general, with a particularly unpleasant dungeon of  Hades, Tartarus, reserved for 
the particularly wicked. The elite classes of  both the Stoic and Epicurean schools 
of  thought, generally thought of  as opposites, for all their disagreement, tended 
to reject altogether the notion of  an afterlife. Significant new perspectives on life 
and afterlife were to appear in the later centuries of  the first millennium BCE in 
the form of  what Michael Mann terms the ‘salvation religions’.
The Mystery Cults of the Classical World
These proved to be more ephemeral forms of  approach to the supernatural world, 
but of  considerable importance on account of  their contribution towards preparing 
the ground for the appearance of  the most successful, in spread and numbers, of  
all the salvation religions. In later classical antiquity in the Greco-Roman world at 
large, mystery cults flourished, from the traditional ancient Eleusinian Mysteries 
based near Athens, to the much later ones (of  which Orphism was the most 
significant) and which promised to purify the initiates’ souls to their great benefit 
and possibly to confer immortality and communion with the gods.
Orphism, a religious cult of  the mythical musician Orpheus, originating in 
Thrace, and transplanted into Athens in the wake of  trade and industry, was 
‘an outgrowth of  the urban revolution’.13 It may have reflected the outlook of  a 
dispossessed peasantry. Their account of  the origins of  the earth and humanity 
is derived from Hesiod, the eighth-century BCE poet of  an independent but 
hard-pressed and overworked peasantry – he describes his own holding at the 
foot of  Mount Helicon as ‘a cursed place, cruel in winter, hard in summer, never 
pleasant’.
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The Orphics treated life as bad news for the living person, a penance which had 
to be lived through in toil and misery to atone for the sin of  the Titans who killed 
and devoured Dionysus (he was subsequently resurrected), for the human soul is 
born from the ingested god after Zeus blasted the Titans with his thunderbolt, 
but the human body from the ashes of  the Titans. ‘The body is the tomb of  
the soul . . . All life is a rehearsal for death [through which] the soul can hope to 
escape from its imprisonment.’14 However if  the individual has been very evil the 
soul is damned to eternal torment. If  it is salvageable it undergoes reincarnation 
till after three lives of  asceticism and following the correct rituals it is allowed to 
join the blessed in the Elysian fields. ‘ . . . [M]an is to God and body to soul what 
the slave is to his master.’ It was a doctrine which, turned upside-down, was at the 
foundation of  Plato’s aristocratic and virulently anti-democratic metaphysic and 
the resemblance to Christian mythology is not accidental. Possibly the movement 
drew its initial inspiration from the sufferings of  the peasantry, turned off  the land 
and enslaved or driven into destitution. However it subsequently penetrated into 
all classes of  society, including aristocrats like Plato – and, with modifications, a 
moderately prosperous Hellenised Jew, Saul of  Tarsus.
According to George Thomson, 
[The Orphics] could not rest content with what they had because they had 
nothing, and their hopes were as infinite as their desires. All life was strife and 
struggle. And if  man would only run the race with courage, there was none so 
humble or debased but he might win the prize of  glory and become a god.15
Whether this argument will stand up to investigation might be questionable, 
given the reality that, like Christianity, Orphism soon came to be adopted by all 
classes in society including the elite, but given the emphasis on suffering and 
redemption it is not an unreasonable interpretation of  its beginnings. The Classical 
mystery cults too, less concerned with right order than with offering comfort and 
hope to their initiates, though they proved to be historically ephemeral, reflected 
the social tensions and distresses which generated the great salvation religions.
The First Salvation Religions and their Competitors
The salvation religions that Mann discusses represented something totally new 
in the human narrative after around 200,000 years of  doing without them. Their 
continuing importance is testimony enough to that. They supplemented or 
supplanted the communal religions which had prevailed up to that point. Their 
attraction was that they offered promises to the individual believer, who by 
appropriate belief  and practices usually, though not invariably, including intense 
asceticism, would be offered an improved existence either in a future reincarnation 
or else in the afterlife. 
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First in the field were Brahmanism, a development of  the original Vedic faith, 
and its later offshoot Buddhism, which, displaced from its original home in the 
subcontinent, was to become dominant in Ceylon and Tibet and strongly influential 
in China, Indo-China and Japan, where it rivalled or supplemented the indigenous 
cultures. Judaism was to develop in a similar manner, to be followed by its offshoot 
Christianity and six centuries later the last of  the great salvation religions, Islam. 
The remainder of  this chapter deals with the earlier versions and their rivals.
While being careful to avoid any suggestion of  technological determinism it is 
highly suggestive that these religions began their emergence in the aftermath of  
the expanding use of  iron in tools and weaponry. The first millennium BCE was 
an era of  increasingly aggressive, disruptive and oppressive empires that shattered 
the preceding Bronze Age empires and cultures less well equipped technologi-
cally for extracting labour and surplus from their subjects. In a new world of  
oppression and exaction punctuated with social calamity it is scarcely surprising 
that there should, according to Benedict Anderson, have arisen new ‘imaginative 
response to the overwhelming burden of  human suffering – disease, mutilation, 
grief, age and death’.16
Nonetheless it is important to keep in mind that salvation religions however 
defined did not spring out of  nowhere but with the possible exception of  Islam, 
were evolved, with a shifting emphasis, out of  the established communal religions, 
which in parts of  Eurasia continued to survive and flourish and influence. One 
form of  religious competitor which did not survive, but nevertheless made 
its contribution to the emergent Christian faith and left behind a significant 
inheritance was Classical paganism, returned to at the conclusion of  this chapter.
Vedism and Brahmanism
The Vedic religion, the oldest of  the ‘salvation religion’ group, takes its name from 
the Rig Veda,17 the oldest still operational sacred text, which assumed its written 
form at some point around the end of  the Bronze Age, but evidently had a much 
longer oral history. The religion associated with it was developed during the second 
millennium BCE by the speakers of  the Indo-Iranian or Indo-European language 
group living in the region of  the Iranian plateau, and is of  immense importance 
in history. Its importance derives from the fact that different communities of  its 
adherents moved west, south and east, and through them it was the fountainhead 
of  the classical pagan religions of  Europe including the Celtic, Germanic and 
Norse ones, of  Hinduism and its derivative Buddhism, and, via Zoroastrianism, 
most likely the monotheist ones as well.
Its most direct descendant today, though much altered, is the Hindu or 
Brahmanist faith of  the Indian subcontinent, which continues to use the Rig Veda as 
a sacred text, so that will be the first to be discussed here. Warrior elites professing 
this form of  religion invaded the subcontinent, initially the Indus valley, from the 
north in the course of  the second millennium BCE. At the time of  their arrival and 
Thompson T02687 01 text   121 16/12/2014   13:29
122 Work, Sex and PoWer
being Bronze Age peoples, their development of  chariot warfare gave them the 
military advantage which enabled their takeover, later supplemented by iron-using 
technology which furthered their expansion southwards (this summarises a very 
complex process with numerous rival localised empires and kingdoms based on 
agricultural exploitation rising and being overwhelmed in their turn).
It is worth quoting at some length the description of  Brahmanism given in the 
Great Soviet Encyclopaedia of  1979. According to this, 
Brahmanism is characterized by polytheism with the inclusion of  various local 
tribal deities in the pantheon, by the retention of  animistic and totemistic views, 
and by ancestor worship. The supreme deities of  Brahmanism are Brahma, 
the creator and embodiment of  the universe, and the beneficent Vishnu and 
terrible Siva, which embody the productive forces of  nature. At the basis of  
the dogma of  Brahmanism are the notions of  the animation of  nature and the 
reincarnation of  all living beings. Rebirth of  the soul in one or another new 
corporeal form proceeds as requital (karma) for virtuousness or sinfulness in 
the preceding life: in the first case, a soul is reborn in the body of  a human being 
of  higher social standing or even as an inhabitant of  heaven; in the second case, 
the soul is reborn in a person of  lower social standing or even in an animal or 
plant. . . . The accurate execution of  the ritual of  reading the sacred texts in a 
language incomprehensible to the people (Sanskrit) required long training; this 
helped increase the importance of  the Brahmins (the priestly class). The notion 
of  ritual purity was extremely persistent; its violation required compulsory 
purifying rites. Brahmanism developed the notion of  man’s ability to obtain 
the favour of  the gods and acquire superhuman capacities by means of  ascetic 
feats. In the struggle against Buddhism, and under its influence, Brahmanism 
was transformed into Hinduism in the first millennium A.D.18
Undoubtedly the depiction is crude and oversimplified, but nevertheless not 
altogether off  the point. Brahmanism did constitute, in a particularly emphatic 
and focused manner, ideological underpinning for a structure of  domination and 
subordination in social relations typical of  agrarian civilisations, and was viewed by 
the historian Norman Cohn as ‘a divinely appointed order that was basically timeless 
and unchanging, yet never wholly tranquil’.19 The Vedic religion encompassed a 
range of  deities with their roots in the ancestral Indo-Iranian culture, particularly 
Indra, ‘the uncompromising hero of  wrath hundredfold, subduer of  troops’, and 
cognate with equivalents in both Middle East and European paganism,20 and the 
earliest documents of  the culture are hymns to these divinities and accounts of  
their exploits. 
The social structure of  the people who composed and transmitted (orally for 
centuries) the Rig Veda, and its succeeding sacred writings, maintained a social 
order which had as its central tenet the doctrine of  varna (allied to though not 
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identical with caste or jati) which prescribed the division of  the population into 
three hereditary orders – priests, warrior cattle herders and tillers of  the soil. 
When the Indo-Iranians first entered the subcontinent all fit men were expected 
to participate in armed conflicts on behalf  of  their lords, but settlement and social 
differentiation had given rise in due course to an order of  ‘professional’ fighters. 
The fact that these early texts are concerned so centrally with the doings of  
warrior gods suggests that at the time they were composed, warriors served as 
the dominant varna. However as oral transmission was the rule and these texts 
increasingly assumed the status of  sacred knowledge, they overtook in importance 
the deities they celebrated. The guardians and purveyors of  that knowledge, the 
masters of  worship and ritual, displaced the warriors, even the warlords, as the 
leading element in the social structure and themselves assumed sacred attributes. 
The professional priests, the Brahmins, monopolised sacred knowledge and the 
correct procedures for carrying out sacrifice, critically important because the 
health of  the gods themselves depended on plentiful sacrifice, and all but the 
most elementary sacrifices required a Brahmin to officiate and to be paid for his 
expertise. Natural disasters were attributed to insufficiency of  sacrifice and the 
worst of  sins became hostility to, or disregard for, Brahmins. 
Caste
The passage of  time and interaction, both violent and otherwise, between the 
newcomers and preceding populations brought change and development. 
Hinduism develops continuously and has no final form, but the basic framework 
was constructed around the middle of  the first millennium BCE in what is termed 
the ‘Hindu synthesis’, with the Vedas as its starting point but incorporating many 
other religious and social strands, developing, according to Michael Mann, into a 
system of  ‘Intense ritual penetration of  everyday life, greater than of  the other 
world religions’.21 The number of  castes multiplied greatly until the religion 
became and remains a very complex phenomenon, with its central principle being 
degrees of  ritual defilement. It can be compared to the terminology of  a Japanese 
ruler dividing the polluted from the unpolluted in the creation of  the Burakumin 
outcaste section of  Japanese society; the lowest castes were ‘full of  filth’ while the 
Brahmins were exempt from it.
Like social class, jati was based upon the division of  labour but by no means 
represents an equivalent – it was possible for an individual to change their social 
class, but never their caste, which is exclusively hereditary. In modern India a 
low-caste person can become a very important politician or potentially a millionaire, 
but they remain of  lowly caste. No individual could convert to Hinduism, for there 
is no caste to which they could be assigned – in principle a community could do 
so, and in the past Brahmanism spread by this means into the Himalayas and in 
Southeast Asia, but it would require the community in question to form a new 
caste. For individuals the situation changed somewhat with the establishment in 
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the twentieth century of  the Hare Krishna movement with its dynamic proselytism 
– if  that indeed is regarded as an authentic form of  Hinduism.
Caste, in the theology of  the religion, is an expression of  dharma, also termed 
rita, a concept rather similar to the ancient Egyptian ma’at. The particular caste 
an individual is born into is an expression of  one’s karma, for the concept of  
reincarnation is central to the religion, and this abstract form of  supernatural justice 
will reward or punish in a subsequent life how well or badly one has performed 
in one’s assigned station during the present. For example, if  one has been very 
bad one may be reborn as a worm. It is a magnificently effective ideology of  
social control, a ‘moral acceptance of  hierarchy’ in Mann’s phrase, and will also 
incidentally tend to promote vegetarianism, for if  one is carnivorous one may end 
up eating the corpse of  one’s reincarnated grandmother.
Reincarnation, as already noted, is a frequent feature of  hunter-gatherer belief  
and penetrated into Daoism. It was taken over by the Buddhist belief  system and 
found also among some of  the classical Greek intellectual schools, particularly 
the Pythagoreans of  the sixth century BCE. Whether or not there was any Indian 
influence remains uncertain, but there may have been for trade and intellectual 
links certainly existed. 
In Brahmanism it was generally held that on reincarnation any memories of  
one’s past life or lives were cancelled, not carried over, in which case reincarnation 
would seem to be indistinguishable from death, for if  all memories are inescapably 
erased and one can never remember anything from one’s previous life, one might 
as well have never had it. As Sartre remarked, we do not have a past; we are our past.
Ambiguity
What most forcibly strikes an outside observer about the Hindu religion is the 
staggering complexity and variation developed within its essential principles. 
Unlike the monotheist religions its clergy did not try to suppress rival interpreta-
tions of  these principles – it simply absorbed them all, leaving a believer free to 
apply them according to inclination. Gods may be regarded as specific entities 
or alternatively avatars or manifestations of  each other or else of  the supreme 
divine principle, Brahma. Brahma can be either the supreme god, or one of  a 
trinity (the Trimurti) concerned respectively with creation, maintenance and 
destruction, or even as an abstract cosmic principle. Hence Hindus could be either 
polytheists, monotheists or even, if  Brahma is interpreted as a principle without 
a personality or attributes, atheists so long as traditional precepts are observed. 
The last, according to some, is a perfectly respectable interpretation of  the Vedas. 
Hinduism is the most syncretic of  any religion. Taking one thing with another, 
however, Perry Anderson’s historical verdict on Hinduism and its caste structure 
is scathing:
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Hereditary, hierarchical, occupational, striated through and through with phobias 
and taboos, Hindu social organisation fissured the population into some five 
thousand jatis, few with any uniform status or definition across the country. No 
other system of  inequality, dividing not simply, as in most cases, noble from 
commoner, rich from poor, trader from farmer, learned from unlettered, but 
the clean from the unclean, the seeable from the unseeable, the wretched from 
the abject, the abject from the subhuman, has ever been so extreme, and so 
hard-wired with religious force into human expectation.22
Buddhism
Though Buddhism is most normally regarded as an offshoot of  Brahmanism there 
is some reason for believing that its original source lay partly within a pre-Vedic 
or non-Vedic form of  religious belief  and practice. Its founder, Siddhartha, later 
known as Gautama or the Buddha (the enlightened one) was reputedly born a 
prince of  a minor principality between the sixth and fifth centuries BCE (the 
dates are uncertain as there are no contemporary records) in the north of  the 
Indian subcontinent. Certainly his doctrines differed substantially from central 
elements of  Brahmanism, which was at the same time in a state of  turmoil and 
division before consolidating into what was to remain its form during subsequent 
centuries, partly in response to the Buddhist challenge.
The theology or philosophy of  Buddhism took little account of  gods. 
Gautama considered that they had little relevance to his project of  enlightenment, 
which was roughly the understanding which would enable an individual by 
means of  meditation, mental exercises and righteous behaviour to transcend 
the suffering intrinsic to earthly life and eventually, possibly after a number of  
reincarnations, reach the state of  nirvana, in which all desire was annihilated and 
the individual spiritually awakened, bringing rebirth to an end. The subsequent 
state of  an individual’s consciousness following that annihilation was treated as an 
illegitimate question. 
There are two major breaks with Brahmanism however; rejection of  the culture 
of  animal sacrifice that was practised within it, and relative indifference to caste. 
On the other hand, acceptance of  karma and reincarnation was appropriated. 
For a time, especially when it was patronised by the emperor Asoka who ruled 
most of  the subcontinent in the third century BCE, Buddhism flourished there 
and spread far beyond it, north and south, beyond the Himalayas into what is 
now Afghanistan and Tibet, through China and Korea, reaching even Japan; into 
Southeast Asia and to the island of  Ceylon (Sri Lanka), which lay outside Asoka’s 
domains. However in its homeland it withered (though there still remain around 
seven million Buddhists in India)23 probably because of  the decline of  imperial 
and elite patronage. It was hotly contested by the Brahmins, but its Achilles heel 
was its rejection of  sacrificial rituals, the performance of  which was an important 
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source of  income to its rivals, and so Buddhism was much more dependent on 
patronage and donations, a less reliable income stream.
In Ceylon and Tibet it became the overwhelmingly dominant form of  supernat-
uralist faith, and in the other areas mentioned a very important one alongside the 
already established forms, especially Daoism in China and Shinto in Japan, where 
Buddhist monks became a very significant social force, even at times in armed 
conflict with the secular authorities. The secret of  its success in these areas outside 
the subcontinent may have been that in Buddhism, at least the Chinese version, 
karmic debts from past lives could be cancelled by donating to monasteries, and that 
the forms it evolved were better adapted to the indigenous forms of  supernatural 
belief  in these countries. Accepting them into its praxis Buddhism supplemented 
rather than tried to supplant them as it did in India. Though sometimes in conflict 
with the secular authorities, it was normally compatible with them, as it had been 
with Asoka, teaching values of  acceptance and submission. 
The Competitors
Daoism
Daoism (or Taoism) takes its name from a legendary founder, Laozi, supposed 
to have lived in the fourth century BCE. Whatever its origins may have been, it 
developed out of  the ancestral Chinese agricultural folk religion. This postulated 
all manner of  deities and spirits for all manner of  situations and occupations, and 
stressed what is termed in Western cultures ‘ancestor worship’. The assumption 
is that ancestors have survived their demise and as spirits are, if  appropriately 
reverenced, capable of  acting on behalf  of  their descendants (apparently these 
beliefs are still widely practised even in contemporary China). Daoism shared these 
presumptions, but incorporated them into a philosophical system of  remarkable 
abstraction and sophistication, developing concepts such as the interpenetration 
of  opposites (familiar in Western cultures through widespread reproduction of  
the yin–yang symbol). 
It was one of  a number of  philosophical movements emerging in China around 
that time24 and initially was seen as a rival to the somewhat earlier Confucian 
doctrines, which were, according to one commentator, ‘used to sugarcoat the 
harsh Legalist [rigidly authoritarian] ideas that underlay the Imperial system’. 
Daoism differed in having a more supernatural cast, and was therefore possibly 
more comforting to lower-order wretchedness, but in essence was not that much 
unalike the less otherworldly-centred Confucianism25 in social doctrine, since both 
stressed harmony, non-resistance and subordination to superiors. Consequently 
from early in the first millennium CE they could be yoked together with Buddhism 
as the ideological underpinning of  traditional imperial society.
The name Daoism is derived from a root meaning ‘pathway’ and all three of  
these religions/philosophies attempted to show their followers a pathway to 
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harmony in their personal lives and social relationships and set them towards 
the good life – which did not prevent imperial Chinese history, both official and 
oppositional, from being exceedingly violent. In addition, while these doctrines 
could embrace large sections of  the population, only real adepts were in a position 
to intensively study and practise their implications – in other words they had to 
be leisured gentlemen exempt from the manual toil to which the great majority of  
imperial subjects were destined and who provided the resources that the rulers, 
priests and philosophers relied on.
Confucianism,26 Daoism and Chinese Buddhism were all extremely conservative 
faiths and philosophies of  life and social order. They presumed that things 
ought to be as they were and could not be otherwise. No significant general 
improvement in material life could be expected (the Daoists were quite explicit 
about this) and the only recourse for an individual was to pray to the deities, or 
by means of  contemplation and correct behaviour to withdraw mentally from 
the world (a form of  internal exile) into a state of  consciousness where material 
considerations ceased to matter. None of  that prevented frequent rebellions and 
dynastic overthrow.
Shinto
The folk beliefs of  the Japanese islands from the very lengthy Jomon period 
(covering the millennia from the late Palaeolithic to the end of  the first millennium 
BCE)27 and afterwards were certainly supernaturalist, as would be expected, with 
multitudes of  spirits and gods both minor and major, and a range of  practices 
including, along with worship of  particular deities, seasonal and life-course ritual, 
sacrifices, sorcery, divination, faith healing and so forth. Being rather similar in 
origin to the pagan traditions found in Europe prior to the appearance of  the 
Olympian gods upon the scene, it has had no particular doctrine even to the extent 
of  Daoist beliefs.
As with Dao, the word means ‘pathway’, i.e. pathway to a satisfactory life 
according to prevailing cultural standards, assisted perhaps by the spirits or kami. 
For centuries it remained as diverse and unstructured as any folk religion without 
central organisation. It did have concepts of  ritual impurity, nowhere however 
as strong as with Brahmanism and capable of  being purified by suitable ritual. 
Different clans and communities practised their own particular varieties of  Shinto, 
while during the historical period, when contacts with the Asian mainland became 
more prevalent, it assimilated elements and mythologies from both Daoism and 
Buddhism, which were in turn very much affected in their Japanese form by the 
indigenous beliefs and practices.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, some writers, such as 
Motoori Norinaga, began to stress Shinto in nativist terms as distinct from foreign 
imports such as Dao, Buddhism or, by that time, Christianity (which was later 
outlawed) and Shinto’s position altered dramatically following the forcible Western 
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intrusion into Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, which was reacted against by 
the Meiji Restoration (or revolution) of  1868. The section of  the Japanese ruling 
class behind this political and social transformation advanced a deliberate and 
strategically conceived project to ‘remain the same by far-reaching alteration’. 
In short, they aimed to assert and preserve Japanese elite aristocratic and 
neo-feudal values by importing and copying Western science, technology, 
overseas imperialism and organisational methods in order to make Japan an 
industrial power to stand comparison with the imperial West. To counterbalance 
this, Japanese traditions at the same time were propagated and emphasised.28 
The previous figurehead emperor, now decreed to be descended from the sun 
goddess, was increasingly presented as a national icon with great power, real or 
pretended. Shinto shared in this development, now sponsored by the state as the 
authentic national and nativist religion. Its most important embodiment was in 
a multitude of  shrines, great and small, where what were supposed to be Shinto 
rituals were and are officiated over by Shinto priests. Currently there are around 
eighty thousand such shrines.
Even a fairly superficial survey of  the traditions of  the faiths discussed so far in 
this chapter reveal at their heart an essential similarity despite the great variety of  
concepts and practices found between and within them, implicit in some instances 
explicit in others. Their similarity lay in their adherence to a concept of  a right 
order in the universe, either laid down by the gods or prevailing as an abstract 
principle, one which humans must uphold and direct themselves by or else suffer 
adverse consequences. This was an approach very much in tune with the interests 
of  elites, yet at the same time it offered to the mass of  these traditions’ adherents 
practices, techniques, and promises to make life in grim conditions more bearable.
This notion, like the Vedic ´rc, the Chinese Dao or Japanese Shinto, linked the 
natural world with the supernatural one, so the force that kept the heavenly bodies 
moving in the sky was the same as those which produced the rain, the growth 
of  vegetation, the reproduction of  cattle and, importantly, the lineaments of  the 
social order. These assigned individuals to their appropriate position within it and 
required them to behave in particular ways towards superiors, inferiors or equals, 
required a woman to obey her husband (or mother-in-law), a son or daughter, 
regardless of  age, to obey their parents, and all to obey the rulers (though of  
course reality seldom measured up to the ideal, as rulers often discovered). It is 
not surprising that the more ambitious of  these doctrines, such as the Buddhist 
one, recommended escape from earthly cares through a discipline of  meditation, 
ritual and mental exercises in order to reach a state of  mind where the inflictions 
did not seem to matter. There are resemblances here to the Stoic philosophy of  
the Hellenistic era – and there may have been a degree of  contact, as Alexander’s 
empire bordered on India.29 Ernest Gellner is of  the opinion that ‘Of  the great 
literate civilizations, Hinduism is the one closest to the Platonic blueprint . . . ’.30
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An essential point here is that although Daoism and Shinto were competitors 
with Buddhism no great hostility developed between the adherents of  these faiths. 
On the contrary, peoples in the areas where they interpenetrated, principally China 
and Japan, experienced no difficulty in adhering to both Buddhism and either of  
the other two – they supplemented each other rather than conflicted, quite unlike 
the monotheist salvation religions further to the west.
These are the subject of  the following chapter, and even disregarding the 
mystery cults discussed above which also possessed the essentials of  salvation 
religion, there is evidence, quoted in Robin Lane Fox’s Pagans and Christians,31 that 
Classical pagan culture in general was heading in a salvationist direction, with 
increased emphasis on personal communication with whichever god was favoured 
by the worshipper. The aspiration of  an afterlife existence free from the threats 
of  starvation, massacre, torture, plague, enslavement – not to mention the routine 
torments of  toil, illness, ageing, sexual abuse, poverty and parasitic invertebrates – 
was a very powerful one. The monotheist Christian cult/religion discussed in the 
next chapter took root comparatively easily because the pagan ground had been 
well prepared. 
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Monotheism
Monotheist religion was not among the first of  Mann’s ‘salvation religions’, but 
it was something entirely novel, even counter-intuitive, and in spite of  its odd 
novelty was to prove extraordinarily powerful and in time come to dominate for 
centuries most of  the Eurasian landmass – and then spread across the Atlantic 
and southward into Africa. Of  the three great faiths defined as monotheist, none 
was totally so, as they all postulated other supernatural beings, namely angels and 
demons in addition to the deity. Neither of  the other two however went to the 
extent of  the Christians – at least the mainstream followers of  that religion – with 
their paradoxical doctrine of  the Trinity, which, on the basis of  contradictions in 
the scriptures and contorted reconciliation of  the Jewish scriptures with pagan 
Greek philosophy, insisted that their god was both one and three at the same time. 
One medieval scholastic philosopher, Roscelin, proposed that believers might as 
well postulate three gods, but his suggestion was not adopted.
In the rise of  the monotheist faiths once again the transition that occurred as 
the Eurasian Bronze Age gave way to the Iron Age at the end of  the second and 
beginning of  the first millennium BCE takes on central importance, and what is 
now the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was centrally involved. 
Zoroastrians
Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, which is now reckoned to be the more likely form, is to 
some extent a legendary figure, but, as with Jesus of  Nazareth, and Muhammad it is 
probable that an individual of  that name did actually exist and the legend contains 
an essential element of  factuality. The religion developed in his name was dualist 
rather than strictly monotheist, but is included in this section because the two gods 
were not equal. The good one was superior to the evil. The monotheist religions 
which exist today probably owe, unacknowledged, a great deal to Zoroastrianism.1 
By the time of  its emergence in the area of  the Iranian plateau, as in the Fertile 
Crescent, the agriculture and stock-raising economy had already predominated for 
around seven millennia; urban concentrations for around two. Despite its antiquity 
this was a precarious existence, the more so with the metallurgical transition from 
bronze to iron; constantly threatened by chaos resulting from flood, desertifica-
tion, epidemics, famine and – not least – attack from human enemies, whether 
rival rulers (Zoroaster was reportedly such a victim), seaborne pirates or nomadic 
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herders. Not surprisingly, the dominant religious ideologies reflected such central 
concerns. 
Consequently the chief  remit of  leaders, who as elsewhere in the Middle 
East, were soon accorded divine attributes as the representatives of  the gods 
or as subordinate gods themselves, was to preserve stability and repel danger by 
carrying out the appropriate rituals pleasing to the high gods who decided all 
things. If  the gods were indulgent then the feared chaos would be warded off  
whenever it threatened, but the dominant reign of  insecurity was expected to last 
forever and traditional hierarchical structures to remain in place for all time. Their 
pantheon included a mighty warrior hero-god, who subdued and destroyed the 
chaos monsters which menaced the community.
Zoroaster
An epochal religious change occurred at an uncertain date, but most probably 
around the beginning of  the first millennium BCE, owing to the influence of  
the Iranian prophet who was trained initially as a priest of  a divine cosmogony 
not unlike the Vedic. From the Vedic religion his followers inherited a particular 
reverence for fire,2 a striking feature of  their religious practice to the extent that 
they were sometimes described by Europeans as fire-worshippers. This however 
was a misperception; fire was not a god but a symbol of  purity. For Zoroaster 
only two gods really counted, ‘two primal spirits’ in his own words; Ahuru Mazda, 
the god of  creation, light and righteousness and Angra Mainyu (or Ahriman) his 
evil enemy – other supernatural entities (who were nevertheless important) being 
merely their servants. 
This in itself  was a major innovation, but there was more. Zoroaster promised 
blissful immortality not only to distinguished individuals but to all who followed 
his ethical precepts and attended to their prescribed ritual duties. More innovative 
still was the promise of  a divine apocalypse, the ‘making wonderful’ in which there 
would be a universal resurrection of  the dead, the virtuous would be rewarded 
with immortal bodies in an earthly paradise and the wicked, including Angra 
Mainyu, utterly destroyed. The parallels with the Christian apocalypse virtually 
force themselves on the reader. 
His teachings reflected contemporary social conflict, and promised that, ‘the 
established order would be abolished, the existing authorities exterminated 
and [oppressed believers] vindicated and exalted’,3 Norman Cohn writes. 
Zoroastrianism, when it became the creed of  rulers, naturally underwent many 
modifications, but its essence still remained at the time the Achaemenid Persian 
empire dominated the Middle East, including Palestine, between the sixth and 
fourth centuries BCE. This meant that there was plenty of  opportunity for 
the adherents of  the then Jewish religion to become acquainted with and be 
influenced by it. 
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Judaism
The origin of  the ancient Hebrews remains wrapped in obscurity and mythology – 
certainly the biblical accounts, even when stripped of  their supernatural dressing, 
lack all plausibility. Possibly they were herders from the east who had forced their 
way into the uplands of  that part of  the Fertile Crescent then called Canaan, 
comprising autonomous cities with their agricultural areas and usually dominated 
by neighbouring empires, initially the Egyptian – or possibly the Hebrews or 
Israelites were just an indigenous tribal community. John Pickard argues that the 
Amarna Correspondence (see Chapter Six) of  the fourteenth century BCE gives 
evidence of  fierce class struggle in the Levant at the time of  its composition and 
that Hebrew conquest may have been the outcome of  a revolutionary struggle, 
with Yahweh as the rallying symbol for the revolutionaries4 and their Covenant a 
political alliance.
At any rate, around the ninth to seventh centuries BCE the Hebrews or 
Israelites eventually established two minor principalities; Judah based on Jerusalem 
(King David, if  he ever existed, was at most a bandit chieftain) and its northern 
neighbour, Israel. Moreover they shared with their neighbours the Canaanite 
religion, including its numerous pantheon and its chief  god El, whose name is 
incorporated into many of  their personal names such as Joel or Ezekiel, or even 
Israel itself. 
Yahweh 
El had a son and chief  subordinate, Ba’al, an equivalent to Indra of  the Vedic 
herders or Marduk of  the Mesopotamians, a fierce and powerful storm god who 
kept chaos monsters at bay. His Israelite equivalent was called YHWH or Yahweh, 
who shared exactly all the characteristics of  Ba’al – indeed may very likely have 
been the same god under a different name (as with the Greek and Roman deities). 
Eventually Yahweh was to absorb El (there are clues to their original differentia-
tion still in the Bible) and acquire all his characteristics (including initially his female 
consort), so that he became both the universal creator, establishing the world and 
society, and an insanely jealous micro-manager of  human affairs in permanent 
apoplectic fury with his chosen people because of  their deviation towards other 
gods; was amiable and generous as long as his commandments were adhered to, 
but a raging sadist when they were not.
Yahweh was an innovative deity in many respects – or rather his worshippers 
were innovators and devised the first religion in which history, real or counterfeit, 
was a central element. Not initially a monotheistic deity, he nevertheless became 
the foundation of  ethical behaviour in a manner divergent from any of  his 
counterparts. One aspect of  this was the close interconnection of  ritual and 
morality, with the first being the more important. As it eventually worked out, the 
cardinal injunction was to keep him well supplied with animal sacrifices and to 
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offer sacrifices to absolutely no-one else whomsoever. In addition there were an 
enormous range of  ritual injunctions and prohibitions,5 the intention of  which was 
to separate his worshippers off  from any other community and emphasise their 
otherness, and in subsequent centuries these rather than the sacrifices became, 
due to contingent historical events, the distinctive markers of  the Jewish religion. 
As far as the ethical prescriptions were concerned, these formalised the traditional 
understanding of  acceptable clan relations. Not to kill another clansperson, not 
to seize or aspire to seize his property (including his female subordinates) not to 
tell lies about him so as to get him into trouble with the clan authorities; and for 
female clanspersons to observe due deference towards their male relatives and 
refrain, under grim penalties, from unauthorised sexual relations (the same applied 
to male ones, but to a lesser extent).
It was of  course his priesthood, anxious to institute a profitable monopoly 
for their own cult, who propagated these notions, against what the Jewish Bible 
suggests was considerable popular opposition, but paradoxically they achieved 
success only after the destruction of  Jerusalem and its temple by the Babylonian 
empire in 586 BCE and the deportation of  the upper classes, including the priestly 
one, to Babylonia. There the supposedly historical scriptures were redacted to 
produce the picture with which we are familiar today, later incorporated into the 
Jewish Bible. To hold the exile community together, exclusive devotion to Yahweh 
is presented as their central theme, with apostasy insistently blamed for all disasters 
and especially the recent catastrophe. Rival gods are abolished or relegated to the 
status of  angels or demons.
The return from Babylonia to Palestine was as important as the exile. Within a 
few decades the Babylonian empire was overthrown and annexed by its Persian rival, 
whose ruler, Cyrus, permitted the exiles to return and take over the government of  
Judea under Persian hegemony. (Not all took advantage of  the offer: those who 
did were of  the ‘Yahweh only’ school). Their gratitude to the Persians was great 
and presumably reinforced by the Zoroastrians’ semi-monotheism, while close 
contact provided opportunities to learn about their apocalyptic visions.
The first apocalyptic writing in the Jewish Bible or Christian Old Testament 
(the last book to be composed) is the Book of  Daniel. Though purportedly set 
in Babylonia it was in fact written when the Jews and their religion were under 
persecution in the second century BCE from the Greek successor to the Middle 
East part of  Alexander the Great’s empire, and was designed to encourage their 
(ultimately successful) resistance. It was followed by the Book of  Enoch and 
the Book of  Jubilees, which envisaged an apocalyptic outcome in a manner very 
similar to the Zoroastrian prophecies. 
Among the Jews of  the Second Temple, subject to Persian and subsequently 
Macedonian, followed by Roman hegemony, rival theological schools developed, 
the best known being the Sadducees, the Pharisees and the Essenes. The 
Sadducees, generally identified with the ruling elite who collaborated with the 
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Roman power, rejected belief  in any afterlife; the latter two distinguished between 
the post-mortem fates of  the good and the evil. The Christian sect, which in its 
theological conceptions was nearest to the Essenes, once it became established 
made a similar distinction even more emphatically. More broadly, the Jesus sect 
tended in general more to the Pharisees’ viewpoint, and the bitter denunciation 
of  the latter in the Christian scriptures are more related to rivalry focused on the 
person of  Jesus of  Nazareth than to antagonistic religious conceptions.
Christianity
We are the few, the chosen few,
And all the rest are damned.
There’s room enough in Hell for you,
We don’t want Heaven crammed.
—Origin uncertain but possibly US Southern Baptist
The Jesus sect was originally very much a part of  the fragmented and internally 
quarrelsome Judaism which prevailed under the Roman occupation. Though 
the New Testament gospels are scarcely more historically reliable than the Old 
Testament narratives, it is clear enough that Jesus of  Nazareth, if  he existed, 
which he probably did, was a Jewish prophet preaching an imminent overthrow of  
Roman power by divine intervention followed by a future of  blissful abundance, 
and targeting initially the Roman collaborators of  the Jewish priesthood. The 
four canonical gospels of  the Christian New Testament make a point however of  
insisting on his alleged pacific intentions. They were written around the time when 
Jews were under Roman suspicion on account of  their great revolts and so their 
intellectual offspring were naturally keen to emphasise their claimed founder’s 
rejection of  insurrection.6 
Considerable controversy has taken place around the historical status of  the 
person in whose name the sect was founded – one cannot say the ‘founder’, for 
although little is accurately known about this individual, such documents as exist 
make it evident that founding a religion was certainly never his intention. The 
claim of  scholars who dispute his reality is that Jesus of  Nazareth is a made-up 
figure, composed from decontextualised references in the Hebrew Bible and with 
the characteristics of  mythical gods or legendary heroes, attributes such as virgin 
birth and resurrection from the dead. 
A leading proponent of  this view early in the twentieth century (he convinced 
Lenin) was the German historian Arthur Drews and it has been advanced again 
recently by John Pickard in Behind the Myths: The Foundations of  Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, published in 2013. Pickard deploys an able case, but the weight of  
evidence appears to be against him, even if  that evidence is principally negative. 
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What the gospel narratives, which diverge in many respects, agree upon is that 
Jesus preached in Galilee, north of  Judea, at the time a peripheral area of  the 
Jewish religion (and also a notorious hotbed of  opposition to the Jewish and 
Roman authorities). Secondly that he was executed as a rebel against Roman rule, 
though the Gospels do their best to obscure this, which in itself  is significant. If  
a divine or semi-divine or divinely inspired figure was to be invented, it would 
be unlikely that he would be placed in provincial rural obscurity for most of  his 
career and end up executed as a criminal. More positive is the fact that James 
the Just, for whom there is fairly unquestionable evidence, was appointed leader 
of  the Jerusalem Christians on the basis of  his accepted blood relationship. The 
probability therefore is that there was a real figure behind the myths and legends, 
though it scarcely matters so far as history is concerned.
The cardinal event which led to the divergent path of  Jesus’s Jewish and 
non-Jewish followers – apart from the activities of  the Hellenised Jew, Saul of  
Tarsus – was the utter destruction by the Romans of  the temple and the original 
Jewish Christian community in Jerusalem during the great Jewish revolt of  66–70 
CE. The Book of  Revelation with its Zoroastrian parallels, written around 25 
years afterwards and most likely by a Jewish Christian, was the culmination of  the 
Jewish apocalyptic tradition and in that text, ‘. . . the role that had hitherto been assumed 
by Jews in general is now assumed by the Christian branch of  Judaism’ (emphasis added),7 
in Cohn’s words.
Christianity, driven in the catastrophe of  70 CE from its original home as a Judaic 
sect, found its insertion in the Roman empire. The Christians, initially persecuted, 
eventually came to regard the empire as a providential dispensation to facilitate 
the spread of  the religion. The imperial world was one of  extreme differences of  
wealth and pauperism, of  freedom and slavery, of  routine violence and torture, of  
psychopathic despotism and increasingly crushing taxation, of  massacre, plague 
and famine. For women, apart from a very small and fortunate upper-class stratum, 
but not even all of  them, it was still worse. Women were in effect regarded as the 
property of  their menfolk and wholly subject to their authority, to be married or 
otherwise disposed of  at their pleasure, and with no redress. 
It need come as no surprise that populations and individuals – and not only 
the destitute, at the sharp end of  this society, under threat from all the above 
inflictions with no hope of  improvement in the material world – would seek 
supernatural solace for their woes, more convincing (and less expensive) than the 
existing mystery cults. The early Christian message could indeed be made to sound 
very convincing, with the authority of  holy written texts behind it; and the Jewish 
scriptures were rearranged to purportedly predict the appearance of  Jesus. 
There were material advantages in addition. One of  the injunctions to the 
better-off  in the early communities was to practise charity towards less fortunate 
members of  the congregation, who benefited materially as a result, and the donors 
received for themselves spiritual benefit thereby.8 Advantages existed too for 
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women, who could now defy their fathers, brothers and husbands (especially in 
relation to forced marriage and sexual abuse) in the name of  intense religious 
conviction and confidence that they would be rewarded in the afterlife for anything 
they might suffer in the present one as a result of  their intransigence. They might 
also hope to convert their menfolk. 
Internal Conflicts
From its very beginning, Christianity was an inherently contentious and fissiparous 
movement. There was first of  all sharp conflict between the original Jerusalem 
church and the Christian communities being established throughout the empire 
in the early decades, to a significant degree by Saul of  Tarsus (Saint Paul). It is 
unclear whether this dispute was ever resolved before the great Jewish revolt and 
its repression overtook the Jerusalem Christians. That was not all however, for the 
New Testament writings, both those of  Paul and other authors or alleged authors, 
constantly refer to intra-faith conflicts.
The author of  the Book of  Revelation starts off  his text with a polemic on 
such matters, and the letters ascribed to Paul issue constant warnings against false 
teachers purporting to be of  the faith but bringing a message divergent in some 
ways from his own. Evidently he had rivals. In the span of  the two millennia 
during which Christianity has existed literally hundreds of  groups of  divergent 
belief  have evolved, each regarding all the others as schismatic, heretical, cultic.9 
These have multiplied exponentially since secular governments decreed freedom 
of  religious belief  and prohibited any particular Christian orthodoxy from 
enforcing its monopoly.
That Christianity should have taken this direction was no accident, arising from 
its theology alone, leaving aside for the moment the material pressures it was 
subject to. The pre-salvation religions were essentially religions of  practice, and 
to a large extent, apart from the Jesus religion, so were the salvation ones. Some 
standards of  belief  were certainly required by the others but they generally tended 
to be fairly simple ones. Islam for instance requires belief  that the Abrahamic god 
is the only god and that Muhammad is his prophet and that the faithful will enjoy 
an afterlife – otherwise its demands are largely practical ones, such as pilgrimage, 
fasting at Ramadan and regular prayer. The Judaic religion too centres around 
practical requirements on the part of  its faithful. As a result, despite variations in 
belief  and practice within these religions, they have not usually had the poisonous 
character of  Christian disagreement – though in recent decades such Christian 
intolerance and intransigence has increasingly been imported into Islamic societies 
where rival interpretations of  Islam are to be found.10
Importance of Belief
The Christian message however, by the standards of  other faiths, was extraordi-
narily complex and it made belief central to its message. The apparent simplicity 
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of, ‘Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved’ hides all manner of  
unstated assumptions and begged questions. Firstly, who exactly is Jesus, and why 
is belief  in his supernatural character necessary? Secondly, saved from what, and 
what is meant by salvation in this instance? The Christian believer was required 
to accept that Jesus of  Nazareth was the son of  YHWH (whatever ‘son’ was 
supposed to mean in this context – certainly not a biological relationship), that 
his mother was a virgin and he had been sent into the world to redeem individuals 
from the sin they were supposed to have inherited by descent from the disobedient 
couple in the Garden of  Eden. The manner of  this redemption was that he offered 
himself  as a blood sacrifice to his parental deity, taking the place of  sinful humanity 
and thereby appeasing Yahweh’s anger. If  however, according to Trinitarian belief  
he was not merely the son of  god but was god, and since there was only one 
god, presumably he was a sacrifice of  himself  to himself  – reminiscent of  Odin 
hanging by the neck on the bough of  the world tree Yggdrasil, sacrificing himself  
to himself  for the sake of  obtaining deep knowledge.
Not even that, however, is the end of  the matter. The Christian also had to 
believe that Jesus was physically resurrected from his tomb and then, after several 
appearances to his disciples, ascended into heaven. This was taken as proof  that at 
the end of  time all humanity would be resurrected from their graves, their bodies 
reconstituted and their souls reunited with their bodies, after which virtuous 
believers would be rewarded with eternal bliss in heaven and the reprobate and the 
infidels tormented for eternity in the underground lake of  fire (while the believers 
established in heaven would enjoy the spectacle).
With a foundation of  that sort the range of  necessary beliefs multiplied and 
expanded, and the scope for disagreement was enormous in the range of  both 
belief  and practice. Differing interpretations of  what exactly was meant by the 
core beliefs and ambiguities in the sacred texts were a recipe for division, dispute, 
and hostility, at times resulting in lethal encounters between rival factions. The 
early Christians were persecuted from time to time by the Roman authorities 
(and sometimes lynch mobs). This was not directly because of  their beliefs 
but – once they had separated themselves from the Jews, who were tolerated, 
however grudgingly, in deference to their traditional religion – in consequence of  
the Christians’ refusal to recognise the emperor’s quasi-divine status. They were 
therefore regarded as socially disruptive. At the same time it has been remarked 
that these Christians suffered more from their own quarrels than they ever did 
from the attentions of  the pagan emperors.
So long as they occupied the position of  a persecuted sect and had no power 
of  their own, the differences and antagonisms were relatively manageable and the 
example and reputation of  the martyrs11 encouraged solidarity across theological 
divisions – though it could also give rise to them as when dispute burst out over 
the readmission of  weaker brethren who had defected under persecution and 
wanted back in again. However when the irresistible spread of  the cult convinced 
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the emperors12 that it was ineradicable and if  they couldn’t beat them they’d better 
join them, which happened in 312 CE, the Christian cult, now the Christian church 
under imperial patronage, acquired both power and property. Its leaders, the 
bishops, particularly those of  five great centres, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, 
Constantinople and Rome, became very great men, encouraging major rivalries 
over who was to occupy these episcopal chairs.
With that in mind, the question now became what was the church, for theological 
disputes ballooned, and gave rise to ever more deadly antagonisms. The disputes 
emerged mostly over the question of  the nature of  the relation of  Jesus to 
YHWH, or the son to the father as it was usually expressed, and Constantine 
called a council of  bishops at Nicaea to settle the matter. The verdict left the 
disputants divided, and while imperial power might try to enforce it within the 
imperial domain, it could not do so among the newly converted Germanic former 
pagans on the borders of  the empire and about to invade it. 
Among the orthodox – in other words those sections of  the Church which 
accepted the Council of  Nicaea’s decision – no less ferocious disputes erupted 
over the relation of  Christ’s divinity to his humanity, depending on whether the 
disputants too closely identified them or incontinently separated them. Orthodoxy 
propounded a solution which did neither, but orthodoxy was different in Egypt 
from what it was in Constantinople, Antioch, Georgia or Armenia, or for that 
matter in what is now Tunisia, or Spain. It all led to the formation of  totally 
separate and hostile congregations even within the empire’s bounds. The existing 
Coptic church of  Egypt and Ethiopia among others is a remnant of  that era, and 
its rival, the Nestorians,13 might well have prevailed throughout central Asia but 
for the later Muslim impact.14
It was something altogether new in world history – that belief  or disbelief  
in undecidable questions, should have become major social issues and indeed 
matters of  life or death. In fact, that expression underrates their importance, for 
the assumption was that more was at stake than mere life, for on correct belief  
depended the individual’s fate of  eternal salvation or damnation, and more, that 
an individual’s heretical notions might infect a community and endanger other 
people’s immortal souls. The destruction of  such vectors of  pollution was 
therefore of  cardinal urgency.
It cannot be doubted that such rival convictions about the nature of  the 
supernatural universe were sincerely adhered to, but behind them always lay issues 
of  power and property – who would prevail and draw revenues from the believers, 
who would have the favour and the ear of  the ruling authorities. Forcing everyone 
within reach to become believers was therefore a natural corollary, and in the 
course of  a century within the empire pagan beliefs and practices were suppressed 
bit by bit until they were entirely outlawed by the end of  the fourth century. That 
could not be done to the Jews, partly because of  the belief  that their voluntary 
conversion was a necessary stage in the unfolding of  the apocalypse, and of  course 
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they refused to convert. Consequently they were subjected to intermittently severe 
persecution and pogrom which stopped short of  their attempted destruction.
The same centuries as saw the great theological uproars were also ones of  intense 
asceticism practised by individuals who as a result won profound public admiration 
from a population who sought their advice on all manner of  issues. Asceticism 
was likewise and for similar reasons a strong current in both Brahmanism and 
Buddhism, but the Christian saints of  the period excelled in prodigies of  the 
style. These included spending their adult life sitting on the top of  pillars in all 
weathers; extreme fasting, minimal sleeping time, disregarding ulcers and sores, 
indeed encouraging parasites to breed in them. To be sure, starvation and sleep 
deprivation would certainly discourage sexual libido and induce states of  mind 
which convinced the ascetic they were getting closer to their objective of  divine 
communion. In time these extremes performances died away and asceticism was 
institutionalised in monastic communities, though hermits, usually somewhat less 
exuberant than their predecessors, persisted throughout the medieval centuries. 
Power and Schism
The major Christian schism of  that period,15 which occurred in the eleventh 
century – although it included some theological issues, principally over the correct 
Latin phraseology for describing the holy ghost – was acknowledged to be mainly 
about power and authority; whether the bishop of  Rome or the patriarch of  
Constantinople should exercise hegemony within the church. The Latin pope had 
during most of  late antiquity acknowledged himself  as subject to the emperor 
in Constantinople, but at the beginning of  the ninth century, having appointed a 
rival emperor in the person of  Charlemagne, who gave him protection,16 he now 
began to insist, on the basis of  seniority based on Saint Peter’s mythical claim 
to have been the first bishop or Rome, that he was the supreme authority in the 
church; while by the eleventh century all Byzantine power in southern Italy had 
been expelled by the Normans, who recognised the pope’s pretension. 
Though there was no possibility of  the Byzantine emperor recovering his 
position in Rome, the pope’s assertion was emphatically rejected in the emperor’s 
own territories. In spite of  efforts to find a compromise and unite the rival 
positions, the breach became irreparable in 1054. During the following three 
centuries growing divergence was punctuated by mutual massacre and destruction, 
and though a final effort was made in the mid-fifteenth century as Turkish 
Muslim armies prepared to overrun Constantinople itself, it came to nothing. The 
catastrophe (from a Christian viewpoint) was certainly expedited by the refusal of  
any coordinated Latin assistance, whose leaders, apart from a Venetian military 
unit, left the Eastern schismatics to their fate.
As noted above, issues of  salvation or damnation were believed to hang on 
correct belief  (and consequent practice, including due submission) in both 
matters of  principle and matters of  detail. The invention of  hell, the threat of  
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being dispatched to a divine Auschwitz, only much worse, whereby the sinner 
was ingeniously tortured in the afterlife, not for any specific length of  time or 
until they submitted to the torturer’s demands but through all eternity, was a 
most effective instrument for ensuring social discipline and religious conformity. 
Preachers delighted in inventing and dwelling on the refinements of  suffering 
that the damned would undergo. Nonetheless it was not effective enough, for 
insurrections occurred and religious dissidence continued during the centuries of  
faith. So severe were the consequences that the dissidents as well as the authorities 
had to believe passionately that they were the saved and their enemies the damned.
On both sides of  the great division, East and West, further schisms and 
heresies emerged during the succeeding centuries, but particularly in the West. 
The thirteenth century witnessed material destruction, massacre, and torture 
on an enormous scale in southern France during the uprooting of  the Cathar 
heresy, and lesser persecutions were launched against numerically smaller targets. 
The sixteenth century saw a further major rupture on the Western side, when 
papal authority was challenged and rejected, and in states where the dissidents 
successfully established themselves they soon turned to persecuting each other 
over finer points of  theological controversy. 
Of  course terror was not the only pillar of  the church (or rather churches) 
although it was the central one.17 In addition it offered visual, auditory and olfactory 
spectacle – at least until the Calvinistic sections of  the sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century reformers denounced such things as distractions from concentration on 
the Word of  God and extirpated them in the regions where they attained political 
power. The churches however held out the promise of  delight as well as torture in 
the afterlife (if  only, in the Calvinist persuasion, for a minority of  souls). 
The framework of  belief  provided ceremonial support on important life 
occasions, principally birth, marriage and death. The congregations were or could 
be social collectives, not mere assemblies of  worshippers, which of  course was 
true for other religions as well. It furnished believers with an understanding of  life, 
the universe and everything, especially the narrative course of  their own life. Most 
of  all, perhaps, it brought with it a cloud of  powerful imaginary friends in the 
shape of  angels and saints, who assisted the believer in resisting temptation from 
the malevolent ones in the shape of  demons, while also perhaps supporting their 
material concerns. Often, particularly for evangelical Protestants, the imaginary 
friend could even be the supreme deity himself  – ‘What a friend we have in Jesus!’.
Not only Christian individuals or congregations believed they were entitled to 
divine assistance and support, but also Christian states, even when engaged in 
conflict with others of  the same persuasion. The elites of  the Roman empire, 
Constantine, his successors (apart from the apostate Julian) and their colleagues 
believed that since they had made the empire Christian, surely divine providence 
would uphold them. Indeed surviving pagan intellectuals, whenever the empire 
ran into trouble, as it did with increasing frequency, complained that its woes were 
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a consequence of  abandoning the ancient gods.18 All the successor kingdoms 
and their monarchs likewise felt that they were, or ought to be, under the special 
protection of  the deity, hence the phrase that Shakespeare gives to Claudius that 
‘There’s such divinity doth hedge a king’.
Gott Mit uns was the slogan of  the imperial German military, though going back 
many centuries, and being used by the medieval Teutonic Knights. The Romanov 
dynasty in Russia had a similar slogan. Britain of  course has its national anthem 
calling on the deity to make its monarch victorious. At the same time it is certainly 
important not to overlook the consolatory function which Christianity, along with 
other forms of  religion, exercises as ‘the heart of  a heartless world’. At times this 
results in material charity as well as religious consolation. It is also important to 
acknowledge the reputation of  pious believers who do exemplify the values and 
virtues which Christianity purports to embody but does not.
Islam’s Context 19
Six centuries after Christianity became a significant social force Islam made its 
appearance in western Arabia, a crossroads of  commercial activity, and therefore 
well acquainted with Judaism, Christianity in its several varieties, and the version 
of  Zoroastrianism (Zurvanism) which was the established religion of  the Sassanid 
Persian empire. Zoroastrianism was recognised by the Muslims as a legitimate faith 
(though not of  course the true one) rather than a form of  paganism, a ‘people of  
the book’ though it was a dualistic religion rather than a monotheist one. 
Much of  Islam’s monotheist religious belief  followed and adapted Jewish 
traditions, a smaller element came from Christian ones. Jesus for example was 
recognised as a prophet, though the crucifixion was denied – prophets were 
not supposed to suffer shameful execution. It has been remarked that medieval 
Christians would have regarded Islam as a Christian heresy or schism rather than 
a rival religion – certainly that is the guise under which Muhammad appears in 
Dante’s Inferno – disembowelled because he had divided the faith.
As with Jesus, the historicity of  the faith’s founder has been questioned, 
including, in 2008 by a German Muslim convert, Professor Muhammad Sven 
Kalisch.20 He has pointed out that many scholars are doubtful concerning the 
ancient sources on Muhammad’s life and that the earliest biography, which is no 
longer extant, dates from a century after the accepted date of  the prophet’s death 
in 632 and is known only from references in much later texts. The first coins 
bearing his name appeared only in the later seventh century. John Pickard makes 
similar points, also drawing attention to the fact that the inscriptions on the Dome 
of  the Rock in Jerusalem scarcely mention Muhammad, and the one which does 
may be referring not to an individual but a title – ‘one who is worthy of  respect’. 
Discussing the religion itself, he notes that that the reported early sayings are 
addressed to Jews and Christians rather than pagans, claiming to be a refinement 
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and true interpretation of  their faiths, not something entirely novel. Pickard implies 
that Islam probably arose in precisely that milieu, among communities of  Arab 
Christians or Jews seeking a purer religion than Byzantium’s ‘gilded Christianity’.21 
The great significance of  Jerusalem to the faith is also held to be a pointer in the 
same direction. ‘The Qur’an assumes familiarity with major narratives recounted 
in the Jewish and Christian scriptures’, he asserts, and possibly some of  its content 
(up to a third in one version) is pre-Islamic, though this is disputed. Following 
the overthrow of  the Sassanid empire and the conquest of  Iran local Christians 
referred to the Arab monotheists as ‘New Jews’  – for which a modern translation 
might be neo-Judaism. 
Effectively Pickard is arguing that Islam was invented by the ex-Christian and 
ex-Jewish Arab imperialists to give themselves an ideological underpinning distinct 
from but compatible with the religious circumstances of  the region. He writes,
Whatever may have been the role of  an Arab leader called ‘Mohamed’ the 
religion that developed in his name did not exist in the-mid seventh century 
but arose from the class and ethnic conflicts within the Arab Empire and 
the stresses and strains of  holding together the enormous conquests of  the 
seventh century.22
As with the case of  Jesus of  Nazareth the argument is well developed and effectively 
presented, but as with that, the probabilities are that a specific individual was the 
source of  the religion whatever the later accretions around his name may have 
been. Probably these were quite considerable.
Conquest
After becoming hegemonic in Arabia the new faith spread through the regions 
of  Arab conquest, mostly by voluntary conversion. Edward Gibbon devoted a 
volume of  his History of  the Decline and Fall of  the Roman Empire to the impact of  
Muhammad and Islam. The account is still worth attending to, at least in Gibbon’s 
analysis of  the manner in which the practice and rituals of  Islam, as well as the 
unifying ideology, contributed to military discipline and effectiveness thanks to 
regular prayer, hygiene and well-defined chains of  command. The faith had other 
advantages as well. It was simple and straightforward, avoiding the theological 
and Christological labyrinths of  Christianity – the previously mentioned Sven 
Kalisch said he converted because it was the most rational form of  religion. Unlike 
the Christian regimes it was tolerant, for although conversion at sword-point 
occasionally happened, normally unbelievers (at least fellow-monotheists) who 
did not wish to share the advantages of  the new faith were tolerated on fairly 
mild terms, mostly being required only to pay a special tax – which meant that 
conversion was initially discouraged. Not surprisingly Islam made rapid progress 
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among populations ground down by Byzantine or Sassanid financial demands and 
in the former empire persecuted for Christological deviation.
Within a century of  the new faith being proclaimed the Persian empire, which 
included Iraq, was overthrown, the surviving portion of  the Roman empire, ruled 
from Constantinople or Byzantium, was greatly reduced, including Sicily, and the 
Gothic kingdom in Spain conquered. Even the Frankish kingdom was attacked. 
By the tenth century Muslim power extended from Spain, along the North African 
littoral, throughout the Middle East and into central Asia, including part of  China, 
though repelled in Tibet. 
Naturally it was impossible for such an extent of  territory to continue to be 
ruled from a single centre, first Damascus and subsequently Baghdad, and it 
soon enough divided into mutually hostile principalities. Some of  that, as in the 
example of  Egypt, was due to religious dispute, not so much over questions of  
doctrine such as agitated the Christians, though that was not altogether absent, but 
more over the interpretation of  tradition and who should be regarded as the true 
successor to Muhammad.
In due course Islam spread even further, to Southeast Asia and what is now 
Indonesia, up the Nile to what is now Sudan, and along the Red Sea coast to 
what is now Somalia across the Sahara, where Timbuktu became a major cultural 
centre, and into tropical West Africa, where powerful states were established by 
Islamic rulers through conversion rather than conquest. That the importance of  
the religion continues into the twenty-first century needs no demonstration.
Disruptive Implications
The monotheist religions, with their sacred writings which supposedly constitute 
a revelation direct from the deity via prophets such as Moses or Muhammad, 
or else the four Christian evangelists, have an attribute which does not apply to 
their counterparts either in the other salvation religions or others outside that 
category. This is the fact that sacred writings of  that sort contain a disruptive 
charge, and do so even beyond the most evident sources in the apocalyptic 
writings in Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity, which threaten damnation 
and punishment to the high and mighty and paradise for the subjected. These 
are handmade for rebels, dissidents and religious revolutionaries and were indeed 
frequently so used, the last notable occasion being the English revolution of  
1640–60. Not surprisingly the religious establishments did their best to neuter 
them; Zoroastrianism was sanitised into Zurvanism, the Jewish apocalypses (apart 
from Daniel) did not make it into the canon, and the bishops were dubious about 
the Book of  Revelation, only accepting it as canonical after several centuries. 
But even without these apocalypses the monotheist sacred writings can still 
inspire dissidence and revolt. There is only one god (setting aside the reservations 
concerning Christianity) and his words are sacred. Unfortunately the deity has 
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not spoken unambiguously to all his followers and there are as many potentially 
different interpretations as there are believers.23 Despite the disciplinary regimes 
evolved to institute and preserve an orthodox interpretation – from ecumenical 
councils to papal infallibility in the case of  Christianity – it is always possible to 
challenge the authorities on the argument that they have misinterpreted, distorted, 
and debased the holy word. Strangely enough, such challenges have always 
coincided with and were related to social issues agitating sections of  the faithful at 
the place and time in question. 
Taking religion as a whole, although its supernatural postulates have no 
worthwhile evidential basis, and the multiplicity of  varieties which exist round the 
globe is surely proof  enough of  that, its foundation is that in any pre-scientific 
culture supernatural belief  follows quite naturally and gets quickly established 
as a persistent tradition. Whatever may be the percentage of  believers that are 
adherents of  the tradition in which they were educated – rather than making a 
deliberate choice among those available – that proportion must be overwhelming 
large, probably well over 90 per cent.
Supernatural belief  becomes particularly relevant when the issues it addresses 
are not something to be debated or reflected upon in tranquillity but assume 
terrifying reality in situations of  extreme danger and distress. Superstition and 
religion then become particular temptations, though such traumas may instead 
provoke negative reaction when they expose religion’s false claims – for example 
in Europe following the slaughters of  the First World War when all the belligerent 
governments constantly solicited divine aid.
Even when there are no actual real dangers, the conviction that they exist, 
especially when promoted by skilful publicists, may assist in keeping the faith 
vigorous and active – for example with ‘the paranoid style in American politics’24 
when US citizens were afflicted during the Cold War by the imagined threat of  a 
communist domestic takeover or invasion by godless communists, and now by the 
equally imaginary one of  Islamist ambitions. The widespread conviction in the late 
1940s that religion was a dying belief  system has only been very partially fulfilled – 
though matters might well have been different if  varied faiths were not being given 
strenuous and well-funded life support from centres such as Riyadh, Islamabad, 
Rome and Dallas and been adopted as an answer to life’s problems by individuals 
and nations in mass societies when secular political projects have failed them.25
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Imagined Communities: Signs and 
Symbols, Identities and Nations
The theme of  ‘imagined communities’ (Benedict Anderson’s phrase in respect of  
national sentiment), is more generally one of  enormous scope and purporting to 
discuss it in one single chapter borders on the preposterous. My objective however 
is to single out certain aspects which seem to be of  particular importance and 
constantly recurrent in the processes of  historical development – symbols and 
identities that have been intrinsic to the course of  history. My focus is also on 
means used to establish social collectivism and social discrimination whether on 
the basis of  nationality, gender, race, hierarchies or other markers of  difference.
Identity and the Other
The conceptual identification of  individuals with their social and communal 
grouping is promoted not only by language, beliefs, ceremonies, cooperative 
labour and social interaction but by contrast and distinction with non-members 
and outsiders. In addition to that of  course, social cleavages within a community 
establish further patterns of  distinctiveness, linguistic variation, and self-identifi-
cation against other sections of  the same community. 
Without any doubt the earliest form of  community identity was that of  the 
extended family group where all were engaged, within the circumstances enforced 
by differences of  skill, stature and status, in the common business of  survival and 
reproduction and everybody knew everyone else personally. All must have shared 
the same language, the same rituals, the same concepts of  the supernatural and 
the same accepted precepts for inter-group behaviour, all based upon conceptions 
of  kinship.
With the extension of  supposed kin links over a wider area and the creation 
of  a clan structure, there is created, in Benedict Anderson’s words, an ‘imagined 
community’. With even wider ranges of  association some form of  imagined 
linkage is essential to cement the social order together and make its smooth 
interaction possible. Almost invariably this tended to take the form of  communal 
religious rites. With the expansion of  social groups, regardless of  the strength 
of  the symbolic cement, the co-existence of  large numbers of  separate families 
and family networks in the tighter settled environment of  village or city provided 
growing scope for social and personal conflicts. Some sort of  overall authority, 
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whether communal or personal, was required to mediate or repress these, and that 
authority was at pains to emphasise its elevated importance. 
The god-kings of  the early civilisations and their Roman imperial successors 
understood very well the importance of  visual and iconic representation, as did 
their counterparts throughout Asia. Statues in stone or in bronze were a major 
component of  this, but a much more effective and widespread manner of  such 
propaganda was stamped on coins, once coinage became commonplace. The 
ruler’s head on a coin made his (occasionally her) image, even if  it were a stylised 
one, familiar to the lowliest subject at the outmost bounds of  their realm. Muslim 
rulers were at something of  a disadvantage in this respect, since their religion 
prohibited human imagery, and an early caliph after trying it briefly quickly gave up 
the attempt and reverted on his coins to a written superscription only.
In forager and early agricultural societies, projecting from what is known about 
the survivors of  such societies into the late modern period, a complex network 
of  interaction between separate clan groupings must have characterised their 
relationship. Much of  it was based on the practices of  totem distinction, taboo 
relationships and exogamy, whereby sexual partners had to be obtained from 
outside the kin or totem group, who thereafter joined the clan of  their residence, 
while maintaining links with their birth kin group. 
Such arrangements have the advantage of  spreading and mixing the gene pool 
– though that could in no way have been their purpose – but also of  establishing 
a network of  relationships conducive to peace and cooperation among separate 
clans, and doubtless it would also facilitate material trade and exchange. On 
occasion it could also mean hostility and aggression, as among head-hunting 
communities, but, interestingly, that kind of  conflict tended to be ritualistic in 
nature (which was even the case with Aztec bloodthirstiness) and seldom or never 
an all or nothing affair.
In the early civilisations the ‘we’ as against the ‘others’ referred to the subjects of  
the god-king – though there was differentiation between his core subjects and his 
tributaries. The ‘others’ were the populations outside his sphere of  control, with 
whom hostile postures were frequent and routine, though that did not necessarily 
exclude exchange relations. Imperial China was the ‘Middle Kingdom’, regarding 
itself  as the centre of  the earth and theoretically entitled to universal hegemony. 
Its earlier equivalents in Egypt and Mesopotamia advanced similar pretensions. 
Benedict Anderson makes a pertinent remark when he writes that, 
These days it is perhaps difficult to put oneself  empathetically into a world 
in which the dynastic realm appeared for most men as the only imaginable 
‘political’ system . . . borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties 
faded imperceptibly into one another. Hence, paradoxically enough the ease 
with which pre-modern empires and kingdoms were able to sustain their rule 
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over immensely heterogeneous and often not very contiguous populations for 
long periods of  time.1
In the independent Mediterranean city states the identifying distinction 
was between citizens and non-citizens, both resident aliens and outsiders. The 
inhabitants of  the Phoenician cities thought of  themselves as Tyrians, Sidonians 
or whatever, not as Phoenicians. This applied also to the Greek city states, but 
beyond that the Greek speakers overall possessed what might be described as 
a quasi-national identity as Hellenes, with non-Greek speakers being identified 
as ‘barbarians’ on account of  their different language. They were designated on 
that account as an appropriate source of  slave labour, though again a further 
distinction was made between civilised barbarians, Persians and Egyptians, and 
the tribal communities to the north.
The Greek city states were scenes of  extreme social tension and conflict, based, 
quite explicitly, on wealth and property and frequently erupting into massacre and 
purges, with Athens being the best documented. Sparta, with on the one hand its 
hyper-militaristic ruling class of  citizens where social distinction based on property 
was restrained as far as possible, and on the other its helot serfs, was very different 
from anything else found in Greece. 
In Athens by contrast, where, as Michael Mann puts it, ‘All kinds of  social 
tension were introduced into the polis through the generation of  enormous 
unequally distributed wealth’,2 the landowning wealthy, who hated the citizen 
democracy but mostly put up with it due to their plentiful supplies of  slave labour, 
explicitly identified themselves, as can be seen in Plato’s polemics, against the small 
property and unpropertied citizen community, the hoi polloi – in other words, ‘those 
who are of  inferior status’. The modest wealth of  peasant proprietors from wine 
and olives however underpinned the slave-owning misogynist democracy. 
The Roman republic, like its Greek equivalents, also maintained the key 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens, and like them too was severely 
class-divided, with these divisions frequently exploding into violence. Once 
again the main opposing sides acquired specific names, in this case the wealthy 
aristocracy (or patricians), and citizens of  moderate property (or plebeians) and 
further categories below these, apart from the slaves, with the plebeians themselves 
divided between the not-quite-patrician equestrians and the others. The recurrent 
brutal conflicts provoked by these class divisions, plus the recurrent threat of  slave 
revolt resulted eventually in the supersession of  the republic by the Principate near 
the end of  the first millennium BCE.
A male privilege, citizenship itself, regardless of  which class the citizen 
belonged to, conferred substantial advantages to its possessor. It excused him 
from torture or crucifixion, and under the Principate entitled him to appeal to 
Caesar from lower courts, as Saul of  Tarsus (Saint Paul) is reported to have done. 
Saul himself  was not a Roman, but an inhabitant of  an Anatolian city, for by 
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that time citizenship had become much more widely extended and in subsequent 
centuries was to be extended still further. In earlier times the notion of  Roman 
citizenship as a binding cement of  identity surpassing those of  class division, 
was a favourite trope of  senatorial orators contrasting the strong, upright moral 
Roman citizen with feeble and degenerate easterners and Carthaginians or savage 
northern barbarians; especially when they wanted to recruit public sentiment to 
support aggressive enterprises. 
During the centuries of  Christendom the outsiders were the non-Christians, 
always despised and regularly persecuted, above all the Jews, but not excluding 
Muslims and pagans, who were fair game for conquest. In the Islamic kingdoms 
and empires matters were similar but the outsiders were treated a good deal more 
tolerantly unless they were pagans; subject certainly to special taxation but not 
otherwise molested except in crisis situations.
Rationale
The early kin-related hunting and foraging group can be regarded as a rational 
identity in that its cooperative actions are the necessary condition for the 
preservation and continuance of  the group. The same can also be said about the 
early village communities, even when social differentiation is beginning to divide 
them – all the inhabitants would have known each other – but the initial state 
formations are a different matter altogether. Their necessary social unification is 
provided not by inescapable conditions of  economy and environment, but by 
the myth, whatever it might be in particular instances, of  their god-king and the 
invisible beings who are associated with him and determine human destinies. 
Religion and politics are seamlessly combined, but religion of  that kind is a much 
different beast from what the ‘salvation religions’ of  the first millennium BCE 
and their seventh-century CE successor were to produce. Pagan religions were 
enormously variable in their detail but all pretty much alike in their essential belief  
in multiple deities requiring regular animal sacrifices to keep them well-affected 
towards the communities of  their worshippers. Conquerors, however repressive 
in other respects, did not regard it as necessary in any manner to abolish or 
significantly interfere with the religion of  their new subjects, though they would 
of  course expect them to respect the new supreme god of  the conqueror and his 
rites, and if  the conqueror hoped to be respected as well as feared he might even 
pay homage in the temple of  the conquered community’s god, as sometimes did 
Alexander the Great.
When salvation religion was combined with dynastic rule however, a different 
social landscape comes into view, though this did not mean that the dynast 
necessarily set out to persecute, let alone annihilate, the minority faiths in his or 
her domains – Christianity was exceptional in this respect. What it did mean was 
that the subjects identified themselves simultaneously as members of  a particular 
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faith community and subjects of  a particular dynast and faced differently 
evaluated significant Others. The already noted aim of  devising a machine gun 
to fire round bullets against Christians and square ones, whose shape gave them 
greater destructive impact, against Turks is telling – it might be necessary to kill 
fellow-members of  the faith if  they belonged to a different political monarch, but 
appropriate to do it in a more civilised fashion.
Once the Roman empire disappeared from history with its breakup into western 
and eastern sections, the former dissolved into independent kingdoms and the 
latter slowly but steadily over centuries declined eventually into insignificance. 
During the subsequent centuries that we dignify as the Middle Ages, that peninsula 
of  peninsulas projecting anomalously out of  western Asia, namely Europe, was 
home to no polity that could equal in significance the great empires of  China, the 
Arab Caliphs and their Ottoman successors (who anyway ruled the Balkans) or 
even the Muslim Persian empire, or those of  Genghis Khan’s successors such as 
Timur the Lame. 
Nevertheless Europe’s multiple rulers still clung to their pretensions. The 
Holy Roman Emperor might have no more than local authority, if  even that, but 
he was still an emperor – supposedly – and one of  the two pillars of  Western 
Christendom, the other being the Church. Eventually the Habsburg monarchs of  
southern Germany ensured a monopoly on that title and by means of  marriage 
alliances acquired their own mini-empire along the Danube, though they did not call 
themselves emperors of  that until the nineteenth century.3 The English monarchs 
went empire-building in what is now France (as did the Castilian ones in Iberia, 
Italy and the Low Countries, and the Muscovite ones in what became Russia) and 
when that failed the British Isles themselves could be regarded as an empire of  
sorts. During these centuries territorial empires across Eurasia predominated, and 
their rulers were sacerdotal personages, supposedly appointed by god, and with 
lesser monarchs attempting to ape them. 
By the seventeenth century the sacred patina was beginning to erode. As early 
as the fifteenth century the Swiss peasants and burghers had bloodily toppled 
the Burgundian monarchy. The Dutch burghers, religiously inspired, had forcibly 
seceded from the sacred Spanish monarch, and the Anglo/Scottish king had, in 
the name of  the people, had his head ostentatiously cut off. This was scandalous 
(the decent form was for unsuitable monarchs to be quietly murdered). Monarchy 
in Europe, though it continued as the political default option for further centuries, 
would never be quite the same again. Nationalism would come to replace it as the 
focus for public loyalty and monarchs, to retain their public credibility, increasingly 
had to present themselves as the representatives of  a nation rather than a dynasty. 
Nationality and Nationalism
By the nineteenth century sacerdotal empires, and kingdoms, emperors and kings, 
were under challenge everywhere, from political and social forces with nationalism 
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as their banner. In that century dynastic states, though retaining the dynasty, were 
forged into national ones in Italy, Germany and Sweden. Nationalism has proved 
to be the most pervasive of  modern ideologies, generating a sense of  identity and 
loyalty across wide spectra of  society, and it has a clear quasi-religious dimension. 
Anderson writes that,
It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which 
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of  the divinely-
ordained hierarchical dynastic realm . . . the nation is always conceived as a deep 
horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity which makes it possible, 
over the past two centuries, for so many millions of  people, not so much to kill, 
as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.4
To underline the strength of  these imaginings, he notes the absurdity ‘if  one tries 
to imagine, say, a Tomb of  the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals’.5 
From the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century and beyond, the focus of  
public identity, the imagined community of  our days, was to become the nation, 
whether or not defined by ethnic descent, and the outsiders the citizens of  other 
nationalities, who might always become political enemies. The reasons for this 
shift are not very mysterious; the nation was a replacement for loyalty focused 
on a hereditary monarchy, although until after the great wars of  the twentieth 
century every effort was made by ruling elites to combine these sentiments, as in 
England remains the case. In one case, Japan, the conviction of  a special ethnic 
destiny focused on a god-emperor easily morphed into a hyper-nationalism, with 
the sense of  ethnic superiority rigorously guarded against Japanese nationals of  
other ethnicities, such as the aboriginal Ainu or even the outcaste community of  
ethnic Japanese, the Burakumin. 
The identification in public discourse of  supposed alien groups within a 
community, whether or not they are citizens of  the state in question, who then 
serve as scapegoats for all manner of  economic and social trouble and difficulties, 
has provided a major historical theme in twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
politics and social relations. This occurred most notoriously with reference to 
Jews but has been far from limited to them alone, and with economic breakdown 
combined with the vast media extension of  recent years, it continues as a central 
discourse around the globe. 
Modern Imperialism
As the antique dynastic territorial empires were tending towards decay and 
disintegration the resurgent European powers were in the process of  establishing, 
from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the huge overseas empires (the 
British one eventually incorporated a quarter of  the earth’s land surface). These 
were the precondition for the West’s eventual global domination (and hegemony 
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over the old empires even where these formally still existed in China, Turkey and 
Persia). According to Mann,
[N]ations also became more passionate and aggressive. Passion derived 
principally from the tighter links between the state and the intensive, emotional 
sphere of  family and neighbourhood interaction in which state education and 
physical and moral health infrastructures loomed large. Ideologies saw the 
nation as mother or father, hearth and home writ large. Aggression resulted 
because all states continued to crystallise as militarist; all were geopolitically 
militarist, and some remained domestically so.6 
The populations of  the metropoles were taught a nationalism which embraced 
‘their’ empires as well as their home countries – and which their colonial subjects 
were expected to share. Such ultra-imperialism naturally provoked reactive 
counter-nationalisms among their much-abused colonial subjects. Anderson cites 
a Batavian (Javanese) writer satirising the fact that the Dutch colonists expected 
their colonial subjects to celebrate the Dutch struggle for independence. ‘If  I were 
a Dutchman I would not organise an independence celebration in a country where 
the independence of  the people has been stolen’.7 The same principle applied 
to Algerian or Vietnamese subjects being expected to sing the Marseillaise and 
acclaim 1789, or British ones to do the same for ‘God Save the King’ and Magna 
Carta. Right up to its end in 1975 the Portuguese quasi-fascist regime tried to insist 
that its colonial subjects were Portuguese under the slogan ‘Portugal is not a small 
country!’ counting all the overseas territories as parts of  Portugal.
Racism
In what we may define as the modern era – very roughly the last six centuries – 
racism has been a prominent strand in the fabric of  history, glaringly prominent 
in the era of  nineteenth-century imperialism. It has the effect, to adapt a phrase 
of  Anderson’s of  erasing the victim’s cultural quality by ‘reduc[ing] the adversary 
to his biological physiognomy.’8 Prior to the modern era there was certainly 
discrimination and persecution aplenty of  what were identified as hostile groups 
or social outcasts. However this was only exceptionally ever justified on the basis 
of  genetic descent, such as with the Burakumin in Japan, the Cagots in France and 
the Roma, then designated as Gypsies, throughout Europe. The persecution and 
isolation of  Jews, for example was justified on religious not racial grounds. 
Dislike of  outsiders was of  course perfectly traditional and routine, the outsiders 
could even be the inhabitants of  the neighbouring village. In the thirteenth century 
Scottish people were said to believe that the English had tails, but the idea that 
entire ethnic categories could be regarded as inferior or vicious on the grounds 
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of  descent alone would have everywhere been regarded as preposterous, at least 
among the literate classes.
The hereditary principle was of  course central to social structure and 
functioning, especially in India, but elsewhere too it crossed language differences 
and even religious ones; for example the crusader leaders regarded their great 
enemy Saladin, who had aristocratic forebears, as a very honourable individual, and 
he appears to have reciprocated. On the whole, again with the above exceptions, 
a member of  a pre-modern outsider group, if  they had the requisite qualities and 
assets, could be accepted as a full member of  the community and rise to high 
office, whether secular or religious. 
The first officially sponsored example of  discrimination purely on grounds 
of  even distant descent apart from religion or other form of  outsidership dates 
from fifteenth-century Spain, where the key criterion was termed ‘purity of  blood’ 
(limpieza de sangre) and intended to exclude any descendants of  Jews or Muslims 
from official positions.9
Undoubtedly the burgeoning of  the West African slave trade from the 
seventeenth century onwards had a lot to do with the growth of  racist sentiments 
as the victims were visually very different from Europeans, as was the very large 
slave-descended population in the United States. On account of  their cultural 
background they could be regarded as intrinsic inferiors (biblical justifications 
were also invoked) even if  they converted to Christianity,10 though the very large 
Arab slave trade in East Africa does not appear to have evoked similar sentiments 
among Muslim communities. In summary, racism can be defined as a form of  
stereotyping prejudice based upon the once prevalent dogma that ‘bad blood will 
out’; in other words the belief  in hereditary transmission of  imagined undesirable 
traits among identified communities. Blood here is being used in a metaphorical 
sense to mean heredity, but the metaphor is significant for throughout written 
history blood, that remnant of  the ancient sea in which our remote ancestors 
swam,11 has had particularly strong symbolic associations. Across very different 
pre-modern cultures it was considered bad luck to spill royal blood, and royals 
were preferably killed by other means.
It was during the course of  the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that 
European power, from its footholds on the coasts of  the two continents, spread 
across Africa and Asia in a previously unimaginable fashion, and the settlements 
on the North American east coast, a number of  them heavily dependent on 
African slave labour, set out on their genocidal progress across the continent, as 
their counterparts were doing in Australia. In the arrogance of  power it was not 
in the least surprising that their victims came to be viewed as innately inferior in 
different degrees. 
The ones who resisted strenuously as they were being exterminated, such as the 
Native American ‘Plains Indians’, the Zulus or the New Zealand Maoris, might 
gain a grudging measure of  respect for their fighting skills, but they were still 
Thompson T02687 01 text   152 16/12/2014   13:29
ImaGIned communItIeS  153
regarded as savages; others like the Chinese, or most Indians and Africans, were 
merely contemptible. In the late eighteenth century educated opinion in Europe 
had been impressed by Indian, Muslim and Chinese cultural, scientific and artistic 
achievements. In the following century these were downplayed and disregarded 
in the popular perception of  the results of  research into these cultures, otherwise 
known as ‘Orientalism’.12 Learned opinion was divided on whether these ‘races’ 
could eventually after a lengthy spell of  ‘tuition’ be brought up to European 
standards of  civilisation, or whether their genetic heritage rendered them incapable 
of  such advancement. It was the latter thesis which generally won out, especially 
after the ‘Indian Mutiny’, or ‘First War of  Indian Independence’ in 1857. 
Pseudoscience
As science in the nineteenth century began to take an increasing hold on the 
popular imagination pseudoscientific principles were sought to establish schemes 
of  racial hierarchy, and even those theorists most inimical to imperialism and 
racial persecution, such as Marx himself, could not escape some degree of  
contamination. Darwin’s principle of  natural selection proved a godsend to 
racists when misapplied to supposed ‘races’. It was no accident that the climax 
of  European imperialism in the late nineteenth century coincided with the notion 
of  eugenics and the prophets of  ‘scientific racism’ such as Arthur Gobineau and 
Houston Stewart Chamberlain.
Antisemitism was a case on its own. Evidently Jews were not physically different 
from other Europeans, suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding. The arbitrary 
designation of  Jews as a ‘race’ and a malevolent one at that, was simply a pseudo-
scientific add-on to age-old hatreds generated on other grounds.13 This form of  
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century prejudice was at its most vicious in France, 
the central European Habsburg empire and the eastern portions of  the Russian 
empire, where sections of  the petty bourgeoisie, including peasants, regarded Jews 
as an economic and cultural threat. Never did pseudoscience produce a more 
virulent outcome.
However it was more than simply pretended science. The most virulent of  all 
racist documents, The Protocols of  the Elders of  Zion, purporting to be the record of  a 
conference in which Jewish leaders plotted to take over the world, was forged by a 
Russian Orthodox cleric (as part of  an intended text on the coming apocalypse).14 
Language
Language of  course as well as conveying major survival advantages to a bipedal 
primate living upon the African savannah is the beginning of  representation. 
Despite the importance of  visual symbols – representations or actions, these have 
to be explained, interpreted and enveloped in the linguistic narratives attached 
to them. The significance of  language in relation to emerging social distinctions, 
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whether within religious or political realms and to the development of  nationalism, 
forms the focus of  the following section.
Language and Status
Words, as is universally recognised, have power and those relating to human 
identities and status have especial power. This is carried to its ultimate perhaps in 
certain cultures where personal names are secrets known only to their possessors. 
Everyone in these circumstances naturally has also a public name by which they 
are addressed in conversation, but to reveal their secret name would lay them open 
to hostile magic operations. If  this should be thought to be ignorant superstition, 
it should be kept in mind that in nearly every culture the name of  a god is 
mega-powerful. This is particularly true of  the Jewish god, the pronunciation of  
whose name we do not even know accurately, as it was never spoken in public and 
the Hebrew alphabet has no vowels. A scribe writing it, YHWH, would afterwards 
clean his writing instrument, it was so sacred. Nowadays it is given as Yahweh, but 
that is a guess. 
In Anglo-Saxon culture, though there is no legal prohibition, the name Jesus is 
never used as a personal name, and Christ, Yahweh or Jehovah (the first inaccurate 
English name for the deity) would be even less acceptable, though Christ 
(pronounced Creest in these cases) occasionally occurs as a surname.15
Lesser variants of  the same linguistic phenomenon are also involved when 
prescribing how a person of  superior or lesser status should be addressed.16 Persons 
in the militaries of  Anglo-Saxon cultures have to address their superior officers as 
‘Sir’ or ‘Ma’am’ (and salute), and prior to the cultural revolution of  the 1960s this 
applied much more widely. It is still by no means extinct. It might nowadays just 
be imaginable for an ordinary citizen to address the US president as ‘Barack’ rather 
than ‘Mr President’, but never the English monarch as ‘Lizzie’ rather than ‘Your 
Majesty’. Her sister, Princess Margaret, was said to be very annoyed with anyone 
who omitted to use her formal title of  ‘Your Royal Highness’. Anti-honorific 
phraseology such as ‘your humble servant’ is now rare in English but remains 
prevalent in many languages.
Language does not only discriminate by the use of  names or titles. In many cases, 
though not all, it is also integrated grammatically into the social structure. The 
‘royal we’ is indicative of  a presumption of  power and authority, and the practice 
of  using the first person plural rather than singular by high-ranking individuals 
is found in other contexts as well. In many languages these grammatical status 
indicators are very complex indeed, with numerous honorifics – and grammar 
changing according to the honorific title being used. Indo-European languages on 
the whole are simpler in this respect and English possibly the simplest.
The most noticeable marker of  this is the withering of  the separate second 
person singular form, with both singular and plural collapsed into the indifferent 
‘you’, although the archaic form still persists in local dialects and among Quakers. 
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Prior to this the correct form was to address a superior person as ‘you’, and use for 
an equal or inferior person ‘thou’, ‘thee’, ‘thy’ ‘thine’, though, peculiarly, the deity 
was also addressed in the informal second person. King Charles II was amused 
when the Quaker William Penn addressed him as ‘thou’ and omitted to take his hat 
off. Charles had a sense of  humour, he removed his own hat, declaring that only 
one head should be covered when he was present; any other English king of  these 
times would probably have had Penn executed for lèse majesté. Monarchs’ subjects 
were also required to display appropriate body language – by bowing, kneeling, 
or prostration depending upon the particular culture. This too extended further 
down the line; you were, if  male, supposed to raise your hat or cap to a social 
superior. It was all an expression of  power and subordination.
Language and the State
During the greater part of  human history distinctions of  language and religion, 
though markers of  identity and social hierarchy, were not divisive ones in the 
manner which they later became – with one enormously important exception. 
That exception was of  course the post-exilic Judaic religion, which was specifically 
designed to be divisive and to protect the distinctiveness of  the religious 
community with its highly unusual concept not of  a supreme deity but a single 
one. Pre-modern conquerors did not as a rule regard it as necessary to attack the 
languages, any more than the religions, of  the newly-conquered peoples. It was 
a multilingual environment and the language of  one people was not regarded as 
in some sense intrinsically better than another – at least until the classical Greeks 
began to regard non-Greeks as less cultured than themselves, and to identify the 
distinction linguistically (hence the term ‘barbarian’). Ironically, the Greeks’ Roman 
conquerors, apart from some grumpy old reactionaries, actually accepted the 
Greek definition of  cultural reality and identified with the latter’s culture, including 
their language. The language of  polite society in Rome in the late republic and 
early empire was Greek not Latin, except for formal purposes such as Senate 
orations. The ability to speak Greek, which depended on having an appropriate 
slave tutor, like literacy itself, further distinguished elite Romans from the others. 
In the European medieval centuries, when the degree of  communicative inter-
connectivity that the Roman Empire had established broke down, communities 
were much more isolated and embryonic states went their separate ways. 
Language, to be sure, distinguished, in an even more brutal fashion, conquered 
populations from their masters of  a different speech. England is a good example. 
Following the eleventh-century conquest by Duke William, English-speakers were 
specifically identified as an inferior caste and the hitherto flourishing vernacular 
literature came to an abrupt end. In cases of  the unsolved murder of  a Norman, 
the native speakers in the vicinity were subject to a different and more onerous 
legal practice known to the lawyers as the ‘presentment of  Englishry’.
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For centuries the ruling elite spoke different languages from the remainder of  
the population, either Norman French or Latin depending on their function in 
the elite structure. The opening chapter of  Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe has two English 
peasants discussing their miserable lot. They note that when the farmyard beasts 
are running around the fields they are Anglo-Saxon and cows, pigs, sheep, 
chickens, but when they appear on the elite tables they become French-derived 
beef, pork, mutton and poultry. Ironically, the Viking ancestors of  the Normans 
had themselves spoken a Germanic (or even among some members of  William’s 
retinue, a Celtic) language, but within a couple of  generations they had become 
entirely Frenchified.
Had it not been for contingent events between the late fourteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries the language established in Britain, as education extended 
and Latin declined, would most likely be a Romance language with its roots in 
French. Instead, it is argued, what became modern English prevailed as a result 
of  a deliberate policy agenda led by intellectuals both lay and clerical, connected 
with the court and universities, particularly Geoffrey Chaucer and his circle. This 
aimed to emphasise English distinctiveness, linguistically as well as politically and 
ecclesiastically – at a time when France and the Papacy were either regarded as 
enemy powers or sunk in deep discredit.17
It was English itself  which became the elite language, a distinguishing mark of  
superiority, with Latin continuing as the ornament of  the intellectual elite well into 
the seventeenth century. Even from the late medieval era the Celtic languages of  
the British Isles had come under attack and their speakers subject to discrimination 
and persecution in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, not least because these 
same speakers, apart from the Manx islanders, were regarded as a political threat.
Language and Nationalism
Nothing quite like the situation in Britain described above was apparent elsewhere 
in Europe or indeed throughout Eurasia or the Americas. It was the consolidation 
of  nationhood and national sentiment in the nineteenth century, largely in reaction 
to the Napoleonic empire, that gave linguistic differentiation a social and political 
charge that it had not previously possessed. Particular languages, rather than 
language in general, are, in modern conditions the supreme markers of  identity, the 
foundation stone of  modern nationalism. It is unusual for hostile nationalisms to 
arise within the same language,18 Ireland and former Yugoslavia being exceptions 
(and even in the Irish case strong efforts have been made to promote a different 
language, while mainstream Scottish nationalism, as evidenced by the rhetoric of  
its leaders, cannot be classified as one of  hostility to outsiders). Speakers of  the 
same language, such as in Rwanda, tend to kill each other for other reasons, mainly 
economic, political or religious. 
With the rise of  nationalism dead languages, such as Hebrew, were revived, 
and a new one, Indonesian, was even invented, though based upon a variety of  
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Malay and with much borrowing.19 Throughout central and eastern Europe mainly, 
but also in other regions, nationally minded philologists energetically compiled 
dictionaries and grammars of  minority languages and encouraged their official 
use, and similarly inclined historians compiled celebratory histories of  their 
newly-defined nation’s triumphs or victimhood. It is important to emphasise the 
importance of  printing in the dissemination of  such texts and the standardisation 
of  linguistic forms.
Not surprisingly these activities were regarded by centralising powers as an 
irritant at best and a threat at worst, and strenuous efforts made to discourage 
them. In mainland Britain this amounted to a low-level persecution, with everything 
short of  legal prohibition used to suppress the minority languages (and dialects), 
especially during schooling. Children were punished severely for using Gaelic or 
Welsh in the schoolroom, or even in the playground. In Ireland, however, national 
sentiment was too strong to make attempted suppression a worthwhile endeavour. 
In France similar repression was applied to Breton, Occitan and Corsican. In the 
newly-established Italian state of  the 1860s onwards, the Florentine dialect was 
adopted as the official language and imposed throughout the peninsula.20
In Spain the official language, Castilian, is the first language of  only around 
70 per cent of  the population (had the Iberian peninsula remained united as it 
was between 1580 and 1640 Castilian would be in a minority position). Catalan 
and Basque are its principal rivals. During the twentieth century these minority 
languages became a major issue when the Catalans and Basques supported the 
Republic and the regional autonomy it granted, and were consequently identified 
with communism and separatism in the eyes of  the quasi-fascist regime which 
won the Civil War. Consequently these languages were both ferociously repressed 
by the regime, which only resulted in more militant resistance, especially in the 
Basque country. At least until very recently a very similar situation existed in 
Turkey, with the Kurdish language here forming the target for persecution. In 
the era of  modern nationalism a dominant national group, ruling within a state 
over linguistically different national minorities who may resent the rulers, seem to 
have been convinced that their ethnically different subjects would become more 
obedient and better assimilated if  they were made to speak the rulers’ language. 
Languages, in this case French and Dutch (Flemish) are markers of  identity 
in different parts of  Belgium, giving rise to national tensions which threaten 
to tear the country apart. By contrast, in Norway two different written forms 
of  Norwegian coexist happily, and the spoken language is itself  an amalgam. 
The present situation came about as a result of  nationalist agitation in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, Norway having been lengthily under at 
first Danish and subsequently Swedish rule (the Norwegian flag, the prime symbol 
of  its nationhood, is the Danish flag with a blue cross superimposed on the white 
Danish one). The Swiss state, famously, has no difficulty with three different official 
languages. It is no accident that in recent decades when a territory undergoes a 
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national-political change of  regime, the place names of  the region or country are 
changed in accordance. The phenomenon has been at its most marked in central 
and eastern Europe, when with the Nazi conquest Slavonic place names were 
Germanified, and following 1945 changed back again, or in the territories taken 
from Germany into Poland changed from their original German. Thus Terezin 
became Theresienstadt, and back again; Breslau turns into Wrocl⁄ aw.
Visual Signs and Symbols
Palaeolithic communities certainly used symbolic representations, whose function 
we can only guess at, as is attested by the famous rock and cave paintings throughout 
the world. To an even greater extent from the Neolithic era onwards symbolic rep-
resentations become pervasive in all societies and exist in a great range of  media 
from painting to architecture. Their other common aspect is that to a great extent 
– though not in every respect – they are associated with social division. It is this 
aspect that forms the focus of  my discussion here. Their frustrating aspect for 
historians is that in the earlier millennia of  the Neolithic, prior to 4000–3000 BCE 
for Eurasia, there is no written script to assist the interpretation of  the symbolic 
objects and structures. However there can be little doubt that many of  them, 
from the megaliths of  western Europe to the Neolithic ‘temple’ of  Orkney were 
connected with the ‘unseen powers’ of  superstition and religion which are the 
subjects of  the previous chapters.
Garments, Headgear and Power
A form of  symbolic representation of  a very everyday sort which has been 
intrinsic to the human story is the differentiation of  gender by garments. This has 
been a feature of  nearly all societies as soon as fabric beyond animal skins became 
available, in other words from the time of  the Neolithic revolutions. Violating the 
associated rules in either direction was often a serious criminal offence (especially 
so if  contradicting male dominance) and invariably, if  not illegal, a social scandal. 
In modern times if  a woman was reputed to rule the household and her husband, 
she was said to be ‘wearing the trousers’. Anna Clark’s volume is entitled The 
Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of  the British Working Class.21 Hairstyles 
too were a very apparent marker of  gender differentiation.
As a rule the garments permitted for women were more restrictive than those 
allowed to men, and the same was true of  hairstyles. Modern industrial societies 
from the second third of  the twentieth century were the first, at least since the 
Palaeolithic, to adopt relatively gender-neutral clothing (and to a lesser extent 
hairstyles) – though with dress codes this applied only in informal contexts as a 
rule. A closely allied development has taken place in the matter of  what individuals 
of  both genders put on their heads.
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In the symbolic display of  individuals, headdress has been down the centuries a 
key component of  representation, distinguishing both individuals and social classes 
(the cloth cap/bowler hat stereotype is indicative). Once again the industrialised 
cultures of  the late twentieth century and afterwards are also the first in history 
in which it has become normal for individuals of  both genders to go around 
bareheaded22 – though headgear remains standard for the military and police and 
in certain formal contexts. 
Moving up the social scale, with headgear as symbolic of  power; the double 
crowns of  Upper and Lower Egypt worn by the Pharaohs are well known, as is 
the triple crown, the tiara which represents the office and authority of  the Pope.23 
In pictorial illustrations from the early empires of  the Middle East, kings are 
identified by their headdress – as they have continued to be down to the present, 
though in the case of  the Byzantine emperor it was his footgear more than his 
headgear which signified his imperial dignity. However, in western European 
monarchies, where the crown was the distinctive mark of  royalty from medieval 
times onwards,24 there exist distinctions between different sorts of  crowns.
The primary difference was between the ‘closed’ crown, the sort with arches 
over the wearer’s head and a fabric cap beneath them and the ‘open’ crown, which 
is shown on illustrations of  English and other kings of  the medieval centuries. The 
difference was that the open crown was the one specific to mere kings or queens 
and the closed crown was reserved for emperors, beginning with Charlemagne – 
monarchs who stood above other kings and had no earthly superior. The Holy 
Roman Emperor was recognised as having precedence, if  no actual power, over 
the other monarchs of  Western Christendom. It was when the English monarchs, 
beginning with Henry VIII, insisted on their independence of  any superior that 
they took to using a closed crown. When Henry declared in the 1530s that ‘England 
is an Empire’ he meant not that it possessed colonies, but that it was independent 
of  the Pope or any other monarch.
A lesser, but nevertheless distinguishing manner of  formal headgear was applied 
to other aristocrats in England and France, these being known as coronets (little 
crowns, though other countries did not have that distinguishing terminology). 
These varied in elaboration depending on the feudal rank, from plain barons at 
the bottom up to dukes and princes at the top. These types of  headdress were 
only worn on very special state occasions such as a coronation, a parallel to the 
cardinal’s hat or the papal tiara.
The symbolisation of  the exclusive headdress is also used in what was to become 
another distinguishing symbolic mark of  social ascendancy in Europe and the 
monarchical European colonial empires, namely the coat of  arms (there is also a 
Japanese equivalent), which normally included a representation of  the appropriate 
crown or coronet. Coats of  arms evolved from the devices used on the shields 
of  early medieval knights and went on to become the – literally ostentatious – 
exclusive possessions of  elite individuals and families. It was the particular heraldic 
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coat of  arms that was the exclusive property, the privilege of  having one was 
extended also to towns (provided they had a royal charter) as well as universities 
and other elite educational establishments. Symbolic power was everywhere.
The coat of  arms, which appears to have been adopted in some manner or 
another well beyond its societies of  origin (even the USSR had an emblem very 
like one) can be viewed as the ancestor of  the present-day corporate logo. Many 
institutions, especially educational ones, use both, with the former for their 
more formal documents.25 Heraldic devices employed colours (the use of  which 
in European heraldry was confined by a specific code), objects (usually military 
ones), plants (the oak tree was a favourite) and animals. 
The animals tended to be predatory ones (though horses and mythological 
unicorns were an exception) with eagles and lions, and their mythological 
equivalents such as dragons and gryphons, seen as noble beasts, being specially 
favoured – hyenas were never used, though they would have been equally or more 
appropriate. Symbolism here above all reflected hierarchy, and this tended to be a 
constant across cultures – dragons were a Chinese imperial symbol and the Aztec 
warriors included ‘eagle knights’ and ‘jaguar knights’. 
Symbols of  status through apparel exist also in hunter-gatherer societies. 
They frequently use feathers as marks of  distinction, such as in Native American 
headdresses and also, in other cultures, on the bonnets of  Scottish highland 
clansmen. It can be reasonably assumed that something similar applied in 
Palaeolithic societies, but visual markers of  social inequality in regard to entire 
classes and strata are apparent in the earliest literate societies and have been eroded 
only in recent centuries. Widely but by no means universally disappeared in the 
present, in military hierarchies they remain in full flower even if  not with quite the 
degree of  ebullience which used to characterise them.
The Roman republic was notable for its sumptuary laws, which prohibited 
forms of  dress and food. These were supposed to prevent excessive luxury but 
served to distinguish between social classes. During the imperial centuries only 
the emperor was permitted to have a cloak dyed in the extremely expensive Tyrian 
purple dye. The rank of  the knights or equestrians entitled them to a narrow 
purple stripe on their togas, the senators to a broad one.
Social stratification marked by aspects of  dress operated to facilitate social 
control. In the European medieval centuries identifying symbols for religious 
minorities were enforced both in the Christian and the Muslim cultures, which 
made them easier both to tax and to persecute depending on the state of  toleration 
at the time – and remain an issue in the present century, though now it relates more 
to the prohibition of  certain forms rather than to their enforcement. Socially dif-
ferentiating marks were stipulated in both the Chinese and Japanese empires, with 
the latter being the most comprehensive and tightly regulated of  any. In England 
what one might wear (including the shape of  headgear) or display, depending on 
social level, remained subject to legislation until after the English revolution. As 
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one author phrased it (I am quoting from memory), an individual in Jacobean 
England would no more think of  wearing clothes reserved for persons of  higher 
rank than a contemporary officer would contemplate adding an extra pip to his or 
her epaulettes.
Standards and Banners
Symbols of  collective identity signifying states or military formations date back 
to the ancient empires. The battle standard was particularly necessary in ancient 
warfare, identifying the location of  the headquarters and the spot which in 
emergency had to be rallied around for the last stand. Best known of  these was the 
eagle standard of  the Roman legions, which was regarded not merely as a symbol 
but as a sacred emblem, whose loss was a cause of  exceptional public distress, as 
when the Germans in the Teutoburg forest wiped out three Roman legions and 
captured their standards. The cohorts, individual units of  the legion, also had their 
own standards, though less sacred than the eagle. Throughout pre-modern warfare 
the capture of  the enemy’s standard usually signified victory, and this was still the 
case in naval warfare as late as the eighteenth century, when the lowering of  the 
ship’s flag indicated surrender.
Battle standards in the form of  cloth flags were universal in medieval Europe (the 
Byzantines used a form of  kite, as did the Chinese) and these were the ancestors 
of  the modern national flag. This has become the key signifier of  national identity, 
in the USA practically worshipped. It is supposed to subsume social (and in many 
cases minority national) identities into one constructed around the state that the 
flag symbolises. The flag condenses into one concentrated image the history, the 
society and the culture of  the unit which it represents. Flags are important also to 
many political movements, and on occasion when these are successful in capturing 
state power become the national flag; examples include the Irish tricolour and the 
Nazi flag. The red flag as the symbol of  socialist and communist movements is 
equally famous; trade union banners, though less central to their organisations’ 
identities are also significant.
‘All in his uniform . . . ’
Although the roughly standardised armour of  the Roman legions gave their soldiers 
a somewhat similar appearance, as did the earlier units of  the Chinese emperor, 
represented in the terracotta army; and while retainers of  medieval leaders would 
display their lord’s livery and the Christian clergy had always favoured a uniform 
of  sorts, the military uniform in its modern sense was a seventeenth-century 
innovation. Military uniform’s functional use, namely to distinguish in combat one 
side from the other and to demonstrate that its wearer was a legitimate combatant 
(not a franc tireur or a spy) and in its later manifestations also to act as camouflage 
– were all, if  anything, subordinate to its major purpose. The central purpose 
was to promote a sense of  collective identity among the wearers, in military 
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terms to strengthen morale. It extended in European armies even to the minor 
distinguishing marks on the uniforms of  different units within the overall army – 
the regiment, with its specific regimental history and battle honours was a key focus 
of  identification and promoted as such. For the individual soldier or equivalent in 
other services, the award of  medals and decorations signified particular merit. In 
the British military medals were awarded to all personnel who had taken part in 
particular campaigns; decorations were more individual and awarded for especially 
outstanding performance. Even so there were distinctions based on hierarchy. The 
decorations awarded to officers were superior to those given to their inferiors, with 
the exception of  the highest honour, the Victoria Cross, open equally to all ranks.
The uniform also served as a marker of  caste and encouraged its wearers to feel 
superior to mere civilians – at least once common soldiers ceased to be regarded as 
the scum of  the earth. For the officer corps, a caste within a caste, such assumed 
superiority was always the case, and particularly within militaristic societies like 
imperial Germany, uniforms, especially the officers’, were deliberately intended 
to intimidate civilians. The mitre-like hats worn by eighteenth-century grenadier 
regiments were designed to make the wearers look taller than anybody else, and in 
Prussia their kings took this a stage further by having these hats worn by units of  
particularly tall soldiers. In imperial Germany it was a serious offence on the part 
of  an officer to fail to thrash a civilian who had insulted his uniform.
The symbolic impact of  uniforms was enormous, and the nineteenth century 
saw them being adopted in all manner of  contexts. Police forces were provided 
with uniforms (and in England, after top hats were abandoned, the tall helmet 
modelled on the solar topee favoured by European military and administrators 
in the tropics). Railway companies put their staff  in uniform, as did airlines once 
passenger flying came on stream, while local authorities instituted uniforms in 
the municipal transport services. Nursing staff  were uniformed and likewise 
children in elite and even not-so-elite schools. The twentieth century saw the novel 
phenomenon of  paramilitary and political uniforms with the same purpose as 
military ones  – solidarity among the wearers and intimidation of  outsiders and 
opponents; and it was possible to devise one out of  items of  ordinary clothing, as 
did the latter-day IRA. The pioneers in this respect were Mussolini’s Blackshirts, 
whose style was deliberately modelled upon that of  an elite military unit, the 
Arditi. Simone de Beauvoir remarks in her memoirs that her and Sartre’s friend 
Jean Genet, though he had absolutely no sympathy with Nazism, compared 
unfavourably the outfits of  the liberating US forces, ‘uniformed civilians’, with 
those of  the Germans – ‘at least the occupiers had style’.
The self-conscious identification of  the wearer with his or her (though almost 
invariably his) uniform is a theme explored from time to time in twentieth-century 
fiction. Certainly it is a key component of  bad faith, generating the conviction that 
the uniform confers intrinsic privileges, the wearer is absorbed into the meaning of  
the uniform and enjoys in some metaphysical fashion a dispensation from the rules 
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that govern civil society. Einstein once remarked that the members of  marching 
cohorts absorbed in the metaphysic of  their uniforms had no need of  a brain 
– a rudimentary brain stem would prove perfectly adequate. The phenomenon 
of  police forces, given a sense of  collectivity by their uniforms, running amok 
on the streets when confronted by demonstrations is a routine news item. If  the 
SS killers had had to carry out their atrocities while wearing civilian clothes they 
would almost certainly have found their ‘task’ more difficult.
Uniforms could also be used as sources of  disparagement and denigration, 
as with the uniforms worn by prisoners in many incarceration regimes. Again 
the ostensible purpose, easy identification, is subordinate to the main one of  
institutional humiliation. As military personnel are supposed to take pride in 
their uniforms, and feel elevated above the common throng, so are the prisoners 
through their uniform intended to internalise their degradation, worthlessness and 
exclusion from society – all of  which is supposed to promote a reformed lifestyle.
These considerations however only scratch the surface of  the issue of  social 
identity and its symbols, matters which have an enormously powerful hold on 
individual and collective imaginations. ‘Workers of  the World Unite!’, though one 
of  the most famous of  nineteenth-century slogans, has also proved to be one 
of  the most futile. The attempt by movements and parties to create a politically 
resonant social identity based on the rational concept of  economic class has 
always crumbled in the face of  appeals to one based upon symbolically-charged 
‘imagined communities’. 
Visual iconography follows the same principles and has done so since the days 
of  the pharaohs, when the monuments of  a particular ruler were defaced after 
his (in one case her) death if  his memory was unpopular with his successor; his 
cartouche chipped off  written monumental texts and his face erased from his 
monuments. Similarly with the statues of  detested Roman emperors – and the 
attitude continues into our own days. Among the first actions of  the victors after 
the fall of  communist regimes was to demolish the statues of  its iconic figures, and 
in addition Saint Petersburg, briefly having become Petrograd when Germany was 
an enemy power in 1914, changed to Leningrad under the Soviet regime and after 
1991 resumed its original name. 
The auditory and visual markers and symbolism discussed in this chapter – 
language (in some cases even accent), ritual, dress codes, deportment, bodily 
decoration, objects of  display all serve to produce a sentiment of  social identity 
and common purpose between some individuals  – and to exclude others. At the 
same time they have historically reinforced social differentiation and hierarchical 
relations and so strengthened structures of  inequality.
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A Broad View – The Rhythm 
of  Empire
May you live in interesting times.
—Supposed Chinese curse (possibly invented by Ernest Bramah Smith)
Around the middle of  the second millennium CE the world’s population was 
about to undergo the second of  the great transformations previously referred to. 
This second transformation, to industrial society in the framework of  new forms 
of  empire, was to prove enormously faster and deeper and a great deal more 
consequential in every dimension of  living and dying.
This chapter extends discussion of  some of  the issues introduced in the previous 
one in relation to empires, and aims to specifically examine the line of  processes 
which laid the historical foundation for what was to emerge subsequently as the 
hegemony of  European states over the remainder of  the globe. On the face of  
it, this was a most unlikely outcome. The continent’s land area, including Russia 
west of  the Urals is less than a quarter of  that of  Asia and not much greater than 
Australia, if  indeed Europe can be considered to be a continent at all. Its population 
again has been much smaller than the Asian one throughout historic times.
A pattern of  development in Eurasian/North African history is observable 
from the time of  the Pharaohs and Sargon of  Akkad onwards; one repeatedly 
seen throughout Eurasia and North Africa from China westwards. A series of  
loosely articulated empires was the default political system embracing most of  the 
agriculturally settled populations of  this area; and they succeeded each other across 
the centuries. They were based upon tribute extracted in labour, goods or, latterly, 
money from the agrarian producers subjected to a hierarchy of  lords topped out by 
divine or semi-divine monarchies. These monarchies were threatened from time to 
time by nomadic pastoralists beyond their frontiers as well as by popular resistance 
and inter-elite hostilities. Although the Amerindian example demonstrated that 
cultures of  that kind could be based upon a Neolithic technology, metalworking 
was central to the evolution of  Eurasian and African societies. 
Axial Age?
Developments in the course of  the first millennium BCE caused the German 
philosopher Karl Jaspers to postulate an ‘Axial Age’ of  roughly 800 to 200 BCE. 
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The ‘Axial Age’ was essentially a religious conception, Jaspers noting that great 
religious and philosophical systems with their real or assumed founders, evolved 
during these centuries in China, India, Iran and Greece. Though probably 
exaggerated, there may be some basis for this in the cultural forms generated 
through the impact of  the social crisis brought on by the iron-using assailants of  
the Bronze Age empires. Literate thinkers, naturally themselves members of  the 
elites, were seeking explanations of  humans’ place in the natural order and for the 
catastrophes being permitted by the gods.
Around or a little later than the turn of  millennia from BCE to CE a series 
of  new empires were consolidated across the area; the Roman, the Persian, the 
Gupta in the subcontinent and the Han in China, the latter two being regarded 
as then enjoying the respective ‘golden ages’ of  their imperial eras, while Gupta 
scholars invented the concept of  zero in mathematics and postulated a heliocentric 
explanation of  the sun–earth relationship. Like their predecessors, these were 
hierarchical, iron-using, agrarian, literate empires based upon a tribute-paying 
peasant underclass. A few centuries later all of  them were in deep trouble from 
internal upheaval and external assault and suffering profound damage or extinction. 
Others of  a similar sort were to succeed them, but their collapse is generally taken 
to mark the boundary between antiquity and the lead-in to our contemporary 
world. The circumstances are outlined below.
The Mediterranean 
In reaction against the previous Eurocentric overemphasis on the historical 
importance of  the Mediterranean, particularly its two largest peninsulas, the 
significance of  this inland sea (with its eastern extension the Black Sea) has recently 
been somewhat underplayed. Its historic importance was nevertheless very great. 
This particular marine combination is a unique geographical feature on the 
planet – there is nothing quite like it anywhere else. Just short of  three million 
square kilometres in extent, it could almost be regarded as an enormous saltwater 
lake, approximately eleven times the combined area of  the American Great Lakes, 
more than twice that of  western Europe, and containing both large peninsulas and 
innumerable islands, some of  them significantly large. Moreover, it is bordered 
by an astonishingly diverse range of  geographical features; mountains, deserts, 
steppes and rich agricultural terrain in which a very diverse pattern of  different 
socio-economic structures and political regimes could evolve. In preindustrial 
times the sea acted as the principal transport artery between them for both trade 
and aggression, with uncounted ancient shipwrecks on its seabed. 
It therefore bordered the Fertile Crescent and the great empires of  the Middle 
East, and was of  critical importance to the three great monotheist religions. Along 
its shores the great variety of  social units which appeared before and during 
the first three millennia BCE intermingled, spoke to each other and mixed their 
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languages, traded with each other (including slaves), exploited each other’s sex 
workers, learned of  each other’s cultures, influenced each other and fought each 
other. Among those best known to history were the Egyptians, the Assyrian 
vassals on the Levant, the Hittites in what is now Asia Minor, the Persian vassal 
satrapies, the Minoans, the Greeks with their multitude of  outpost colonies around 
the Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Phoenicians and their colony Carthage, 
the Etruscans and the Romans. Out of  this intermingling emerged the phonetic 
alphabet, invented by the Phoenicians and adopted by the Greeks (possibly via 
Crete) and thereafter spread around the great sea. 
Something else that emerged was the reality that one of  these entities, the 
oligarchical Roman republic, was by the end of  the (supposed) axial age on the 
verge of  rising to dominate the states and peoples around the sea, not to mention 
ones well inland from it. By the second century CE its rulers were masters of  
the Mediterranean. Of  its imperial rivals only the Parthian empire (formerly 
Macedonian, formerly Persian) still counted.1 
In terms of  military power, by the installation of  the Principate under Augustus 
it would probably have outclassed even the Chinese empire of  that time, then in a 
state of  turmoil; and certainly outranked the warring kingdoms of  the subcontinent 
following Asoka’s death and the fall of  the Mauryan empire. It took its naval 
architecture from the Carthaginians, its urban architecture from the Etruscans, 
its literary culture from the Greeks and eventually in 312 CE its religion from a 
former Jewish sect. Its cultural influence was enormous on the successor states 
which took over its western portion and were much later to go on to dominate the 
globe for a time (and to an extent still do in the shape of  the USA). The very words 
‘empire’, ‘kaiser’ and ‘tsar’ are Roman-derived.
Sub-Saharan Africa
It is not only during the past five centuries, but long before, that the African 
continent has been of  major importance in Eurasian affairs. Evidently this was 
the case with the Mediterranean shore of  the continent (which in historical terms 
if  not geographical ones, can be regarded as an extension of  Eurasia). It applied 
no less to much more southerly parts of  the continent in the course of  recorded 
history. Iron smelting may have developed independently in Africa (as may 
also have been the case in China) but given the degree of  communication links 
between Asia, Europe and Africa, the possibility of  diffusion cannot be ruled out 
whichever sub-Saharan area first adopted the technique. 
The overall pattern in different parts of  the continent was not very dissimilar to 
what prevailed elsewhere; the establishment of  more or less widespread empires 
over agrarian or herding populations, empires which in due course fragmented 
on account of  economic shifts, climate alterations, and internal strains among 
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their elites (which we may guess were accompanied with popular discontent) to be 
replaced by successors of  a similar stamp.
The area between the Nile and the Red Sea was of  particular importance due 
to the marine communication which resulted and the proximity of  the Arabian 
peninsula. The kingdom of  Kush, with its capital at Meroe, north of  modern 
Khartoum, supported a highly developed culture derived from Egypt and actually 
conquered Egypt in the early first millennium BCE establishing a dynasty of  
Pharaohs. Its successor, Aksum, was of  special importance as a trading hub 
between the Roman empire and India, and sustained commercial links with China 
as well. In this region, following the Arab seventh century conquest of  North 
Africa, Muslim and Christian rulers contested for control and for their religion. 
The Christian ones eventually established themselves in the Ethiopian highlands 
and the Islamic ones everywhere else in the region, as well as further south along 
the coast to the island of  Zanzibar and the coastline opposite it.
The western part of  the continent was scarcely less important in the first 
millennium CE, and embraced both the savannah Sahel region south of  the Sahara 
desert and the rain forest north of  the Gulf  of  Guinea. The vigorous trans-Saharan 
trade, first with the Carthaginian and Roman polities and subsequently the Arab 
empire, was its kingdoms’ principal form of  exchange, the key commodities 
being gold and slaves, with salt as the most important one coming in the opposite 
direction. The first of  these kingdoms was Ghana (in a very different location 
from the present state of  that name) and one monarch of  its successor state, Mali 
(again not coterminous with the current state of  that name) by that time converted 
to Islam, is said to have astounded the Egyptians with his wealth and train of  
servants when undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca. Here too Islam was to make 
a big impact, converting the rulers of  the Sahel and their subjects, but it did not 
penetrate to the coastal rain forest area, where again independent kingdoms and 
empires established themselves, such as Dahomey and Ashanti.
What has been described as one of  the great migrations in history, occurring in 
the first millennium BCE and beginning of  the Common Era, was the expansion 
of  the agriculturalist speakers of  the Bantu languages over the southern continent 
from their original location in modern Cameroon and western Nigeria. It is 
analogous to the earlier spreading out of  the Indo-European speakers west and 
south from the Iranian plateau and therefore not a coherent exodus but one 
proceeding over several centuries and in different southward directions, one in the 
east and one in the west of  the continent south of  the western bulge. The forager 
and pastoralist indigenous societies, now referred to as the Khoisan, who may 
have retained the physical appearance of  the first H. sapiens, were driven ahead of  
these invaders until what remained of  them fetched up in the marginal lands and 
deserts at the southern end of  the continent.
The more economically and technologically accomplished Bantu speakers (if  
they did not have iron artefacts at the beginning of  the migration they adopted 
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the technique of  its production during its course) like their counterparts in West 
Africa established agrarian tributary kingdoms and empires wherever they settled, 
also engaging in trading relations whenever possible and in which once again gold 
played a prominent role. The course of  their development repeated the cycle 
of  breakdown and replacement seen in all similar state structures. The ruins of  
Great Zimbabwe attest to the power and achievement of  the most successful (the 
final example of  which was the Zulu empire of  the nineteenth century located in 
modern Natal).
If  Africa was important to the transcontinental society of  the pre-modern 
world outside the Americas, it was to become many times more so when its 
inhabitants and their descendants played a critical role from the middle of  the 
second millennium in bringing the great economic and social transformation into 
being. They did so as the personnel of  the most basic and brutal of  all forms of  
coercive cooperation, otherwise known as slavery.
From Antiquity to European Feudalism
The great migrations a couple of  centuries after the beginning of  the first 
millennium CE which, if  they did not bring it about, certainly contributed to the 
decline of  the Roman empire, were a Eurasian-wide phenomenon. The rather 
mysterious East Asian nomadic herders known to history as the Huns, depended 
on the horse for their livelihood, for transport, meat, milk and all manner of  
essentials – an Iron Age people with a quasi-Palaeolithic lifestyle using the horse 
as their stone age ancestors had used their prey (which also included horses) while 
at the same time employing it in what was, for the times, almost literally, the cutting 
edge of  contemporary technology. Along with the adoption of  the stirrup (and 
possibly the nailed horseshoe as well) the favourite Hunnic weapon was the cavalry 
bow, which they also improved.
With this novel technology and the leadership of  a capable commander who 
could unite the related clans into a formidable striking force, the opportunities for 
invading and plundering both the settled agrarian and citified communities to the 
south and west were immense and were speedily grasped; but the Huns proved to 
be more than plundering raiders. In the fifth century CE they briefly established 
a huge empire stretching from central Europe to western Asia and attacked Italy, 
Gaul and the Balkans. 
The Huns’ importance however was less in their own exploits than in their 
knock-on effects. Their own linguistic group was no more than the core of  their 
empire and was greatly outnumbered by the Germanic-speaking tribes or peoples 
whom they conquered and incorporated, and who successfully rebelled on the 
death of  the Huns’ great leader, Attila. Rather, their significance was in stimulating 
the armed migration of  the Germanic peoples fleeing before the onset of  the 
Hunnic attack who spilled into the Roman empire east and west either by force or 
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reluctant agreement from the Roman authorities, and eventually established their 
own hegemony on the territory of  the western empire – they were the remote 
origin of  some existing west European states. 
Interesting Times
The human world would probably look very different today if  the empires of  
the early first millennium had persisted into the second, but they did not. They 
all disintegrated or were overthrown in one way or another – and replaced by 
successors of  a similar character. A good deal of  that was due to short-lived central 
Asian empires established by the pastoral nomad confederations, especially the 
Mongols led by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. Some of  the successor 
empires, such as that of  Timur, whose capital was at Bukhara in south-central 
Asia – but nevertheless aspired to add China to his many conquests – were also 
disturbers of  the Eurasian peace.
The Roman empire was severely weakened by Attila’s incursions and exaction of  
tribute, and its western portion disintegrated as a coherent polity. Control over its 
peasantry was seized by tribal aristocracies (who also settled their own rank-and-file 
followers on confiscated landholdings) The invaders were Germanic-speaking 
peoples who either entered as Attila’s confederates, were fleeing in advance of  
his forces or simply took advantage of  the resulting chaos.2 The surviving eastern 
portion, commonly styled the Byzantine empire, revived for a time and subjugated 
its Persian rival before losing the major part of  its territory, including the most 
valuable, to the Arab Islamic empire, known as the Caliphate, with capitals first at 
Damascus and subsequently Baghdad. 
This empire was itself  the major player on the Eurasian/North African 
scene of  the later part of  the first millennium CE, before splitting into several 
mini-empires, including in Egypt and Spain, and finally falling victim first to the 
Mongol power and its successors and subsequently to the Turks, firstly the Seljuks 
and eventually the Ottomans, who also disposed in 1453 of  the remnants of  the 
Byzantine empire. Penetrating deep into eastern Europe they remained for over 
three centuries the major world power west of  China.
A recurrent pattern, though of  course with many specific regional variations, 
emerges in the life cycle of  the Eurasian iron-using empires over two and a half  
millennia. Such an empire would be established, focused upon the personality 
usually of  a petty prince (who would give his name to the dynasties) who had 
emerged as its ruler. He would be acknowledged as such by many others of  the 
same category, while his empire incorporated numerous different linguistic groups 
and local cultures. 
The lack of  a centralised administrative system and power structure (particularly 
marked in the nomads’ empires), often further complicated by succession disputes 
between the heirs of  the founder, would then result in political disintegration and 
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regional secession until the next empire-builder came along. Some qualification of  
this picture however applies to China. Here the successful usurpers were either 
themselves native Chinese, or if  conquerors like the Mongol and Manchu, very 
quickly adapted themselves to Chinese norms, so that it was the dynasty which 
changed but with continuity of  the culture. Further west Islam provided something 
of  the same service, as there the successors of  Genghis quickly converted to Islam.
Popular Insurrection
Two other aspects of  this cycle should not be overlooked, namely popular 
resistance and revolt and outbreaks of  plague or other pandemic diseases (which 
were sometimes connected), the most notorious being the bubonic plague or Black 
Death. This persisted in western Asia and Europe during the first and second 
millennia CE, with a particularly devastating outbreak in the 1340s, which killed 
a very high proportion of  the European population and had major repercussions 
upon social structures. Although the responsible bacterium Yersinia pestis appears 
to have originated in the Mongolian region, China and India seem to have escaped 
this outbreak.3 The Black Death further west strengthened the bargaining position 
of  the surviving peasants on account of  labour shortage, but also the ferocious 
determination of  their masters to continue the pre-existing power relations. 
During the first seventeen centuries of  the Common Era throughout Eurasia 
there occurred literally dozens of  regime-threatening rural and urban uprisings, 
with localised ones too numerous to count. The Bagaudae of  Gaul and Spain in 
the late Roman empire took decades to suppress. The An Lushan Rebellion in 
eighth-century China with millions of  casualties, though instigated by an ambitious 
general of  the Tang dynasty, was fuelled by rural and urban discontent. 
These popular revolts very seldom achieved a successful outcome, and on the 
rare occasions in which they did, it was always ambiguous and never long-lasting. 
They rarely aimed in practice to overturn social structures based upon authoritarian 
relations of  ruling and subordinate classes but only to secure better treatment 
from more congenial governors. At times however, apocalyptic expectations 
were in the air, such as Zoroaster’s ‘making wonderful’, or the Jewish apocalypses 
where through divine agency the social structure would be upturned, ‘the poor 
filled with good things and the rich sent empty away’ – but the constituted 
authority and the classes on whose behalf  it ruled, unless themselves in a state 
of  disintegration, normally had much greater resources and far superior military 
power to crush resistance. 
To this was added in many cases bitter quarrels among the participants in the 
revolt or among their leaders. In the great Jewish revolt for example, the insur-
rectionists were split into three factions fighting each other as energetically as they 
fought the Romans. The best that could be hoped for was that the insurrection’s 
leaders would stick together, succeed in taking over the governing power and follow 
that by instituting a less brutal regime, as in the early Han or Gupta empires, but 
one still based on social relations not essentially different from the preceding ones.
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Resistance to oppressive class relations however could never be annihilated. 
No matter how often it was suppressed during these centuries it would sooner or 
later regenerate and on the eve of  ‘modern times’ became particularly formidable, 
with revolutionary regimes in power, if  temporarily, monarchs publicly executed 
and the Russian empire swept by peasant revolt across its breadth on two separate 
occasions. Such contestation would emerge even more emphatically in the 
following centuries.
The Significance of Europe
The great Belgian historian Henri Pirenne argued in Mohammed and Charlemagne, 
published posthumously in 1937, that the seventh-century Arab conquest of  
the south Mediterranean coastline plus the Iberian peninsula, was of  critical 
importance. He proposed that turning that sea more into a barrier rather than a 
highway (except in the Aegean and Adriatic where the Byzantine navy retained a 
presence) profoundly affected the subsequent development of  Europe in several 
dimensions.4 Though his thesis has not found universal academic acceptance, 
nevertheless the main lines if  not the details would appear to have relevance. The 
sudden change from a common culture on both sides of  the Great Sea to two 
antagonistic and incompatible ones professing hostile monotheistic religions, 
could not have failed to have a major impact. It may well have influenced, if  not 
caused, the peculiar social evolution of  post-Classical Europe compared with Asia 
and North Africa.
That peculiarity lay in the character of  Europe’s socio-political structure during 
those centuries. Elsewhere large territorial empires remained the norm. Where 
one disappeared another soon took its place. (An argument could be made that 
the Ottoman empire was the legitimate successor to the Roman on the grounds 
that while Constantine changed it from pagan to Christian, Sultan Mehmed merely 
changed it from Christian to Muslim.) Whether the earlier Arab Muslim power 
in eighth-century Spain seriously attempted to conquer Gaul as well is uncertain. 
Europe west of  Kievan Rus was not incorporated in a widespread territorial 
empire but instead fractured into a number of  different sovereign principalities 
and independent municipalities. This fracturing of  Europe was far from being 
a deliberate piece of  political engineering – on the contrary. The Roman empire 
embracing east and west remained an unforgotten ideal among both the lay and 
clerical aristocracies, and serious attempts were made to revive it. According to 
Michael Mann,
[T]he barbarian probably converted to Christianity as a symbol of  civilisation in 
general. . . after the final end of  the western empire in 476 Christianity was the 
monopoly supplier of  that civilisation’s legacy especially of  literacy.5 
‘. . . what replaced central “Romanness” was not barbarism but forms of  ‘local 
Romanness’.6 
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The sixth-century Byzantine emperor Justinian’s generals successfully 
reconquered the Germanic Vandal kingdom in North Africa and the isles of  the 
western Mediterranean, then proceeded to try to do the same to the Ostrogoth 
kingdom in Italy, but although that kingdom was destroyed along with much 
infrastructure and population and the Byzantines recaptured Sicily and much of  
the peninsula, nevertheless their resources were inadequate to hold all of  it against 
invasion by the Germanic Lombards.7 
The next attempt at revival was made by Pope Leo III, who had fallen out with 
the Byzantine monarchy and renounced previous popes’ allegiance to the emperor. 
In the year 800 he crowned Charlemagne as Roman emperor in rivalry to the 
actual occupant in Constantinople, the Frankish king’s military reputation making 
him appear a suitable candidate to re-establish a unified empire and possibly 
even reconquer Muslim Spain and North Africa – but though Charlemagne had 
certainly established an empire spanning most of  west and central Europe east and 
north of  the Pyrenees, any such idea was purely fantasy. 
Mini-Empires
Charlemagne’s own empire, impressive in extent as it was, disintegrated almost 
immediately on its founder’s death in 814. One further serious attempt to establish 
a central European empire, formally the continuation of  Charlemagne’s, was 
made by the Ottonian dynasty of  Saxon dukes (Saxony having been absorbed into 
Charlemagne’s empire). Its leading representative Otto I had the then pope crown 
him in 962, this time as Holy Roman Emperor in addition to king of  Germany 
and Italy. In little more than a century the title had become a nullity8 with nothing 
beyond prestige value, the territory having fallen apart into the domains of  various 
feudatories and commercially orientated cities. Efforts to make it into a reality 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II 
came to nothing. Eventually the title was incorporated into the pretensions of  
the Habsburg dukes, allowing them to call themselves emperors in addition to 
whichever lesser titles they possessed in their south-central European domains. 
Napoleon abolished it.
The later medieval European assortment of  states (including city states) of  
different rankings, populated by speakers of  different languages and practitioners 
of  different cultures and economic systems, was unified in no territorial empire 
but was nonetheless as ferociously aggressive as any. Its rulers fought each other 
with unrestrained savagery, massacring each other’s populations of  servile agricul-
turalists and wrecking each other’s infrastructure in order to satisfy their egotistical 
cravings. 
A number of  mini-empires were thereby established: by the Anglo-Norman 
kings of  England in France and Ireland (both vigorously contested) but not in 
Scotland; by the Castilian ones in Spain, by the Habsburgs, already mentioned, 
by the rival Danish and Swedish monarchs very shakily in Scandinavia; by the 
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Serbian and Bulgarian monarchs in the Balkans, and by the Polish and Lithuanian 
ones in eastern Europe. Two commercial empires were added to this mix – in the 
Mediterranean by the rival maritime city states of  Venice and Genoa; in the Baltic 
and northern waters by the confederation of  port cities, the Hanseatic League, 
controlled by their German-speaking merchant guilds. Similar autonomous 
mercantile cities were established along the river valleys (principally the Rhine) of  
the Mediterranean-Baltic trade route.
Nor was this all. The ferocious expansionism displayed by Christendom’s elites 
was not confined to each other’s territories but extended to populations and 
polities unwilling to have the blessings of  Christianity enforced upon them. The 
most notorious series of  crusades were directed against the Seljuk Turkish and the 
Egyptian Mamluk empires from the late eleventh to the late thirteenth centuries. 
The series was begun by Pope Urban II, bothered about the constant internal wars 
being conducted by the Christian aristocracies and princes. He was embarrassed 
by his own quarrel with some of  them, and hoped to gain unlimited prestige 
by bringing about the recapture of  Jerusalem, thus underlining reputational 
superiority over the Patriarch of  Constantinople – the Great Schism with the 
Eastern church having occurred a few decades previously.
Accordingly participants in this enterprise were promised remission of  sins 
and no doubt that was a real motivation for their response – they had a genuine 
belief  in the afterlife and plenty to need remission for – but an equal or stronger 
one was the prospect of  seizing land and property from the infidel, as well as 
practising the crusaders military and massacring skills. Jerusalem was indeed taken 
with fearsome slaughter of  Muslim and Jewish non-combatants and any Christians 
who happened to get in the way. Crusader states were set up in the Levant, the last 
being retaken two centuries later. At the other end of  the Mediterranean attacks 
against the Muslim rulers of  Spain were virtually continuous until the latter were 
finally overwhelmed in 1492.
Another theatre of  aggression was along the southern Baltic coastline, where 
various holy orders of  knights, most prominently the Teutonic Order, were 
in action. The inoffensive Slavonic Prussians9 were the first victims, but the 
Lithuanian monarchy, the last pagan state in Europe, proved a more formidable 
opponent and survived until its monarch made an opportunist conversion, which 
enabled the Lithuanian nobility to establish their own mini-empire. 
The aggressively violent traditions established in Europe during this period 
certainly helped to provide ideological fuel for the establishment of  the overseas 
empires achieved by several European states in the modern centuries. The conquest 
by Spaniards of  large portions of  the Americas was viewed as a continuation of  
the Reconquista; a minor part of  Mussolini’s excuse for invading Abyssinia was to 
impose the Catholic faith upon the Copts. Very explicitly the German state in 
the first part of  the twentieth century aimed at an eastern hegemony and to turn 
Ukraine and Belorussia into vassal states and a little later, famously in Mein Kampf, 
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Hitler was even more explicit: ‘And so we National Socialists . . . take up where we 
broke off  six hundred years ago . . . and turn our gaze towards the land in the east 
. . . and shift to the soil policy of  the future.’
The Papacy
Although after Charlemagne the bulk of  Europe was never again incorporated 
into a meaningful secular empire, a substitute of  sorts existed in the form of  
the church governed from Rome, which could perhaps be described as a kind 
of  cultural empire and very largely saw itself  as the continuation of  the Roman 
empire. Prior to the eighth century the structure of  government in the western 
church was at a low ebb and the bishop of  Rome, a subject of  the Byzantine 
monarch, lacked any particular authority beyond his own city. It was the Frankish 
rulers of  the eighth century who enabled these popes to advance their pretensions 
and provided them with estates (cultivated by slave and serf  labour) to underpin 
their assets.
The claim to supreme religious authority was made by a number of  very 
dynamic individuals in the subsequent five centuries not least by their insistence 
that they were authorised to consign any individual to hell. By playing off  one 
set of  rulers against another and dispensing spiritual legitimacy upon them, they 
found acceptance for their claims throughout western and central Europe despite 
friction from time to time with particular monarchs. 
The enterprise was backed up by the church’s virtual monopolisation of  literacy. 
Clergymen became indispensable to monarchs for their secretarial functions, and 
also by the development of  canon law, first in the Roman curia, and later extended 
in the universities which began to function from the twelfth century onwards. 
This law related not only to the affairs of  the church itself  but to the personal 
behaviour of  its faithful (which was everyone within its sphere apart from Jews) 
over such matters as fast days, holy days, marital and sexual practices and suchlike, 
reinforced with the practice of  confession. Until the later medieval centuries it was 
the only coherent legal code established in western Europe.
The church was economically very important as well. Its monasteries were often 
agricultural factories in addition to their spiritual purposes. It possessed enormous 
landholdings which it supplemented with the tithe that every family was obliged 
to pay along with payments for services such as weddings, baptisms and funerals. 
Its looting by Henry VIII may have been the beginning of  the revolution in 
landownership which led on to the agrarian capitalism of  England in the following 
century – and so very consequential indeed. 
Michael Mann suggests another very important role, namely that its ideological 
coverage eased the frictions of  social life in the areas over which it exercised 
hegemony and underpinned the efficacy of  contracts and oaths, evidently also of  
great economic importance, and so lubricated the functioning of  merchants and 
markets. If  this should be the case (Perry Anderson disputes it) then the Roman 
Thompson T02687 01 text   174 16/12/2014   13:29
a Broad VIeW  175
Catholic Church and its supreme authority, the Roman pontiff, fulfilled a role 
similar to the imperial regimes of  China and the Indian subcontinent.
Subsequent chapters will discuss the reasons why the fragmented and mutually 
quarrelling European states of  the medieval and early modern world, unified, after 
a fashion, only by a degree of  common culture and commercial intercourse, later 
came to overwhelm and dominate the mighty empires of  Eurasia. Part of  the 
secret of  their predatory ‘success’ may indeed have lain in their very multiplicity 
and fragmentation, as aspect discussed extensively in Perry Anderson’s two 
volumes, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of  the Absolutist State.10
Conclusion
From the time of  the early Pharaohs onwards the world of  agricultural production 
and natural power sources was a world of  empires and would-be empires, 
accompanied by the usual authoritarian brutality and coerced cooperation of  
forced labour. This reality did not prevent great material achievements being 
realised in technique and technology from irrigation to horse collars,11 and highly 
impressive intellectual and cultural ones in artefacts, literature and pictorial and 
sculptural representation.
These developments proceeded at glacial pace against a background of  social 
and gender oppression accompanied by political mayhem, but in the millennium 
following the collapse of  the western Roman empire, in the inconsequen-
tial peninsula of  Europe underneath the horrors of  violence (possibly even 
exaggerated by the absence of  an all-encompassing empire), the basis was forming 
of  an economic and social regime which would transform the planet and with it 
the fabric of  history both in texture and in pattern. Such transformation is the 
subject of  the following chapters. 
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Human Reality in Transformation: 
Modern Population, Migration and 
Labour
This chapter deals with some central aspects of  the second and previously 
emphasised most far-reaching transition in human history, the planetary shift 
from cultures of  a basically agrarian character to ones dominated by mechanisms 
dependent upon artificial power sources, together with all the human consequences 
which ensued. The direction of  events could not be initially recognised and it was 
of  course unplanned. Someone jokingly once remarked that when Henry Tudor 
killed Richard III in 1485 he didn’t then dismount from his horse and say to his 
officers, ‘Right guys, that ties up the Middle Ages, let’s get on with Modern Times!’ 
Nevertheless, within not very many years, his European contemporaries, if  they 
hadn’t noticed much change in their living conditions, were aware that a huge and 
previously unknown landmass could be reached by sailing westwards – and certain 
denizens of  that landmass and its associated islands were being forced to realise 
that hostile strangers bearing the powers of  gods were descending upon them with 
evil intent.1
Modern times were indeed about to begin in those years, and not only for the 
Europeans who gave it that designation, but ultimately for every inhabitant of  the 
globe. World population over the next centuries would grow beyond all imagining, 
despite the unprecedentedly lethal character of  human interactions during those 
centuries, while towards the beginning of  the third millennium urban populations 
would surpass rural ones in numbers. Methods of  gaining livelihood and production 
of  the necessities of  life would change beyond all recognition. So would modes 
of  communication and living standards for a significant proportion of  the globe’s 
inhabitants, especially those with access to unprecedentedly improved medical 
techniques. Migrations would occur rendering all previous instances puny by 
comparison. Age-old political systems would be utterly overturned. Populations 
would be mixed as never before.
No simple analysis can encompass and explain the forces behind this shattering 
of  the social world which had been the norm for 50 centuries. One point worth 
stressing, with reference to this and the following chapter, is that short-term aims 
pursued by individuals and collectives came together to culminate in the world with 
which readers of  this volume are familiar. Some very long-term projects of  social 
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reconstruction were indeed initiated in the latter part of  the era; these however up 
to the present have frequently produced outcomes opposite to the intended ones.
Historians, at least western historians, divide these centuries for convenience 
into Early Modern, running approximately from around 1500 to 1789, Modern 
from then to the end of  the Second World War, and from 1945 to the present, 
Modern becomes Contemporary History. All such divisions are of  course 
arbitrary, but these ones do at least correspond to significant shifts. Prior to the 
eighteenth century advances in European technology, though significant, had not 
been profound, and in social structure, apart from the disappearance of  slavery, 
not very marked. A citizen of  the Roman empire such as Constantine, who was 
originally based at York, if  transported into eighteenth-century England would 
have noted many changes from his own era, but would not overall have sensed 
a dramatic difference, and in the road system he would have observed significant 
decline from the civil engineering expertise of  his own days. 
The mass of  the population would still have toiled on the land with equipment 
not too remarkably different from his own times. They would still have been 
governed by an oligarchy of  wealthy aristocrats exercising a ferocious penal 
discipline, if  not quite so ferocious as that of  his own epoch. He might have been 
puzzled by the non-existence of  a chattel slave population, but a voyage across 
the Atlantic would have reassured him on that point. It is hardly necessary to 
labour the contrast with the mid-twentieth century. A transformed social universe 
based on unprecedented technological change came into being during the three 
succeeding centuries. The foundations of  the transformation were population 
growth, revolution in the nature of  mechanisms, reorganisation of  the processes 
of  production both rural and urban and the expansion and intensification of  
market mechanisms. 
Population
Population size, in the view of  opinion-formers in particular societies throughout 
history, has never been ideal – there was/is either too little of  it or too much. During 
most of  historical time it has been the former that has been the source of  concern. 
The importance of  fertility to preliterate societies is a reasonable presumption that 
is given confirmation by their surviving artefacts. With literacy what seems to have 
been, not without reason, a near-obsession, becomes explicit. The Mosaic sexual 
code, as evidenced in the Jewish Bible or Christian Old Testament, was concerned 
above all to promote fertility by rigorously prohibiting non-procreative sex.
Both then and in succeeding centuries rulers were highly concerned about 
the size of  the populations over whom they ruled, wanting them to be as big as 
possible both for their taxable capacity and as a reservoir for personnel to use in 
either aggression or defence. When yoked to personal ambition on the part of  
these monarchs this was not the least of  reasons for expanding their empires, 
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since they had no policy options for naturally increasing the numbers of  their 
existing subjects (other than forbidding non-procreative sex, a command difficult 
to enforce even when aided by religion).
Worries about the insufficiency of  numbers persisted into the earlier years of  
the twentieth century. In Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
rapid population growth was generally welcomed, despite Malthus’s concerns, as a 
larger population meant bigger markets and encouraged industry, not least because 
it generated a ‘reserve army of  labour’ (numerous unemployed job-seekers) and 
thus kept wages low. For similar reasons US governments until the First World War 
encouraged immigration – provided it was of  European descent (though even so 
immigrants were popularly unpopular in their earlier generations) as similarly did 
the British ‘Dominions’, the parts of  the empire where the indigenous populations 
had been displaced by settlers. 
Similarly nineteenth-century French governments, for taxation, military and 
market reasons, lamented the slow growth of  their population – an inheritance of  
the smallholding peasant culture, reinforced by the Revolution, as a result of  which 
peasant proprietors, aiming to inhibit inheritance disputes, took measures to limit 
their families in defiance of  religious injunctions by engaging in non-procreative 
sex – those in the south of  the country were said to use the more certain technique 
of  anal sex in preference to the less reliable coitus interruptus utilised elsewhere. In 
the twentieth century, when such slow endogenous growth was accompanied by 
the massive losses of  fertile young men in the First World War, what had been 
a significant concern became a veritable obsession. Pronatalist propaganda was 
stepped up enormously during the interwar years2 from all parts of  the political 
spectrum and contraception was not legal in France before 1967.
In spite of  the more than impressive British nineteenth-century population 
expansion by endogenous growth, British journalists and politicians expressed 
worry in the late century that the country had been outstripped demographi-
cally by the new German empire, not to mention the United States. By the early 
twentieth, both the UK and the US were gripped by fears of  the ‘yellow peril’, 
given the combination of  immense numbers in eastern Asia and the Japanese most 
effectively displaying their newly-acquired and high-tech military might.
Malthusian Trap? 
It is questionable whether populations in the past have ever fallen into the 
‘Malthusian trap’ postulated by the odious clergyman of  the early nineteenth 
century after whom it is named, in which numbers in a given population outrun 
the ability of  available agricultural output to supply sufficient food resources, 
and famine supervenes. Famine certainly has been a frequent visitor to earth ever 
since the Neolithic revolution (and very possibly earlier) and even apart from 
such demographic disasters global population generally has shown a rhythm of  
growth and decline within an overall upward trend. What is dubious is whether 
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population numbers per se have ever been the key responsible factor in famine 
years. Commonly it has been a sudden and catastrophic failure of  a previously 
adequate food supply, whether due to climatic factors or political action such as 
scorched-earth policies including massacre of  agricultural workers. It is more likely 
that in the normal times of  pre-modern societies the attrition of  infant mortality, 
adult premature exhaustion and also routine disease would have been sufficient to 
keep numbers below the famine level. 
There are a couple of  possible exceptions to this generalisation, but in these 
too we find extraneous factors at work. The first is the population growth in 
Europe of  the thirteenth and very early fourteenth centuries, which, in England 
at least and most likely elsewhere, was putting pressure on a relatively static grain 
output, which made its increase possible only by cultivating less fertile land, with 
diminishing returns. The culmination was a massive population collapse in the 
mid-fourteenth century, one estimate for the world being a reduction from 450 to 
350 million; roughly a fifth to a quarter. 
The first two extraneous factors are well known, especially the Black Death 
(probably bubonic plague) which more than decimated Europe in the middle of  
the fourteenth century and killed around half  of  its inhabitants. Less dramatically 
famous was the ‘Little Ice Age’, a precipitate temperature drop which began in the 
early fourteenth century and of  course gravely worsened conditions for cultivation. 
These alone would have been sufficient to account for the demographic collapse, 
but there was more. In the course of  the thirteenth century as population grew 
landlords were pressing increasing exactions upon the working peasantry and in 
all likelihood undermining their general health and vitality, making them less able 
to resist the infection and the deteriorating climate.
The second example (there are plenty more) and even better renowned, was 
the great Irish famine of  the nineteenth century. The Irish population had been 
growing in the course of  the previous century, even faster than the rapid increase 
in mainland Britain, and the landlords, like their European predecessors eight 
centuries earlier, were screwing their tenants into the ground, forcing them to 
feed themselves on smaller and smaller potato patches while the landlords used 
the remainder of  their estates to produce profits. When potato blight struck in the 
1840s, mass starvation resulted. Yet as the Irish expression put it, ‘God sent the 
blight but the British sent the famine’. There was plenty of  food in Ireland but 
the government was permitting the export of  grain from the island in the middle 
of  the famine. The Tsarist government did the same during the early twentieth 
century. Once again it was not a simple ‘Malthusian trap’ and there is no instance 
of  a famine that was not aggravated, or more commonly created, by a combination 
of  climatic and political developments.3
None of  this is to argue that the Malthusian trap is a complete fiction and 
nothing more than a device to enable governments to evade responsibility for 
their crimes against humanity. Even if  we have no clear examples of  the trap 
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being sprung in the past, it could have been a possibility in Britain itself  during the 
nineteenth century. Such possibility was averted by the ability to import grain and 
other foodstuffs into the country made possible by the cultivation in the Russian 
steppes and the American prairies of  grain as a cash crop, to be transported to 
Britain in immense quantities by railway and steamship. World croplands grew by 
70 per cent between 1859 and 1920.4 
Transcontinental Migration 
A foundation stone of  what we call modernity was the realisation by Europeans 
around 1500 that there existed a continental landmass (or rather two continents 
and numerous islands) hitherto unknown to them roughly midway between 
Europe and eastern Asia. Migration to this ‘New World’ thereafter took place on 
an enormous scale stretching over centuries. That, combined with the immigrants’ 
natural increase, was very bad news indeed for the indigenous inhabitants whose 
remote ancestors had migrated from northeastern Asia probably in several waves, 
and had themselves migrated southward over the generations, establishing in 
different regions both foraging and agrarian cultures as well as a series of  Neolithic 
civilisations. Subjugation and/or extermination were to be their common fate.
The feedback effect on Europe itself, environmentally, economically, socially 
and politically, was to be incalculably enormous. The Spanish conquistadors of  
Mexico and Peru were initially hunting above all for precious metals. They secured 
plenty of  them, particularly silver from the environmentally deadly Potosí mines 
located in present-day Bolivia, worked by indigenous and later African slave labour, 
and bringing fabulous wealth to the Spanish crown (and the English pirates who 
preyed upon the treasure fleets). The exact role this bullion played in the European 
economy is disputed, but clearly it at least greatly lubricated trade with Asia and 
influenced to some degree the economic developments leading eventually to 
industrialisation.5
The precious metals were only the start – a range of  domesticated plants and 
animals arrived from across the Atlantic to transform European culture. A cursory 
list includes cocoa, tobacco, cane sugar (native to southeastern Asia but enormously 
expanded in the Americas) maize, potatoes, turkeys and guinea pigs. All except the 
last were of  enormous importance and impact, but if  one had to be singled out 
it would probably be the potato,6 which may well have underpinned the dramatic 
European population growth of  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Cotton 
is far from indigenous to the Americas and was domesticated independently there 
and in Asia, but its production in North America by European colonists proved in 
due course to be central to the industrialisation process. 
Colonists in the Americas extensively cultivated tobacco, cane sugar and cotton 
in plantations. This was made possible by a different sort of  migration, which 
may be termed forced migration, of  slave labour from West Africa – as has 
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been previously discussed in Chapter 6, a major element of  seaborne commerce 
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, above all in the eighteenth. The 
expansion of  British cities such as Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and Bristol 
(also Bordeaux in France) depended directly or indirectly upon this trade and the 
products which resulted. Profits made in this way financed industrial development 
in cities and towns around Britain, even on the east coast such as Newcastle, and 
not only the west coast centres themselves which were directly involved. 
Indentured Labour
The diminution, if  not suppression, of  the Atlantic slave trade in the late 
nineteenth century did not end another form of  forced migration. This was known 
as indentured labour, which in the eighteenth century had been an additional 
method of  securing a labour force on the colonial mainland American tobacco 
and cotton plantations. It was voluntary insofar as the labourer was offered 
passage to America in return for agreeing to work unpaid for a given number of  
years, after which they could hope with reasonable prospects to make a better 
living there than in Britain.
In the late nineteenth century the practice was used in the South African mines, 
the main supply being of  indentured labourers from China who worked and lived 
during the period of  their indenture as virtual slaves under abominable conditions. 
The scandal this created in the UK was partly responsible for the landslide defeat 
in 1906 of  the then Conservative government. Although most of  these labourers 
returned eventually to China, a mainly commercially motivated number of  
Chinese immigrants remained in South Africa, having settled there before racially 
motivated exclusion policies were adopted in the early twentieth century.7 
The principal area of  indentured labour at the time however was in the sugar 
cane fields of  Australia. The labourers were Pacific Islanders, and their situation 
was a far from voluntary one. They had either been kidnapped or tricked (known 
as ‘blackbirding’) by hired crews of  thugs and compelled to undertake such labour 
under the pretence of  a fake contract. Similar tactics were used by South American 
plantation owners, and were also utilised to acquire the Angolan slave labour 
employed in the contemporaneous production of  cocoa beans on Portuguese-
owned African islands.8 
All the Pacific Islanders working in Australia, whether voluntary or coerced, 
were unceremoniously expelled at the beginning of  the twentieth century. Later 
on in that century, in postwar western Germany, temporary contract workers 
from Turkey and Yugoslavia made up a section of  the labour force without 
which the West German economic miracle would have been impossible. Ironically 
termed ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter), with few social rights during their period 
of  contract, these individuals were on no account allowed to take up permanent 
German residence.
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What was to be cardinally important and to settle the destiny of  humanity up 
to our own times was migration to, and natural increase in, the northern American 
continent. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it sucked in immigrants 
on an unprecedented scale from all over Europe and from every state and nation, 
some more so than others and with Britain and Ireland in the forefront. France, 
for whatever reason, was unusually underrepresented and most French Americans 
are descended from previous immigrants to Canada; as most Spanish-Americans 
in the USA originate from south of  the Rio Grande rather than directly from 
Spain itself. 
When in the late eighteenth century the 13 British colonies along the eastern 
coast revolted and established the independent United States of  America the 
continental ambitions of  the new polity were already present in embryo, and 
within a century had been violently achieved in spite of  and through foreign war, 
internal war against the Native Americans, civil war and massive social and ethnic 
conflict. Nor did such obstacles and problems prevent it from becoming the world 
leader in industrial output. In the course of  the European war of  1914–18 this 
enabled it to become the world’s dominant economic power, which it continued 
to be throughout the great depression of  the interwar years. After 1945, though 
challenged, it has additionally been the world’s political and military hegemon. 
From the later nineteenth century it had acted to shut off  the Asian immigration 
which has left a substantial Chinese and Japanese population in the western USA. 
Following the Great War it also began to restrict and limit immigration from 
Europe as well. 
Meantime, coercive migration has not ceased but continued with mass fatalities 
in different portions of  the globe such as the northern part of  the Indian 
subcontinent after the Partition of  British India; in Palestine, in former Yugoslavia 
and most of  all in regions of  the African continent. Also since 1945 voluntary 
migration has taken on a new quality, globalised in a manner not previously 
imagined. This has principally involved the migration of  citizens from what is 
now termed ‘developing countries’ into West European states, most prominently 
but not exclusively West Indians and Pakistanis into Britain, Algerians into France, 
and forced migrant refugees or asylum seekers,9 into all of  them. The European 
Economic Community has grown far beyond its originally intended limits. Its 
transformation into the European Union, with free movement across frontiers of  
money, commodities and labour, has involved a new pulse of  migration – from the 
more impoverished states of  the former Soviet bloc to the much more attractive 
consumer paradises of  the west. It has also stimulated an illegal traffic in sex slaves 
in the same direction – and more widely, including the former USSR. According 
to the economic historian Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The capitalist world economy 
has required for its optimal functioning widespread and continuous migrations 
of  people (both forced and voluntary) in order to fulfil labour-force needs at 
particular geographical locations.’10
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Internal Migration
Also significant is one-way internal migration in the sense of  population movement 
within a political unit from rural to urban areas. A current of  this sort, albeit a 
weak one, has been evident throughout history from the earliest eras of  urban 
settlement, though frequently interrupted by major environmental, economic, 
social and political upheavals, as during the collapse of  the western Roman empire, 
when the trend was reversed and cities decayed.
During the European medieval centuries, while the trend was quite strong in 
the Chinese and Arab empires, it remained weak and often very weak in Europe, 
though never altogether ceasing. Towns, such as they were, functioned as a magnet 
for peasants trying to escape feudal servitude – though generally only unattached 
young men could take the risk. This circumstance applied even to migrants from 
the free peasantry who saw little future prospect on their home patch – the Dick 
Whittington story is a fanciful account of  such an episode. 
From the sixteenth century onwards the pace of  urbanisation in Europe 
quickened considerably. By the sixteenth century urban concentrations put 
significant pressure on food and fuel supplies in London and stimulated the 
substitution of  coal-burning for firewood. Established towns and cities grew 
remarkably and the spread of  industrialisation conjured new ones out of  what had 
formerly been rural villages, such as Manchester, among others in the north of  
England, in the Rhineland and northern France. Naturally, conditions of  housing 
and hygiene were abominable in these growing urban concentrations and diseases 
were rife. As contemporaries noted, they also became foci for social disruption, 
generating crime, beggary, alcoholism and prostitution on an expanding scale11 
and presenting a standing challenge to the ordered and hierarchical society of  the 
contemporary ideology – a relationship exemplified in John Gay’s The Beggar’s Opera. 
In the twentieth century internal migration became a deluge, creating, in the 
title used by Mike Davis, a ‘planet of  slums’,12 as the migrants, with few or no 
resources, established major areas of  makeshift dwellings on the outskirts of  cities 
throughout all the major continents in variously-named concentrations without 
running water, sanitation, power supply or any basic amenities. Before the end 
of  the century the majority of  the world’s population had become urban rather 
than rural.
Motivations
The above outline of  world migration patterns to date stimulates the question 
of  what motivates the phenomenon. There are of  course many very different 
answers depending on circumstances. In cultures accustomed to nomadism 
migration is no big deal and involves no drastic alteration in lifestyle, though there 
would presumably be reluctance to abandon an attractive hunting-ground – or 
pasture if  domestic animals were the food source – without strong reason if  the 
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clan was fortunate enough to possess one. Climatic changes which reacted upon 
sources of  meat, or vegetable food, would probably have provided an incentive, as 
would the attentions of  a larger and more aggressive clan.
For sedentary populations with permanent habitations and agricultural 
resources including soil, water and domesticated animals, and possibly attachment 
to a god for whom location was important, such reluctance must have been much 
greater and migration is likely to have been more coercive. Fear from an aggressor 
bringing peril of  massacre, rape and enslavement would indeed supply a motive 
if  alternative sources of  nutrition were potentially available  – possibly through 
aggression against a weaker neighbour. Migration of  a satisfactorily settled agrarian 
population simply in the hope of  finding something even more satisfactory ‘over 
the hill’ must have been very rare if  indeed it ever occurred – except when the food 
supply was threatened by pestilence (locusts for example) or climatic variation. 
In modern times voluntary migration by entire communities has been rare, 
but forced migration on that scale has certainly not. Leaving aside the African 
slave trade, which on the whole involved individuals rather than communities, 
instances of  what has been known since the 1990s as ‘ethnic cleansing’ have 
occurred with frequency. Early modern times might be said to have opened with 
the expulsion of  the Jews and Muslims from the Spanish kingdom, and later even 
of  the Catholic converts from those religions, ‘Conversos’, and ‘Moriscos’. During 
the nineteenth century the United Sates government was its leading practitioner, 
shifting Native American communities around the country at its will and pleasure 
onto increasing restricted ‘reservations’.13 During the twentieth century in Europe 
it reached unprecedented levels, the first major instance being between Greece 
and Turkey at the end of  the First World War. It was later applied by Stalin in the 
1930s to peasants deemed to be ‘kulaks’ who were deported to central Asia or 
Siberia; and during the war to entire national groups suspected of  disloyalty, such 
as the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans, and even their co-nationals fighting at 
the front. 
The Nazis, in addition to their Jewish extermination project, applied similar 
techniques to Poles in Poland, in this case a conscious, previously intended 
programme rather than an unplanned response to emergency circumstances. 
Following the war the ethnic cleansing went in the opposite direction, when the 
entire German population living in the Polish territories newly-acquired from 
Germany, was expelled en masse. There was similar action against the Sudeten 
German population when the Czechoslovaks recovered that part of  their 
country.14 Shortly afterwards extensive population transfers occurred between the 
newly-independent India and its neighbour Pakistan, accompanied by ferocious 
massacre on both sides of  the border. The same, or attempts at the same, was seen 
in the Yugoslav civil wars in the 1990s, and it was for this occasion that the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ term was first used in English.
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On the whole though, the pattern of  migration through recorded history has 
been voluntary or at least quasi-voluntary (in the sense that it might be an offer that 
could not be refused without dire consequences, or applied to children without any 
say in the matter). It has generally involved individuals, small groups or families 
rather than entire populations. Motivation in such cases could vary between dis-
satisfaction with home life or the lure of  preferable circumstances elsewhere, or 
a combination of  both. An illustrative example is the shift in motivation of  Irish 
migrants between the late eighteenth century and the middle of  the nineteenth. 
In the former case the dominant attraction to fit young men in Ireland, faced 
with a more competitive labour market owing to population growth, was of  work 
availability across the water. The construction of  the canal system in England 
demanded heavy labour and was highly dangerous, hence it required comparatively 
high payment levels to maintain the labourers’ fitness and attract a workforce 
which might have found a safer if  less remunerative occupation. 
The situation in the 1840s during the great famine was completely different. 
Here the choice was, at best, between migration and starvation; and the USA, 
with its greater opportunities and anti-Irish prejudice no worse than in Britain, 
was the destination of  choice. Irish migration was not of  course the only source 
that the USA was attracting – plenty came from mainland Britain as well, not to 
mention all over Europe, either to take advantage of  occupational or landowning 
opportunities, or, at the other end of  the scale, to flee persecution from inimical 
regimes. This especially applied to Jewish populations from eastern Europe. Until 
the outlet was closed, immigrants in the nineteenth century also arrived in the 
United States from eastern Asia, both China and Japan.
The South African gold mines came to depend on migrant labour and, following 
the ending of  Chinese immigration, were seriously dependent on an African 
workforce sourced from the regions north of  South Africa – Mozambique, Angola 
and regions even further afield (there was of  course also migrant labour form 
inside South Africa itself). Conditions for these migrant labourers were always 
vile, and following the installation of  the apartheid regime after 1948, became even 
viler. The migrant labourers were forbidden to bring their families with them, and 
at the end of  their contract period or working life were peremptorily dismissed 
and returned to their place of  origin. In spite of  that, there was always a plentiful 
supply of  potential migrants, so impoverished in their homelands that it was 
worthwhile for them to put up with the inflictions they suffered on the goldfields 
as the price of  the marginal increase of  resources they obtained and could remit 
in part to their families. 
Migration to Australasia, principally from the UK, was a combination of  
coercive and voluntary factors. There is a joke that the ancestors of  the Australian 
population were selected by some of  the best judges in Britain. This refers to the 
fact that from the 1780s, following American independence, which closed off  
that avenue, the southern continent was used as a transportation destination for 
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forced labour which was applied to persons convicted of  serious crime (which 
could include the theft of  a few shillings) but who had not been consigned to the 
gallows. The sentences were typically of  seven or 14 years (occasionally for life) 
and the convict could in theory return to Britain at the expiry of  their sentence 
(to do so earlier was a capital offence). Most however did not, either because they 
could not afford the fare or because they preferred to avoid a further uprooting. 
New Zealand was different. The first British settlers were escaped convicts 
from Australia, but the immigrants thereafter were voluntary ones. They were 
drawn by the attractiveness of  the temperate climate and the impressive fertility of  
the location – albeit there were greater dangers from volcanism. The indigenous 
population of  warlike agriculturalists was also much better positioned to resist the 
intrusion than their unfortunate counterparts in Australia.
The global migration which commenced after the Second World War and has 
expanded continuously since, is motivated mainly by pull rather than push factors 
– though not invariably. Some of  it is stimulated by political instability or war in 
the migrants’ (or would-be migrants) homeland resulting in danger to body and 
life, particularly from invasions by Western powers and their consequences, such 
as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Principally though it is stimulated by the attraction 
of  moving to wealthier societies with greater economic and possibly social and 
cultural opportunities in order to escape a life of  impoverishment, even when 
there is no immediate danger of  being murdered, raped or perishing in flood 
or famine.
Thompson T02687 01 text   186 16/12/2014   13:29
13
Inhuman Powers: Capitalism, 
Industry and their Consequences
Capitalism
Capitalism is first and foremost the art of  using money to get more money . . . It is the secret 
scandal of  capitalism that at no point has it been organised around free labour.
—David Graeber
All the developments associated with the great transformation occurred within 
market societies dominated by property owners whose property was either mobile 
capital or the possession of  assets such as land which enabled them by borrowing 
to raise such capital, and at least up to the twentieth century these developments 
could not otherwise have been accomplished. ‘The separate interests of  the old 
regime were fused by commercial capitalism’, writes Mann. ‘Capitalists in land, 
commerce, and finance fused as a single extensive political class . . . .’1 
Markets have played a major role in history ever since the institution of  
settled communities and the practice of  agriculture. They are a major force in 
achieving social cohesion, the more as society becomes increasingly differentiated 
and complex. They exert an enormous power in driving historical change and 
development and have increasingly done so throughout the course of  time. The 
modern world could have said to have begun with the creation in the sixteenth 
century of  a global market due to the establishment of  communication links 
between Eurasia, Africa and the Americas – especially the Americas. According to 
Thomas D Hall writing in the journal Social Evolution & History:
Not the least of  [the incentives] was a drive to explore and find shorter, or 
at less contested routes to Asia, to develop new kinds of  shipping . . . All 
these factors helped set western Europe on a trajectory of  change that gave 
rise to colonialism, mercantilism, the rise of  capitalist states, and the industrial 
revolution. Clearly the ‘rise of  Europe’ can not be explained solely by internal 
factors. Those who claim to do so ignore the Afroeurasian-wide process that 
created a context within which features in local European social organisation 
could have the effects they did . . . much of  what happened in Europe could 
only make sense in a larger context . . . . 2
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The bourgeoisie, as Marx expressed it, was a most revolutionary class. However 
the word ‘capitalism’ does not appear in the title of  any of  his writings; his magnum 
opus is entitled Capital, which is not quite the same thing – the subtitle is, A Critique 
of  Political Economy. Capital is the social mechanism of  economic production and 
capitalism the social formation in which it is embedded. According to Marx’s 
definition, capitalism represents a society dominated by commodity production 
in which labour-power itself  has mostly become a commodity and throughout 
society establishes ‘conditions that allowed the market to compel people to follow 
its dictates or perish’.3 ‘The destiny of  the bourgeoisie, its champions felt, was to 
humanise capitalism by bringing the market into every human relation, every facet 
of  social provision, of  production, of  consumption, of  the political process itself.’4
Capital and capitalists have existed down the ages, at least since the invention 
of  coined money around the middle of  the first millennium BCE. Slave traders, 
after all, could be regarded as a species of  capitalist. However that reference points 
up a significant difference in the nature of  capital – commercial capital in the 
early modern centuries was accumulated by trading in commodities which had 
been produced by traditional organisation and technologies and only occasionally 
by wage labour, whereas the capital characteristic of  a capitalist society enters 
into and modifies the process of  production in a manner intended to enhance 
productivity. This generally means substituting division of  labour and/or machine 
production for the previous modes. 
As writers such as Jack Goody and John A Hobson have argued (see below), 
the Chinese empire and to some extent the Islamic ones, at least until the 
eighteenth century (they would place it even later), surpassed the European 
powers in every economic sector – invention, production, output, trade. But these 
were not capitalist societies, and this proved to be the crucial difference which 
determined the location of  the new industrialisation and the world hegemony 
which accompanied it.
Globalisation
The most dramatic manifestation of  modern times was that (often rival) European 
powers between them established a part-trading, part-territorial pattern of  empires 
spanning the globe, and from the early seventeenth century they were joined by 
England. With acknowledgement to Douglas Adams and The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
the Galaxy, the ‘Answer to the Ultimate Question of  Globalisation, the Planet and 
Modern Times’, could be said to be 1492, for this was the year of  the Common 
Era in which Christopher Columbus (Cristoforo Colombo or Cristóbal Colón) 
made landfall on Hispaniola (Hobson reminds us that it was also the founding year 
of  the Spanish Inquisition). Although Columbus never accepted that the islands he 
visited in his four voyages were adjacent to a huge landmass previously unknown 
to Europeans, his enterprise initiated, within a few decades, the European (initially 
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Spanish adventurers’) plunder of  the two continents’ choicest bits. It resulted in 
the eventual takeover of  them both, along with the adjacent islands, inaccurately 
termed West Indies.
Somewhat earlier in the fifteenth century Portuguese adventurers had pioneered 
a sea route to southern and eastern Asia, where they encountered civilisations who 
were militarily and economically more than a match for them, but over the course 
of  the following century the Portuguese monarchy gained control over coastal 
parts of  the island later named Ceylon and later still Sri Lanka. Their Spanish 
counterparts did the same in the Philippines archipelago, as later did the Dutch 
republic, or rather its trading company the VOC, in Java and other islands of  the 
East Indies archipelago. 
High value spices were the principal target. These were already available by 
overland trade, which depended on camel transport, but the point of  the voyages 
and establishment of  outposts was to establish control of  the source of  supply 
and also to avoid interruptions to the overland route which might be caused by 
political upheavals.
Later the VOC allied with the inland king of  Kandy in Ceylon resisting the 
Portuguese in order to help him expel the latter, then cheated him by taking over 
the island for themselves. Their vessels and their firepower at the time were not 
greatly superior to what was available to the Son of  Heaven, and if  they had 
confronted the sort of  fleet captained by Admiral Zheng He in the early fifteenth 
century they would have had no chance whatever. By the time of  the Europeans’ 
arrival however, the empire had abandoned that form of  naval power (presumably 
reckoning that it didn’t need it) and the mighty junks which sustained it had been 
left to rot.
From this initial form of  globalisation flowed a torrent of  riches, further 
enhanced when the Caribbean islands and part of  the North American coast, 
with the importation of  African slave labour, became mass producers of  the then 
luxury products of  tobacco and sugar – and later cotton. Associated industries 
such as shipbuilding, ironworking, sailmaking, ropemaking and so forth expanded 
in concert, large enterprises were formed and transport systems expanded and 
improved. By the last decades of  the eighteenth century (possibly taking the 
abolition of  serfdom in the Scottish mining and saltmaking industries as the marker 
date)5 Britain was a capitalist society – but a rival interpretation suggests that the 
world trading system (including the slave trade), which Britain now dominated, 
though highly important, and identified by Immanuel Wallerstein’s ‘World 
systems theory’ as centrally important was not the most crucial circumstance in 
transforming a pre-capitalist society into a capitalist one. 
Ellen Meiksins Wood has argued instead that English agricultural economy of  
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was the starting motor for world 
capitalism, namely on account of  tenant farmers being obliged by economic 
necessity to ‘set in train a new dynamic of  self-sustaining growth with no historical 
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precedent.’6 This was to spread outwards until it encompassed the entire globe. 
Robert Brenner has argued along similar lines. The virtual abolition of  independent 
peasant landholdings throughout the UK, a process being completed at the end of  
the eighteenth century, proletarianised the agricultural workforce, at that time still 
the largest component of  the working population. It thereby generated the pool 
of  potentially available workers in town and country ‘who had nothing to sell but 
their skins’ – male, female and of  every age from six upwards to decrepitude – and 
whose unemployed component on the brink of  starvation kept the wages of  the 
others at a satisfactorily low level. In this interpretation the world trading system 
and the wealth it produced for the economies of  western Europe was auxiliary to 
the process, though nonetheless also essential. 
Where Did it Begin?
The distinctive characteristic of  Marxist interpretations of  the birth of  capitalism 
and the industrial revolution is that these were coercive processes. Total reliance 
on wages was initially regarded as a disgrace by the workforces first subjected to 
it7 and only submitted to when all other potential sources of  legal income had 
been closed off. Their successors had no option, and though they constituted ‘free 
labour’ and were not subjected to slavery or serfdom for any individual capitalist, 
they were effectively slaves, wage slaves, to the capitalist class as a whole. 
They were ruled in their working lives (in some instances even outside them in 
‘company towns’) by their employers and behind the employers stood the state, 
designed to forcefully repress any serious opposition to the capitalist structure.8 
Moreover the initial accumulation of  mobile capital to set the process in motion 
was coercively obtained in a process known as ‘primitive accumulation’, without 
even the pretence of  individual freedom on the labourer’s part, by means of  
dispossession (such as the agricultural enclosure process), robbery, forced labour, 
colonialism and slave production.
Bourgeois economists and economic historians not surprisingly declined and 
still decline to recognise these realities, but there is also considerable controversy 
among Marxist historians as to the relationship of  the various coercive aspects of  
capitalism’s establishment, with Wood, Brenner and Immanuel Wallerstein to the 
forefront. England and lowland Scotland and the North American colonies/USA 
were market-based societies before they were capitalist ones, and capitalist before 
they were industrialised. Their market economies (most famously theorised by 
Adam Smith in the 1770s) were undoubtedly an essential precondition of  capitalist 
development and served as the engine of  accumulation which enabled capital to 
enter and control production increasingly in the second half  of  the eighteenth 
century, leading on eventually to mechanisation and growing use of  artificial 
power sources once the technical problems were mastered.
So much is common ground. Where argument, which originated in the 
1940s, begins is over the respective contributions to the process from internal 
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developments, principally in Britain, on the one hand, and the global commercial 
system, with emphasis on foreign trade, upon the other. Neither side to the 
controversy discounts either of  these relationships – the point at issue is the 
proportionate weight to be given to each.
In 1946 Maurice Dobb, the then unusual phenomenon of  an Oxbridge 
Communist Party academic, published Studies in the Development of  Capitalism, which 
combined a deep study of  the emergence of  capitalism in England with its impact 
on the world at large. The controversy was kicked off  with a review of  his volume 
by the American Marxist Paul Sweezy. It is summarised by one blogger as follows, 
In this debate a main point of  contention is between Dobb’s attempt to 
demonstrate that capitalism emerged from contradictions internal to feudalism 
itself; while Sweezy more takes the position that capitalism developed 
independently of  feudalism and overtook it as an external force because of  its 
dynamism in contrast to feudalism’s stagnancy.9
A further dimension to be added to this is the claim advanced by Sweezy that 
Dobb was rather too dismissive and insufficiently appreciative of  the impact and 
importance of  long-distance trade to the erosion of  feudalism and emergence 
of  a capitalist class; in short that more attention should be given to the structure 
of  world economic systems. Dobb himself  made some partial concessions on 
this point.
Harvey Kaye sums up the argument in the following terms:
In this exchange we recognise the emergence and divergence of  two kinds 
of  Marxist analysis of  economic history and development. One is decidedly 
economic, focusing on exchange relations. As in Sweezy’s critique. The other is 
politico-economic, focusing on the social relations of  production and directing 
us towards class-struggle analysis, as in Dobb’s Studies and reply.10
This was the starting point of  the argument that has been developed further by 
Wallerstein, Wood and Brenner. A very judicious survey and consideration of  the 
contending positions with all their strengths and weaknesses is to be found in 
Henry Heller’s The Birth of  Capitalism.11 This deals with the birth of  industrial 
capitalism. Its expansion and development eventually embraced the entire world. 
The stage it had reached by the mid-nineteenth century is summarised in vivid 
prose by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. 
What should be noted, however, is the interpretation of  capitalism’s rise, 
spanning the eras of  commercial and industrial capital, in Giovanni Arrighi’s The 
Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of  Our Times. Arrighi contends 
that the globalised market system of  the modern era has always existed in the 
context of  a dominant centre, an economic global hegemony which over the 
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centuries shifted from one state system to another following the economic/
military exhaustion of  its predecessor. He notes the states in question as being 
the Dutch republic (though surely the Spanish kingdom is more entitled to be 
considered the earlier pioneer) followed by the United Kingdom and afterwards 
by the United States. 
Industrialisation
The form of  capitalism described above, sometimes termed, though inaccurately, 
‘merchant capitalism’ supplied the necessary foundation for the industrialisation 
which produced the modern world, otherwise known as the industrial revolution. 
Within the past two-and-a-half  centuries this revolution has changed dramatically 
the fabric of  history in texture and colour; the second great alteration (and 
acceleration) following the Neolithic revolution ten millennia earlier. The term 
‘industrial revolution’ was first used in the 1820s on analogy with the French 
Revolution and was also employed by Engels midway through that century, but 
was popularised only as late as the 1880s by Arnold Toynbee (not to be confused 
with his nephew Arnold J Toynbee) when the profundity of  the change was 
fully appreciated. 
The validity of  the term ‘industrial revolution’ has been questioned (as have 
various political revolutions including the French) on the grounds that the changes 
were not particularly speedy, often instead being incremental and extending over 
decades and that nobody, or very few at any rate, realised that they were living 
through a revolution. Suffice to say that if  what happened between 1750 and 1850 
did not constitute an industrial revolution, what then might one look like?
That said, many aspects of  the process remain appropriately the subjects of  
lively debate. The simplistic popular view has tended to be that it was essentially 
about technological innovation – which was clearly its most dramatically visible 
feature. The reality was somewhat more complex. These innovations were made 
possible not only by the international commercial order but also by the far reaching 
non-technological developments which underpinned the new technical ones, 
and by the accumulated experience, stretching over decades or even centuries in 
older technologies (such as clockwork) which produced the skills necessary for 
the technological leap with which we are concerned here. Moreover, in several 
instances, particularly the most centrally vital one of  coal mining, there was little 
or no technological improvement apart from the safety lamp12 during this century 
of  revolution – traditional techniques sufficed. 
Any textbook on the industrial revolution will devote a substantial section to 
population growth (See Chapter Twelve) and without very substantial expansion 
of  population and migration industrialisation could never have taken place in the 
manner in which it actually did occur. Rising population numbers had the twin 
effect of  expanding both markets and the labour force for economic growth. 
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Britain was the first industrial nation (the title of  a renowned textbook) in the 
modern sense and as we have seen population growth on the island was most 
impressive and additionally supplemented both by migration from Ireland and 
internal migration to the industrial centres. Probably the most important migration 
however was the coercive migration of  the slave trade to provide the labour force 
for the production of  semi-luxuries on the Caribbean islands and tobacco and 
cotton production in mainland North America, first as British colonies and later 
the United States. The most sophisticated technology in Britain in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries was in cotton manufacture, and slave-produced raw 
cotton was central. 
Cotton manufacture and marketing, which well into the nineteenth century 
depended mostly on natural power sources, was enormously profitable. That was 
the case not only because British cotton had an enormous market available to it on 
a world scale, but a major wind-powered shipping industry to carry it, along with 
other profitable commodities, around the globe. These profits, were combined 
with colonial plunder, with which foreign trade was often indistinguishable, 
especially in relation to India, and also until 1807 with the slave trade, to provide 
the mobile capital through which further economic growth was advanced. To take 
full advantage of  this a banking and credit system accompanied by paper currency 
was also essential, and these were soon devised, though for nearly a century they 
functioned in a very ramshackle fashion with frequent crashes and bankruptcies.
Without these preconditions the industrial revolution could not have occurred, 
but they were by no means the only ones. The first industrial nation also enjoyed 
very favourable natural endowments, particularly its plentiful and phenomenally 
productive coal seams, producing coal of  many different sorts suitable for diverse 
purposes, from steam coal to consumption in domestic fireplaces. It was likewise 
provided by geology with extensive supplies of  iron ore and other minerals 
essential for iron and steel manufacture. Its shape also ensured that it had an 
easily available waterborne internal transport system of  natural rivers and artificial 
canals which served as an essential predecessor and also accompaniment to the 
nineteenth-century railway network. 
Technological Marvels
At the same time, while it is apparent that the technological breakthrough 
associated with the industrial revolution would have been impossible without the 
physical and economic context sketched above, which in the end boils down to the 
availability of  markets and workforce, nevertheless the popular image of  industri-
alisation as centred on technology, while certainly inadequate, nevertheless goes to 
the heart of  the matter. Not least in reaction to this popular assumption, economic 
commentators and historians have tended to underplay technology’s central role 
and overemphasise the other essentials of  the industrialisation process. What was 
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cardinally important was not technology per se, but the sort of  technology which 
came on stream.13
Though technology dependent on natural power sources can reach an 
extremely advanced level, inherently it is limited, given the techniques available at 
the time.14 It was only once engineers learned how to effect controlled release of  
the energy locked up in fossil fuels that the modern world was truly born. I am 
rather surprised at the degree to which historians seem to underrate the central 
significance of  steam power. Even such an acute analyst as Henry Heller appears 
not to stress its centrality.
Steam engines had existed since the beginning of  the eighteenth century, but 
they too were initially of  limited application – in essence they could only drive a 
pump, even when they functioned adequately, which was often not the case. Only 
with such an engine capable of  driving a wheel did the sky become the limit, 
technologically speaking. It is therefore scarcely any exaggeration to suggest that 
the single most important individual in all history since the Neolithic was James 
Watt, who devised the first mechanism of  this kind – which is not to say that 
someone else would not have succeeded if  he had failed to do so. Even so, the 
rotary steam engine at first spread slowly in factories since they were expensive to 
build and maintain – water power was cheaper and not much less reliable, again 
underlining the importance of  the economic context.15 Only the immensity of  
the cotton market could make worthwhile the relatively few engines which were 
adopted in almost three decades. Steam power only really came into its own with 
the development of  the railway and sea transport networks. Both were critically 
important, the former the most emphatically transformative. Without this 
development the use of  steam power would have probably been confined to a 
very restricted level.
Railways
Ironically, taking into account the state of  the British economy in the early 
nineteenth century when the first essentially modern railways powered by steam 
locomotives appeared, the network should never have been built. The existing 
transport system of  rivers, canals and horse traffic was perfectly adequate to the 
needs of  the time. The construction of  the new system was driven by the lust for 
profit, the availability of  cheap credit and new instruments of  investment. The 
canal system created in the previous five decades had been extremely profitable 
both in construction and operation and the rail investors hoped to replicate that 
success, which in general they failed to do. Though not a black hole, the returns on 
rail investment were only modest.16 
Nevertheless the railway system had all manner of  spillover effects 
(economically the principal ones were in demand for coal and iron) and soon 
radically transformed Britain and its society, industrially, economically, socially, 
militarily, politically and culturally in ways too numerous to list, soon going on to 
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do the same for the remainder of  the globe.17 Without the railways the general and 
universal transformation associated with the industrial revolution would have been 
much retarded. The application of  steam power to shipping was only relatively less 
important, its effects too were momentous, not only in the dramatically increased 
speed and carrying capacity of  sea transport, but in the industrial development it 
provoked in the manufacture of  steamships. In addition it enhanced the appetite 
for coal and iron and the need for coaling stations to be be established around the 
globe; a significant factor in European, particularly British, imperial expansion.
Second Industrial Revolution
Economic historians often refer to the developments during the last three decades 
of  the nineteenth century as ‘the second industrial revolution’. Though there 
were substantial and significant developments in existing technologies, such as 
steelmaking, and to the steam engine was added the steam turbine, particularly 
useful in shipping, the ‘second’ designation comes from the introduction and 
development of  three particularly important and novel technologies. These were 
the use of  oil as a fuel source, applications of  electricity and new branches of  the 
chemical industry.
The first made possible the petrol and in due course the diesel engine, which 
would eventually transform the railway and shipping network. However, much 
more economically, socially, militarily and culturally significantly was the fact that 
the petrol engine, much lighter than its steam counterpart, was applicable to road 
transport, and from the early twentieth century to powered flight, with all that 
these developments implied, not least the sourcing of  the necessary fuel.
Electric current had been employed since the 1840s for the purpose of  
telegraphy. From the 1870s a wide range of  fresh applications included telephone 
communication, the beginnings of  radio communication, lighting, the electric 
motor, which could be made more compact even than the petrol engine, and of  
course, in the USA, a novel means of  execution, first pioneered, unsurprisingly, 
on an African-American. Electricity in the shape of  the sparking plug was also a 
necessary adjunct to the operation of  petrol engines. One aspect of  its employment 
had implications also for imperial policies, for that was the necessity to obtain 
reliable sources of  copper ore for the wiring.
The third of  these technologies stretched across a wide range of  applications. 
Artificial dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals were important, as were new types of  
explosives to add to and supersede the old traditional standby, gunpowder, in 
military use since the fourteenth century. By far the most important, however, 
was the adaptation and use of  the tropical plant gum, rubber, in an enormous 
number of  different contexts, but above all for the manufacture of  vehicle tyres, 
which made possible the full benefit of  the petrol engine in road transport (and 
also in the new exercise of  cycling). Again the sourcing of  the raw material, 
originally a South American plant, was a matter of  extreme political importance 
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to the industrial societies of  Europe, the USA and eventually Japan, and resulted 
in horrific atrocities committed against the effectively slave labour forces in South 
America and central Africa. 
Why not China?
An outgrowth of  this controversy, which has emerged in the past few decades, is 
over the question of  whether capitalism could have developed and an industrial 
revolution could have occurred elsewhere in the world. It is a question that has 
been given especial bite with the theorisations known as ‘postcolonialism’, which 
accuses interpretations which focus on European ascendancy of  Eurocentric bias. 
Was it merely certain accidental contingencies, especially its military apparatus, that 
enabled Britain to get there before any other society that had an equal or better 
likelihood of  prevailing in the race?
In dealing with this question it has to be stressed that there was no race. The 
individuals and groups who laid the economic foundations for the modern world 
and a European hegemony over it had no project for transforming the globe in the 
manner that eventuated – of  covering the earth with factories, mines, megacities 
and railways and the oceans with steamships – and instituting rule over them all by 
European or European-descended nations. They simply wanted to make money 
and were not particular about the methods they used to secure it. They devised 
the world we are familiar with today essentially as a by-product of  that ambition. 
Marx once remarked that every generation only sets itself  the tasks it is capable 
of  accomplishing. Every project, no matter how ambitious or how consciously 
revolutionary, even social transformation, is set within the parameters of  the 
society that the projectors are familiar with – the far future is shrouded in deep 
darkness. The point applied, as we shall see, to Jacobins and Bolsheviks as much 
as to industrial entrepreneurs.
It has been demonstrated convincingly18 that certainly until the eighteenth 
century and possibly as late as 1800, Asia, and China in particular (it is worth 
recalling that the Chinese invented not only printing but printed money)19 was 
ahead of  Europe technologically, economically, and in some respects socially (to 
be fair, European intellectuals at the time appreciated this fact). Notoriously, at 
the time the quality of  Chinese products far outstripped anything the Europeans 
could offer – the only European invention which could impress them was the 
barrel, a strong, efficient, economical and mobile means of  storage which they had 
not themselves devised. Could capitalist industrialisation then not have been first 
initiated in the Turkish or Persian empires, the Moghul empire or the Chinese, or 
even Japanese, which, as Perry Anderson has pointed out, had a feudal structure 
not too different from the English one?
A passionate partisan of  such a view is John A Hobson, whose volume The 
Eastern Origins of  Western Civilisation, propounds it with extreme vigour. The book 
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provides an interesting read, though unfortunately not a very convincing one. He 
certainly details at great length the respects in which Chinese and to a lesser extent 
Islamic, knowledge, organisation and technology were in advance of  the west until 
very late in the day, but these accounts are spread over a theoretical apparatus 
which cannot be taken seriously.
Confidence is not inspired by the bizarre and manifestly erroneous claim that, 
‘Crucially, the actual landmass of  the southern hemisphere is exactly twice that 
of  the northern hemisphere’.20 In any case both China and almost all the Islamic 
world lie inside the northern hemisphere. To this is added Hobson’s reference to 
‘globalisation’ during centuries when the Americas were totally isolated from the 
remainder of  the world. What he means are communication links, which certainly 
existed, between eastern and western Eurasia, with the addition of  Africa, 
nevertheless making ‘globalisation’ a wholly inappropriate term.
John Hall, reviewing Hobson in the English Historical Review,21 writes that 
Hobson ‘tends to cite only those parts of  an author’s work that agree with his 
argument, and misses out whole realms of  scholarship’, also characterising his 
particular construct of  Eurocentrism as being ‘Often a straw man’. Indeed a 
whole procession of  straw men parade through Hobson’s pages. The impression 
is given that Eurocentrism represents some sort of  intellectual conspiracy with 
a definite and focused agenda of  doing down Eastern achievements. In fact 
the unquestionably Eurocentric remarks of  nineteenth-century commentators 
are presented as though they still represented the intellectual consensus. These 
certainly presented the rise of  the West as ‘a moral success story’. Marx is written 
off  in the same terms, though his remark, with specific reference to the imperial 
record, that capital came into the world ‘dripping with blood and filth from 
every pore’ is never quoted, nor is the fact acknowledged that Marx presented 
capitalism’s triumph as an amoral success story.
The problem with this kind of  approach is that it tends to cast discredit on the 
correction of  the historical picture that is necessary if  the reality of  the Chinese 
empire’s power, influence and achievement up to that time is to be adequately 
presented. Ethically speaking, East and West were as worse as each other, the 
question therefore is why the Celestial empire, which had taken an economy 
based on natural power sources about as far as it was possible to go, with all the 
advantages at its command, did not become the initiator of  what we know as the 
industrial revolution. 
Eric Hobsbawm remarks somewhere that since the First World War was not 
avoided there is no point in disputing whether it could have been. Avoidance of  
the conflagration was certainly one of  the potential outcomes of  the 1914 crisis, 
but it was not the one that was realised. A similar approach needs to be taken with 
the question of  which society could have initiated the industrialisation process 
driven by artificial power sources. There can be no doubt that Imperial China had 
a perfectly adequate preindustrial economic potential and financial instruments to 
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accomplish, had its elites wished, what the western European ones, particularly 
Great Britain, did in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century – but they 
did not. The reasons for this disparity may be in practice now irrelevant, but 
nevertheless inquiring into it is unavoidable. 
Two substantial considerations can be advanced. In the first place, during 
the era of  preindustrial capitalism the empire’s power, though covering a very 
extensive area of  eastern Asia, did not reach around the globe in the manner of  
the European powers with their colonies and depots (known to the British at the 
time as ‘factories’). It therefore did not have the enormous volume of  resources 
thus acquired to risk investing in the doubtful new experimental technologies of  
steam power and railroads (railways do not appear in Hobson’s index). It was 
western power not Chinese which looted the Americas and subsequently the Indian 
subcontinent and Indonesian archipelago, and generated enormous revenues by 
slave labour. The Celestial empire moreover had other calls on its resources. 
The second significant obstacle was the empire’s social structure, which remained 
‘feudal’ in the broadest sense, founded upon a depressed peasantry in an essentially 
tributary relationship to local landlords and the state. China certainly had a large 
cadre of  merchants and dealers, indeed what could be appropriately identified as 
a merchant class. But they were not a capitalist class in the sense that they took 
command of  production, had access to a reserve of  proletarianised labourers, and 
invested in technological devices to drive accumulation forward. The conclusion 
of  the encyclopaedic Joseph Needham,22 the incomparable western expert on 
all matters of  Chinese science and society, appears to be the most convincing 
diagnosis. He argues that China’s advance to what became the Western mode of  
production was stalled by the fact that its society and government were in the grip 
of  a Confucian23 elite of  authoritarian bureaucrats who were in a position never 
to permit the emergence of  an authentic capitalist class, particularly in agriculture, 
which would have been the essential foundation. 
Assessment
To be sure, the first industrial revolution, the one which occurred in Britain, was 
dependent on an assembly of  the contingencies listed above  – favourable geography, 
natural endowments, greedy entrepreneurs, an available low-paid workforce, the 
plundered Atlantic and African resources, a friendly government, etc. Had any 
of  them been absent the industrial revolution would not have happened, though 
capitalism might, albeit with reduced probability. It is essential to understand that 
for a take-off  of  mechanisation, and more especially the use of  artificial power, to 
happen for the first time a very formidable hump has to be surmounted. In brief  
– such innovations have to be worthwhile to those projecting them, and only in 
the right conditions can they become so.
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If  a plentiful supply of  low-wage labour is available new-fangled mechanisation 
may well not be worth the effort and expense. Handicraft employment may be 
cheaper, particularly if  the handicraft workers are employed part-time and feed 
themselves from subsistence agriculture. The necessary incentive is simply not 
there. At the same time, factory production also requires an adequately numerous 
workforce plus an unemployed or underemployed reserve army of  labour to 
keep wages satisfactorily low, not to mention market outlets for the product. 
In other words the balance has to be exactly right, not merely temporarily, but 
over the long term. A further obstacle is presented by governments eager for 
taxation revenue making the exercise unprofitable, or even being suspicious on 
principle, constantly aware of  the social disruption likely to result from the new 
system. My own view is that the first industrial revolution could have occurred 
only where it did, for only in the British Isles were the conditions quite right for 
the process to begin. The ‘success’ was indeed contingent, but nowhere else were 
the contingencies appropriate.
Once started however, the process has built-in momentum in a number of  
dimensions. Other regimes, which want the products made available by the new 
technologies, especially the military ones, have no alternative but to play catch-up, 
and here the transformation, as occurred in Japan, is imposed by government from 
above rather than generated by lowly entrepreneurs from below. Internally too, 
competition between capitalists within and across frontiers forces each economic 
unit to constantly deepen and cheapen production by improved organisation 
and more advanced machinery rather than merely expand it through further 
employment of  existing methods and technologies. 
A famous text by Peter Laslett is called, with reference to the pre-modern 
centuries, The World We Have Lost. Much, indeed most of  it, is well lost, although 
as Christopher Hill noted, ‘we do not need to idealise “merrie England” to realise 
that much was lost by the disruption of  the medieval village’. Such positive 
communal features as it possessed however were accompanied, as he points out, 
by grinding poverty and much else intolerable to a contemporary inhabitant of  the 
consumer society. For good or ill, however, it is irrecoverably lost, and can never 
be reconstructed, at least not in any non-catastrophic manner.
The Twentieth Century
The innovative technologies of  the second industrial revolution fitted together 
in a complex socio-economic structure. It was during the interwar years of  the 
twentieth century when, in spite of  the great depression, these technologies, 
together with spinoffs such as cinema, the beginnings of  television and the first 
plastics, fully came into their own as the foundation of  full-blown consumer 
societies, and were continued with growing intensity and improvement into the 
industrial societies of  the postwar world. In that world they were joined by the 
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spread of  electronic technologies, themselves dependent of  course in one way 
or another on the use of  electric current, as are virtually all technologies of  the 
contemporary era.
Computers were first used for military purposes during the Second World War 
for code breaking and in the Manhattan Project for the manufacture of  the first 
atomic bombs. That use, as very large apparatuses, continued into the subsequent 
decade, as well as for control mechanisms in nuclear power stations; while in the 
1960s and 70s they were also applied to industrial purposes (it was known at the 
time as automation) and to space flight. Their true revolutionary impact began 
in the 1980s with the introduction of  the personal computer, which in the past 
quarter-century has grown exponentially, alongside a process of  continuous min-
iaturisation and the creation of  the worldwide web. It has happened to the extent 
that I often feel that I’m living in a science fiction universe,24 and when I hear the 
usage statistics of  the latest computer equipment and digital media platforms, start 
thinking I’m a proper Luddite (or at least what the Luddites were reputed to be).
Technologies however, central though they are, form only part of  the story. Nor 
do they have an independent existence, their place in the fabric of  history depends 
upon the manner in which and the purposes for which they are used. Moreover 
they, like everything else, are subject to the demands of  the market economy, of  
which the dot-com bubble at the turn of  the century was an outstanding example 
but by no means the first. 
The destructive force of  nineteenth-century military technology had been 
exhibited properly for the first time in the American Civil War, and subsequently 
in the employment of  the early machine guns against lightly armed colonial 
populations foolishly unwilling to be ‘civilised’ by humanitarian western armies 
or to be drawn into the delights of  the capitalist universe. However the next 
two significant wars, the Franco-German and the South African were not very 
prolonged, new technologies were denied the opportunity to realise their full 
destructive potential, and lessons in this respect were forgotten. The ferocious 
Balkan Wars of  1912–13 gave more of  a hint of  what was to come.
The Great War of  1914–18 brought it home all too bloodily and the Russian 
Civil War of  1918–20 underlined it emphatically. The annihilatory power of  
technology applied to destructive purposes reached further heights during the 
years 1939–45 after having been well tested throughout the decade of  the thirties 
in China, Ethiopia and Spain. With the creation of  nuclear weaponry in 1945 and 
its expansion thereafter in the possession of  mutually hostile regimes, the prospect 
of  planetary destruction was offered and very nearly accomplished.25
This particular sequence of  events was not an autonomous process. The world-
shattering impact of  the First World War was not directly due to economic and 
colonial rivalries, a contest for the economic division of  the world – although the 
industrial and landowning elites of  Imperial Germany certainly aspired to achieve 
that on a European scale. It owed its origins to the collision of  industrial capitalist 
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powers (including even Imperial Russia for all its economic backwardness) each of  
which was ready for war if  it believed its vital interests, certainly economic ones at 
root, were seriously threatened. 
The responsibility of  the war and subsequent political upheavals for the crash 
which overtook the global economy at their conclusion is a disputed area. Certainly 
the war, by bankrupting the western powers engaged in it as well as giving the 
Bolsheviks the opportunity to take power in the Russian empire, disrupted the 
prewar system based on the pound sterling and so propelled the USA into the 
position of  economic hegemon. There is however an argument that the great 
depression of  the interwar years and the nadir of  the collapse between 1929 
and 1932 were due to deeper processes of  economic development, essentially 
imbalance between raw material producers and industrialised economies, and that 
the war was only an ancillary factor.
Be that as it may, the world slump and its impact upon Germany were directly 
responsible for enabling Hitler’s seizure of  power in that country, without which 
there would have been no Second World War, at least in the form it actually took, 
and without that the world’s history in the second half  of  the century would have 
been markedly different. 
The communist parties of  the time were convinced that the depression marked 
the final crisis of  capitalism, and they may not have been so wrong as subsequently 
it appeared. In spite of  a weak and petering out recovery in the late 1930s there 
was no realistic prospect at that point that the depression was likely to lift. What 
pulled the US and the capitalist world economy out of  depression was the Second 
World War and the subsequent Cold War, creating an enormous level of  demand 
and government willingness to supply it – military in the first instance but with 
all manner of  knock-on effects. What would have been the social and political 
outcome had the depression continued indefinitely (as its present-day successor 
appears to be doing) is anybody’s guess.
Central to this development was the power of  the US empire and the elites 
which control it. Their global hegemony, economic, political, military and 
incidentally cultural, was a deliberate and carefully planned long-term project, 
as was destruction of  their communist rival. According to Perry Anderson, ‘All 
[US geopolitical and other advantages] could be, and were, synthesised into an 
imperial ideology commanding popular consensus . . . at home and power of  
attraction . . . abroad’.26 If  necessary military force would be applied, as it had 
been continuously in Latin America during the nineteenth and earlier twentieth 
centuries.27 The notion that US values would come to dominate world society had 
been voiced from the very earliest years of  the republic, so that ‘For all its scope 
and intensity the Cold War was . . . “merely a subplot” within the larger history of  
global domination’, ‘the construction of  a liberal international order with America 
at its head’.28 With the project apparently accomplished, its apparent success was 
the occasion of  Francis Fukuyama’s celebration in 1992 of  the ‘end of  history’.29 
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However history in the event has not taken very long to come back to life. To 
quote Anderson once more:
The institutions and acquisitions, ideologies and reflexes bequeathed by the 
battle against communism now constituted a massive historical complex with 
its own dynamics, no longer needing to be driven by the threat from the Soviet 
Union. . . . The Cold War was over, but a gendarme’s day is never done. More 
armed expeditions followed than ever before; more advanced weapons were 
rolled out; more bases were added to the chain; more far-reaching doctrines of  
intervention developed. There could be no looking back.30
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No Such Thing as a Free Lunch:  
Trade-Offs, Opportunity Cost and the 
Dynamic of  Unintended Consequences
This chapter, in some respects a summing-up of  the discussion so far, is 
concerned with the reality that in numerous different contexts both in organic 
nature and more especially in human affairs, scarcities of  various sorts and 
structural limitations force a trade-off  between purposes and possibilities, and 
that unintended consequences are intrinsic to any form of  praxis. On occasion 
these can be beneficial, but in historical experience unwelcome ones have tended 
to make the greater impact. 
The Biological Foundation
The reality of  trade-off  is something that all of  organic life is subject to – partly 
it is a matter of  energy conservation and partly of  opportunity cost. Since both 
body and brain are not so much stable objects but more in reality dynamic systems, 
evolutionary development in one direction is bought at the expense of  its restriction 
in another. Additionally, the more complex an organism’s descendants become the 
more opportunity exists for their malfunction (as with any mechanism) and the 
more likely it becomes that malfunction will occur. The simplest of  organisms, 
archaea and bacteria, are already molecularly complex, and the eukaryotic cells 
which constitute many unicellular and all multicellular organisms, while still 
microscopic, are many times larger and much more complex still.
When the eukaryotic domain divided between the plant, the fungal and the 
animal kingdoms a billion or so years ago, the former two, speaking metaphorically, 
opted to remain in fixed locations (as do some invertebrate animals such as 
sponges, corals and sea anemones) and let their nutrition come to them. There 
are of  course certain advantages in this feeding strategy – they do not have to go 
and search for food, and as for sexual reproduction, which has evolved in both 
plant and animal kingdoms, they let the wind, the water or insects do the job for 
them. The price of  this however is that they have ‘sacrificed’ the nervous systems 
and structured sensory apparatuses which distinguish the animal kingdom. Such 
equipment would be useless, indeed an inconvenience, to an immobile organism 
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such as a plant, while it is essential to a mobile one that has to seek out food 
sources and sexual partners. 
In the animal kingdom such trade-offs are very numerous. The descendants of  
sighted animals which have adopted a lifestyle in conditions of  total darkness, such 
as certain fish in underground lakes, lose their visual sense. Brains, marvellous organs 
that they are, nevertheless have limits to their capacity, and evolution, concentrating 
on the development of  senses appropriate to a totally dark environment, will do 
so at the expense of  visual ability. Even in less definite circumstances, bats enjoy 
proverbially poor vision – their evolutionary development of  echolocation has 
been at its expense. The ancestors of  whales and dolphins were land-dwelling 
animals but in their case evolution has produced a shape (and in the case of  large 
whales, weight) appropriate to an aquatic environment, which does not include 
legs capable of  terrestrial locomotion. A vertebrate which employs its forelimbs 
for walking can also, depending on its anatomy, use them to a limited extent for 
other purposes, but if  it uses them in order to fly it cannot. Insects which have 
both legs and wings, are inherently limited in size and weight.
The giant panda is an instructive example of  the trade-off  of  merits and 
disadvantages in evolutionary development. Its ancestors were carnivores or 
omnivores, but in the wild its diet consists 99 per cent of  bamboo. This has 
consequences for its digestive apparatus, since that has not kept evolutionary 
pace and it has to eat enormous quantities of  bamboo to gain adequate nutrition 
(though it is still capable of  eating carnivorously) and tends to be afflicted with 
lassitude, which may go some way to explaining its reluctance to mate. Presumably 
its ancestors must have taken to the vegetarian diet since that was at the time much 
easier to obtain than by hunting small animals. The downside is that the species 
became dependent on a single food source, and with the shrinkage of  the lowland 
bamboo forests through human activity, remains a highly endangered species.
Human Anatomy 
The human anatomy is also an instructive example of  such evolutionary trade-offs. 
Evolution has concentrated here on developing the proportionately largest and 
most magnificent brain in the animal kingdom, with all its amazing capacities, but, 
as with cetaceans, if  less dramatically, this has come at significant physical expense.
As noted earlier, H. sapiens is the only habitually bipedal living mammal, and 
that, especially in combination with its huge and splendid brain, evidently has 
splendid advantages. For a ground-dwelling species with a short neck it greatly 
improves the visual range. Even more importantly, it frees up the forelimbs for 
all the manner of  operations made possible by the opposable thumb. There is 
also a lesser-known and rather surprising advantage – humans are the champion 
long-distance runners of  the mammalian class. Practically any four-legged animal 
can easily outpace a human over short distances, but suitably experienced humans 
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can run down any of  them to exhaustion. Hunter-gatherer societies made use of  
use this technique to overtake and kill their quarry.
There is however an analogy with the panda’s digestive system. Essential 
parts of  the human anatomy, especially the circulatory system, have not kept 
evolutionary pace with our upright stance. The consequence is not lethal, but it is 
uncomfortable – often resulting in haemorrhoids and varicose veins. Hernias too 
are an unfortunate and more dangerous side-effect of  bipedalism.
There is another area where evolution certainly has kept pace, but again with 
very significant trade-off  consequences. Of  all the great apes humans are by far 
the most puny. Compared with chimpanzees, orang-utans, or even large monkeys 
such as baboons, not to speak of  gorillas, humans are physically contemptible. 
Any other ape could rip apart even the strongest of  humans, with no problem. 
Evolution here, by concentrating on brain power, has had to sacrifice physique – 
the human brain monopolises 20–25 per cent of  our metabolism and requires, 
proportionately, huge energy inputs. Nor is this the end of  the matter. To 
accommodate the magnificent brain the human face has had to shrink and lose 
the powerful jaw muscles that other apes possess. Along with that have gone the 
impressive teeth, especially the great canines, the useful defensive equipment that 
were our remote ancestors’ endowment.
Humans are not quite the potentially longest-lived of  mammals, but they stand 
very near the top and outclass any other primate. For any animal, longevity may 
be considered good fortune, but it is not without its disadvantages. Old age, as 
the epigram has it, does not come singly. Anatomy and function both deteriorate 
with the years. If  the animal is a predator it will lose its hunting ability and die of  
starvation, if  it belongs to a prey species it will be singled out by the predators. 
Vegetarian mammals such as elephants and gorillas, which may be so big and 
powerful as to have no natural enemies – and humans who also, for different 
reasons – are in the same position: if  they avoid death by accident, infection or 
violence, they nonetheless fall victim to degenerative diseases. For humans that 
most often means (there are a few exceptional cases) serious deterioration in 
the brain. Brains do not come cheap; they are metabolically expensive, though 
their advantages outweigh their shortcomings, otherwise that evolutionary 
process would not have occurred. Less generally considered is what evolutionary 
disadvantage might there be in possessing a unique consciousness and a self-con-
sciousness, such as humans do?
A number of  answers can be suggested. With this kind of  consciousness comes 
the ability to suffer and to be keenly self-aware of  suffering, and humankind has 
certainly done plenty of  that throughout the aeons. ‘Man was made to mourn 
as the sparks fly upward.’ Here the dialectic is at its harshest and constitutes the 
greatest of  all trade-offs. 
Consider also the evolutionary advantage of  a disposition to respond to false 
positives noted in Chapter One. Useful in the Palaeolithic, however in the context 
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of  settled living and socially differentiated communities, the night-time shadow 
becomes a malignant ghost, coincidental incidents lead to the identification of  
witches or possessors of  the evil eye; ill-treatment by the member of  a particular 
ethnicity brings condemnation of  all the members of  that group. Random visual 
differences appear to take on a coherent shape – the tendency to see faces when 
there is no justification to do so, for example the Virgin Mary in the clouds or Jesus 
Christ in Martian rocks.
Unintended Consequences
These biological realities have in common the fact that they are all involuntary 
manifestations, necessary consequences of  the organisms’ natural constitution, 
including the human one. Human activity, however, resulting from conscious 
choice (leaving aside implausible theories that no such thing actually exists) in 
short the dimension of  culture, raises this interaction to a new level.
The controlled use of  fire, which, as stressed earlier, marks the dividing line 
between nature and culture, introduced the dialectic of  unintended consequences. 
The fire which warms and makes possible the habitation of  previously 
over-inclement environments, which processes foodstuffs and makes them both 
more palatable and safer to eat, which repels animal predators, can also kill and 
injure, and very painfully at that. So can domesticated wolves, otherwise known as 
dogs. Despite being invaluable assistants to humans in all manner of  enterprises 
from hunting to herding to guarding there is the ever-present possibility that a 
large one can resume its ancestors’ wolfish habits, turn vicious and deadly. At 
a later stage of  development, domesticated cattle, especially but not exclusively 
uncastrated male ones, may demonstrate lethal hostility.
Human settlement and congregation around eight thousand years BCE raises 
the stakes still further. As suggested earlier, this crowded new environment 
provides marvellous opportunities for invertebrate parasites, as well as vertebrate 
scavengers such as rats, to spread and flourish, bringing with them a range of  lethal 
micro-organisms, while dependence on plant cultivation necessarily involves the 
danger of  crop failure from drought, fungal blight, or swarming locusts delighted 
to encounter such munificence. 
Though organic evolution has no specific direction – its character is better 
illustrated as a rounded bush rather than as a pyramid-shaped conifer with humans 
at the top like a Christmas tree angel – one branch of  it, no doubt contingently 
as we have stressed, has been a trend of  expanding and intensifying brainpower. 
Once the process got started one thing led to another. 
Ain’t Technology Wonderful?
By analogy, human history has been one of  growing technological sophistication, 
with the improvements tending to shift from location to location and from culture 
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to culture. The most significant of  these have been covered in previous chapters. 
As civil organisation and technology advanced, so did military, increasing in 
destructiveness as the centuries passed. Less sophisticated weaponry could be as 
lethal and destructive as the most advanced, but required greater manpower to get 
the same results in terms of  generalised slaughter. In economic terms, the former’s 
productivity was lower. The Romans’ great success in conquest and imperial 
control within the Mediterranean basin and beyond, was due above all to their 
military organisation, the highly developed, virtually industrial supply system to 
their legions and not least their very advanced and effective siege engines, bridge 
construction and road building techniques.1 
The successful dynastic empires of  the following centuries everywhere in 
Eurasia extended their borders by similar methods, and the Chinese ones were 
masters of  the technique. They made only very limited use for military purposes 
of  the explosives invented there as early as the ninth century CE – which provokes 
further intriguing speculation. Plenty of  available manpower may have made it 
seem scarcely worthwhile to develop a new technological line, and anyway the 
culture was, except in technology and the economy a very conservative and 
traditional one. The early Ottoman sultans, less well supplied with population and 
less constrained by tradition, did resort to widespread use of  explosives, especially 
for siege purposes. And so it has gone on, up to the twentieth century and the 
appearance of  nuclear weapons.
The essential point is that the dialectic of  technological advance could as readily 
be applied to death and annihilation as to Francis Bacon’s project to ‘improve man’s 
estate’ by scientific endeavour. During the Renaissance Leonardo was as ardently 
devoted to perfecting the instruments of  death as he was to civic invention, 
anatomical and other research or artistic accomplishment. Even civil ingenuity 
could be turned in lethal directions; the pioneers of  nuclear physics certainly did 
not expect a military application, and a large number of  them objected strongly 
to this. Though centuries earlier the very notion of  flying machines had been 
regarded with horror, later inventors were less reticent.2 
The visionaries of  gravity-defying rocket engines did not think in destructive 
terms, though rocketry as such had been used for military purposes since the 
medieval era. Their attention was concentrated on the then seemingly innocuous 
and unrealistic projects of  eventual space flight and orbiting satellites. They 
could not have anticipated the use of  the latter for military observation. Any 
computing device that could solve mathematical problems might have potential 
military applications, but the earlier attempts, of  which there were many, were 
not developed with that in mind. The dialectic of  unintended consequences was 
powerfully active in these instances.
Military devices are invented and developed with the deliberate purpose of  
killing people and obliterating structures – they are intentional not unintended 
consequences; but most commonly the science, expertise and technology which 
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lies behind them were not first intended to be used in that manner. They could 
reasonably be said to be the unintended consequence of  technological development 
in general. Many adverse consequences of  human praxis however are not at all 
related to military considerations, or only related at second or third hand. 
Perils of Progress
The perils of  shift from a foraging to a settled lifestyle are noted above. In these, 
generally speaking, there is not a great deal of  change from the Neolithic, or at 
least from the emergence of  city states, to the eve of  modernity – apart from 
the appearance in history of  the supernatural ideologies discussed in a previous 
chapter. These could certainly make a grim domestic, social and civic life a great 
deal grimmer for individuals, multiplying restrictions and obligations and making 
them more onerous and intrusive than had previously been the case, even if  the 
respective faiths suggested that if  these rules were observed the believer could 
hope for a more congenial afterlife. 
The economic revolution which accelerated from the seventeenth century 
CE onwards grievously multiplied the occasions for grief  among increasingly 
numerous and diverse populations. We can in this instance divide the dialectic of  
unintended consequences into two overlapping categories. The first and smaller 
category consists of  those consequences which genuinely escaped from deliberate 
human intention and direction but were by-products of  the system. The further 
destitution and possible starvation of  populations and their dependants through 
shifts in the trade cycle when their life-support consisted of  wage payments is one 
instance. Another is the insanitary conditions of  urban living at the time in market 
societies which bred squalor and disease, together with the appearance in the 
nineteenth century of  pandemics of  a previously localised new plague, cholera, as 
well as an array of  new industrial diseases.
Overlapping between the intended and the unintended are the ailments caused 
by the widespread adulteration of  commercially provided foodstuffs, and the 
large-scale dependence in Europe and the USA on the opium-based analgesic, 
soporific and pacifier, laudanum. The suppliers of  these products did not intend 
their purchasers to die from ingesting them but they often did in any case. Similarly 
the absentee landowners of  Irish estates who forced their tenants onto shrinking 
plots of  land and to a diet based exclusively on potatoes, did not actually intend 
to kill them (though some, regarding Ireland as overpopulated, welcomed the 
outcome) but when the potato blight struck that result was inevitable. 
Parallel occurrences on a planetary scale characterised the early modern and 
modern practices of  colonialism. In some instances the genocide and extermination 
of  indigenous populations was no unintended consequence but an intentional and 
deliberate policy – the Native Americans in North America and the aboriginal 
population of  Australia are examples. US presidents such as Andrew Jackson, 
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Ulysses Grant and Theodore Roosevelt even boasted about it. However in many 
other cases it resulted from the unforeseen results of  colonial practice. 
The Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors of  Central and South America did 
not set out with the intention of  bringing about the massive death toll of  their 
imperialism – they preferred to convert and/or enslave the indigenous populations, 
but starvation and disease resulting from their treatment & the infections they 
brought with them, together with deliberate slaughter of  resisters, had that result. 
The late Victorian holocausts examined by Mike Davis were, again, not deliberate 
results of  exterminatory policies, but due to the combination of  colonial economic 
and social policies and climatic disturbance resulting in floods and droughts 
occasioned by shifts in the el Nino and el Nina ocean currents. Contrawise, the 
pandemic of  syphilis in early modern Europe, particularly during the sixteenth 
century, is generally attributed to a strain of  the relevant bacterium brought to 
Europe by men returning from the Americas, an infection which the indigenous 
Native Americans were adapted to but to which other ethnicities were entirely 
vulnerable.3 If  the New World hypothesis is correct (medical consensus supports 
it) that was certainly an unintended consequence of  a particularly dramatic sort. 
These are specific examples of  this chapter’s theme. Any general perspective 
on how unintended consequences are part of  the fabric of  history shows that 
they are indeed a fundamental part of  its pattern – what was advantageous in one 
situation turns into a menace when times change or are changed. So far as it is 
possible to speak about a fundamental human project across the millennia that 
project could be defined as the struggle to escape from nature or to substitute 
culture for nature, to combat the natural afflictions that characterised the existence 
of  our hominin ancestors, H. sapiens and its predecessors – cold, wet, unreliable 
food source, parasites, predators, early death. Every solution led on to further 
ambitions and every solution brought with it unforeseen problems. Humans are 
social animals, and all endeavours to escape from the biological consequences of  
being human had to be conducted in a social and hierarchical context, for even in a 
forager society hierarchy exists (and almost certainly did so too in the Palaeolithic) 
albeit to a limited degree. 
Settlement brings with it, as I have emphasised, vulnerability to infestations of  
viruses, bacteria and parasites to a much greater degree than in hunter-gatherer 
environments. With it too hierarchy evolves into class division, which means 
the forcible acquisition of  the labour of  one portion of  society by another one. 
Misogyny becomes entrenched. Expanded population and class division offers 
the temptation to find victims for human sacrifice (or to capture them from 
other communities) in order to propitiate the gods invented to control nature in a 
manner beyond human powers. Urbanisation and its consequences expands and 
greatly intensifies the character of  such relationships. Evidently no such outcomes 
were intended by the original communities which pioneered sedentary lifestyles, 
whether in Eurasia, Africa or the Americas.
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Very generally, effective techniques were imbricated with superstitious 
irrelevancies. Study of  the stars can have practical uses for direction-finding 
purposes, and even in some cases to predict natural events such as when the Nile 
was due to flood. However their movements, especially if  the heavenly bodies are 
regarded as gods, can by extension be assumed to have implication for human 
destinies and thereby give rise to astrological superstition. Humans are all too 
readily tempted to look for patterns in nature which they hope might be capable of  
predicting events in an uncertain and perilous future. In literate, and presumably 
pre-literate, cultures other methods of  fortune-telling even more absurd than 
astrology quickly proliferated.
Medicine
Disease, injury, and more minor sorts of  ailment are an ever-present reality. Folk 
medicine and herbal remedies had a certain limited efficacy. When they were 
consolidated as medical science, along with quasi-scientific studies of  anatomy 
and physiology made by such intellects as Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen, then 
some degree of  relief  could be offered to the sufferer – although the placebo 
effect cannot be overlooked. However the establishment of  a medical profession 
was by no means an unmixed blessing, as sacrifice, devotion and prayer remained 
part of  the treatment and all manner of  useless or noxious remedies got included 
in the prescriptions.4
The situation was little improved by the establishment of  hospitals for the sick 
in subsequent centuries, for these institutions themselves became vectors for the 
further spread of  disease. It was remarked that anyone who entered an English 
hospital as a patient in the eighteenth century was comparatively fortunate to die 
of  the same ailment as they had been admitted with and not one contracted in the 
hospital. The medical profession, before the late nineteenth century at the earliest, 
probably killed more people than would have died without treatment. The one 
great success, though not an unproblematic one, was vaccination against smallpox. 
Even in subsequent decades, when thanks to Hunter, Pasteur, Koch, Simpson, 
Lister, and the developments which put medicine on a fully scientific basis, the 
dialectic of  unintended consequences was at work. Some developments, such as 
antiseptics and anaesthetics were almost entirely benign (though misapplication 
of  the latter occasionally killed or brain-damaged a patient) and the ability to treat 
appendicitis with surgery certainly saved many lives. The extension of  vaccination 
beyond smallpox to inoculation against such ailments as diphtheria (formerly a 
major infantile killer) and polio (formerly a major infantile physical disabler) were 
almost (though not quite) unqualified successes, for inoculations could go wrong.
Antibiotics however were a different story. When they first began to be used 
in the 1940s they appeared as practically a magic wand to treat all manner of  
previously untreatable or very difficult ailments – sexually transmitted diseases, 
tuberculosis,5 pneumonia for example. The unintended consequences emerged 
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in the 1960s when the accidental microbial evolution which the antibiotics had 
generated, resulted in the appearance of  superbugs immune to previously effective 
doses of  antibiotics and eventually entirely immune to the antibiotic which had 
worked so superbly in the first place. Only one major plague, smallpox, has been 
entirely eradicated. Malaria still continues to flourish and reservoirs still remain of  
all the other principal killers, tuberculosis, syphilis, influenza, even bubonic plague.
The British Museum has exhibited a display of  the different drugs in capsule 
form produced by the pharmaceutical industry. The viewer could only marvel at 
the astounding and mind-bending quantity and variety of  these drugs, which laid 
out on a flat surface, roughly a metre broad, extended for several metres down 
the room. Undoubtedly these chemical agents have many merits and have eased 
the conditions of  life and saved the lives of  innumerable individuals but they can 
also be the agents of  catastrophe, most notoriously with the thalidomide episode.6 
The advancement of  medical expertise in general also has its dialectic. One 
consequence is that people can be forcibly kept alive when they no longer want to 
be on account of  age or injury, and in circumstances in which they would naturally 
have died. Also, it is a sad reality that doctors can perform as very efficient torturers 
if  willing to submit to the demands of  tyrannical regimes. Nevertheless, hardly 
anyone would wish to forego the benefits of  medical science in all its dimensions, 
but the negatives also have to be kept in mind.
Dangerous Innovations
An interaction of  a not altogether dissimilar kind relates to agricultural science 
and practice, and also has a number of  dimensions. Deforestation can render 
large areas infertile by destroying the rainfall retention and windbreak functions 
that tree cover can provide. The overuse of  fertilisers, especially inorganic ones, 
but even organic ones as well, can seriously damage the soil. Equally notorious 
is the temptingly excessive application of  pesticides and herbicides, which, like 
antibiotics, provoke evolutionary development in their targets so that the pests 
and the weeds emerge more resistant and vigorous than ever. Genetically modified 
crops doubtless have their advantages, and there is no evidence so far that they are 
unsafe to eat, but these considerations omit the question of  the impact they are 
likely to have on the soil and other forms of  plant and insect life.
In the fields of  engineering and fuel supply, nuclear energy appeared to be the 
answer to numerous prayers. Indeed in the 1950s the movement in opposition 
to nuclear weapons used to stress the slogan of  ‘atoms for peace’. What was not 
taken to account then, or among the advocates of  nuclear energy today, were 
the consequences of  the inevitable calamities in nuclear power plants and the 
permanent problem of  disposing of  accumulations of  nuclear waste that remain 
radioactive for hundreds of  thousands or even millions of  years. Also in the 
engineering context, civil aviation had inestimable advantages and is overall a very 
safe form of  transport, but nevertheless has killed a large number of  people. 
Thompson T02687 01 text   211 16/12/2014   13:29
212 Work, Sex and PoWer
Market Forces
What these forms of  dialectic have in common is that they are driven by market 
forces (though, to be sure, their publicly owned equivalents in the Soviet bloc did 
little better) and the aim of  their producers is to boost sales and profits and dodge 
regulation so far as possible.
This leads us on to the dialectic of  market forces. Marx begins his first 
volume of  Capital with an analysis of  the commodity form. A commodity in his 
terminology is an article produced for sale to satisfy the purchaser whether in the 
brain or in the belly as he expresses it, in other words to bring either material or 
mental satisfaction to the purchaser. He had no reason to analyse at that point why 
purchasers should want to obtain commodities beyond the basic needs of  bodily 
existence (which are certainly considerable), but the initial reason is not far to seek. 
It is, again, to directly or indirectly put as much distance as possible between the 
natural existence of  the individuals involved in the transaction and the one they 
hope to enjoy by making the purchase.
Markets have of  course existed since time immemorial – they probably existed 
in a rudimentary form even in the Palaeolithic in relations between forager bands 
– and are a powerful engine of  productive growth and development and of  social 
change. In subsequent millennia they have constantly expanded on a global scale 
and brought within their scope multiplying sectors of  the economy in spite of  
wars, natural catastrophes and all species of  disruptions. Of  great importance 
though, and necessary to keep in mind, is that markets until at least the eighteenth 
century CE were governmentally controlled, as indeed many still are – and it was 
a universal consensus that they should be controlled, contrary to the ideological 
propaganda and widespread assumptions of  subsequent decades. 
The market too is subject to the dialectic, and the vision of  the ideological 
proponents of  the market freed from governmental regulation and interference 
was far different from the reality that emerged from the decoupling of  this 
relationship. The earlier consensual acceptance of  market regulation by authority 
rested upon two foundations, one from the side of  the rulers and the other from 
the feeling of  the ruled. 
In the first instance it was agreed, most famously by the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century mercantilists, that government intervention was required both 
to serve the national interest by keeping the various sectors of  the economic 
system in harmonious balance (mainly for the rulers’ benefit of  course) and to 
aggressively promote the nation’s trade (which at the time included trade in slaves) 
at the expense of  commercial rivals. The Navigation Acts passed by English 
governments are a good example of  this. They aimed to promote English shipping 
by compelling merchants to trade only in English vessels or those of  the immediate 
trading partner, and so cut out middlemen (especially the Dutch) in the carrying 
trade. There was however exception taken to domestic monopolies formerly sold 
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by the monarchy to royal favourites for the purpose of  raising revenue, and these 
were abolished by Cromwell’s regime and not reinstated after its collapse. However 
monopolies for certain areas of  foreign trade, especially with south and eastern 
Asia, remained acceptable. 
The second foundation was the popular demand that governments should 
intervene to address food shortages in particular areas, especially of  grain, by 
means of  price controls to discourage movements of  grain from the affected area 
and to prevent merchants from taking advantage of  shortages by raising prices 
to the degree of  putting foodstuffs out of  the reach of  the poor. This was what 
E P Thompson designated as the eighteenth-century moral economy, and it was 
exemplified by food rioters who expropriated grain stores (usually in transit) but 
instead of  simply stealing them sold the commodity at what was regarded as a 
fair price.
Ideologists
The ideologists of  free trade disputed these assumptions. Adam Smith, who 
was primarily a philosopher rather than an economist, was no admirer of  
businessmen, contrary to the twentieth-century ideologists who argued in his 
name. His presumption was that merchants, traders and owners of  manufacturing 
establishments were swindlers by nature and would cheat the public whenever 
opportunity offered. The cure for that, however, was not government regulation, 
but a free competitive market, so that these same merchants, traders and owners 
of  manufacturing establishments would be compelled in their own interest to also 
serve the public interest with low prices and good quality goods, or risk losing 
business when their customers went elsewhere. 
The argument was extended. Competitive pressure would also promote 
innovation and much improved organisation of  production (Smith did not foresee 
the industrial revolution, he assumed natural power sources), resulting in greatly 
enhanced public prosperity from which everyone would benefit. A free market in 
grain would not result in shortage and starvation but instead induce progressive 
farmers and landowners to expand their output, and the outcome would be 
cheaper bread (which would also enable wages to be reduced).
This would particularly be the case if  the argument was also applied to foreign 
trade. Free markets here would result, as the title of  his magnum opus implied, 
in great enhancement of  the wealth of  nations. Welcome as that would be, the 
benefits would be even greater. Such a policy would promote universal peace, 
as nations linked by commerce, where each concentrated on producing the 
commodities which it was naturally best fitted to produce, known as comparative 
advantage, would never go to war with each other. In short, the spokespeople for 
the free market had beneficent, not malevolent intentions and outcomes in mind. 
In Smith’s time government obstruction undoubtedly was an especially relevant 
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obstacle to increasing production. It was not the fault of  these theorists that the 
acceptance of  their prescriptions produced results of  quite a different sort.
To the distress of  some neoliberal fundamentalists, markets totally free 
of  government interference have never existed even at the peak of  free trade 
ideology. Even during the second half  of  the nineteenth century when free trade 
was the reigning orthodoxy in the UK, the government not merely reserved to 
itself  control over the coinage, as all governments do, but also strictly regulated 
paper money though not directly responsible for its issue, which was the province 
of  banks. It also extensively regulated the privately-owned railway system and did 
not reject the possible option of  taking it into public ownership if  the railway 
companies failed to fulfil their purpose.7 
The economic affairs of  British colonies were controlled much more severely 
– and in India the regime even copied one of  the most hated institutions of  the 
French ancien régime, prohibiting even private individuals from producing salt 
(such as by evaporating seawater) so that the Indian government enjoyed a total 
monopoly.8 By that time international trade in the UK was mostly open to all 
competitors with few restrictions and only light customs duties, but other states, 
particularly the German empire and the US, operated restrictive tariff  policies. 
Moreover, in every manner of  enterprise, commercial, financial, agrarian, or 
industrial, free competition where it existed inevitably evolved into monopolistic 
or oligopolistic domination of  the relevant economic sector as the more successful 
capitalists swallowed up the less. 
Nevertheless, even taking these particulars into account, open markets with 
free competition became the bread and butter of  modern western societies, and 
the results were spectacular. The industrial revolution was one of  them, and far 
from lightening the burden of  backbreaking toil it enhanced it immensely in 
industrial establishments and subjected infants along with adults to the disciplines 
of  factory production mediated by the market. Pre-industrial cities were also 
filthy disease-ridden locations, but to that the early industrial ones added massive 
smoke and chemical pollution and new records in muck creation. In the realm of  
transport the branch of  commerce concerned with insurance gave birth to the 
coffin ships, so overloaded that they were likely to sink even in less than severe 
weather, to the unconcern of  the owners who collected the insurance on vessel 
and cargo. 
With land transport, the railway certainly gave rise to many casualties through 
accidents on under-maintained lines when maintenance was scamped for the 
sake of  profit, but that was comparatively minor stuff. The motor vehicle did not 
require malpractice on the part of  manufacturers or salespersons (though there 
was plenty of  that as well) to take on the role of  an angel of  death – ordinary 
human carelessness at the wheel or among pedestrians was perfectly adequate to 
produce massive death tolls across the decades. The market dialectic even fouled 
up the ostensible purpose of  the innovation  – speed of  travel – above all in towns 
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and cities, though by no means confined to these alone, owing to unmanageable 
traffic congestion caused by the multiplying number of  private vehicles.
The immediate unintended consequences of  market-driven, consumer-
directed industrialisation are serious enough, but much worse could potentially 
be waiting to show itself. In brief, it threatens to wreck the planet by destruction 
of  the rainforests, together with their carbon dioxide-absorbing capacity and their 
biodiversity, and by the release of  trillions of  tons of  carbon dioxide and possibly 
methane as well, heating the planet precipitously. This causes the destruction of  
the plankton at the bottom of  the oceanic food chain and has a resulting impact 
on marine life in general. Additional threats to the planet arise from the production 
of  acid rain destroying terrestrial vegetation and from rises in sea levels through 
polar melting such as to not only drown coastal landscapes but disastrously affect 
wind and ocean current patterns. 
Certainly global warming is proceeding now at a faster rate than at any time in 
the geologic record over the past quarter-billion years at least.9 Even so, comparing 
it with past episodes, it will probably not render the planet uninhabitable in the 
manner of  Venus or Mars, or even necessarily bring on the extermination of  human 
life, but instead it is likely to kill billions and fit the survivors to re-experience all 
the horrors of  pre-modern living. 
Debt and Money in Modernity
Chapter Six has examined the role of  debt relations in the pre-modern period. 
It was then of  critical importance. In the era of  modernity it has become even 
more so, particularly in the context of  ‘liquid resources’, in other words money. 
The biblical pronouncement that ‘the love of  money is the root of  all evil’ is 
frequently rendered as ‘money is the root of  all evil’. The misrepresentation is 
significant. Both money and debt could be seen in their early days as convenient 
innovations lubricating social interaction, but soon thereafter and particularly in 
recent centuries they have assumed the character of  alien forces holding struggling 
populations in their grip.
For some centuries, during what western historians define as the medieval era, 
coined money, although never unimportant, played a relatively subordinate role, 
but from the middle of  the second millennium CE individuals, societies and states 
became increasingly, and thereafter wholly, dependent upon the shiny metal, as 
they remain to the present. Even without the international gold standard to adjust 
currencies, as used to be the case, the gold stored in Fort Knox is still the ultimate 
underpinning for the world’s monetary system. Coinage also made debt easier to 
impose and manipulate. It was bad enough when you had to turn over part of  
your product to the lord or the monarch, it was worse when you first of  all had to 
transform your tribute into coin. If  for any reason money was difficult to acquire 
because of  price fluctuation or other causes, you went deeper into debt and might 
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have to hand over your daughter as security to be the superior’s plaything or 
drudge until the debt was paid – if  it ever could be.
It was the Anglo-Scottish state of  the late seventeenth century10 which finally 
devised an excellent solution to the dangers of  bankruptcy into which states at 
that time were inclined to fall. That solution became intrinsic to the military-
commercial success of  the Anglo-Scottish state in the following century and 
rendered it the dominant global power, and which has since become standard 
practice for market-based states everywhere. This was, through the mechanism 
of  a central bank, the institution of  a regime of  continuous borrowing and 
continuous debt repayment. The practice was rendered attractive by means of  
moderately profitable but rigorously guaranteed securities, ‘gilt-edged stocks’ in 
British parlance, to draw in the savings of  investors all over the state’s territory and 
even beyond. Graeber writes that,
I have already pointed out that modern money is based on government debt, 
and that governments borrow money in order to finance wars. . . . The creation 
of  central banks represented a permanent institutionalisation of  that marriage 
between the interests of  warriors and financiers that had already begun to 
merge in Renaissance Italy and that eventually became the foundation of  
finance capitalism.11 
In the course of  the past century debt has increasingly come to permeate the 
existence of  ordinary citizens in industrialised societies. The main component of  
that has been, in the US and Britain, the increasing shift from house renting to 
house purchase (‘house’ in this instance including apartments of  all sorts). That 
has meant incurring a very large debt to be repaid over a shorter or longer period. 
During the ‘age of  affluence’ following the Second World War this form of  debt 
was supplemented by the growing purchase of  household utilities by means of  
deferred payment or ‘hire-purchase’ – or referred colloquially and tellingly as ‘the 
never-never’. Following the onset of  depression (politely termed ‘recession’) from 
the seventies into the present century, with intensified pressure upon wage-earners 
and trade unions, personal debt instead of  decreasing did the exact opposite. It 
expanded as a substitute for the slower growth or even contraction in real incomes. 
Thus the advantages of  debt to governments, to creditors, to business and even 
sometimes to individual debtors as well, developed over the centuries until the 
entire structure came crashing down in the first decade of  the twenty-first century 
– as it had in 1929. On the earlier occasion the details were different but the basic 
underlying reality was similar. Contrary to the expectations of  the 1950s and 60s 
the historical dialectic of  unintended consequences had not gone away and was at 
work once more.
The industrial economy of  the contemporary world is founded upon debt as 
is the property market and even a very large proportion of  everyday consumer 
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expenditure. Organised violence is not absent from the equation even when no 
actual fighting is taking place, for the importance of  the arms economy mentioned 
above though paid for in the long run by the taxes of  the countries’ citizens, is in 
the immediate event financed by borrowing, so that an enormous golden cascade 
flows via the Treasury into the accounts of  the lenders, predominantly banks and 
financial institutions. 
Political Developments
The historical dialectic applies not only to the material underpinnings of  society 
and culture but to consciously directed intervention in the government of  
societies. The Athenians after their victory in the Persian wars established an 
Aegean commercial empire to benefit themselves, and it did benefit them – the 
surviving cultural treasures that we know today, from the Parthenon to artworks 
in different media, were largely financed by that exploitation. However this empire 
also raised up deep opposition among the subjected cities and led eventually 
to the Athenians’ own ruin. Two thousand years later the English king Henry 
VIII took a decision to debase the coinage, an act which put rockets under the 
already embarrassing monetary inflation of  his reign. Henry died in good time 
to escape the consequences of  his policies – it was his successor Charles I who 
experienced them. 
To continue on that theme – when the respectable English parliamentar-
ians of  1642 took the reluctant and awesome step to confront their monarch in 
arms for limited objectives, the last thing they expected was that they themselves 
would in due course be shoved aside by the army radicals and that the monarch 
have his head cut off. Charles’s son, restored to the throne in 1660, would have 
been in a position when he died in 1685 to congratulate himself  that he had, 
despite some very bad moments, successfully relaid the foundations of  absolute 
monarchy. He could not know that his very success would be responsible for 
the overthrow of  his dynasty and of  absolute monarchy in the British Isles. The 
execution of  the Irish rebel leaders after the Easter Rising in 1916 was intended to 
ensure that the independence movement would be permanently crushed – instead 
it was responsible for its ultimate success. Before the aftermath of  the Rising 
independence was not a majority demand – devolution or Home Rule would 
have sufficed. 
These are specific illustrations of  how events might be said to have a will of  their 
own and run beyond the intentions of  those who set them in motion. Sometimes 
there are exceptions. The Dutch republic which emerged from the wars with the 
Spanish crown in the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries largely took the form which 
its inspirers intended; a bourgeois republic with a monarchical slant based on 
commerce and manufacturing, where power was safely concentrated in the hands 
of  the wealthy burgher oligarchy. The American republic established in the 1780s 
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after defeating the colonial power followed the Dutch example, and keeping more 
or less to the intended plan, prospered as a market-based, property-owning polity 
with the elites easily able to stay in control without any serious challenge from the 
lower levels of  the society. The fact that, unlike the Dutch, they had an enormous 
continental territory to exploit helped very considerably (and would have done so 
even if  the Spaniards had succeeded in holding on to the west and southwest of  
what is now the United States). 
Any form of  warfare is horrible beyond description – quite literally – for no 
description of  a battlefield, whether verbal or visual, can convey what it smells like 
as dozens, hundreds or thousands of  participants lie bathed in their blood with 
their guts torn out – and, in modern conditions of  urban warfare, civilians as well. 
The American independence war of  1776–83, fought between opposing formal 
armies and with little non-combatant involvement, was probably as ‘civilised’ as 
armed conflict is capable of  being (the Americans even showed sympathy for a 
condemned British spy): the equivalent Dutch war of  the sixteenth century was 
certainly not. It included generalised massacre and execution accompanying the 
military engagements. What these revolutions had in common was that neither 
was aiming at the fundamental transformation of  existing social structures, and 
thus could be supported, in both cases even militarily, by elites outside the specific 
conflict zone, English in the latter, French and Spanish in the former. However 
when significant challenges to the property basis of  society appeared on the agenda, 
the dialectic of  unintended consequences operated even more dramatically.
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Social Critique
Class Society – Early Critiques
Before any critique of  class society could be advanced certain preconditions 
were necessary. There had to be recognition that such an entity existed, that it 
contradicted the hopes and expectations of  those who experienced their dissatis-
faction not purely in personal or family terms but as part of  a wider public; and 
that deficiencies existed in the very structures of  social living.
The earliest known critique of  this sort appears comparatively late in historical 
development, and the term ‘appears’ is stressed – for with literacy confined to the 
elite levels of  society which benefited from the existence of  class structures, no 
such critique, if  it had existed, was likely to have left any written record. However 
the fact that not even elite attacks on such views are found before, at the earliest, 
the middle of  the second millennium BCE suggests that they were unknown in the 
pioneer literate civilisations. Grievances might generate revolts, even substantial 
ones, and palace coups, but these left the social foundations untouched. If  they 
succeeded the most they did was to replace one set of  rulers with another who 
continued except in details to rule as before.
When critiques of  class relations did emerge, inevitably they were cast in 
religious terms and looked to divine assistance to achieve their objectives. 
Zoroaster’s ‘making wonderful’ was the first of  which a record has survived 
(albeit only partially). In these writings the defects of  the class society of  the day 
were attributed along with other inflictions to an evil spirit locked in permanent 
conflict with his opposite number representing the desirable conditions which his 
followers were expected to inherit. 
Later religious critiques of  society (which of  course would not have for an 
instant recognised themselves in that description) followed along similar lines, and 
continued to do so for more than two millennia, while a favourite stratagem of  the 
powers-that-be was to incorporate the oppositional faith into the official pantheon 
in order to defuse its revolutionary charge. That, as noted above, was to be the fate 
of  Zoroastrianism, in the form of  Zurvanism, and later of  Christianity as well.
Apocalypses
In the second half  of  the first millennium BCE the Jewish kingdoms and their 
inhabitants were subjected to foreign powers – Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, 
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Greek and Roman, who had differing styles of  rule (the Persian monarchs were 
particularly indulgent) but each was in every case hegemonic and exercised the 
final word regarding Jewish affairs. The Greek successors of  Alexander the Great 
went further than the others and actually tried to destroy the religion. They had 
a measure of  success until defeated by the Maccabean revolt, which naturally 
reinforced the religion’s strength but generated its own subsequent contradictions 
and problems. 
Out of  these turmoils emerged the Jewish apocalypses, represented by some 
of  the apocryphal texts or pseudepigrapha surviving as footnotes to the Christian 
bible. These include the Book of  Enoch and the Book of  Jubilees for example, 
with visions of  a final overthrow and punishment of  foreign oppressors and 
their hirelings, to be followed by a paradisial state of  affairs where there would 
be material plenty for all believers in beautiful surroundings and total absence of  
oppression and conflict. As noted in Chapter Nine, at some point around 100 
CE an adherent of  the new faith produced a Christian version of  the same, now 
termed the Book of  Revelation, which foresaw apocalypse in even more fearsome 
terms than the earlier Jewish versions and promised, with gloating dwelling on 
mass death and catastrophe, the exact opposite to the promise incorporated in 
another canonical Christian text of  ‘peace on earth and goodwill towards men’.
In actual fact the contradiction only emerged once the Christian biblical canon 
(New Testament) was well established, for initially many church leaders distrusted 
Revelation’s implied social message of  ferocious punishment for rulers, and so 
argued against its inclusion. Bishop Eusebius, in Constantine’s reign, the first 
historian of  the Christian church, expressed serious doubt about its authenticity. 
However the rank and file of  the movement loved it, for they naturally read into 
it their own discontents and resentments along with its promise of  their ultimate 
good fortune when the apocalypse or last judgement finally occurred, which it was 
thought would not be long delayed.
These pressures, along with its claimed authorship by the apostle John (though 
the styles of  the various writings attributed to this individual are very different) 
resulted in its eventual acceptance, with the advantage of  deferring settlement 
of  social issues till the last judgement.1 Not that the contents of  this text were 
wholly original and altogether spun out of  its writer’s brain. The earliest Jewish 
followers of  Jesus of  Nazareth had certainly expected him, with divine assistance, 
to lead the overthrow of  Roman power and institute a glorious new social order, 
and there is every reason to conclude that their rival gentile Christians recruited 
by Saul of  Tarsus also foresaw an imminent end to the world. The author of  the 
Revelation horror-story with a happy ending was undoubtedly drawing on these 
same traditions.
The suspicious bishops certainly had a point, for throughout the centuries 
thereafter this text was constantly mined for inspiration and morale by social 
radicals hoping to overthrow the constituted authorities of  their day, and finding 
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in the historical developments of  their own time substantiation of  Revelation’s 
prophesies. This is a process which continues into our own century except that it is 
seldom or never social radicals who are now responsible but religiously motivated 
social reactionaries.
Even in past millennia the possibility of  social transformation was envisaged 
not only by radicals speaking on behalf  of  the masses, but also social and political 
reactionaries aiming to serve the ends of  the elites they spoke for. The most 
renowned of  these was the Athenian aristocrat Plato in his best-known text, The 
Republic, motivated by the intense social struggles then raging within the Athenian 
community. The landowning elite detested and abhorred the fact that they had to 
operate within the framework of  the Athenian democracy, limited though it was. 
Plato envisaged a city in which the most able members of  his class – ability in 
this version consisted in understanding philosophical abstractions  – would enjoy 
unlimited authority over everyone else in a three-level system of  caste stratification 
with some flexibility of  movement between the castes. Of  course the top-level 
‘guardians’ in this concept would be committed to ruling for the public good, 
not their own personal advantage. Subsequent social reactionaries, most notably 
the Roman Cicero, picked up on these notions, discussed and developed them, 
but in the changed circumstances of  their times treated them as speculative and 
admirable ideals rather than as practical recipes for government. 
Religious Rebelliousness
When Christianity, from 312 CE onwards ceased to be an oppositional movement 
in any sense and instead became part of  the governmental machinery of  the Roman 
state, the contradiction between its future vision and its present circumstances 
became particularly acute. Oppositional ‘heretical’ movements such as Donatists, 
Circumcellions and Montanists multiplied within the community. They adhered to 
the older ideology and imminent apocalyptic expectations, seeking martyrdom in 
order to hurry it up.
In the latter days of  the western empire, the bishop of  Hippo in North 
Africa, Augustine, also in his spare time a persecutor of  the Donatists, devised a 
theology intended to resolve the contradictions. Drawing on his earlier Manichean 
beliefs, which hated and despised the material world, he propounded a doctrine 
of  total human depravity brought on by disobedience in the Garden of  Eden, 
with sexual sin as its consequence and emblem, and only redeemable through 
divine grace, sparingly doled out. The apocalypse was probably not imminent; 
it might be delayed for hundreds of  thousands of  years and until that far time 
social transformation was off  the agenda and Christians duty-bound to obey both 
secular and religious authorities. Paradise was to bookend human history. It had 
been lost at its beginning and was to be regained at its conclusion, but between 
these events there could be no question that individuals’ existence in the Christian 
scheme must be nothing but a vale of  tears. The historian Ellen Meiksins Wood 
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remarks that, ‘[Augustine] succeeded in arguing a brief  for absolute obedience to 
even the most unchristian of  worldly rulers’2
During the European medieval centuries, both in Europe and the Islamic world, 
not to mention the Indian subcontinent and China, there were endless religiously 
inspired or influenced popular rebellions and oppositional movements, but they 
did not envisage a new heaven and earth but rather a reversion to the imagined 
‘good old days’, even if  these good old days were in the far distant past. One such 
notion was exemplified in the concept of  the ‘Norman yoke’,3 which remained 
alive in English radical politics into the eighteenth century. Even more distant 
good old days might be envisaged, for example in the slogan of  the English four-
teenth-century rebellious peasants, ‘When Adam delved and Eve span, who then 
was the gentleman?’
However in Europe from the time of  the Reformation in the sixteenth century the 
pursuit of  the millennium, to use Norman Cohn’s phrase, was once again practical 
politics, most notably in the case of  Thomas Müntzer, a leader in the German 
Peasant War which followed Luther’s Reformation and which had a programme 
of  radical social equality. John of  Leiden was able, during the following decade, to 
take control of  the city of  Münster and institute a soon-suppressed Anabaptist4 
version of  the new Jerusalem.5 Similar ideas of  a divinely-mandated overthrow of  
existing institutions emerged during the English revolution of  1640–60, its main 
proponents being the Quakers (a very different breed from their contemporary 
descendants), the Ranters and Muggletonians and the Fifth Monarchists (from 
their doctrine of  five monarchies of  which Christ’s, imminently due, would be the 
final one). The Puritan emigrants to Massachusetts also intended to construct ‘a 
city on a hill’ with a drastically different religious regime from what prevailed in 
England – but did not propose any upset in property relations.
Property was likewise an institution whose basis the Enlightenment thinkers of  
the eighteenth century exempted from their far-reaching critique of  contemporary 
institutions. The Enlightenment was no coherent programme but a very divided 
and contradictory climate in the thinking of  eighteenth-century western European 
intelligentsia. By and large these thinkers, from Diderot, Condorcet and Voltaire 
in France, Hume and Smith in Scotland, Kant in Germany, to name only the most 
eminent, were devoted to the concept of  progress – institutions and practices 
had, in Marx’s words, ‘to justify themselves at the bar of  reason’. Reason was 
their guiding light and, though disagreeing on much, they wanted institutions 
reformed according to its dictates. They saw free commerce as the rational mode 
for economic affairs, but they did not challenge the institution of  property as 
such, nor, on the whole, did they advocate upsetting existing political structures. 
They saw these instead, including absolute monarchy, as the instruments through 
which the reforms they advocated could be realised (for example the Austrian 
ruler Joseph II).
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau was somewhat different, indeed there is disagreement 
over whether he should even be included among the Enlightenment figures. The 
foundation of  his thinking was not so much reason as his idea of  nature. Nor was 
he wedded to the notion of  progress, arguing in an early essay that the triumph of  
culture over nature had been a disaster rather than a blessing for mankind. He was 
also intellectually at an angle to the other Enlightenment eminences in being, albeit 
somewhat ambiguously, a democrat, with his notion of  the general will. Certainly 
he advocated a transformation of  political institutions and educational practices, 
and was of  the opinion that riches and poverty were both obstacles to virtue; his 
vision was of  a moderately prosperous community of  agriculturalists and artisans, 
avoiding extremes of  wealth.
Challenge to Property
Issues of  property and its consequences for the dispossessed became politically 
explosive in the early modern era in the aftermath of  the last and greatest of  what 
Robert Palmer has termed the ‘Atlantic revolutions’ of  the late eighteenth century: 
the French Revolution of  1789–99, which also provided the most immediately 
dramatic example up to then of  the dialectic of  unintended consequences. Of  
course, as with the Dutch, English (more accurately British Isles) or American 
revolutions, nobody at the starting point intended that the process should assume 
widely lethal dimensions let alone become the mother of  all subsequent revolutions 
– quite the contrary. 
The process was set off  by an inter-elite quarrel whose originators had 
reactionary aims in view and which Louis XVI tried to finesse by summoning the 
archaic feudal representative institution, the States General, redundant for almost 
two centuries, to the royal residence at Versailles. It quickly ran out of  his control, 
as well as that of  its upper elite constituents. Accompanied by upheavals in 
nearby Paris, it fundamentally altered the terms of  French politics, bringing to the 
forefront a new breed of  bourgeois politicians who soon sidelined the declassed 
aristocratic leaders they had initially accepted.
At the beginning all that was intended was the redress of  widespread grievances, 
economic, social and cultural. When that was attempted however it profoundly 
disturbed the fundamental social structures. The consensual abolition of  feudalism 
literally overnight (serfdom as such was already largely extinct) constituted an 
attack on property rights and privilege, giving rise to frenzied panic in the mind 
of  the English reactionary Edmund Burke, who had formerly had no difficulty 
in ideologically supporting the American rebels. The social instability resulted 
from the fact that the opening scenes of  the revolution had generated enormous 
hopes throughout the populace who had been afflicted for countless centuries by 
not only the material exactions of  the monarchy and aristocratic elites but their 
arrogance and disdain as well. 
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Now they had thrown off  these burdens (though still with a constitutional 
monarch and being expected to pay compensation to the nobility for their loss of  
feudal rights) they were citizens enjoying ‘The Rights of  Man’, so why should there 
be any further problem? The revolution had succeeded splendidly in a matter of  
months – but popular aspirations once ignited could not be so readily contained. 
The bourgeois politicians now in command aspired to remodel French society 
according to Enlightenment principles, the masses to remodel it still further. 
Democracy Militant
Before long what had been achieved was seen to be under threat from various 
directions: from unreconciled aristocrats plotting armed action with foreign aid 
to regain their privileges; from disruptions to the urban food supply consequent 
on the rural upheaval; from the financial straits of  the successive revolutionary 
governments as the outrageously unfair taxation system, already in a thorough mess 
and requiring profound reform, disintegrated. The king tried unsuccessfully to flee 
the country to the reactionary rebels across the frontier, and the neighbouring 
monarchs who sympathised with them later mobilised their forces, thanks to the 
frivolous overconfidence of  the early revolutionary governments in declaring war 
to distract popular attention. With the army in turmoil the fighting went badly and 
the country suffered invasion. It was an ideal combination of  circumstances to 
generate intense suspicion, especially when foreign armies did actually invade and 
advance quite easily, threatening destruction of  all the revolutionary gains.
The mess had already been further compounded when the same revolutionary 
governments attempted to reorganise the Catholic church. It was not the 
confiscation of  church lands to use as a substitute for bullion to underpin the 
new paper currency they introduced which created the crisis; rather it was their 
attempt to subject the clergy to civil control and make them swear an acceptance 
oath to that effect. This provoked intense opposition at all levels of  society, and 
in combination with economic disruption, centralisation of  government in Paris 
and the overriding of  local custom and practices, resulted in many of  the newly-
emancipated citizenry feeling that they were worse off  than they had been under 
the royal and aristocratic regime. Soon enough it provoked boiling discontent both 
in substantial areas of  the French countryside and in major cities such as Lyons.
The crisis which was the outcome of  this situation generated its own chain 
of  unintended consequences. The Parisian petty bourgeoisie (the sans-culottes), 
who had most to gain from the revolution, took the initiative. In response a new 
breed of  radical politician using the Jacobin Club and the Paris city administration 
of  the Commune as their nerve centres, mobilised popular anger and bloodily 
overthrew the monarchy in August 1792, following this by executing the king and 
purging their rivals in the newly elected Convention. The foreign enemy continued 
to advance however, while civil war exploded throughout France. 
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The Jacobin-dominated Convention centralised authority even more tightly in 
Paris, intensified the scale of  internal repression in the capital and outside, and 
seized provisions from the surrounding countryside. Earlier they had looked the 
other way when fear of  imminent enemy attack triggered a frightful spontaneous 
massacre in Paris of  suspected counter-revolutionaries (and many others as 
well). Responding to sans-culotte pressure they instituted an emergency regime, 
with terror proclaimed ‘the order of  the day’, to be enforced by special courts. 
They imposed military conscription, police vigilance and economic controls 
accompanied by ruthless liquidation of  alleged counter-revolutionaries. ‘Perhaps 
no other subject makes it quite so difficult to resist the temptation to read first 
beginnings in terms of  subsequent developments and outcomes. . . ’,6 Arno 
Mayer argues.
Their grim programme was successful. The regional revolts were crushed, 
the new armies reorganised and supplied, incompetent or traitorous generals 
guillotined,7 internal revolt quelled and the invading forces thrust back. The 
Republic passed over to the offensive. The Jacobin leaders nevertheless soon 
found themselves caught up in the wheels of  the merciless historical dialectic. The 
Convention, the Jacobins and the leaders of  the Paris Commune divided three 
ways – between the organisers of  the regime which aimed to develop it into the 
Republic of  Virtue, resting on the twin supports of  virtue and terror; the faction 
which thought the Terror not severe enough and too inattentive to sans-culotte 
needs; and the one which deemed it too severe. 
The great majority of  Conventionnels, not to speak of  the minor revolutionary 
officialdom, belonged to the last of  these. They were eager to enjoy what had 
been accomplished, to cash in for wealth and status the political influence they 
possessed. By mid-1794 they were free from the desperate unity imposed by 
invasion threat, irked by the restrictions of  Jacobin virtue and terrified of  the 
Revolutionary Tribunal. In July 1794 their alliance of  convenience with the 
surviving ultra-terrorists overthrew the revolutionary administration, executed 
its leading upholders, and installed a more ‘moderate’ regime which rigorously 
repressed the sans-culottes to the accompaniment of  an orgy of  profiteering. 
Property was once again in the saddle.
The succeeding regime however could not stabilise itself. The obvious solution 
would have been to restore the monarchy under conditions, as its counterpart 
in the British republic had done in 1660, and this was considered, but rejected 
as too risky. Too many of  the rulers were former regicides who stood to be 
executed with horrible tortures if  the Bourbons ever got back on the throne. 
Various constitutional experiments were tried but none was stable and the regime 
fluctuated slightly to the left or to the right depending on circumstances, while 
both Jacobin and royalist revolts and conspiracies in Paris continued to occur. 
In consequence in 1799 the republic morphed into a lightly disguised military 
dictatorship, ‘beating guillotines into swords’ in Arno Mayer’s apt phrase.8 Five 
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years later the monarchy was restored after a fashion when the dictator, Napoleon 
Bonaparte, had himself  appointed as Emperor. At his coronation, one veteran 
revolutionary general in attendance looked around and remarked, ‘Everybody is 
here – apart from the ones who gave their lives to stop this kind of  thing ever 
happening again’.
Rousseau was the prophet of  the most advanced Jacobins, who regarded 
property as so beneficial that everybody ought to have a sufficiency of  it, if  
necessary by redistribution, and in the final months of  the Jacobin republic, in 
early 1794, it attempted to advance some distance along that route by proposing 
the redistribution among good citizens of  the property of  traitors and émigrés. 
That project was aborted with their overthrow, and was probably unrealistic in 
any case. It was only in the post-Jacobin decade, with Gracchus Babeuf  and his 
abortive Conspiracy of  the Equals, that property itself  and not merely its maldis-
tribution, was identified as the key social problem.
The Jacobins not only adopted a constitution (which they never implemented) 
with a universal (male) franchise but decreed the abolition of  slavery in the French 
colonies. They represented what was probably the farthest imaginable degree 
of  social transformation available at the time. Babeuf ’s intended conspiratorial 
coup never had a chance of  success. Only with their failure and the unplanned 
transformation of  economic life did a different approach become feasible.
Industrial Impact
It was apparent to any observer that the new industrial world of  the nineteenth 
century, located in western Europe and the United States, was riddled with 
contradictions, and it was no accident that Hegel placed that concept at the centre 
of  his philosophy. New inventions and innovations made possible the creation 
of  commodities which were marketed as lifestyle improvements, or widened 
availability of  ones hitherto confined to the higher income groups. Cotton for 
example, the centrepiece of  early British industrialisation, was the amazing new 
fabric of  its day, combining qualities of  lightness, temperature adjustment – cool 
in hot circumstances, warm in cold ones  – easily washed and readily printed. Other 
innovations expanded the availability of  ceramics and glassware, steel cutlery and 
woollen cloth. Railway systems enabled communication of  goods, persons and 
information to be carried on at hitherto unimaginable speeds. In Ivanhoe, referred 
to earlier, Walter Scott also remarked as an aside how the aristocracy of  past 
centuries lived in circumstances far less comfortable than the average person (i.e. 
the middle-class one) of  his own day. 
Yet the urbanisation associated with these developments turned the new 
population concentrations into perfect hell-holes of  filth and squalor and 
intensified rather than alleviated the nauseous character of  preindustrial towns 
and cities. The universal fossil fuel, coal, which made it all possible, apart from 
imprisoning growing numbers of  adults and children in underground caverns of  
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unspeakable discomfort and extreme danger, deposited its blanket of  soot over 
public and private spaces alike. Appropriately enough Charles Dickens named his 
representative urban setting Coketown. Where chemical works were in operation 
a further ingredient was added to the poisonous brew, and where salt was pumped 
out of  the ground in liquid form town dwellers suffered the additional experience 
of  their buildings’ foundations being undermined and frequently collapsing.
Socially and culturally things were no better, with Thomas Carlyle complaining 
of  the reduction of  all relationships to ‘the inhuman cash nexus’. In Europe, apart 
from France, but not altogether absent from there as well, territorial lords were 
still very much on the scene and in their attitudes to dwellers on their estates 
little improvement on their medieval predecessors, indeed in some instances like 
Ireland worse if  anything. To them had been added the magnates of  industry, who 
in some cases aspired to treat their workforces as a medieval baron would have 
treated his dependants – the Krupp steel firm in Germany being a classic example. 
What it added up to was extreme destitution evident in the middle of  plenty, 
squalor in the middle of  the potential for its abolition, and the growth of  new 
social classes out of  pre-industrial roots. On the one hand that period saw a 
development of  the middle classes which had existed for centuries as traders 
and affluent peasants, and on the other there emerged a class of  labourers who 
were cut off  from virtually any source of  livelihood other than the weekly (often 
intermittent) payment for their labour power and perpetually threatened with the 
stoppage even of  that unreliable source. 
Not surprisingly there were strong reactions on both an individual and a 
collective level, both theoretical and practical. Visionaries of  the Romantic 
movement looked back nostalgically to the imagined simpler, purer, rural, more 
‘organic’ times of  the European medieval period in contrast to the soulless 
‘mechanical’ civilisation in which they found themselves embedded. It would be 
an exaggeration, but not wholly without foundation, to describe them as nature 
worshippers. It was an intellectual trend which continued throughout the century, 
to include towards its end William Morris, who combined his medievalism and 
attachment to an organic vision of  society with Marxism. 
However it was not only intellectuals who adopted that attitude. The idea of  
escaping from an intolerable urban environment to one of  rural harmony motivated 
the groups who tried to found utopian colonies in the American wilderness, one 
being titled, significantly, ‘New Harmony’. The notion of  retreating to a family 
farm had, until at least the middle of  the century, great appeal to many members 
of  the English working class and was a significant theme within the Chartist 
movement.
What was to mark a new and portentous departure was the idea that instead 
of  rejecting the new industrial civilisation it could be embraced and turned into 
one fit for human beings. Not that its satisfied admirers such as J R McCulloch 
and Nassau Senior thought any differently in that respect. The renowned English 
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economist Alfred Marshall, late in the century, summed it up in the comment that 
‘I regard all this poverty as a mere passing evil in the progress of  man upwards’.9 
Where the new thinkers differed, was that they combined the promise of  indus-
trialisation with the critique of  property relations begun by the Conspiracy 
of  the Equals in the 1790s. Babeuf  is sometimes credited with being the first 
(revolutionary) socialist, although the ‘socialism’ term was not minted until the 
early nineteenth century by Henri de Saint Simon.
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Socialism: Its Promise and Paradox
The essence of  the socialist thesis in all its multiple varieties was that the essential 
social problem was not one of  industrialisation per se, which had on the contrary 
the potential of  putting an end to the millennial blights upon human existence, but 
the social context in which it was embedded. The problem was identified as the 
dog-eat-dog one of  possessive individualism. This celebrated greed and the cash 
nexus and correspondingly was driven, whatever the sentiments of  the individual 
employer, to hire labourers at the lowest possible rates and work them for the 
longest possible hours in the worst possible conditions and to resist improvements 
in public health and amenities if  these had to be financed by taxation and did not 
have a short-term financial payoff. Cooperative work and living, plus production 
for need instead of  greed, should replace it.
From this basic starting point socialist thinking diverged in a multitude of  
conflicting directions. Saint Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen were the 
most eminent of  what were in due course to be designated the utopian socialists, 
for the reason that they thought these essential aims could be realised through the 
application of  reason and example. Saint Simon appealed to the high and mighty 
to recognise the merits of  his views and help him implement them; Fourier, with 
greater or lesser success, founded utopian colonies in the United States.
Robert Owen, with experience as a humane but successful capitalist employer, 
believed initially that society could be transformed by such methods. With his 
propaganda falling on stony ground among the British influential, he also 
experimented with utopian colonies and finally with an attempt to institute an 
alternative cooperative economy in Britain, with a labour currency in competition 
to the capitalist one. By the second half  of  the century these approaches were 
marginalised if  not dead (though some ideas of  their proponents were to live on in 
other contexts) and three principal currents of  socialist thinking, themselves more 
fragmented than homogenous, dominated the field of  cooperativist ideology.1 
Anarchism
The first of  these was what became known as anarchism, which itself  took both 
pacifist and revolutionary forms. Its basic idea sprung from the reality that humans 
are a social species, though most varieties of  anarchists also, in rather contradictory 
fashion, stressed individualism, and advanced the conception that the ideal social 
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form was one of  small communities of  individuals living co-operatively. These, it 
was argued would neutralise oppressive and inhuman practices. 
The big enemy was the state, currently dominated by wealthy aristocrats and 
oligarchs, but just as vicious if  it ever came to be employed as a method of  control 
by alleged revolutionaries. The instruments of  the state, especially armies, police 
and religion, were included in this condemnation. The public that anarchism mostly 
came to attract were those social strata threatened by the advance of  industrial 
capitalism, such as peasants and independent craft workers. It achieved a degree 
of  purchase in Italy, Switzerland, France, the western Russian empire, the United 
States and above all in Spain and the former Spanish Latin American countries. 
Round the turn of  the century it gave rise to what were for a time powerful trends 
among industrial workers, those of  syndicalism and anarcho-syndicalism, which 
postulated that independently of  politicians, whether reformist or revolutionary, 
workers’ power mobilised in industrial unions could overthrow capitalism and 
institute a socialist community.
Reformism
The second major current was that of  reformist socialism, which again came in a 
spectrum of  differing shades. The fundamental concept here was that the blights 
of  capitalist society could be overcome by a process of  action which displaced 
the ruling classes from their positions of  power and wealth by means of  popular 
pressure stopping short of  bloody turmoil. These actions would at least compel 
the capitalist-dominated governments to accept the socialisation of  large parts of  
the economy and a generous welfare system sustaining decent living standards for 
the working class in sickness and health, in youth and old age – i.e. comprehensive 
reforms. This was to be achieved through the use of  voting power in a democratic 
franchise, propaganda and agitation and occasionally coercive power in the form 
of  strike action – which in Belgium in the 1890s actually worked to secure a 
universal (male) franchise.
A lot of  emphasis in reformist socialism was placed on evolutionary 
conceptions, or rather a misunderstanding of  them, which envisaged organic 
evolution as a teleology and then applied similar thinking to social evolution as 
well. Organic evolution after countless aeons had at last produced humans as 
the supreme evolutionary achievement, and social evolution was headed in the 
same direction when it would before many more decades bring into existence 
a collectivist society employing the wonders of  technology and industry in the 
cause of  human welfare rather than capitalist profit. Ruling classes might object 
and resist, but resistance was futile, for they were a doomed social species, as the 
dinosaurs had been a doomed organic one. The failure of  Bismarck’s anti-socialist 
programme, embodied in his Anti-Socialist Law of  the 1870s and 80s, could be 
viewed as an instructive example.
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It is not surprising that such a perspective proved very attractive to many 
industrial workers and persons of  goodwill from other classes as well. Violent 
revolution is a very risky business for its participants and their dependants, with 
imprisonment, destitution and death very much on the agenda; and so not likely to 
be entered into except in very extreme conditions. Socialists, tending on the whole 
to be historically well-educated even if  in these years, self-educated, were aware 
of  the precedents of  the French Revolution and the revolutions and attempted 
revolutions of  the nineteenth century with their extensive bloodlettings.2 
Among its adherents reformist socialism tended to be viewed as being possible to 
implement within national borders, contrary to the generally prevailing conception 
that though the socialist parties were organised within state boundaries, essentially 
it was an international movement. One of  the most conservative German 
socialists, Georg Vollmar, even used the expression ‘national socialism’ – to be fair, 
he could not have been expected to have possessed prophetic powers. A revealing 
characteristic of  the reformist socialists was that they tended to take for granted 
the colonial empires of  the European powers while advocating improvements in 
the treatment their inhabitants received from the colonisers. Again misapplica-
tions of  evolutionary thinking came into the picture – European civilisations were 
assumed to stand on the highest level and therefore represented suitable mentors 
and guides for ‘the natives’.
The first major example of  a reformist socialist movement was established 
in Prussia in the 1860s. Though it remained small during his own lifetime, its 
originator was the charismatic though unstable Ferdinand Lassalle, who tried to 
establish an alliance with Bismarck.3 His organisation the ADAV, was one of  the 
two major components of  the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) of  the 
subsequent decade.
Communism
The other component represented the third current, that of  communism, though 
that actual name itself  disappeared for almost seventy years.4 Its basic postulates 
were embodied in The Communist Manifesto, the pamphlet authored by Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels in 1847. It shared with the reformist socialists the conception 
of  social evolution leading on to a collectivist society based upon science and 
modern industry – but an evolutionary process of  a very different sort. A sketch 
of  historical development since the foundation of  class society portrayed it as 
a grim affair characterised by perpetual conflict along the route as one class of  
oppressors replaced another to torment and exploit the basic producers. 
However this process had finally by dialectical necessity produced the 
bourgeoisie, who had been responsible for the unprecedented wonders of  the 
modern era. They had indeed thereby outlived their usefulness and achieved their 
own redundancy as they were no longer needed for the collective and beneficial 
employment of  these same wonders. They could not however be expected to 
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quietly concede their peaceful removal, and though the Manifesto itself  did not 
specify how they might be got rid of, Marx and Engels’s other writings made clear 
that it could only be done by violent revolution.
Whom the revolutionaries were to be was also explicitly set out. Not the 
conspiratorial groups à la Babeuf  or his ideological successor Auguste Blanqui, but 
what they termed the proletariat, by which they meant the class of  wage-earners, 
with the organised factory and equivalent workers as its core. They specifically 
disavowed providing any prescription for what the successor socialist society 
would look like or how it would be run, attributing such schemes to the utopian 
socialists who specified ‘street plans of  the New Jerusalem’. Marx however was 
later at pains to write a pamphlet indicating his opinion of  what a socialist society 
would not look like.
The title of  that pamphlet was Critique of  the Gotha Programme, which was a 
response to developments in Germany, where his followers were proposing to 
unite with those of  Lassalle to establish a unified socialist movement. Despite 
Marx’s criticism of  their perspectives, which he regarded as unrevolutionary and 
utopian, they went on to do so with Marx’s grudging endorsement, withstood 
Bismarck’s assault of  the 1870s and 80s and under the name of  the German Social 
Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, the Communist 
name being dropped as being too provocative), established the flagship example 
of  a successful socialist movement. 
Socialist Development
Early in the twentieth century the SPD’s leading theorist Karl Kautsky tried to 
resolve the contradictions by defining it as ‘a revolutionary but not a revolution-
making party’. It enjoyed the loyalty of  the majority of  German industrial and 
associated workers, providing an alternative cultural universe for its adherents in 
counterposition to the official national one. It sustained an enormous range of  
publications – dailies, weeklies, monthlies and learned journals – a powerful trade 
union affiliation and collectives for every imaginable social collective and cultural 
pursuit – women’s organisations, youth organisations, recreational and educational 
organisations, consumer cooperatives. 
So far as it had an ultimate perspective it was that capitalism would reach an 
impasse and breakdown as a result of  its own contradictions, the bourgeoisie 
would be unable to control the situation or the economy, and then socialists, with 
a parliamentary majority, would take over (means unspecified). In short, its leaders 
found themselves in the dilemma that would be repeated in many different contexts 
during the century ahead – a movement aspiring to social transformation faced 
with a social structure and political context in which socio-political revolution was 
most definitely not on the agenda; the situation theorised by the Italian Antonio 
Gramsci from his prison cell in the twenties and thirties. 
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In spite of  its rather unthreatening posture the SPD was particularly hated and 
feared by German monarchical officialdom, especially as its voting strength and 
parliamentary representation continued to grow. It violated their image of  united 
national sentiment happily focused upon loyalty to the Hohenzollern dynasty and 
in tune with its great power pretensions and imperial ambitions. The SPD’s trade 
union strength was an irritation to the feudally-minded German capitalist dynasties 
and those entrepreneurs and aspiring middle-class elements eager to join them; its 
consumer cooperatives a menace to small shopkeepers; its materialist ideology an 
offence to religious sentiment and to the romantic idealist philosophy favoured 
by the mainstream intelligentsia and the universities; its anti-militarist stances a 
provocation to the military elites and their many admirers.
Proposals were advanced for a military takeover with the Kaiser as political 
figurehead, to be followed by the thorough uprooting of  the party through a 
more effective revival of  Bismarck’s Anti-socialist Law. Such schemes were by no 
means confined to Germany, with similar notions being floated in Italy, likewise 
to combat a strong socialist political challenge. However in neither case prior to 
1914 were the times judged by their proponents to be sufficiently auspicious for 
such an undertaking. 
In the early years of  the twentieth century, as Perry Anderson has pointed out, 
thoughts and expectations of  cataclysm and revolution were widespread in public 
consciousness. Very bloody upheavals had erupted in China, Mexico and Russia 
with varying outcomes. Full-dress war was fought in South Africa and in the 
Balkans and the UK stood on the verge of  civil war over Irish Home Rule while 
undergoing at the same time an officers’ mutiny and massive civil unrest, which 
resulted in a gunboat deployed to intimidate strikers. 
At the same time the formal Socialist International network linking socialist 
organisations (even accommodating rival groups from the same country though 
excluding anarchists) was at the height of  its standing and confidence and prepared 
to pass resolutions denouncing war – which, if  entered into, would send workers 
into battle on opposite sides. It also threatened action to stop any European war 
which might break out on account of  the malevolence of  bourgeois governments. 
Naturally these same governments were alarmed and made preparations for 
mass arrests and repression to neutralise the threat if  the socialist leaders tried to 
implement it.
In August 1914 push came to shove and the dilemma confronted the socialist 
leaders in the respective belligerent countries of  adhering to their formal anti-war 
positions when to do so could have very serious consequences. The majority 
failed the test most conclusively and assisted their governments to prosecute the 
slaughter, or at most adopted a pacifist standpoint. They were motivated by a 
variety of  considerations, not all of  which were wholly discreditable. The French 
ones convinced themselves that they were supporting a principled war of  national 
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defence – after all the German government had declared war and the German 
army invaded. 
However the German socialist leadership also thought their country was 
engaged in a defensive war, this time against Tsarist tyranny and found texts from 
Marx and Engels to underwrite their position. Here too it was Germany which 
had declared war, not Russia, but the Kaiserreich’s excuse that Russian military 
mobilisation had left no alternative was all too easily accepted.
Then there was the attitude of  the socialist leaders’ constituency – the working 
classes of  the engaged countries on the whole did not doubt that war was justified 
and if  an evil then a necessary one, and they might well have repudiated leaders 
who tried to argue otherwise. Support for the war made them generally popular 
for the first time in their political careers and accepted into polite society. It 
could also give them the leverage to influence political decisions, and in some 
of  the belligerents make socialist participation in governments an accepted part 
of  the political scenery. At the trade union level it also gave opportunities to 
workers, particularly engineering ones, to assert themselves in consequence of  
their centrality to war production, though also stoking up industrial conflict as 
employers did their utmost to frustrate that ambition. 
The dialectic of  unintended consequences was certainly at work between 1914 
and 1918. The war was never intended to last over four years, to kill around 30 
million people, to accomplish incalculable material destruction and bring about 
the liquidation of  four empires. It had been planned to be short and decisive, 
reaching a speedy conclusion followed by a peace treaty or treaties in the style of  
their nineteenth-century equivalents, with national boundaries and international 
power relations seriously adjusted but existing regimes remaining in place. The 
reality was very different and the prolonged war both brought on the carnage 
and wreckage indicated above, but ruined the nineteenth century global economy, 
though this was not immediately apparent at its end. 
Communism in Action
What was apparent was that the bourgeois nightmare of  a socialist takeover had in 
1917 been realised, and not in any minor nationality but in the Russian empire, one 
of  the great powers, stretching across Eurasia from central Europe to the Pacific. 
Not only that, but within a year the new rulers of  the former empire made it plain 
that they intended, if  they could, to inspire replication of  their feat everywhere 
else. That project included encouraging the populations of  the European colonies 
and semi-colonies to rise against their masters  – something the reformist socialists 
never dreamed of  doing.5 Even after the international war was over the overthrown 
ruling classes in the former empire and the governments of  the victorious powers 
made strenuous efforts to destroy the new regime. They failed, but succeeded in 
reducing the country to a state of  utter destitution. The result of  that was to haunt 
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the new regime during the seventy-four years of  its existence, as Isaac Deutscher 
expresses the reality, 
Socialism cannot be founded on want and poverty. Against these all its 
aspirations are powerless. Scarcity inexorably breeds inequality. Where there is 
not enough food, clothing, and housing for all, a minority will grasp what it can; 
while the rest go hungry, clothed in rags and crowded in slums.6
The socialists who had brought about the 1917 overturn, and then gone on 
to establish an international organisation to further the project of  world socialist 
revolution, belonged to the most intransigently anti-bourgeois wing of  the 
movement and, for purely accidental reasons, had termed themselves Bolsheviks 
or majority people. Following the revolution they deliberately revived the old 
Communist name for themselves and their international co-thinkers who organised 
themselves along similar lines and with similar aims.
Meanwhile the Socialist International of  the prewar years had also been 
destroyed by the conflict, or rather by the reactions to it of  its member parties 
when they were lined up against each other in armed opposition. An attempt to 
revive it was made after the war in rivalry to the Communist International, but the 
revived organisation (which still exists after a fashion) was less than a shadow of  
its former significance and was specifically orientated towards a reformist agenda 
and acceptance of  capitalist hegemony as a permanent reality – though due to 
conflicting perspectives among its rank and file membership it took decades for 
this to become explicit.7 
The Communist International project based itself  on Lenin’s analysis of  the 
significance of  the war and the Socialist International’s collapse and capitulation 
to the demands of  bourgeois governments. His argument was that these 
developments signified that capitalism was in its death throes and that the exposure 
of  the socialist leaders as ‘labour lieutenants of  capital’ urging their followers on to 
the slaughter meant both that the developed world was ripe, ‘rotten-ripe’ indeed, 
for socialist revolution, and the working classes everywhere were ready to perceive 
this reality. With effective and determined Marxist leadership, the communists 
imagined, workers were perfectly placed to rise against their masters and traitorous 
former leaders and to establish socialist regimes immediately throughout Europe 
and shortly throughout the world. 
The Bolshevik revolution itself  had been premised on the assumption that it 
was setting a precedent and example which would soon be followed (to be fair, the 
signs of  the times did point in that direction). It was the condition of  the Russian 
empire, in catastrophic condition amid a lost war which the Tsar’s successors 
after his overthrow refused to terminate, that provided the basis for the October 
Revolution. However had the Bolshevik leaders not been convinced of  their 
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international analysis (some were not, but these were marginalised) they would 
probably not have acted as they did.
The suffering masses around the globe however did not respond, or at least 
not in the manner that the Communist International (Comintern) expected, 
either because they disliked that scenario on principle, did not see it as a viable 
proposition in their particular circumstances, or were too severely repressed to 
attempt it – or for a combination of  these reasons. The communist rulers of  the 
new state, which ended up being the former empire with some truncations of  
border territory, and from 1924 renamed the Soviet Union, refused to accept that 
their basic analysis had been wrong. 
They insisted instead on attributing the failure of  similar revolutions which 
had been attempted, as in Germany, or not even attempted, as in the UK, not to 
insurmountable circumstances and lack of  support, but to inadequate leadership. 
As a result the Soviet Union stood out all the more as the one great success 
where Marxist revolution had actually been accomplished. As a result the policies 
and organisational principles of  its ruling party soon came, through prestige, 
to dominate all the others in the Comintern founded in 1919 and eventually to 
subject them to detailed direction.
Although these parties had initially been founded by strong-minded individuals 
of  independent views like Gramsci, who well understood that the issue was 
immensely more complex than the Comintern specified, their leaders submitted 
to Soviet direction. Within the Soviet Union itself  (perpetually in fear of  renewed 
military attack from its enemies) the dilemmas and issues resulting from the 
country’s devastation8 resulted in an iron dictatorship being imposed by the 
communist party over the rest of  society and its institutions, and in due course 
even over the party membership by its central leadership, itself  the scene of  bitter 
faction fights around policy and personalities. 
The culture of  the most intense phases of  the revolutionary struggle and savage 
civil war which followed was adopted as the standard context of  government. 
Soviet party domination of  the Comintern made it possible for whatever ‘line’ was 
in favour to be imposed internationally, at least as regards central political issues. 
At the same time the other CPs, with new leaderships replacing the original ones 
and strictly subordinated to Moscow, were left free in the main to work out how 
they should apply the requirements of  the ‘line’ to local conditions  – and subjected 
to regular tongue-lashings for not being more successful in doing so.
Degeneration
Internally in the USSR at large there was a degree of  relaxation of  social pressure 
during the middle 1920s, largely as a result of  a tightly regulated resort to market 
exchange, which greatly improved the country’s devastated economy. But in the 
late 20s, this was considered unsatisfactory and a breakneck industrial drive was 
instituted – accompanied by an agricultural upheaval resulting in near civil war 
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conditions and seriously damaging Soviet agriculture for the remainder of  the 
state’s existence. It did however give the government control over the grain supply, 
which was its objective. In such circumstances, with social control a priority, the 
full weight of  repression was resumed and intensified to surreal proportions.
In 1903, when what was to become the Bolshevik party was first formed, 
Trotsky, at that time in the opposing faction, made a remark which was to turn 
out uncannily perceptive and which, as a Bolshevik, he was to come to bitterly 
regret and repudiate. He declared that following a successful revolution if  Lenin’s 
proposed party rules were applied, the party would come to dictate to society at 
large, the central committee to the party and eventually a single individual to the 
central committee. The history of  the early USSR followed precisely that route.
Social power became concentrated in the person of  one man, a not uncommon 
phenomenon throughout history of  civilisation everywhere around the globe 
(very exceptionally it was one woman). Indeed as we have already noted, civilised 
H. sapiens appears to have had a propensity for that form of  government and social 
control. Usually it was in the form of  hereditary monarchy, or quasi-hereditary as 
in the Roman and Chinese empires. 
In these social formations however, once a regime or dynasty had settled down, 
convention and habit usually imposed constraints on the reach of  the ruler’s 
powers (some monarchs still of  course tried to act otherwise). When however 
the society was gripped in a state of  semi-permanent emergency and feeling itself  
under constant threat from enemies within and without it was a very different 
matter, especially when that was combined with a world-transforming project and 
driven by intense ideological motivations. These considerations were at the root 
of  the resemblances between the Nazi and Stalinist dictatorships despite their 
ideological projects being utterly different.
During the 1930s the ordinary citizen who was not being targeted as a public 
enemy fared even worse under Stalin’s tyranny than under Hitler’s. The former 
was, in addition to other problems (such as military conflict with the Japanese 
in eastern Asia), in charge of  trying to construct an industrialised economy and 
corresponding military capacity at breakneck speed; the latter had one ready to 
hand. This led to fierce concentration on national objectives, which in the Soviet 
case clashed with the international project which featured as the basis of  the state’s 
legitimacy and could not formally be repudiated. That international project was 
however very much marginalised, even more than in the previous decade and the 
foreign communist parties became, in the words of  one critic, no more than border 
guards for the Soviet state, with their members finding in Soviet achievements, or 
claimed achievements, vicarious compensation for their own failures.
The national emphasis in these circumstances also induced paranoid suspicion 
of  foreign residents, even or indeed especially, those who were sympathetic to 
the regime – a similar phenomenon had characterised the last phases of  Jacobin 
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rule during the French Revolution. Most foreign communists living in the USSR 
perished during Stalin’s purges between 1936 and 1938.
Bureaucracy
It has been stressed in earlier chapters that no monarch or dictator, however 
powerful, can govern all by themselves, as well as that, not infrequently, their 
agents in charge of  armed formations may well aspire on their own account to 
fill the ruler’s shoes. A strong principle of  hereditary succession provides some, 
though far from complete, security against this sort of  thing, but dictators without 
that kind of  legitimacy have to keep their servants (both civil and military) loyal 
whether by reward or ideological conformity or a combination of  both. 
Two consequences follow. One is bureaucratisation – a social stratum is created 
to implement the rules laid down from above and which, either through inclination 
or fear of  a misstep, become rule-bound and structurally fossilised. Bureaucracies 
function only if  the bureaucrats know when to ignore the rules,9 as anyone who 
has been part of  one, whether service or commercial, will be well aware. When 
the constraints of  public or market accountability (constraints which businesses 
try to escape) are removed, bureaucracies focus on their own immediate ends and 
ambitions – effectively they pass out of  the control of  their ostensible masters.
The second consequence is faction at the ruler’s court as intimates and advisers, 
necessary agents of  rule, engage in rivalry to gain the ruler’s ear and favour, 
jockey against each other and construct gangs of  followers to assist with their 
ambitions. This is an invariable feature of  virtually any government, even the 
most democratic in relation to its central figure, prime minister or president; but it 
flourishes especially within arbitrary or unaccountable government. 
Stalin addressed both these problems by a policy of  constant terror. His 
technique was to keep his bureaucrats both civil and military (particularly party 
members) in a constant state of  tension and uncertainty and their noses against 
the grindstone in case they should be accused of  unspeakable political crimes and 
hurried to either the gulag or their graves. From time to time he also made examples 
of  entirely conscientious ones in order to keep up the pressure on the others.10 
There were other motivations as well behind the terror, including spite, revenge 
and paranoia, but these alone could scarcely account for its extent and nature. 
The very real problems confronting the state served as the excuse and created 
the atmosphere where such things were possible. It offered plenty of  scope for 
individuals who enjoyed exercising power for its own sake, particularly powers of  
life and death, or who even got a thrill out of  acting as persecutors and gratifying 
their sadistic impulses.
When necessary though, as in the emergency of  the war for survival between 
1941 and 1945, the pressure could be eased. Stalin, unlike his Nazi opponent, had 
the sense to trust his generals and listen to their advice, a not inconsiderable element 
in the eventual Soviet victory. It was during those years too that the centrally 
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directed economy showed its potential when all resources were concentrated on a 
single objective. Soon after the war ended though, the permanent state of  terror 
was reimposed, this time under the pretext of  the Cold War emergency, and the 
command economy began to show its weaknesses.
At this point too, the situation had changed profoundly. Thanks to the postwar 
boom in the capitalist world, which after a shaky start had got going strongly 
from 1948, capitalism appeared far more able to fulfil public expectations than 
had ever previously been the case. In Europe and a few other parts of  the world 
reformist social democracy also acquired a new lease of  life and appeared to be a 
serious socialist contender against communism for working-class, and other class, 
loyalties. Not that communism too was not enormously strengthened. 
The victory of  1945 enormously enhanced its prestige and the USSR had 
acquired hegemony over eastern Europe, hegemony which from 1948 onwards 
was transformed into complete domination. That too brought with it a raft of  
fresh problems – Isaac Deutscher was to title one of  the chapters in his biography 
of  Stalin ‘Dialectics of  Victory’. In 1949 the Chinese communist party drove 
the last remnants of  the US-supported and invincibly corrupt bourgeois-feudal 
regime out of  mainland China and established the Chinese People’s Republic. That 
in due course was to bring even greater problems than the extension of  Soviet 
power in Europe had done, both to the USSR and the Chinese people themselves.
Rotten Foundations
Socialism in both its major forms, which had appeared relatively marginalised 
during the thirties,11 had after 1945 in different ways acquired a new lease of  life. 
As it turned out, however, the foundations of  both were rotten. In the case of  
social democracy or reformist socialism, its success rested on a world economic 
boom driven primarily by the flourishing success of  US capitalism in the fifties and 
sixties and the world dominance of  the dollar as a reserve currency to which all the 
others in the capitalist world were linked in one manner or another. 
It provided sufficient resources for social redistribution and steadily rising 
material living standards within the sphere of  North America and Western Europe 
– and Japan, along with island entrepots such as Singapore and Hong Kong. This 
outcome was achieved however at the expense of  the ‘underdeveloped’ part of  
the globe or ‘Third World’ and was an essentially imperialist relation based on 
the foundation of  cheap raw materials and other primary commodities, especially 
cheap and plentiful oil, which reflected the poverty incomes of  these countries’ 
populations. Following the financial crisis beginning in 1973 social democracy’s 
weaknesses became all too apparent. It was helpless in the face of  state powers 
and financial systems dominated by the enemies of  redistribution determined to 
repress its social and trade union influence, and therefore easily blown away in the 
Thompson T02687 01 text   239 16/12/2014   13:29
240 Work, Sex and PoWer
neoliberal storm rising in the course of  the seventies and reaching its full force in 
the Reagan-Thatcher axis.
The fate of  the communist bloc was similar but different. In its Soviet part 
efforts were made following Stalin’s death in 1953 both to improve security for 
the general public, including the nomenklatura, which meant in essence the end of  
arbitrary arrest for no reason, and to improve levels of  consumption within the 
framework of  a command economy. As a result, up until the beginning of  the 
sixties, despite the shocks of  Khrushchev’s denunciation of  the former idol in 
1956, followed by political crisis in Poland and insurrection in Hungary, matters 
looked relatively hopeful. 
Nonetheless the USSR and its dependent regimes in Eastern Europe still 
remained authoritarian police states governed by parties accountable only to 
themselves, even those, such as the Hungarian, which were most sensitive to 
popular demand. The attempt made by the Czechoslovak communist party in 
1968 to institute more genuine accountability in combination with a less centrally 
controlled economy was swiftly suppressed by Soviet military force.
Matters were far worse in China, a materially far poorer society, overwhelmingly 
peasant in character. The regime’s attempt in the late fifties and early sixties to 
industrialise by dogmatic crash measures turned into a human catastrophe of  
enormous proportions with devastating famine and millions of  deaths. Only 
the country’s huge population and the Chinese communist party’s tight political 
control averted complete social collapse. 
This episode, styled the ‘Great Leap Forward’, was soon followed by the almost 
equally disruptive ‘Cultural Revolution’ by which the party leader Mao Zedong tried 
to regain his slackening grip on power and reassert revolutionary virtue by purging 
the bureaucracy, especially its communist central element, along with artists, 
intellectuals and suspected dissidents. His method was different from Stalin’s and 
consisted in mobilising millions of  dissatisfied youth to engage in mindless attacks 
upon the bureaucrat objects of  their dissatisfaction and terrorise them by means 
of  humiliation, violence, imprisonment and murder. Prior to this episode and 
continuing during its course and afterwards, a bitter quarrel which even threatened 
warfare, had erupted between the Chinese and Soviet regimes. This arose from a 
variety of  issues but centred on the Chinese claim that the Soviet regime was too 
indulgent and compromising towards the capitalist enemy, displayed great-power 
ambitions at China’s expense, and had even itself  reintroduced capitalism.
What all this signified to populations in the West enjoying the benefits of  
liberal democracy and high consumption was that communism meant at best 
a combination of  impoverishment and repression; massacre at worst; and not 
surprisingly, few citizens wanted anything to do with it. The communist parties in 
these countries were mostly small and marginal,12 and governments, while keeping 
them under supervision by their security services, could afford to tolerate them 
(though in the USA and West Germany they were persecuted nevertheless). 
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Those in Europe that were of  some significance owed their popularity more 
to their anti-fascist record earned either during the Second World War or against 
indigenous fascist dictatorships. In any event, except briefly during the Portuguese 
revolution of  1974–75 they had no hope of  winning sufficient support to aim 
at taking over the state. Among Third World populations inside the capitalist 
orbit, which were anyway enduring impoverishment, repression and massacre the 
record of  the existing communist regimes was a much less convincing argument, 
and in these locations rigorous repression was the rule. Outside of  Indo-China 
none of  them achieved success and in Indonesia members and supporters were 
physically extirpated.
Within the Soviet bloc itself  contradictions accumulated, leading to a steady 
decline in various welfare indicators and growing reliance on capitalist economies 
to plug some of  the gaps. The Soviet Union itself  suffered in addition from the 
West’s implacable hostility, expressed in military as well as political terms, and the 
crushing burden of  the armaments race. The Marxist African-American scholar W 
E B Dubois once remarked of  the Reconstruction in the post-Civil War period that 
what the South Carolina elites dreaded even more than ‘bad Negro government’ 
was ‘good Negro government’; and the same applied to their twentieth century 
US counterparts in regard to communist ones. Had Stalin been a Soviet Mandela, 
his successors likewise, and their regime a communist Sweden, it would have made 
little difference to US attitudes. 
Downfall
Nevertheless that was not the critical factor in bringing about the regimes’ downfall 
everywhere in eastern Europe and the USSR itself. The command economy was 
simply not viable in a consumer society or one attempting to reach that state. 
In fact, as analysis has shown, the overall command economy splintered into a 
collection of  mini-command economies, each enterprise fighting to make itself  as 
self-sufficient as possible and competing against the others for raw materials and 
labour, and equipment and liquid capital from the central authority. 
Cheating on targets and quality, and falsification of  returns to central planning 
made the situation even worse, and various forms of  tinkering in the latter years 
did nothing to improve matters. The final far-reaching attempt at political and 
economic reform brought the system crashing down and the entire communist 
experience in Europe and the USSR was also blown away on the neoliberal gale. 
The Chinese regime managed to survive and stabilise itself  by a mixture of  fierce 
repression and abandonment of  the entire project of  its first quarter-century, 
turning its economy instead into a form of  state-regulated capitalism with plenty 
of  scope for individual enrichment and plenty of  state-enforced super-exploita-
tion of  the workforce. ‘Those who had done well out of  Communism generally 
did even better out of  restored capitalism’,13 in Marc Mulholland’s phrase.
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In Britain ‘There is no alternative!’ had been one of  Margret Thatcher’s favourite 
slogans. In the US, Francis Fukuyama wrote in 1992 to assert more or less the 
same thing – and by the 1990s it looked as though that really was the case. As 
Arno Mayer observed, ‘In this early dawn of  the twenty-first century, following 
one of  humanity’s darkest seasons, revolution is seen as offering little promise 
and posing little threat’.14 Though to a certain extent it depends on what is meant 
by ‘revolution’.
Thompson T02687 01 text   242 16/12/2014   13:29
17
Desperately Seeking Significance
I sensed an infinite scream passing through nature.
            —Edvard Munch
More than half  a century ago, with the development of  nuclear weaponry, the human 
species acquired the ability to exterminate itself  along with a large proportion of  
the planet’s biomass. On more than one occasion that potential appeared likely 
to become a reality and the human adventure might have well ended in a nuclear 
fireball. With the political collapse of  one of  the contenders in the superpower 
rivalry, along with the ideological vision which was its formal justification, that 
particular peril has diminished, though it certainly has not vanished.
It has been replaced by another, less immediate and spectacular, though 
ultimately no less threatening. It also derives mainly from the application of  
technical expertise, and consists in the likelihood that the destruction of  species 
and of  biological habitat, currently proceeding on a geologically unprecedented 
scale, along with the outpouring of  pollutants, will render the planet largely 
uninhabitable, and certainly so to humans. As long ago as 1948 Fairfield Osborn, 
aware of  this potential scenario, published Our Plundered Planet, and since then 
the threatening catastrophe has grown ever more menacing and indeed is well 
underway, regardless of  the bawling of  mindlessly complacent deniers of  
environmental destruction.
In the most likely outcome, however, the global market-driven industrial system 
which inflicts the gross environmental damage will itself  collapse, along with the 
web of  interchange and cooperation which sustains world society, well before 
environmental destruction totally wrecks the planet. Though billions would die 
prematurely the human species, which is present everywhere, is highly adaptable 
and able to eat practically anything, would probably survive, but all the advances 
in safety, longevity, comfort and freedom, in liberty, equality and fraternity which 
have been instituted over the past two centuries, partial and fragmentary though 
they are, would have gone forever, never to be recovered. A bitter irony in that case 
would be that the collapse of  civilisation with uncountable fatalities and intense 
miseries for the survivors should appear as one of  the more optimistic scenarios 
– but such an appalling prospect need not be the outcome.
Humans remain utterly dependent for their very survival on the non-human 
biosphere but thanks to their superior brains cover the planet everywhere, 
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exterminate and exploit other species, and their creations visually dominate the 
landscape. It is easy to believe that we are the dominant species, but far from it. 
If  bacteria had consciousness and vocal organs they would howl with laughter 
at such pretension. They are the dominant organisms, present everywhere, not 
excepting the depths of  the oceans, the ice of  the arctic regions and the hot 
springs of  volcanic ones, present in the human body in numbers greatly exceeding 
our eukaryotic cells – and essential to our bodies’ operation. They always have 
been, and will unquestionably continue to be, the dominant life form so long as 
the biosphere exists. They were the first to arrive and will be the last to depart – 
the bugs always win in the end.
One aspect of  Jean-Paul Sartre’s novels and short stories is to satirise individuals 
who imagine that, because they have an elevated position in society, they therefore 
have inborn rights, especially the right to dominate other people. Humans are also 
mistaken in taking up a similar attitude towards other organisms. Biologically we 
are on the same level as any of  the rest, vertebrate or invertebrate, evolved only 
to survive and reproduce; the universe has not made any special provision for us, 
and if  it were to destroy the species by asteroid strike, volcanism, pandemic or 
environmental collapse that outcome would have no more intrinsic significance 
than applies to any other organism which once inhabited the planet and no longer 
does so. 
And yet in one respect humans are unique and even special. As they are a pattern-
seeking social species they have developed culture both practical and imaginative, 
and through that have become the only species which can collectively think about 
itself, conceptually understand how the environment functions and know what, 
billions of  years down the line, the ultimate fate of  the planet and its star, the sun, 
has to be (that of  the universe is still under discussion, but the cosmologists are 
working on it).
The processes of  the cosmos, the subatomic world or the evolution of  life on 
earth over the aeons can be examined, understood and explained but not be taken 
to mean something beyond themselves. While however for the moment we do 
continue to inhabit the planet, we cannot avoid asking what significance does that 
have, what can we do about it and what is the prognosis for the future.
Unavoidable Constraints
At the beginning of  the first volume of  his great history, published in 1776, Edward 
Gibbon wrote that what ought to be judged the happiest period in world history 
would be that of  the Roman empire under the rule of  the ‘five good emperors’ 
of  the Antonine dynasty of  the second century CE.1 This remark by a humane 
and enlightened writer is revealing, for he was referring to a slave empire acquired 
and sustained by ferocious cruelty and aggression. Nevertheless during most of  
the second century civil peace prevailed within the empire, exceptional rapacity, 
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famine and plague were avoided, production and commerce were enhanced and 
the legal system functioned smoothly. 
In Gibbon’s eyes the pinnacle of  human achievement he regards as having 
been achieved in that era – civilisation and literary culture – rested upon the 
foundations of  productive wealth and opulence, from which, of  necessity, only 
a minority could acquire substantial benefit. According to him this must always 
be the same. His assessment reveals the nugget of  reality hidden under the pulp 
of  apologetics, generally accepted among educated thought in his time; that there 
was no escaping the concentration of  wealth among elites, while the very best the 
masses could hope for was the avoidance of  famine through efficient agricultural 
and transport technique, with arbitrary despotism kept at bay by a constitutionally 
balanced oligarchy. A Greek philosopher of  the Hellenistic era remarked that the 
most fortunate fate for an individual was never to be born and if  born, to die in 
infancy, so grim were the contemporary conditions of  life, even for social elites.2 
Not that life in pre-agricultural times was by any means all fun and games. Apart 
from the dangers and sorrows of  reproduction, toil was by no means absent, 
particularly for women, and if  life was not nasty and brutish, certainly it was 
short. As this volume has tried to demonstrate in outline, with the shift to settled 
agriculture, and more particularly with the appearance of  urban concentrations 
and civilisation, none of  these burdens and rigours was alleviated and many more 
were added to the populations involved.
Throughout the historical span from that era onwards, forced labour in one 
form or another has been intrinsic to the human situation and the progress of  
civilisation – as a form of  state taxation, as slavery, as a state of  personal dependence 
on a superior, known in Europe as serfdom or vassalage, as ‘free’ labour compelled 
by necessity, or as prison labour organised by modern states. Except recently and 
then only in parts of  the globe, humans in general, and not only the repressed 
and subordinated, have lived out their time in bodies plagued with parasites and 
minds plagued with superstition. It would appear that, again except in very recent 
centuries and among very fortunate minorities, the more H. sapiens have removed 
itself  from nature the more exquisitely its members have suffered.
Even within that context, one half  of  the species has endured the greater 
suffering. Women in the main down the ages have found their allocated place in 
society to be that of  domestic drudges, sexual playthings subject to gross physical 
mutilations; breeding machines, counters and pawns in family alliances. In the 
lower levels of  the social hierarchy both genders have been subjected to the 
contempt and disdain of  the upper orders, terrorised by the threats of  lords, laws 
and priests, treated as dirt, their lives held cheap and readily ended, often to the 
accompaniment of  indescribably horrible and ingenious tortures. 
Kafka’s novels and Munch’s famous painting ‘The Scream’ are frequently cited 
to characterise and represent the twentieth century – but rather they do so also 
for the entire historical narrative since the Neolithic revolution. It was not that 
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utopian sentiments, usually in a religious context, were not voiced from time 
to time. They certainly were, as we have seen in previous chapters, but in the 
circumstances prevailing down the centuries they had not even the potential of  
being effectively realised. 
What Gibbon presumed though, accurately enough for his own era, was that 
there was a ceiling to output, quickly reached under favourable social and climatic 
conditions, and a very restricted surplus above subsistence, available only to 
a few. So it had always been, at least since the emergence of  citified societies. 
While Gibbon deplores immoderate savagery by the power holders, the routine 
privations of  the masses leave him unmoved, and when he compares a certain 
emperor to Spartacus it is not intended as a compliment.
A century after his volume was published (coincidentally in the same year as 
the American Declaration of  Independence and publication of  Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of  Nations) Gibbon’s presupposition of  inherently restricted labour 
output was largely discredited and the prospect of  a ‘society of  abundance’ was 
on the agenda. There remained in various quarters hankerings after the old ways. 
These were evident for example among intellectuals like Arthur Schopenhauer and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, the traditional aristocracies, the Catholic church of  the day 
and the disciples of  Thomas Malthus, with their implicit or explicit admiration for 
antique hierarchy and inequality and ‘the brutal display of  vigour in the Middle 
Ages which reactionists so much admire,’3 but the tide was running against them.
What was above all responsible for that tide was machinery driven by artificial 
power sources applied to production, transport and communication in a framework 
of  market capitalism. As Marx and Engels put it as early as 1848: ‘Conservation 
of  the old modes of  production in unaltered form, was . . . the first condition of  
existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of  production, 
uninterrupted disturbance of  all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and 
agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.’4
Rhetorical Revolution
A further hundred years on, following a century filled with indescribable horrors 
and two world wars, no elite anywhere on the planet, whatever their practice 
and private thinking, would dare to proclaim openly that the masses existed for 
their benefit. In earlier eras the privileges of  wealth and property in the context 
of  scarcity could be accepted and defended, as there was ‘no alternative’; in the 
context of  abundance they could not. 
All ruling elites were compelled now to insist that their objectives were 
fundamentally altruistic, aiming to ensure not merely the satisfaction of  basic 
necessities but to enhance consumption availability and general welfare throughout 
society. Whether the rulers were liberals, conservatives, social democrats, 
communists, neoliberals or even fascists,5 that theme at least was similar, the 
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proponents of  each ideology postulating that theirs was the preferred manner of  
achieving such ends. This transition amounted to a world revolution in rhetoric if  
certainly not in practice.
Limited though that is, it still represents progress in the positive sense. The 
cruelties and elite arrogance of  past centuries which used to be taken for granted are 
now no longer found to be ideologically acceptable, even though still hypocritically 
prevalent behind closed doors. Again, among a significant minority of  the world 
population partial steps have been taken along the road of  emancipation, in 
standards of  nutrition, dwelling space, effective medical interventions and 
longevity, education, gender equality, lessening of  sexual and social restrictiveness 
and authoritarian childrearing practices. Not that any of  these advances happened 
smoothly, purely in consequence of  the passage of  time. They were accomplished 
only by intense effort and struggle, through resistance to exploiters, obscurantists 
and their power structures, and at the cost of  much sacrifice and many casualties. 
A working-class inhabitant of  an industrial British city of  the 1840s, if  transported 
to the 1960s, would indeed on first impressions imagine that they had arrived in 
Utopia – clean streets, no smoke pall, everyone of  all ages adequately fed, clothed 
and shod, not a beggar to be seen anywhere, nor a rickety child.
All of  these advances remain under threat and active efforts to reverse some 
of  them are in hand – for supposedly unavoidable reasons of  course. Bankers 
stuffed with bonuses take off  in their private jets to preach austerity to everyone 
else. Nor are the improvements without their underside. The enhancement of  
material comfort all too easily slides into the accumulation of  stuff; the loosening 
of  social fetters into the pursuit of  immediate sensation with consequent growth 
in such phenomena as pornography, obsessive addiction to computer games, the 
dangerous levels of  drug use and suchlike. 
As pointed out in Chapter One, humans have permanently the potential to 
be other than they are and as a universal attribute are unavoidably projecting 
themselves mentally towards a future different from the present they occupy, but 
any such individual project has to occur within a social framework. Very naturally 
as a rule that framework is taken for granted, and historical change as it occurs 
happens behind the back of  the individuals involved,6 emerging from the clash 
of  contrary projects, mostly those of  elite groupings and individuals – and with 
unanticipated outcomes thanks to the dialectic of  unintended consequences.
The project was envisaged in the nineteenth century of  directed social 
transformation brought about by deliberate intent. This would break the five-
thousand-year cycle of  ambitious rival social elites expanding their area of  
authority, overreaching themselves and suffering political collapse, to be succeeded 
by a new set of  rulers of  a similar sort, while popular masses lived on the verge of  
subsistence in a culture saturated with fear and falsehood. The objective of  human 
emancipation, of  replacing that cycle with what used to be called the cooperative 
commonwealth, of  annulling deprivation, repression and superstitions which 
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justified social abominations, could indeed only emerge when technology and social 
reorganisation had transformed the global pattern of  production, distribution and 
consumption, that is, only in the past two centuries or so.
History on Our Side?
The servants of  that project (they used to be called revolutionaries but the name 
is now unfashionable) were necessarily and inevitably a minority, usually a rather 
small one, in any of  the societies they aspired to overturn. The majority of  the 
citizens they wanted to win over very understandably preferred to get on with their 
own lives involving individual or limited collective projects and avoiding the risks 
involved in declaring political (or even real) war upon the authorities – unless the 
times were very critical, in which case the advocates of  really serious change might 
hope to gain a hearing. 
The more usual state of  affairs has been for revolutionaries or would-be revolu-
tionaries not only to be faced with the hostility of  ruling elites but to be met with 
indifference or antagonism from their intended constituency. Consequently they 
then tend to fall into fragmentation, accompanied by mutual hostility among the 
differing groupings as they quarrel over the most effective way to proceed and, 
supposing that to be found, over what the intended social outcome ought to look 
like. Such disputes can turn lethal. ‘Happiness is a new idea in Europe’, declared 
Saint-Just the Jacobin – in March 1794 at the height of  the revolutionary Terror. 
These failures and furies have proved to be the most powerful weapon in the 
arsenal of  reactionaries committed to social structures of  inequality and injustice, 
enabling them to argue that any serious attempt to improve the public condition 
by upsetting these structures will result only in its worsening.
One conclusion which can be reached is that the proponents of  emancipation 
have up to now gravely underestimated the timescales involved in their project, 
not to mention the severity of  the obstacles in the way and the setbacks likely to 
be encountered (although Marx, somewhat contradictory to his own perspectives 
at other times, was to stress this point as far back as 1852). The social muck of  
a hundred centuries cannot imaginably be cleared away in a mere two hundred 
years – it is necessarily a much longer undertaking stretching over many more 
generations. A historically informed appreciation of  the obstacles involved, and 
the mistakes made previously in attempting to overcome them, are essential to 
the continuation of  the project. In the past, proponents of  emancipatory social 
change were in the habit of  consoling themselves for frustrations and setbacks 
with the slogan that ‘History is on our side!’ Although it has seemed of  late 
that the very reverse must be true, nonetheless that belief  is not wholly without 
foundation, though its truth is of  a very ambiguous sort. The reality is that at 
terrible suffering and social cost throughout history, which would never have been 
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voluntarily chosen, the preconditions for emancipation have nevertheless been 
generated – but it will not come spontaneously.
In the past two centuries, roughly every half  century, fundamental change has 
occurred in technology and consequent social organisation, the latest being in 
the character of  electronic communication, which has created linkages on an 
unprecedented scale over the globe in a manner previously unimaginable and 
exceeding every previous advance, from sailing ships to radio.7 The outcome in 
the recent past has been that although enormous changes in economic and social 
life continue to happen behind the backs of  global populations, political structures 
lag behind and remain relatively unchanging. In the past several decades indeed 
they have gone into reverse so that predatory capitalism under the aegis of  the 
hyper-wealthy in all regions of  the globe, becomes ever more firmly entrenched 
and penetrates into every crevice of  social and cultural praxis. To quote 
Graeber once more: ‘[T]he last thirty years have seen the construction of  a vast 
bureaucratic apparatus for the creation and maintenance of  hopelessness, a giant 
machine designed, first and foremost, to destroy any sense of  possible alternative 
futures. . . those who challenge existing power arrangements can never, under any 
circumstances be perceived to win.’8
All that is bad enough, but the reality, as indicated above, is even worse. The 
world is faced with an immediate and enormously perilous crisis. The concentration 
of  resources at one social pole with consequent impoverishment and indigence for 
vast numbers on our ‘planet of  the slums’ in Mike Davis’s phrase is happening in 
the context of  what Elizabeth Ermarth describes as ‘an over-populated, under-
hydrated, lethally warming planet’9 and she might have added, with dying oceans in 
which the jellyfish are taking over; the ‘direct result of  the externalization of  costs 
by capitalist entrepreneurs. . . ’ .10
The accelerating environmental crisis lacks the dramatic character of  Hitler’s 
Wehrmacht poised on the frontier, or superpower leaders a few hours away from 
unleashing nuclear Armageddon, but the reality is no less perilous, merely less 
immediate and evident. Writing in the 1970s on the nuclear threat, Jonathan Schell, 
in The Fate of  the Earth, invited us to imagine how we would feel if  we knew that we 
and our existing relatives would live out our lives comfortably, but a century after 
the last of  these died, our species would be extinct. We would be desolated and 
demoralised – evidently our concerns, whatever our status of  wealth or education, 
extend far beyond our own lifetimes. 
Still on the Agenda
The overriding issue for the centuries ahead and the present century in particular 
– far surpassing the murderous regime conflicts of  the current decades, important 
though these are – is whether the ultimate results of  the second great human 
transformation are to be positive or negative. A favourable outcome is imaginable 
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only with clear and realistic appreciation of  how threatening the situation has 
become. That has to be combined with imagination and vision beyond our 
own lifespan in order to guide the means of  addressing the crisis, balancing 
of  environmental necessities against lifestyle aspirations, and all the effort and 
inevitable sacrifices required to do so.11 It can be done, but the effort will have to 
be prodigious, especially considering the billions currently living in deprivation 
and anxious to win their share of  the potentialities of  industrial growth.
The reality to be confronted has been forcibly emphasised by the 2014 reports 
of  the International Panel on Climate Change. These reports likewise point to the 
initiatives necessary to deal with the central feature of  the environmental crisis, 
human generated global warming, which is also a significant contributor to the 
second main issue, species destruction both animal and vegetable. Accepting the 
inevitability of  environmental cataclysm (with the despairing hope that something 
might be saved from the wreckage) is neither necessary nor appropriate. In the 
words of  the editorial title in New Scientist, commenting on the IPCC report, 
‘Resistance is not futile’.12 International cooperation is unquestionably essential, 
and that of  course will not come about of  its own accord but only under 
determined and relentless pressure from all manner of  environmentally conscious 
organisations around the world. 
That has to be the immediate human priority, but no less importantly the 
emancipatory agenda of  the nineteenth and twentieth centuries remains on the 
table, and the effort to save the human world can still be made to morph into a 
determination to improve it. A challenging project to be sure, but not an impossible 
one. As the great seventeenth-century philosopher Spinoza once remarked, ‘All 
good things are difficult’.
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puzzling in terms of  defining and measuring the medium of  exchange.
28. The victims were with one exception all adult males, and their diet, which can be 
analysed, show them to have been of  high social rank. Human sacrifice was a common 
practice in all historic cultures, but whether that ever involved the actual ruler as victim 
is less certain.
29. In Iceland the Viking settlers, though they were certainly class divided, prevented a 
monarchy from emerging. 
30. Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, NLB, London, 1974, p.116. The 
Vandal tribal coalition had passed through Gaul to Spain and then across to North 
Africa where they established their kingdom in what is now Tunisia and northern 
Algeria.
31. ‘Mana is an incorporeal supernatural force that energizes people and things, 
conferring efficacy upon them’, http://what–when–how.com/social–and–cultural–
anthropology/mana–anthropology/.
32. Flannery & Marcus, The Creation of  Inequality, p.206.
33. This was not unusual. With the following two kings the position became one of  high 
standing.
34. James VI and I, surveying the magnificent residence built by his treasurer out of  the 
profits of  his office remarked sardonically that the building was much too grand for a 
king but might possibly do for a treasurer. 
35. The Japanese empire has been unusually fortunate in this respect, with the dynasty 
continuing for centuries without any break in the succession.
36. Numerous texts, attest to this. See especially Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis, 
Allen Lane, London, 2000.
37. Amusingly analysed by Anthony Jay in Management and Machiavelli, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1967.
38. Female absolute monarchs in Europe were rare, but not wholly unknown – in the 
Russian empire the Empresses Elizabeth and Catherine were effective, and in the latter 
case famous, rulers. Maria Theresa fulfilled a similar role in the Austrian dominions, 
though with less personal scandal. In China the only female who was formally emperor, 
Wu Zetian in the seventh century, was disparaged for her attempts at reforming the 
imperial system.
39. They also claimed a mystic power to cure scrofula by touching the patient.
40. Extensively discussed in Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1.
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41. Tributes for his 70th birthday continued to appear in the Soviet newspapers for an 
entire year. 
42. See ‘Communism and the Leader Cult’, title of  Twentieth Century Communism: A Journal 
of  International History, No. 1, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 2009. This discusses 
leader cults in non-ruling communist parties.
43. Ibid., p.10.
Chapter Six
 1. Ideology here is understood as ‘an interconnected system or structure of  basic 
belief  applicable to particular social or cultural collectives – one which incorporates 
conscious beliefs, assumptions, unthinking modes of  perception – through which its 
adherents view the world around them, the interactions and the life processes in which 
they are engaged’. W. Thompson, Ideologies in the Age of  Extremes, 2011, p.1.
 2. Lenin’s early text What is to be Done? is largely concerned with this issue.
 3. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, Melville House, New York, 2012, p.258.
 4. Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus, The Creation of  Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancestors 
Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery and Empire, Harvard University Press, 2012, p.557.
 5. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1: A History of  Power from the Beginning 
to AD 1760, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.54.
 6. Ibid., p.123.
 7. G E M de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, Duckworth, London, 
1983, p.230.
 8. George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1946, p.149.
 9. The most comprehensive analysis is to be found in Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the 
Ancient Greek World.
10. See his Framing the Early Middle Ages, Oxford University Press, 2005.




15. Slaves, particularly slave girls also served as a currency unit of  account, a practice 
which the Vikings used extensively.
16. In the case of  British banknotes explicitly so, where the bank still promises to ‘pay the 
bearer on demand’.




21. A Roman practice was to kill all the slaves of  an owner if  one of  them had killed him.
22. A rural rebellion movement drawing on various elements of  the dispossessed and 
exploited. It may possibly be the origin of  the word ‘Hebrew’.
23. John Pickard, Behind the Myths: The Foundations of  Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Author 
House, Bloomington, Indiana, 2013, pp.22–4.
24. According to Marc Mulholland, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of  Fear: From Absolutism 
to Neo-Conservatism, Oxford University Press, 2012: ‘ . . . in Britain and America, 
bourgeois civil society was expansive, confident, and thus securely liberal . . . Liberal 
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consumerism, therefore, implied a pact of  sorts with organised labour’, p.207. 
Dramatic examples of  such violence, both state and private, used by employers in 
the USA against their workforces are noted in Michael Mann, Sources, Volume 2 and 
Volume 3. Maurice Dobb writing in the 1940s drew explicit parallels with fascism.
25. Mann, Sources, Volume 1, p.48. See also Jared Diamond, The World until Yesterday, Penguin, 
London, 2012, Chapter 3, ‘A Short Chapter, About a Tiny War’.
26. Not all monarchs had a fixed capital, the Scottish ones for example did not become 
established at Edinburgh before the fourteenth century. In areas with a poor supply 
system it was easier to move the court to the food rather than vice versa. 
27. The Gatling was not wholly automatic, as the feed mechanism had to be hand cranked.
28. E J Hobsbawm Primitive Rebels, 1959; Bandits,1966.
29. The KGB uniform was indistinguishable from the military, apart from their collar 
patches.
30. And also forbade them to grind their own corn and bake their own flour but instead 
to use the lord’s mill and oven.
31. The pagan Lithuanian monarchy however possessed the best artillery in fourteenth-
century Europe.
32. The Stanford Prison Experiment of  1971 demonstrated vividly the manner in 
which social pressure and social expectation could generate sadistic attitudes among 
previously normal individuals. Volunteers acted as guards or as prisoners in a mock 
prison and quickly and spontaneously developed exaggerated versions of  the brutality 
and traumatisation routine in normal prisons. The experiment had to be discontinued 
for fear of  severe psychological damage. Clearly social context is very important, but 
can scarcely be the whole story.
Chapter Seven
 1. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, Melville House, New York, 2012, p.90.
 2. For example, ‘The Tao is infinite, eternal. Why is it eternal? It was never born; thus 
it can never die. Why is it infinite? It has no desires for itself; thus it is present for all 
beings’ (http://taoism.net/articles/mason/ethics.htm).
 3. The Australian Aboriginal ‘pointing the bone’ is a striking example of  this.
 4. ‘Given the number of  the faithful who believe in a literal interpretation of  the holy 
word, this new injunction was likely to cause the odd misunderstanding. “(I am not 
repentant, my dear, I am merely obeying God’s will.)”,’ Rick Gekoski ‘The Wicked 
Bible: the perfect gift for collectors, but not for William and Kate’. www.theguardian.
com/books/booksblog/2010/nov/25/wicked–bible–gift–william–kate.
 5. A frequently used example in such discussions is to point out that it is morally 
imperative to lie in order to mislead a murderer looking for a victim; or killing in war, 
especially a ‘just war’. 
 6. Christopher Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of  Virtue, Altruism and Shame, Basic 
Books, New York, 2012, p.337.
 7. Ibid., pp.98–9.
 8. Ibid., pp.19–20. The distinction is important, shame being the product of  condemnation 
by others whose opinion is respected, guilt the result of  self–condemnation by the 
person experiencing it. 
 9. Ibid., p.135.
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10. See E P Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, and Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged.
11. In some states Sharia courts still co–exist with criminal courts, the former being mainly 
concerned to resolve family matters.
12. The United States is exceptional in that executions are employed in some parts of  the 
country (individual states) and not others.
13. Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967, pp.30–46.
14. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the Prison, Penguin, 1991 (‘Supervise’ 
might be more accurate than ‘Discipline’). 
15. Editorial, New Scientist, 18 January 2014, p.3
16. Laura Spinney, New Scientist, 18 January 2014, p.3.
17. Ibid.
Chapter Eight
 1. ‘Over the past 5000 years, humanity has developed an array of  religions, all of  which 
have shared at least one basic feature. They have attempted to give some response to, 
some solace for the perceived material miseries of  the world,’ Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Historical Capitalism, Verso, London, 1983, p.117.
 2. Jared Diamond, The World Until Yesterday, Penguin, London, 2012, p.328.
 3. Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book, the Framework of  Human History, Paladin, 
London, p.73.
 4. Attempts which used to be popular to make spirits take material form in spiritualist 
séances proved particularly unconvincing, though spiritualist churches still exist. 
 5. Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus, The Creation of  Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancestors 
Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery and Empire, Harvard University Press, 2012, p.25.
 6. Ibid.
 7. For an interesting discussion see Henry Frankfort et al Before Philosophy, the Intellectual 
Adventure of  Ancient Man, 1946. The argument is summarised in the form that the 
religions of  Mesopotamia had an ‘I–thou’ relationship to natural phenomena; the Jews 
initiated an ‘I–it’ conception, for example, ‘The heavens proclaim the glory of  God’, 
whereas for Egyptians and Babylonians the heavens were gods, while classical Greek 
philosophy desacralized and disenchanted the natural world altogether.
 8. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of  Classes and Nation States 
1760–1914, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p7.
 9. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power: Volume 3: Global Empires and Revolution, 
1890–1945, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.7.
10. Unearthed in the Middle East.
11. See Michael Scott, Delphi: A History of  the Centre of  the Ancient World, Princeton 
University Press, 2014.
12. A legendary example is of  an extended family executed because its head had violated 
a divine command when Joshua captured Jericho. 
13. George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1946, p.144.
14. Ibid., p.146.
15. Ibid., pp.152–3.
16. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  Nationalism, 
Verso, London, 1983, p.18.
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17. Published as a Penguin Classic, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 2005.
18. http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Brahmanism. That this approach was 
not confined to Soviet writers however is suggested by an Indian title published not 
long afterwards, M Paliwahadana, The Indra Cult as Ideology: A Clue to Power Struggle 
in Ancient Society, 1981, http://dl.sjp.ac.lk/dspace/bitstream/123456789/399/1/
The%20Indra%20Cult%20as.pdf.
19. Norman Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come, Yale University Press, 1993, p.57.
20. Indra, Ba’al, Yahweh, Zeus and Thor are all storm gods. 
21. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1: A History of  Power from the Beginning 
to AD 1760, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.353.
22. Perry Anderson, London Review of  Books, 2 August 2012, p.22.
23. And where the faith is growing again as, like Islam and for comparable reasons, it is 
embraced by the outcaste or Dalit communities. 
24. The coincidental timing with the emergence of  Greek philosophy has been noted and 
commented on but in this instance coincidental may simply mean coincidence.
25. Confucianism is not discussed at length here on account of  the weakness of  its 
supernatural element. Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1, p.343, comments that 
‘Confucianism was a marvellous instrument of  imperial/class rule’. 
26. According to Richard Baum, in Social Evolution & History, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2004, 
p.52:
In the hands of  Confucian scholars from the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.) 
onward, the doctrine was stripped of  much of  its original spiritual premise of  divine 
intervention in human affairs. Mencius (b. 372 B.C.), for example, argued that the 
will of  heaven was manifested on earth only indirectly, through the will of  the 
people; and he claimed that divine control over temporal affairs began and ended 
with heaven’s act of  investing the dynastic founder with political authority. In place 
of  heavenly piety, Zhu Xi substituted his own agnostic conception of  reverence, 
rooted in such this – worldly values as propriety (li) and filialty (xiao).
27. It’s earliest, Palaeolithic phase, produced the world’s oldest pottery. 
28. A parallel can be observed in the action of  the Bolshevik regime in 1921 when a 
loosening of  state economic control compelled by critical circumstances was 
accompanied by a severe tightening up of  political supervision and repression.
29. Kandahar in Afghanistan probably has the same meaning as Alexandria. 
30. Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book, p.121.
31. Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988.
Chapter Nine
 1. Norman Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come, Yale University Press, 1993, 
pp.77–104. (A Zoroastrian community still exists in the shape of  the Indian Parsis.)
 2. The name of  the Vedic fire-god, Agni, is the root of  the English word ‘ignite’.
 3. Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come, p.115.
 4. Ibid., pp.24–9.
 5. Making up the biblical texts of  Numbers and Deuteronomy.
 6. See Robin Lane Fox, The Unauthorized Version: Truth and Fiction in the Bible, Viking, 
London, 1991.
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7. Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come, p.213.
8. This aspect is discussed very informatively in Peter Brown’s lengthy volume, Through 
the Eye of  a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of  Rome and the Making of  Christianity in the West: 
320–550 AD, Princeton University Press, 2012.
9. An Encyclopaedia of  Heresies and Heretics runs to over 350 pages and by no means gets 
near to including them all. 
10. The current intensity of  Sunni/Shia hostility, after the initial disputes, is a modern 
phenomenon. For centuries their difference was more akin to rival schools of  
Buddhism.
11. See Joyce E Salisbury, The Blood of  the Martyrs: Unintended Consequences of  Ancient Violence, 
Routledge, New York & London, 2004.
12. The emperor who initiated the change was Constantine. What tends to be described 
as his ‘conversion’ following victory against a rival claimant was less a conversion than 
the decision to identify the god he worshipped, Sol Invictus (the unconquered sun) with 
the god of  the Christians, which is why the Christian holy day is Sunday rather than 
Saturday. 
13. Named after Nestor, a fifth-century patriarch of  Constantinople; they made a strong 
distinction between Christ’s divine and human natures.
14. A remnant still continues in India.
15. Another major issue was Iconoclasm, when eighth-century Byzantine emperors tried 
to suppress the use of  images in worship, strongly opposed by the Papacy.
16. See Geoffrey Barraclough, ‘The Medieval Empire: Idea and Reality’, Chapter 8 of  
History in a Changing World, Blackwell, Oxford, 1957. 
17. One section of  mainly US fundamentalists, adhering to what is termed Dominion 
theology, proclaims this openly and justifies it as absolutely necessary.
18. Saint Augustine’s principal theological work, The City of  God, was written in response 
to these accusations.
19. Regrettably this volume was completed too late to make use of  the very interesting 
discussion by Suleiman Mourad, ‘Riddles of  the Book’ in New Left Review, 2/86, 
March–April 2014, pp.15–52.
20. Wall Street Journal, 15 November 2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/.
21. John Pickard, Behind the Myths: The Foundations of  Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Author 
House, Bloomington, Indiana, 2013, p.318.
22. Ibid., p.307.
23. The Qur’an, it is claimed, can only be interpreted with reference to the subsequently 
developed holy traditions, the Hadith.
24. A phrase coined by the commentator Richard J Hofstadter in 1964.
25. See Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby (eds), Fundamentalisms Observed, the first 
volume of  Fundamentalism Project, University of  Chicago Press, 1991.
Chapter Ten
 1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  Nationalism, 
Verso, London, 1983, pp.25–6.
 2. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1: A History of  Power from the Beginning 
to AD 1760, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.208.
 3. Benedict Anderson gives a list of  his titles, running to eleven lines of  small print – yet 
includes by no means all of  them.
Thompson T02687 01 text   261 16/12/2014   13:29
262 Work, Sex and PoWer
 4. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.16.
 5. Ibid., pp.17–18.
 6. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of  Classes and Nation States 
1760–1914, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.732.
 7. Ibid., p.108.
 8. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.135.
 9. Ironically, the Grand Inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada, whose principal office was to 
persecute Moriscos and Conversos, himself  had a known element of  Jewish descent. 
Ironically too, these statutes were abolished in the late nineteenth century when racism 
was flourishing throughout Europe.
10. The sixteenth century was more ambiguous. Shakespeare’s plays have a black hero, 
Othello, and a black villain, Aaron. 
11. Almost literally so. The chemical composition of  blood throughout the animal 
kingdom is strikingly similar across all species.
12. Brought to notice particularly by Edward Said in his volume of  that name.
13. Antisemites disagreed among themselves. Some argued that Jews were tolerable so long 
as they adhered to their traditional culture and made no sneaky effort to assimilate; 
others that the traditional communities were the ones to be hated, and assimilated 
Jews could fit in; still others that Jews were equally vicious whether assimilated or 
traditional.
14. See Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of  the Jewish World Conspiracy and the 
Protocols of  the Elders of  Zion, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1966.
15. The psychotic CIA chief  James Jesus Angleton was highly embarrassed by his middle 
name, as it revealed his Spanish ancestry.
16. The French revolutionaries banned the use of  the ancien regime ‘Monsieur’ or ‘Madame’ 
in formal address; everyone had to be addressed as ‘Citoyen’ or ‘Citoyenne’.
17. See Jeremy Catto, ‘Written English: The Making of  the Language 1370–1400’, Past and 
Present, No. 179, May 2003.
18. Though mutually hostile localisms may do so, as evidenced in the Arab world. 
19. Attempts to invent a new universal one were actually based on Indo-European models, 
particularly Romance ones, and never got off  the ground, or at most very haltingly, as 
with Esperanto.
20. In the Ukranian crisis of  2014, one charge against the parliamentary assembly in Kiev 
was that it voted to remove Russian from its equal position in the country. 
21. University of  California Press, 1995.
22. Contrast with the early decades of  the twentieth century is striking, as crowd photos 
from that time reveal.
23. Apparently this is no longer used.
24. A medieval illustration of  the twelfth-century Sicilian king William III being blinded 
and castrated shows him nevertheless wearing his crown.
25. In England these have to be ratified by an archaic institution, the College of  Arms 
(founded by Richard III) and the Lyon Court in Scotland.
Chapter Eleven
 1. Other Hellenistic successor empires had fallen apart and were dominated by Roman 
power.
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 2. By the time they took over portions of  the empire they had been deeply influenced by 
it – for example they were all Christians.
 3. See https://contagions.wordpress.com/2011/11/26/did–india–and–china–escape–
the–black–death/.
 4. Trade links were certainly influenced  – for example papyrus disappeared on the 
northern shores of  the Mediterranean.
 5. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 1: A History of  Power from the Beginning 
to AD 1760, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.292.
 6. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of  Classes and Nation States 
1760–1914, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.394.
 7. Langobardi or Longbeards.
 8. Voltaire’s joke was that it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.
 9. Known formerly as the Wends and nowadays the Sorbs.
10. Perry Anderson, Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of  the Absolutist State, 
NLB, London, 1974.
11. The importance of  horse collars was that earlier methods of  yoking horses to carts or 
ploughs practically strangled the animal.
Chapter Twelve
 1. Though some of  these tried to ally with the newcomers against their own indigenous 
enemies.
 2. Marie–Monique Huss, Journal of  Contemporary History, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1990), 
pp.39–68.
 3. See Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of  the Third 
World, Verso, London, 2001, ‘the greatest human tragedy since the Black Death’.
 4. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power: Volume 3: Global Empires and Revolution, 
1890–1945, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.552.
 5. The most notable participant in the debate was Earl J Hamilton with his key volume, 
American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501–1650 of  1934.
 6. See R N Salaman, The History and Social Influence of  the Potato, Cambridge University 
Press, 1985 (second edition).
 7. Around a third of  a million ethnic Chinese currently live in South Africa.
 8. See L J Satre, Chocolate on Trial: Slavery, Politics, and the Ethics of  Business, Ohio University 
Press, 2005.
 9. ‘Asylum seeker’ was originally a neutral term but has taken on negative connotations 
thanks to the endeavours of  the tabloid press.
10. Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization, Verso, London, 
1983, pp.121–2.
11. Examined famously in the 1840s by Henry Mayhew in London Labour and the London 
Poor and Friedrich Engels in The Condition of  the Working Class in England. 
12. Mike Davis, Planet of  Slums, Verso, London, 2006.
13. With reference to the ‘Trail of  tears’ see James Wilson, The Earth Shall Weep: A History 
of  Native America, Grove Press, New York, 1998. 
14. Beneš, the Czech leader, wanted to make discriminations based on wartime behaviour, 
but his colleagues insisted on a total expulsion.
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Chapter Thirteen
 1. Michael Mann, The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of  Classes and Nation States 
1760–1914, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.128.
 2. Thomas D Hall, ‘Mongols in World-Systems History, Social Evolution & History, Vol. 4, 
No. 2, September 2005, p.111.
 3. Michael Perlman in Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, 1999, reviewing Ellen 
Meiksins Wood’s The Origins of  Capitalism: A Longer View, Monthly Review Press, New 
York, 2002.
 4. Marc Mulholland, Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of  Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-
Conservatism, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.303.
 5. This serfdom had been imposed early in the seventeenth century to secure a labour 
force in these vital industries.
 6. Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture of  Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes 
and Modern States, Verso, 1991 p.11.
 7. ‘Fees’ and wages were sharply distinguished; the first was honourable, the second 
demeaning.
 8. The ferocity of  this repression in the USA is examined at length by Michael Mann in 
The Sources of  Social Power, Volume 2, pp.635–60.
 9. http://leftspot.com/blog/?q=node/99.
10. Harvey J Kaye, The British Marxist Historians: An Introductory Analysis, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1984, p.46.
11. Henry Heller, The Birth of  Capitalism: A Twenty-First Century Perspective, Pluto Press, 
London, 2011.
12. It was not such a safety measure as was claimed, as it provided an incentive for coal 
owners to try to exploit more dangerous seams. 
13. The sewing machine, developed commercially in the 1840s is a good example, being 
powered by female human muscle in domestic workspaces. 
14. Which is not necessarily true for twenty-first century forms.
15. At least one profitable water-powered cotton mill was operating in the early twentieth 
century.
16. They averaged around 5–10 per cent.
17. A significant incentive was to move troops speedily for repressive purposes, and in 
other countries also for warlike ones. 
18. See especially Jack Goody, The Theft of  History, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
19. The empire even invented moveable type as well during those centuries, but the 
complexity of  the Chinese script made it impracticable to use. That raises the interesting 
speculation of  whether the world today would look fundamentally different if  that 
script had been an alphabetic one and printing in the modern sense been introduced 
to the world half  a millennium before it happened in reality.
20. John M Hobson, The Eastern Origins of  Western Civilisation, Cambridge University Press, 
2004, p.5.
21. John A Hall, review of  The Eastern Origins of  Western Civilization in English Historical 
Review, Vol. CXIII No. 495, 2007.
22. Studying the multiple volumes of  Joseph Needham’s (unfinished!) masterpiece Science 
and Civilisation in China is almost a lifetime’s project in itself. A handy digest of  its most 
important elements with an introduction by Needham himself  is Robert Temple’s The 
Thompson T02687 01 text   264 16/12/2014   13:29
noteS  265
Genius of  China: 3,000 Years of  Science, Discovery and Invention, Inner Traditions, Rochester, 
Vermont, 2007.
23. Confucian ideology, with its emphasis on tradition and right behaviour, might also 
have presented an obstacle, but in western Europe the Catholic church was similarly 
placed, which did not stop capitalism from taking root there.
24. The science fiction writer Isaac Asimov envisaged in the 1950s an electronic library 
catalogue more or less identical to those now in use, and later on something not too 
different from Skype. His less renowned contemporary E C Tubb in at the same time 
imagined an ecologically-threatened world with an environmental movement termed 
‘The Greens’.
25. On at least two occasions, not counting the 1962 Cuba Crisis, only last-minute decisions 
by fairly junior controllers on either side saved the world from nuclear catastrophe.
26. Perry Anderson, Imperium, a special issue comprising New Left Review, second series, 
No.83, September–October 2013, p.33.
27. And not only during the first four decades. Between 1948 and 1990 the US secured 
the overthrow of  at least 24 governments in Latin America, four by direct military 
intervention.
28. Anderson, Imperium, pp.34, 83.
29. Francis Fukuyama, The End of  History and the Last Man, Penguin, London, 2012.
30. Anderson, Imperium, p.110.
Chapter Fourteen
 1. Precedents existed in some of  the earlier empires, particularly Assyria.
 2. Balloons were used for military observation as early as the 1790s.
 3. It has been suggested that an earlier form of  syphilis in Europe may have been 
mistaken for leprosy.
 4. The most common of  those, as least in Europe, being bleeding.
 5. A personal note. I myself  would not exist but for appendectomy, which saved my 
father’s life in his youth; while my mother died aged 31 of  tuberculosis, just too early 
for antibiotics.
 6. Commercial considerations retarded identification of  the responsible drug.
 7. Many nineteenth-century continental railways were indeed government-owned, even 
in market societies.
 8. One of  Gandhi’s first defiances of  the colonial power was to deliberately make salt by 
this method.
 9. Lee R Kump, ‘The Last Great Global Warming’, Scientific American, July 2011, pp.40–45. 
10. These were united through the crown only until 1707, and even afterwards kept their 
separate monetary establishments and banknotes, though not coinage.
11. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, Melville House, New York, 2012, p.364.
Chapter Fifteen
 1. One of  the elite pagan complaints against Christianity was the lowly origin of  some of  
its proponents.
 2. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of  Western Political Thought from 
Antiquity to the Middle Ages, Verso, London, 2008, p.153.
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 3. This concept imagined that Anglo-Saxon England had been a comparatively egalitarian 
and humane society and that the Normans after 1066 had imposed a tyrannical one 
still in existence centuries later.
 4. The Anabaptists were a socially radical sect named for their practice of  rebaptising as 
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